Communist Legacies and Welfare State Attitudes

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Abstract
Post-communist citizens – all else being equal – are more supportive of government redistribution than citizens in the rest of the world. We seek to assess the extent to which these patterns are legacies of communist rule and what mechanisms brought them about. To do so, we introduce two general theoretical arguments for why post-communist citizens might hold systematically different views on these types of questions. The first focuses on the *context* in which post-communist citizens live (e.g., demographic, economic, and political conditions) and makes no reference to the actual experience of living through communism. The second is based on the idea that it is the actually *exposure* to communist rule that may have led to people adopting a particular set of attitudes. Furthermore, we suggest that exposure effects may be *intensified* or *diminished* by predictable factors (i.e., a year of communist exposure is not likely to have the same effect on all individuals or in all countries or time periods.) We present a method for testing both of these approaches, and provide empirical evidence in regard to the attitudes of post-communist citizens towards the welfare state. We find surprisingly little support for the *contextual effects* explanation for the higher post-communist welfare state support. Even when we control for pre-communist differences, conditions at the end of communism, and demographic, economic, and political differences between post-communist and non-communist countries at the time our surveys were conducted, we continue to find persistent and large differences in support for welfare states/redistribution among post-communist citizens. Instead, exposure to communism seems to be quite important, but the effect of exposure is moderated by the timing and social, economic and political context in which a given individual was socialized.

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Introduction

Communism was one of the two most important large-scale authoritarian experiments of the twentieth century, and it outlasted its main rival – Fascism – by almost half a century. Along with the transition away from communist one-party rule, the dramatic economic upheaval that accompanied the collapse of communism was for most East Europeans the most visible aspect of the early post-communist period (Offe 1991, Sachs 1993, Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Tucker 2006). While the timing, speed, and mode of the economic transition varied across countries (Przeworski 1991, Hellman 1995, Frye 2010, Gould 2011), in almost every country the result was a combination of initial economic decline accompanied by a dramatic weakening of the social welfare provisions that had dominated communist societies (Kornai 1992, Verdery 1996, Inglot 2008, Roberts 2010). In Chapter 5 [of our book manuscript] we examined the causes of communist exceptionalism in terms of the lack of support for market-based economies and the role of communist legacies in shaping those viewpoints. We now turn to the second half of this equation, which concerns attitudes towards the extent to which the state is responsible for providing for individual social welfare.

As Table 1 demonstrates below, when we simply examine the bivariate relationship (controlling for the year of the surveys) between living in a post-communist country and attitudes towards state provision of social welfare, citizens of post-communist countries are more likely to agree with statements that it is the state's responsibility to provide for the social welfare of its citizens:[1]

[1] The actual questions reads: "How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. *People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*". This is variable e037 on the integrated World Values Survey questionnaire.

Table 1. Post-Communist Attitudes towards Government Responsibility for Individual Welfare

	Government responsibility for individual welfare
Post-communist	.952**
	(.111)
Observations	285,165
R-squared	.055

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

While we will describe the data utilized in our analyses in more detail later, it is worth noting that these data – taken from the *World Values Survey* – draw upon surveys of citizens from 84 countries conducted over 20 years (from 1989-2009). Moreover, the size of the effect is substantial: despite the entire myriad of factors that undoubtedly go into determining one's attitudes towards government responsibility for social welfare, simply living in a post-communist country is associated with a shift of almost one-third of a standard deviation of the survey question about the proper balance between individual and government responsibility.[2] Or, to put it another way, the effect of living in a post-communist country on attitudes towards state responsibility for individual welfare is approximately twice as large as the effect of having a post-secondary degree as opposed to not having completed high school (see Appendix Table 6.1a).[3]

In line with the broader agenda of our book project, the question we seek to answer in this paper is why this greater reliance on the government exists among post-communist citizens and to what extent it can be attributed to communist legacies. We propose two basic sets of

[2] We obtained very similar results using an index created from the question above and two additional questions (with much more limited coverage): whether the individual or the state should be responsible for providing pensions (E043) and whether the individual or the state should be responsible for housing (E044).
[3] As suggested by prior research, the more economically vulnerable (those without a high school education) are more supportive of state responsibility for social welfare than those with higher education degrees (Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003).

explanations, both of which we elaborate upon in the following section. The first has to do with the *context* in which post-communist citizens are living. To give the simplest of examples, imagine that attitudes towards social welfare are determined solely by degree of industrialization. If post-communist societies were simply more industrialized than countries in the rest of the world, this difference could account for the increased preference for state-provided social welfare in post-communist countries. Note that this type of explanation makes no reference to the actual *experience* of living through communism.[4] Alternatively, however, it could be the case that actually living through communism led citizens to adopt a set of viewpoints in line with communist ideology. And indeed, of all the hypotheses concerning the effect of communist era legacies on post-communist attitudes that we examine in the course of this project, our prediction regarding post-communist attitudes towards social welfare seems the most inherently obvious. Simply put, to the extent that post-communist citizens adopted attitudes consistent with – or advocated by – Soviet communist party doctrine, we would expect to find greater support for state provision of social welfare.

The paper (chapter) is organized as follows: first, we briefly present our theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of communist legacies on attitudes towards state responsibility for social welfare, including drawing out the specific hypotheses to be tested. Next, using data from the *World Values Survey* we demonstrate that even after we saturate our models with variables intended to capture the state of the world before the Russian revolution ushered in Soviet communism, the state of the world at the time of the collapse of Soviet communism, and contemporary social-demographic, economic, and political conditions at the

[4] If this were actual state of the world, then assessing the extent to which this distinction was an actual *legacy* of communism would entail assessing the extent to which urbanization in post-communist societies was a function of communist-era policies. Since this just a simple example for the point of illustration of the argument, we set aside the potentially interesting question of communist era responsibility for urbanization.

time of our surveys, we still end up with almost the exact same estimate for the effect of living in a post-communist country. However, it should be noted that adding most of these variables *increases* the size of post-communist difference in attitudes, while controlling for post-communist political outcomes explains a substantial part of the post-communist differential (see Table 3 below). In contrast, we find that individual exposure to communism has an important and lasting impact on attitudes towards government responsibility for social welfare and that the effect of exposure as an adult was stronger than as a child (see Table 4 below). Our analysis also suggests that certain factors "intensify" the effect of exposure to communism (e.g. living in an urban area) whereas other characteristics affect the "resistance" to the socializing effects of communism (which is higher among Catholics than among Eastern Orthodox respondents). In the final part of the paper we use data from two additional sources – the EBRD Life in Transition surveys and a unique household panel survey from Hungary – to probe the role of the Communist Party and of parental socialization as alternative mechanisms through which individuals adopted or rejected the political attitudes championed by the communist regimes.

Theoretical Framework: Context vs. Communist Regime Exposure Socialization

There is a rich extant literature on attitudes towards social-welfare policies, although the vast majority of this work has featured research only from advanced industrialized democracies.[5] Three explanations seem to predominate. The first – and most prevalent – is that individuals who benefit from social-welfare policies (e.g., the poor, unemployed, elderly, disadvantaged, etc.) ought to be most likely to support social-welfare policies (Beam and Papadakis 1989; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003;

[5] And those pieces that do include cases from outside Western Europe and the United States often have only a handful of other countries included in a comparative study, e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) and Sennik et al. (2008).

Busemeyer et al. 2009).[6] The second is that people who live in countries with more generous welfare states ought to be more supportive of these policies than people who do not (Svallfors 1997; Andreß and Heien 2001; Jaeger 2007). The final major argument is that attitudes towards social welfare policy ought to be function of a general left-wing or social-democratic ideological outlook (Beam and Papadakis 1989; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003), although this of course begs the larger question of the sources of left-right ideological self-placement (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). More recent research – following on earlier studies looking at the effect of race on attitudes towards social-welfare policy in the US (Alesina et al. 2001; Gilens 2009) has also looked at the impact of immigration on attitudes towards social-welfare policy in Western Europe (Sennik et al. 2008; Eger 2010). It is worth noting that there appears to be almost no literature on determinants of attitudes explicitly towards social welfare policy in post-communist countries,[7] and certainly no existing work that attempts to disentangle why post-communist citizens might hold different attitudes regarding the state's responsibility for individual social-welfare than citizens elsewhere.

We argue that when we move to the question of distinguishing why we might find a difference in attitudes in one set of countries with a common socio-political history, there are essentially two different ways to explain why we may find a systematically different set of attitudes on a particular political question – here, attitudes towards state responsibility for social welfare – among citizens of those countries. The first is the nature of the society in which these citizens live their lives. It may be the case that citizens in countries with more industrialized

[6] In an extension of this argument, Goerres and Tepe (2010) also claim that when people are more closely tied to those who are likely to benefit from social welfare – they examine inter-generational solidarity – support for social welfare policies is likely to be higher.

[7] The exception is Lipsmeyer (2003), which examines the extent to which attitudes towards social welfare policies vary across seven different post-communist countries and across different social-welfare policies. There is an existing literature on the larger subject of economic preferences among post-communist citizens (that will have been) discussed in the previous chapter; see for example Kitschelt 1992, 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995; Markowski 1997; and Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000.

economies expect more from the state in terms of responsibility for social welfare than people who live in less industrialized countries. And perhaps citizens in countries with poorly performing economies are more likely to want the state to take responsibility for social welfare (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). If post-communist countries have disproportionately higher numbers of presidential systems and experience greater economic turmoil, then these "contextual" effects could explain why post-communist citizens hold systematically different democratic attitudes towards social welfare than citizens elsewhere.

More generally, we can think about these contextual effects as falling into one of three broad (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories. First, it may be that the *socio-demographic make-up* of post-communist societies accounts for aggregate level differences in attitudes about social welfare policy. From this perspective, individual citizens in post-communist countries might not think about government responsibility for social welfare any differently than citizens sharing similar socio-demographic characteristics elsewhere, but it may be the case that we find different concentrations of particular types of people (e.g., more graduates of technical and vocational schools) in post-communist countries due to the effects of decades of communist policies. Second, it may be that *economic conditions* explain the different attitudes of post-communist citizens; perhaps citizens anywhere living through the kind of economic dislocation found in post-communist countries would adopt similarly demanding views towards state responsibility for social welfare. Third, it is possible that *political institutions and outcomes* account for attitudes citizens hold about social welfare policy, and that post-communist countries just have distinct features in this regard. All of these *contextual factors* could explain why we see – on average – post-communist citizens hold different state

responsibility for social welfare than citizens in other parts of the world, but crucially *without recourse* to the effect of an individual having actually lived under communism rule.

To be clear, we are using a loose definition of the idea of "context" to cover the socio-demographic make-up, economic conditions, and the political institutions and outcomes of that society. The key point here is that we are trying to capture the various factors that exist *outside of one's own previous personal experience with communism* that could be driving the aggregate level patterns we observe in post-communist countries in political, economic, and social attitudes. Put another way, we conceive of "contextual effects" as a set of variables that we could use to construct another region of the world that is identical in every single way to the post-communist world save for the experience of its citizens having lived through communism, and then observe whether these citizens held the same attitudes as the real post-communist citizens we observe do.[8] If this was the case, then our contextual effects – be they demographic, economic, or political – should be expected to "explain away" any systematic differences in democratic support between citizens of post-communist and non-communist countries.

On the other hand, it may be the case that actually *living through* communism led citizens to develop a peculiar set of attitudes towards social welfare policy. We have three reasons to suspect this might be the case. First, there is a longstanding literature on "political socialization," which argues that all political regimes – to one extent or another – seek to inculcate attitudes supportive of the regime into their citizens (Dennis 1968; Greenstein 1971; Greenberg 1973). In many cases, these efforts may be lackadaisical or passive, but in the case of Soviet Communism, there was clearly an active attempt to create "Socialist Man" (Deutscher 1967). Indeed, communist regimes differed from most other flavors of authoritarian regimes by

[8] An alternative thought experiment would involve populating post-communist countries with new, identical citizens in all respects save for the fact that they had arrived after the collapse of communism, and thus had not experienced the regime first hand.

being not merely interested in ruling over citizens, but rather in try to implement a particular project of shaping citizens' attitudes. Communist citizens were not simply expected to accept the rule of the Communists, but rather expected to embrace and embody the precepts of socialism.[9] Moreover, this was not just a stated goal: communist regimes took active steps to try to make sure these precepts were adopted, including in the schools, the work place, and party meetings. This deeper penetration, combined with their longer duration – at least compared to most Fascist regimes in Europe or military dictatorships in Latin America or Africa – suggests that we should expect the economic character of these regimes to be reflected more powerfully in the policy preferences of post-communist citizens. And given that state responsibility for social welfare was such a fundamental tenet of both communist doctrine *and* the communist experience (Inglot 2008, Roberts 2010), it seems that if we were ever to observe such a socialization effect, it would be in the case of attitudes towards social welfare policy.[10]

The obvious next question is how this socialization actually occurs. Based on earlier works about political socialization (developed largely in the American context) we know that individuals pick up attitudes about political systems through their role as citizens in a given system (Greenberg 1973), that this process can occur through multiple agents but that schools play a crucial role (Dennis 1968, Jenning and Niemi 1968, McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, Campbell 2006); that socialization varies across sub-sections of the population (Dennis 1968, Greenstein 1973, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Zuckerman 2007, Eckstein et al. 2013) and that the early years of one's life are important though there is somewhat less agreement about the extent

[9] Of course, this desire was stronger under certain types of communist regimes than others, a point we return to in much greater detail shortly.

[10] Although it should be noted that precisely because in the case of social welfare policy rhetoric largely *did* match the reality on the ground, we are never going to be able to disentangle whether the effects of this socialization process were largely felt because of an active effort by the regime to convince people that the state ultimately had the responsibility to ensure the social welfare of individuals, or whether it was because having enjoyed these benefits from the state previously in their lives, citizens expected and/or wanted them to continue in the future.

to which later experiences matter (Krosnick and Alwayn 1989, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Sears and Valentino 1997, Prior 2010, Osborne et al. 2011). To apply these insights to the communist context, we need a theory that can accommodate a number of additional factors that should be expected to shape the nature of political socialization in communist countries: thus, we have different varieties communism (e.g., Stalinism vs. reform communism) that differ across both countries and time periods; our surveys include individuals who were educated before, during, and after communism; and the former communist bloc includes a broad range of religious traditions that had different relations with the officially atheistic communist state.

To avoid either (a) ignoring these many important sources of variation or (b) simply incorporating them into our analysis in a haphazard manner, in our book manuscript (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013c) we propose what we label a "Regime Exposure Socialization" model. At the most basic level we start with the *temporal exposure* of a given individual to a communist regime (operationalized as the number of years spent living under the communism), and our simplest hypothesis will therefore be that each additional year of communist exposure would increase the likelihood that an individual would come to believe the state ought to bear ultimate responsibility for social welfare.

However, the *intensity* of any given individual's exposure to the regime's socialization efforts (or to the world that existed under communism where most basic social welfare needs were provided by the state) will vary even for similar lengths of exposure. Factors that intensify exposure can vary at both the country level and at the individual level. Similarly, there are both country-level and individual-level factors that affect the *resistance* of an individual to a given dose of communist exposure. Before discussing some of the particular factors affecting the intensity of and resistance to exposure, it is important to note that the two factors work

independently of one another: factors that *intensify* the effect of a year of exposure to communism are expected to do so independent of the level of resistance of any given individual; factors that increase *resistance* are expected to do so independent of the intensity of exposure. Thus the CRES model predicts that the cumulative effect of exposure to communism on any given individual will be a function of (a) years of exposure to communism (b) the *intensity* of that exposure and (c) their *resistance* to that exposure.[11]

Table 2: A Communist Regime Exposure Socialization Model

	Country Level	Individual Level
Intensifiers of Exposure	Types of Communism (Stalinism, Neo-Stalinism, Post-Totalitarianism, Reform Communism)	Communist education Urban Residence Male
Resistance to Exposure	Pre-communist literacy/development Interwar Democracy Communist Economic Success Home-Grown Communism	Age Pre-communist Education Religion

Table 2 concisely presents the various factors that we propose in the book manuscript that could either strengthen or weaken the effects of exposure to communism on values associated with the "Socialist Man" project, including a belief that the state is responsible for providing for social welfare.[12] A detailed discussion and justification of each of these factors is provided in Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013c) but given space constraints we will only briefly comment on a few of them. The most prominent country-level intensifying factor was the systematic variation

[11] Note that *intensifying* factors and *resistance* factors are not just two halves of the same coin. To see why this is the case let us consider the relationship between being exposed to the sun and getting tanned/sunburned. Anyone can put on suntan lotion (resistance), regardless of whether they are exposed to the summer sun at mid-day or in the later afternoon in the winter (intensity). Thus one could high resistance combined with intense exposure or low resistance in an area with intense exposure; the same holds for weak exposure. Thus our intensity and resistance variables are meant to tap into distinct effects on how additional temporal exposure to communism (i.e., more years living under communism) affects one's attitudes. See Appendix Table A.1. for our coding of regime types by country.

[12] This is clearly not an exhaustive list but is limited to factors which we can test based on the survey questions included in the World Values Survey.

between different "types" or "phases" of communist rule. To put this most starkly, we might expect that someone who came of political age in Moscow under Stalinism in the early 1950s to have been exposed to somewhat different propaganda and policies than someone who came of age during *perestroika*. Our expectation here is simply that the *intensity* of the effort on the part of the communist regimes to actively inculcate their citizens with the underlying values of the Socialist Man paradigm decreased as regime move from Stalinist to neo-Stalinist to post-totalitarian to reformist.

However, given the congruence between rhetoric and policy in the realm of social welfare, it also seems plausible that exposure to reformist communism – where social welfare benefits were provided with lower costs in terms of terror and persecution than exposure to Stalinism –this might actually undercut the relative difference in the emphasis that Stalinist regimes placed on preaching the gospel of communism *writ large*. Indeed, we might also suspect as countries entered what Linz and Stepan (1996) have termed the "post-totalitarian" phase of communism – characterized by the diminishing of true ideological fervor and the rise in its place of a trade-off between economic welfare and political rights – the quality of the social welfare services provided to communist citizens may well have *increased* during the post-totalitarian and reformist phases of communism. So to the extent that the socialization that occurred among communist citizens *vis-á-vis* the question of state provision of social welfare was less due to regime propaganda and more due to the actual experience of living through a period of time where the state did in fact take responsibility for the provision of social welfare, we might actually expect greater socialization to have occurred during the post-totalitarian and reformist years of communist rule than under the more dogmatic Stalinist and neo-Stalinist years.

Among the country-level factors shaping the likely resistance of East Europeans against communist socialization, a few are worth highlighting. Thus, we would expect that citizens of countries with high levels of pre-communist literacy and economic development would be less likely to embrace communist ideology both because they are more likely to have already been subjected to prior non-communist socialization efforts (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) and because they were less likely to equate communism with developmental progress than their counterparts in more backward pre-communist countries. Similarly, residents of countries with better pre-communist democratic track record could arguably draw on the memory of this (often idealized) democratic past in their resistance against the communist political project. Finally, resistance against communist socialization efforts should be higher in countries where communism was largely imposed by Soviet tanks than countries where communism was to a large extent a *homegrown* affair.[13]

Turning to individual factors, we would expect the intensity of communist socialization generically to have been higher among individuals who attended school during the communist period, and particularly for those attending secondary and post-secondary education, where ideological indoctrination efforts were more intense. Given Jowitt's (1992) argument that communist regimes achieved much greater penetration in urban settings we would expect *urban residents* to have experienced more intense communist exposure than non-urban residents. Similarly, we might expect men to have been exposed to more intense communist socialization both because they were more likely to be in the formal work force (despite massive increases among women) and because they were affected by universal conscription.

13 We include Albania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovakia, Macedonia, Russia, and Slovenia in this category.

In the case of social welfare, however, it may have been the case that the state provision of social welfare was actually more valuable to the more vulnerable members of society, as has been suggested in the literature on attitudes towards social welfare in advanced industrialized democracies (Beam and Papadakis 1989; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Busemeyer et al. 2009). Were this to be the case, we might actually expect the opposite effects for some of our intensifying factors to be at work *only in the case of social welfare*. (Of course, such an effect would be washed out if one believes that the truly disadvantaged under communism – i.e., the rural poor – never really enjoyed the same social welfare benefits as more urban residents did.) Unfortunately, this holds open the possibility that null effects could be masking counter-veiling effects. However, on the positive side, it does mean that finding effects in one direction or the other might be able to speak to the question of whether these socialization effects were more due to "regime socialization" as we have described it through the manuscript or simply positive memories associated with the prior provision of social welfare.

Turning to individual-level resistance factors, the political socialization literature suggests that people are more open to socialization as children than later in life (Krosnick and Alwayn 1989, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Sears and Valentino 1997, Osborne et al. 2011). Therefore we might find more *resistance* to communist regime socialization effort among adults than among children. Furthermore, for similar reasons as for aggregate-level pre-communist literacy, we expect resistance to be greater among individuals who received at least some education prior to the arrival of communism. Finally, it is possible that followers of particular religious denominations would be more likely to resist communist imprinting. This could be because the actual doctrinaire teachings of the religion were more hostile to communism or, as

Wittenberg (2006) has demonstrated, because religious institutions actually provided a bulwark against communist attempts at indoctrination. In particular, we would expect Catholics to be more resistant to communist socialization because the Catholic Church – particularly in the 1980s – played a much more visible role in the fight against communism than the other main religious denominations in the region.

2. The post-communist exceptionalism and the role of contextual factors

To establish whether there is a systematic difference between ex-communist citizens and their counterparts in countries that never experience communism, we rely on data from the four most recent waves (1989-93, 1994-8, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009) of the *World Values Survey*, which yielded 211 surveys from 87 countries (including 68 surveys from 24 post-communist countries.) To assess welfare state support, we used a WVS survey question that asked respondents to indicate the extent to which the state vs. people should take responsibility so that everybody is provided for (see footnote 1 above for question wording).

For the statistical tests presented in this paper we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions[14] and we report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level to account for the fact that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and political institutions differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey.[15] Moreover, all the regressions use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

Table 3 here

[14] While the DV is a 10-point ordinal variable, we decided to present OLS rather than ordered probit/logit results because they are more intuitive to interpret (especially in the case of interaction effects) and because the constrained regressions using some of the analysis do not allow for ordered models. Note, however, that the substantive conclusions of are findings do not appreciably change when we rerun our models using ordered probit.

[15] For previous work in this project, we have rerun our analyses using hierarchical models and found the results to be essentially unchanged. We will do the same for the results in this chapter in the future.

The results in Table 3 confirm that citizens of the former communist countries were more supportive of a greater state role in providing for the welfare of individuals across a wide range of model specifications. The baseline specification in model 1, which only includes the post-communism indicators and a set of survey year dummies and replicates the results in Table 1, reveals a statistically significant and substantively sizeable (approximately one-third of a standard deviation) negative effect: thus, citizens of post-communist countries are more likely to think the state is responsible for individual level welfare. To put the size of this effect in perspective, this difference is slightly larger than the effect of moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the household income distribution for the respondents in our sample, and twice the size of the effect of moving from not completing high school to having a post-secondary degree.

Model 2, which controls for several key geographic and historical factors that set Soviet bloc countries apart from the rest of the world, shows that the post-communist welfare state support surplus was roughly 30% larger than in model 1 (and was still highly significant). Thus, controlling for deeper historical differences improves the model fit but rather than explaining away the post-communist exceptionalism, it further sharpens the attitudinal imprint of communism compared to what a simple bivariate comparison suggests.

In model 3 we adopt a different approach to controlling for potential pre-communist differences. Following Hainmueller (2012) we use entropic balancing to create a set of weights that allow us to match the treatment group (post-communist countries) to the control group (non-communist countries) along a number of the key developmental characteristics included as controls in model 2. This approach has the advantage of relaxing the linearity assumptions implicit in model 2 but it comes at the cost of reducing the number of characteristics on which

we can match the two groups.[16] The results in model 3 suggest that when compared to a synthetic control group of countries with similar historical developmental and political legacies, post-communist countries still exhibited a large and statistically significant surplus preference for government responsibility for social welfare; while the magnitude of the effect was somewhat weaker than in model 3, it was larger than in model 1.

The controls for the developmental legacy of communism, which are added in model 4, further improve model fit but once again fail to reduce the magnitude and statistical significance of the post-communism effect. According to model 5, the effect also persists when using entropic balancing on both pre-communist and communist developmental factors, though in this case the magnitude of the effect was slightly smaller than in model 3, which only matched countries on pre-communist characteristics. Overall, however, these results suggest that the greater affinity for state responsibility for individual welfare of East Europeans cannot be explained by the institutional legacies left behind my communism.

In the next four models we explore the impact of adding contemporaneous contextual controls that may set apart ex-communist countries. Adding demographics and religiosity in model 6 has negligible effects on the coefficient for the post-communism indicator despite the fact several demographic indicators are statistically significant predictors of welfare preferences and the explanatory power of the model is slightly higher than for model 4.

Model 7, in which we control for economic context and performance, marks a further increase in the post-communism effect, which is over 80% larger than in the simple bivariate model and roughly 25% larger than in model 4, where we only control for pre-communist and late-communist context. This is quite an important finding: not only is it not possible to explain away the post-communist preferences for state-provision of social welfare by taking account of

[16] The tests were run using the ebalance routine in Stata 13 (Hainmueller and Xu 2013).

economic conditions (which were often poor) at the times of the studies, doing so actually enhances this gap. So it is not the case that post-communist citizens in the 1990s and 2000s simply wanted more state provision of social welfare because of the economic turmoil through which they were living.

By contrast, controlling for post-communist political institutions and outcomes in model 8 leads to a noticeable reduction in the post-communist indicator effect, which is 10% smaller than in model 1 and 60% smaller than in model 3. However, the post-communist dummy variable (i.e., the gap between attitudes of citizens in post-communist countries and citizens living elsewhere) and continues to be statistically significant at a level of $p<.01$. This difference suggests that the differential political performance of ex-communist countries is at least partially responsible for the greater reliance of post-communist citizens on state support.[17]

Once we add all three types of post-communist contextual factors to the fully saturated specification in model 9, the post-communist effect is roughly 15% larger than in the baseline model 1 and it remains substantively quite large and statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the greater support for welfare state intervention among ex-communist citizens cannot be explained away by pre-communist, communist and post-communist contextual differences. This conclusion is further reinforced by the results in model 10, where we restrict our analysis to citizens of unified Germany in order to sidestep the potential concerns about survey response comparability and omitted/unobservable differences that may plague cross-country regressions. The within-Germany results yield a pro-welfare state bias among East Germans that is somewhat smaller but still of comparable magnitude and statistical significance as the results in the fully

[17] It is interesting to note that the two most important political factors in model 7 are age of democracy and corruption control, both of which significantly reduce welfare state reliance, and thus help explain why the citizens of newer and more corrupt transition countries are more supportive of state intervention. Perhaps what is going on here is some sort modern version of the political rights for economic development of the later Soviet periods (Linz and Stepan 1996) but only updated to a "tolerating corruption vs. provision for social welfare" trade-off.

specified cross-national model 8. This further reinforces our conclusion that post-communist attitudes towards welfare states are not simply an artifact of different institutional contexts and structural legacies. Therefore, we next turn to an analysis of the impact of communist socialization.

Welfare state attitudes and the role of communist socialization

To begin testing the role of communist regime exposure socialization in model 1 we start with the full set of contextual controls in model 9 of Table 3 and add a simple measure of individual communist exposure that captures the number of years past the age of six that a respondent has spent under communism. Since the model still includes the post-communism dummy and the age variable in the model specification,[18] the exposure variable represents a fairly conservative estimate of the role of communist socialization effects, net of the effects of living in a post-communist country and of the fact that respondents with longer communist exposures tend to be older.

Table 4 here

The results in model 1 indicate that in line with cumulative exposure hypothesis, living for an extra year under a communist regime is associated with higher support for welfare state service provision in the post-communist period. The result is highly statistically significant (at .001) and is substantively quite large: the difference between a respondent with 45 years of communist exposure and one who was six or younger when communism fell (and therefore should be minimally affected by personal exposure) corresponds to a .9 increase in support for government intervention. This is very similar in magnitude to the welfare state support surplus of

[18] In line with the convention in age-period-cohort (APC) models, our regressions include age and survey year dummies in addition to exposure indicators to disentangle the different dimensions of temporal variation.

post-communist citizens in model 8 of Table 4.[19] Furthermore, the inclusion of the exposure variable reduces the size of the post-communist coefficient by 55% compared to model 8 and renders it statistically insignificant. Thus, it appears that most of the differences in welfare state attitudes among citizens of post-communist countries are due to the experience of living through communism rather than just living in a former communist country. The results are confirmed by the fixed-effects specification in model 2, where the size of the exposure coefficient is about 10% larger than in model 1.[20]

As a next step we investigate whether the attitudinal effects of communist exposure are affected by the nature of the communist regime to which a given respondent was exposed. The results in models 3&4 provide mixed evidence in this respect: thus, in model 3 the substantive effects of socialization under post-totalitarian and reform communist regimes was roughly 50% greater than the average communist exposure effects in models 1 and 2 (and the results were highly significant). By comparison, the effects of Stalinist and neo-Stalinist exposure were about half the size of post-totalitarian and reform communist exposure and the effects of neo-Stalinism were only marginally statistical significant. However, in the fixed effects specification in model 4, the patterns are at least partially reversed, with reform communist exposure having slightly smaller effects especially compared to Stalinism. On balance, the inconsistent differences across specifications, combined with the fact that all subtypes of communist exposure were associated with statistically significant socialization effects and that the differences between the coefficients of different categories were largely statistically insignificant, suggest that unlike for democratic

[19] The predicted effects are obviously larger among residents of interwar Soviet republics, who could have up to 25 years of additional exposure.
[20] We cannot include the post-communist dummy variable in the fixed effects models because it is a linear combination of the country dummy variables.

attitudes in chapter 4, the attitudinal differences triggered by different subtypes of communism were fairly uniform with respect to welfare state preferences.

In models 5&6 of Table 4 we analyze the impact of the different timing of communist exposure. The two models suggest that both early and adult communist socialization contributed to greater support for an active welfare state. The effects of adult socialization appear to be more statistically significant and roughly twice as large as for early socialization (and the difference between the coefficients was marginally significant.) In model 7&8 we further tested whether there is an interaction between early and adult socialization, but the small and statistically insignificant interaction coefficient suggest that at least for welfare state preferences this was not the case. Overall, these findings suggest that the "cradle-to-grave" socialist welfare states were indeed effective in promoting individual support for more active state involvement and that these effects were greater for individuals who experienced their benefits as adults.

Moderating exposure: the role of historical context and individual experience

In this section we analyze how differences in the country-level and individual context in which people experienced communism affected the impact of communist exposure on welfare state preferences. We do so by running a series of models that test how several macro-historical variables and individual characteristics affected both the intensity of the effect of exposure to communist socialization and the degree of resistance triggered to that exposure.

For the first set of tests in Table 5, which focus on country-level differences in historical political and economic/developmental trajectories, we restricted our analysis to respondents from the post-communist countries. This analytical choice was partly driven by practical constraints[21]

[21] We were missing comparable institutional indicators for several of the non-communist countries in the WVS sample.

but also reflects theoretical concerns about the comparability of certain measures between communist and non-communist countries.[22] However, this change in samples raises some methodological difficulties due to the fact that in a post-communist sample age and communist socialization are much more highly correlated than in the global sample, thereby leading to much more unstable statistical results and reducing the comparability to the analyses in the first three tables. Therefore, we have run a set of constrained linear regressions, in which we constrain the age coefficient across all the models to the estimate obtained from running a baseline exposure model on non-communist countries.[23]

Table 5 here

The results in Table 5 provide very limited evidence that cross-country differences in historical context mediated the effects of individual communist exposure. The first three models focus on the pre-communist characteristics of communist countries, and while the negative interaction effect between exposure and pre-communist literacy levels (model 1), pre-communist GDP/capita and pre-communist democracy levels were in line with expectations (since they suggest greater pre-communist socio-economic and political development weakened receptiveness to communist socialization), the interaction effects were substantively quite small and fell short of achieving statistical significance.

Turning to communist-era country experiences, model 4 suggests that overall growth levels did not play a significant moderating role for individual socialization vis-à-vis welfare state preferences. Similarly, in model 6 the interaction between exposure and the proportion of a

[22] For example, our indicator for late-communist liberalization (the Polity regime score in 1989) would simply capture levels of democracy in non-communist countries.

[23] These tests were performed using the cnsreg command in Stata. Intuitively, we are trying to get a sense of the extent to which age predicts attitudes towards social welfare completely independent of any of effect of communist exposure, which is why we generate the estimate for age only using data from non-post-communist countries. We then include this coefficient for age in our analysis of the post-communist respondents, so that the exposure variable in these regressions picks up only the effect of exposure to communism and not any independent effect of simply being older. We thank Larry Bartels for this suggestion.

country's communist history during which it was under hardline (Stalinist and neo-Stalinist) regimes was fairly weak. This (non)finding is in line with our finding in models 3-4 of Table 4 about the relative uniformity of welfare state socialization across different communist regime subtypes.

Figure 6.1 here

However, the statistically significant negative interaction effect in model 5, which is illustrated in Figure 6.1, suggests that individual communist exposure had a greater impact on welfare state support among individuals living in countries where communism had been imposed from the outside. Thus, the size of the effect communist exposure is roughly 25% larger in such countries, but the effects of exposure are statistically significant for both home-grown and externally imposed regimes. This negative interaction effect, which is at odds with our theoretical expectation that homegrown regimes would be more effective in socializing their citizens, suggests that communist regimes that lacked the legitimacy that came from being homegrown may have relied more heavily on welfare state public goods provision to win over their citizens. On the other hand, the positive and statistically significant main effect of the native communist regime variable suggests that among post-communist country respondents with no personal communist exposure, those residing in countries with native communist regimes were actually more supportive of extensive welfare states.

Finally, models 7 and 8 indicate that neither late-communist economic performance nor late-communist political liberalization seem to have affected the relative importance of individual communist exposure. These (non)findings suggest that better economic and political performance did not make citizens of communist countries more receptive to the allure of welfare states, despite the fact that stronger economic performance should have translated into

greater higher quality welfare service. However, it is possible that communist economic success could have been self-defeating to the extent that better-off citizens were less dependent on state support.

To analyze how the effects of communist exposure are modified by the particular individual circumstances of a respondent, in Table 6 we analyze the interactions between communist exposure and several individual-level characteristics. Since some of the moderating variables (such as the pre-communist vs. communist education categories) are essentially nonsensical for non-communist countries, we again restrict the analysis in this model to citizens of post-communist countries. We therefore also use the same constrained linear regression approach we employed for the tests in Table 5.

Table 6 here

In model 1 we interact communist exposure with different types of self-declared religious denominations to test whether the greater resistance among Catholics compared to other denominations also applies to the less overtly political aspects of communist socialization, such as welfare state support. The results in model 1 indicate that the effects of communist exposure were once again stronger among Orthodox respondents, for whom the impact of an additional year of living under communism was roughly 30% larger than for Catholics as well as (somewhat surprisingly) for Muslims and for respondents identifying with other/no religious denominations, and these differences were statistically significant at .05 or better. These patterns confirm the greater receptiveness of Orthodox compared to Catholic respondents we found in previous chapters with respect to support for democracy and capitalism. However, what seems to stand out here is less Catholic resistance (given that exposure effects among Catholics are statistically indistinguishable from those of Muslims and non-religious respondents) and more

the greater susceptibility among Orthodox respondents. Protestants occupy an intermediate position, but while the differences in conditional exposure effects among Protestants are not statistically significant from other religious denominations, the positive interaction effect suggests that exposure effects among Protestants were closer to those of Orthodox respondents than among their Catholic counterparts.

In the next two models we analyze to what extent religious attendance attenuated or amplified the welfare appeals of communist regimes. According to model 2, the impact of regular religious attendance had a negligible moderating effect on communist socialization. Model 3 looks jointly at religious attendance and religious denominations, and while it finds a few significant interaction effects – church-going Protestants and non-church-going Orthodox seem to be more receptive to communist welfare socialization, overall the results in model 3 do not tell a coherent story about the role of different denominations in moderating communist welfare appeals.

In model 4 we test the role of education in mediating the impact of communist exposure on individual welfare attitudes. While none of the education interactions are statistically significant at conventional levels, model 4 suggests that individuals with secondary or higher education have about 30% larger exposure effects than their counterparts who did not complete primary education. This suggests that more educated individuals were more susceptible to the secret charms of communist welfare states, a finding that runs counter to the expectation that more educated individuals would be more resistant to communist efforts to buy them off. However, this pattern may also be due to the fact that at least after the initial Stalinist period more educated, middle-class individuals had greater access to welfare state benefits than their less educated counterparts.

Figure 6.2 here

In a similar vein, Model 5 reveals a positive and statistically significant interaction effect between urban residence and communist exposure: judging by conditional effects an additional year of exposure in an urban setting was over 30% larger for than in the countryside (see Figure 6.2). These findings confirm that the greater intensity of communist socialization in urban settings resulted in stronger influence on welfare state attitudes for a given length of exposure. While it is conceivable that these effects might also be driven by the greater availability of welfare services in urban settings during the communist period, such an explanation is less plausible given that according to Figure 6.2, at low levels of personal exposure, support for government intervention is actually significantly lower among urban residents.

Finally, the substantively small and statistically insignificant interaction effect in model 6 of Table 5 suggests that the welfare preferences of men and women were affected to almost identical degrees by longer individual exposures to communism.

Alternative channels of socialization

In this section we offer some preliminary results testing the role of communist party socialization and parental socialization in shaping welfare state preferences. We do so based on data from the EBRD Life in Transition Surveys (LiTS), which include two waves of surveys (2006 and 2010) in virtually all of the transition countries, as well as a handful of non-communist countries. In addition to their remarkable geographic coverage, these surveys are an important complement to our WVS-based tests above because they included a series of questions about whether the respondent had ever been a member of the Communist Party and whether their mother and/or father had belonged to the Communist Party.

While the LiTS surveys did not include a question about individual versus government responsibility, they included a series of questions tapping into attitudes towards poverty, inequality and willingness to pay taxes for a number of public goods (healthcare, education, poverty reduction.) Based on this question, we created a redistribution index, for which higher values indicate greater support for tax-based redistribution and inequality and poverty reduction.[24] The statistical tests in Table 7 control for a very similar set of pre-communist communist and post-communist developmental factors, as well as a standard set of demographic controls.

The first step in model 1 is to confirm the fact that even with this different data set and different measure of the dependent variable longer personal exposure to communism is associated with greater support for government redistribution, which we are able to do. Model 2 then reveals a positive and statistically significant effect for personal Communist Party membership, which suggests that as even 15 to 20 years after the fall of communism former Communist Party members still embraced redistribution values that are closer to communist ideology.

However, the small and statistically insignificant interaction between personal communist exposure and Communist Party membership in model 3 suggests that party members were not affected any differently by living longer under communism. This finding can be interpreted in two ways: first, it may be possible that the effects observed in model 2 are largely driven by selection effects (whereby individuals with pro-redistribution attitudes were more likely to join the CP). Alternatively, however, it is conceivable that CP indoctrination is not a linear process but is front-loaded in the first few years of membership, in which case we might still fail to see a

[24] We used questions q306a, q306b, q306d, p301_8, and q307a_01-08. The alpha reliability score for the index was .75, which is reasonable. See Appendix Figure A.1. for the distribution of this variable.

linear interaction effect between membership and exposure. Nevertheless, this finding calls into serious question the possibility that communist party membership was the mechanism by which greater exposure to communism translated into more support for state provided social welfare.

In model 4 we found a large and marginally significant interaction effect between CP membership and gender. This finding suggests that Communist Party membership had a heterogeneous socialization effect on men and women: whereas for women the effect was substantively fairly small and fell short of statistical significance, for men the effect was four times larger and highly significant. In other words, male CP members seem to have embraced the egalitarian, pro-welfare state redistribution rhetoric of the Communist Party, while women were largely immune to it.

In the last two models in Table 7 we analyze the effects of parental CP membership on welfare state preferences. The results are quite surprising: thus, according to model 5, having parents who were Communist Party members actually contributed to a marginally significant reduction in the support for redistribution. While this pattern needs to be explained in greater detail in future research, the contrast between personal and parental CP membership effects suggests that whereas personal membership contributed to an embrace of communist values, second-generation communist offspring rejected these values, arguably because their new-found elite status made further redistribution much less attractive.

The final model in Table 6 suggests that the anti-redistribution effect of parental CP membership is concentrated exclusively among people whose mothers belonged to the Communist Party, whereas for fathers the effects were nil. These patterns are in line with the less egalitarian attitudinal impact of personal CP membership on women in model 4, and need to be explored in greater detail in future research.

Parental socialization – panel evidence from Hungary

While in the previous section we analyzed the impact of various parental characteristics on the political preferences of post-communist citizens, in this final section we analyze parental socialization more directly by looking at the link between the political attitudes of parents and children during the post-communist period. To do so, we take advantage of data from the Hungarian Household Panel Survey (HHPS), a yearly panel survey that included over 8000 respondents from almost 2700 households in Hungary from 1992-1997. The panel has a number of unique advantages for the purpose of our analysis of parental socialization: First, the survey includes interviews with all adult members of the household, thereby allowing us to analyze the temporal evolution of political attitudes across multiple generations. Second, the timing of the survey in the early to mid-1990s affords us a unique insight into the crucial early years of the post-communist transition, when many of the political attitudes crystallized amid the chaos of the simultaneous economic and political reforms following the collapse of communism. Finally, unlike most other public opinion surveys, the HHPS includes respondents starting at the age of 16, which allows us to analyze an additional two years that may be crucial for understanding the "impressionable" period of political socialization.

Like many other household panel surveys, the HHPS tends to have a better selection of economic and demographic questions than for survey questions tapping into political attitudes. Nevertheless, respondents were asked repeatedly about two different aspects connected to a relatively new and highly salient aspect of post-communist political economy: the rise in unemployment. The first question, which was included in the 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 waves, asked respondents to choose between two statements: (1) "unemployment should be avoided by any means", or (2) "economic problems are impossible to solve without facing a

certain amount of unemployment." Given the communist emphasis on full employment, we would expect communist attitudinal legacies to include opposition to rising unemployment, and while in the absence of a non-communist benchmark it is difficult to establish the extent of post-communist exceptionalism, it is worth noting that about 58% of respondents endorsed the first option.

The second question, which was included in the 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1997 waves, asked respondents whether unemployment benefits should be reduced, kept the same or increased. While this question cannot be directly mapped onto communist legacies, since unemployment benefits did not exist under the full-employment command economies, the overall balance still tilts in the direction of greater state protection from the vagaries of market competition: thus, 44% thought that benefits should be increased compared to under 24% who favored a reduction of benefits and about a third of respondents supporting status quo levels.

For both of the questions we coded for each respondent both their own responses in the current and previous year as well as, where applicable, the current and lagged responses of any parent living in the same household. One obvious limitation of our data is that we cannot capture the impact of parental socialization on individuals who do not live in the same household as their parent(s), which precludes us from analyzing the impact of divorced parents and also means that particularly for older respondents the individuals included in our analysis may not be representative of the broader Hungarian population. As Figure A3 in the electronic appendix shows, the proportion of respondents living with at least one of their parents declines from over 90% for minors (up to age 18) to roughly 50% for 22-23 year olds and to about 30% of 25-26 year olds. Therefore we need to be mindful about the possibility that the parental socialization effects for respondents beyond their early 20s may not be representative of the broader

population not just because individuals not living with their parents are likely to be exposed to less parental socialization efforts but also because the very fact of living with one's parents as an adult may be indicative of closer parental ties.[25] While in future versions of this analysis we will try to model this selection process explicitly, for the purpose of the current discussion we will discuss whether any of our results are sensitive to restricting our analysis to the age groups where the vast majority of respondents lived with their parent(s).

Our regressions control for a number of household and individual characteristics, which may reasonably affect individual attitudes towards unemployment, including age, gender, locality size and education level. Most importantly, we control for changes in logged per capita household income between the current and the most recent survey, which should capture one of the most important sources for spurious correlation between the political attitudes of members of the same household: the possibility that some common economic shock affecting the household could shape the attitudes of both parents and children (e.g. by increasing support for unemployment benefits in response to a sudden loss of income/employment).

Given the categorical nature of our dependent variables, we ran probit regressions for the dichotomous question about avoiding unemployment, and ordered probit models for the trichotomous question about changes in unemployment benefits. All models include year fixed effects to capture possible time-specific shocks in unemployment attitudes. To account for the fact that individuals are grouped in households, we report standard errors clustered at the household level. Finally, to allow for comparability across models we restricted the sample to

[25] However, it should be noted that particularly in the context of the economic crisis of the early 1990s a key driver of adult children living together with parents were economic constraints and the declining supply of low-cost housing. While this still represents a non-random selection mechanism for adults living with their parents, it is less likely to lead to biased estimates of parental socialization effects.

observations for which we had answers to all the relevant questions from both the respondents and their parents.[26]

Table 8 here

The first step, illustrated in model 1 for unemployment views and in model 6 for unemployment benefits preferences, simply establishes that individual responses are fairly strongly correlated with contemporaneous parental attitudes on the same issue. Not only are the results in both models statistically significant but they are fairly large in substantive terms: thus, in model 1 the difference between a respondent with parents opposed to unemployment and parents supportive of some degree of unemployment[27] corresponds to roughly two thirds of a standard deviation in the DV. In model 6 the substantive effects are even larger (equivalent to a full standard deviation) but the most important differences appear to be for individuals where both parents favor higher unemployment benefits However, these results arguably represent an upper bound of average parental socialization effects: even though the models control for key individual and household demographic characteristics, they ignore the possibility of reverse causation (i.e. children affecting their parents' attitudes) and of spurious correlation (e.g. some unobserved factors, such as media consumption, driving both parents' and children's attitudes.)

To deal with these challenges, we ran a number of additional model specifications. First, to address concerns of reverse causation, in models 2 and 7 we used the lagged parental responses to the two unemployment questions. While the magnitude of the difference between the two extreme parental views constellations is about 30% smaller in model 2 than in model 1 and 20% smaller in model 7 than in model 6, we still find that even lagged parental views are strong

[26] While this approach resulted in smaller sample sizes, the results were not affected when we ran the individual models on the largest possible samples.
[27] Note that in all models presented in Table 8, the excluded category is the neutral category, i.e. in this case where one parent favors some unemployment while the other opposes it.

predictors of unemployment attitudes. However, for both DVs using lagged indicators has an asymmetric effect on the size of the coefficients: thus, whereas the coefficients for having two parents who hold "countercurrent" views – i.e. who are willing to tolerate unemployment (in model 2) and who favor lower unemployment benefits (in model 7) - are virtually unaffected in the lagged response specifications, the effects of having two parents holding "majoritarian" views is significantly reduced compared to the contemporaneous versions and in model 2 it even falls short of achieving statistical significance. Also worth noting is that in model 7 the real differences are no longer between households with parental unanimity (i.e. the two extreme categories) but between households leaning in one direction or the other.

As a next step in models 3 and 8 we run an even more conservative specification, which controls for the respondent's lagged answer to the dependent variable question. This approach essentially assumes away any contemporaneous effects and thus largely captures whether parental attitudes "anchor" individual responses by either reducing the likelihood of future deviations from the "family line" or by increasing the likelihood of respondents returning to the fold after temporary deviations. While, reassuringly, lagged individual responses are rather strong predictors of current attitudes, the results still reveal a statistically significant and fairly substantial parental influence. Thus, the magnitude of the parental socialization effect corresponds to half the size of the lagged individual response effect in model 3, and to two thirds of the corresponding effect in model 8. However, once again, the impact of parental socialization is asymmetrical, with the effects of having parents who hold minority opinions mattering much more than those of parents with mainstream opinions. In fact, for both unemployment questions, the responses of individuals with conformist parents were statistically indistinguishable from

those with neutral/mixed responses, whereas the effects of anti-establishment views were statistically significant and substantively similar to the earlier models.

However, the problem with the approach above is that by viewing parental responses largely as a corrective, it fails to answer the crucial question about where initial individual attitudes come from. Unfortunately the HHP surveys do not interview individuals under 16, so we don't have the luxury of establishing at what point these views first emerge and how closely they are tied to parental views. Judging by Figure A4 in the electronic appendix, 16-year-olds in the HHPS had a noticeably higher share of non-responses and don't knows to the unemployment questions but over 70% still reported an opinion on the question, and their answers do not seem to be much noisier than for the overall sample.[28] Nonetheless, in models 4 and 9 we focus on respondents where we know the lagged responses of their parents but do not have a prior response to the unemployment questions, either because they were under 16 the last time the question was asked or because they did not answer the question/stated they did not know the answer. While such an approach obviously has its limitations[29], it nevertheless allows us to test the impact of parental attitudes on a group of respondents with presumably weaker initial views on the subject. The results reveal statistically significant parental socialization effects whose magnitude is broadly comparable to the results in models 2 and 6 respectively. Moreover, to the extent that these models are closer to capturing the dynamics of initial parental socialization, it is interesting to note that for both DVs it appears that the impact of mainstream parental views is broadly similar to that of minority/dissenting views. In other words, it appears that the greater

[28] Thus, for 17 year-olds the correlation between current and lagged responses was .35, which was not considerably lower than the correlation for respondents age 25 and older (.39).

[29] Besides the longer-standing concerns with how to interpret don't knows and non-answers (Berinsky and Tucker 2006), we may worry about the fact that some of the 16-year olds probably had unemployment views at the time of the previous survey but those views were simply not recorded. However, on the latter issue, we were reassured that our results are not significantly affected if we excluded 16-year olds from the sample.

impact of dissenting views applies primarily to the subsequent anchoring mechanism but does not play as prominent a role in the initial imprinting of parental attitudes.

Finally, in models 5 and 10 we ran two "difference-in-differences" specifications, where we assess the impact of changes in parental attitudes toward unemployment and unemployment benefits on the corresponding attitudinal changes among respondents. While this approach is still vulnerable to the possibility of reverse causation,[30] it has the advantage of reducing concerns about spurious correlation due to unobservable household-level characteristics.[31] The results of these two models suggest statistically significant effects that are comparable in magnitude to the previous model specifications and thus further reinforce our confidence in the role of parental socialization. However, it is worth noting that whereas model 5 suggests largely symmetric effects for parental switches towards and away from the mainstream (anti-unemployment) position, model 10 suggests that only shifts towards a minority/dissenting view have a discernible impact on the attitudes of offspring, which reinforces earlier findings about the importance of contrarian parental views in the socialization process.

While the discussion so far has revealed rather strong parental socialization effects, there are good theoretical reasons to expect these effects not be uniform across all respondents. Therefore, in Table 9 we briefly analyze how parental socialization is affected by the age of the recipient, by the gender of the parent holding a given opinion and by the Communist Party and religious affiliation of a given respondent's household.

Table 9 here

[30] However, in separate tests (available upon request) we found that the lagged attitudes of children are not significant predictors of the attitudes of parents once we control for the lagged responses of the parent and their spouse. This suggests that on average we need not be too concerned about reverse causation.

[31] Of course this only applies to time-invariant characteristics, but our models control for what is arguably the most important time-variant factor, changes in the household's economic situation.

First, since we would expect the influence of parental socialization do decline as children get older and more independent, we tested whether the impact of parental attitudes declines with age. To do so we compared the effects of lagged parental attitudes for two age groups for each of the two types of unemployment variables: respondents aged 16-18 and respondents aged 19-25. Comparing the effects of parental attitudes in models 1&2 suggests that even though parental socialization continues be a statistically significant predictor of unemployment attitudes for young adults, the effects were only about half the magnitude of their younger counterparts in model 1. According to models 6&7, the differences were somewhat smaller with respect to the unemployment benefits question, but we can still notice a clear decline especially for the two extreme categories of parental attitude constellations. Moreover, given that the proportion of children living with their parents declines from over 90% for 16-18 year-olds to about 50% for 19-25 year-olds, the overall differences parental socialization impact would probably be even larger if we would include youths no longer living with their parents.

Given the gender dynamics identified in our earlier discussion of parental socialization, the next model looks separately at the impact of paternal and maternal attitudes vis-à-vis unemployment. According to model 3, for overall views about the acceptability of unemployment, the impact of paternal attitudes is somewhat larger, but both paternal and maternal attitudes matter and the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant. According to model 8 the overall difference between having a parent favoring lower vs. higher unemployment benefits is almost identical for mothers and fathers, but it appears that

compared to the status quo option fathers are more persuasive when they favor lower benefits while mothers are more influential when favoring higher benefits.[32]

Given our somewhat equivocal earlier findings about the effects of having parents who were Communist Party members, in models 4 and 9 we analyzed how parental CP membership moderates the effect of parental socialization. From a straightforward indoctrination perspective, we might expect Communist Party members to have been more insistent – and hence more effective – than average citizens in instilling their children with communist values. Alternatively, it is conceivable that given the recent collapse of communism in the region, former Communist Party members might face a credibility deficit not just in the broader society but even in their own families, in which case they might be less effective in shaping the political attitudes of their children. Finally, given that particularly in the case of Hungary's "goulash communism", the Communist Party had lost most of its ideological zeal well before 1989, we may expect CP membership not to matter at all either on its own or as a moderating factor. Judging by the results in model 4, CP households were indistinguishable from the rest of the country in their ability to socialize their children into accepting unemployment. However, even though the interaction term does not even come close to approaching statistical significance, it does appear that the effect of having two parents' opposed to unemployment is substantively about 35% larger in CP households than in non-CP households, which offers some modest support to the indoctrination hypothesis. By contrast, model 9 reveals a rather different picture: whereas in non-CP households parental attitudes had a large impact in the expected direction, in CP households the parental socialization effects are much weaker. Thus, looking at the substantively small and statistically insignificant conditional effects of lagged parental attitudes, it appears that in CP

[32] We also checked whether the gender match between parent and child affected socialization but found no effect. However, we did find that for both mothers and fathers the effects of socialization grew weaker when the age difference between parent and child increased.

households parents were much less capable to get their children to adopt their political views. The only partial exception occurs in households where both parents favor higher unemployment benefits: under such circumstances children are still more likely to embrace similar preferences, though the effect is only marginally statistically significant and is somewhat smaller than the corresponding effect in non-CP households. Overall, these results suggest that families with Communist Party members were no more effective (and in some respects less effective) than their non-CP counterparts, except when both parents endorsed values that were broadly in line with communist ideological commitments to full employment and generous welfare benefits.

The last set of tests probes the micro-foundations of another finding from our earlier analysis: the role of Catholicism in moderating political socialization. Given that we had earlier found weaker communist socialization effects among Catholics, we want to find out whether this lower receptiveness to official propaganda is partly due to the fact that Catholic respondents are more responsive to the political attitudes of their parents. The results in models 5 and 10 provide at least tentative support for this hypothesis: even though none of the interaction terms were statistically significant, their signs all point in the direction of Catholics having stronger parental influence effects regardless of the particulars of their unemployment views. However, the magnitude of the interaction effects is noticeably larger when Catholic parents embrace "anti-communist" attitudes, i.e. when they accept unemployment (model 5) and favor lower unemployment benefits (model 10.) As a result, according to model 10 when both parents favor lower unemployment benefits, the attitudinal impact on their children is twice as large and highly significant in Catholic households, while among non-Catholics the effects are smaller and fall well short of reaching statistical significance.

Overall, these preliminary results confirm the importance of parental socialization in shaping the attitudes towards unemployment of young Hungarians in the early years of the post-communist transition. In line with our expectations, parental socialization is more influential among younger individuals but we nevertheless still see significant effects well into the early and mid-20s, at least among the individuals who still live with their parents (roughly 50% of the age cohort in our sample.) Among moderating factors, it appears that former Communist Party members were less effective in passing on their attitudes to the next generation, while Catholics were generally more effective in transmitting parental attitudes, especially when they embraced anti-communist views. More broadly, we found stronger socialization effects among individuals embracing minority/dissenting views (in this case acceptance of unemployment and support for lower unemployment benefits).

Conclusion

In this paper we have analyzed the mechanisms underlying the greater support for an active welfare state among residents of post-communist countries. We find that a variety of pre-communist, communist and post-communist contextual factors affect welfare state attitudes, but these contextual differences cannot account for the significant differences in welfare state expectations among post-communist citizens. Thus, whereas contemporaneous political outcomes and institutions help explain the post-communist differences, other factors – and particularly pre-communist developmental indicators – actually further accentuate the differences between post-communist and non-communist respondents.

By contrast, we found very strong support for the personal exposure mechanism. Thus, we show that the support for an active welfare state increases substantially with an individual's

temporal exposure to the communist regime: the difference between post-communist citizens with a lifetime of communist exposure and their co-nationals with short or no personal communist exposure is of a comparable magnitude as the average differences in welfare state attitudes between post-communist and non-communist countries. However, unlike our findings in elsewhere in regard to democratic and market attitudes, we do not find significant socialization differences between different communist regime subtypes, which suggests that the welfare appeals of communism were remarkably uniform despite the important variation in economic and political institutions and practices.

In line with our findings elsewhere (in the book manuscript) with respect to democratic and market attitudes, we found that the relative timing of communist exposure affected its relative attitudinal impact. Thus, even though we found some evidence that welfare preferences are affected by early official socialization during the "impressionable years", we find larger and more statistically significant effects for adult exposure. By contrast, our analysis of the Hungarian Household Panel Surveys reveals an opposite effect with respect to parental socialization, which matters considerably more for younger respondents (up to age 18) than later in life. Given that we also found that parental attitudes are more influential when they dissent from the majority opinion, our analysis highlights the crucial importance of family ties in "crowding out" official socialization efforts by the communist regimes.

Even though other aspects of historical context (such as pre-communist economic and political development) were less important in moderating the impact of communist exposure on welfare attitudes than for democratic support, our one significant interaction in this respect – the greater role of communist exposure in foreign-imposed communist regimes – suggests that rather than breeding greater resistance among their subjects, non-native communist regimes appear to

have successfully over-compensated through a greater reliance on welfare-based legitimation, and thereby produced stronger boosts in pro-welfare state attitudes than their home-grown communist regime counterparts.

In line with our theoretical expectations, we also found that several individual-level indicators of resistance and intensity moderated the attitudinal effects of a given length of exposure. Thus, we found stronger effects of a given temporal exposure to communism among urban residents and individuals with secondary and higher education, which confirms our theoretical predictions about the importance of the greater intensity of socialization to which certain socio-demographic groups were subjected during communism. The stronger exposure effects among Orthodox (and to a lesser extent Protestant) respondents than among Catholics and Muslims suggest that religions differed in their ability to inculcate resistance against communist socialization. Our evidence from Hungary, which found stronger parental socialization effects among Catholics, suggests that some of this resistance may be rooted in the more effective intra-family transmission of political attitudes within certain religious denominations.

Finally, we found mixed support for the effectiveness of the Communist Party as an instrument of political socialization. While our analysis of the *EBRD Life in Transition* surveys shows that former CP members were more likely to embrace pro-redistributive attitudes, these differences were not greater among older respondents, which suggests that the effects may be driven by selection effects rather than effective CP socialization. Furthermore, we found that the children of CP members were actually significantly more likely to *reject* redistributive policies, a finding that is reinforced by our analysis of intra-family attitudinal dynamics in Hungary, where CP members were noticeably less effective in affecting the political attitudes of their children. Taken together, these results help explain the ideological bankruptcy of the Communist Party

despite the fact that many ordinary citizens embraced the egalitarian principles of Communist welfare states well into the post-communist transition.

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Table 3: Welfare state attitudes and contextual explanations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Post-communist	.952**	1.247**	1.041**	1.423**	.890**	1.420**	1.755**	.882**	1.094**	.827*
	(.111)	(.252)	(.382)	(.311)	(.270)	(.312)	(.336)	(.334)	(.326)	(.336)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-communist controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Late-communist controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Post-communist demographics	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Post-communist economic outcomes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Post-communist political institutions	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Pre-communist entropy balancing	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Communist entropy balancing	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Countries	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	Germany
Observations	285165	281157	281157	281157	281157	281157	281157	281157	281157	9,325
R-squared	.055	.077	.032	.082	.023	.094	.087	.087	.102	.169

Table 4: Welfare state attitudes and Communist socialization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Total communist exposure	.0200**	.0217**						
	(.0017)	(.0015)						
Stalinist total exposure			.0124*	.0261**				
			(.0063)	(.0038)				
Neo-Stalinist total exposure			.0111	.0219**				
			(.0069)	(.0024)				
Post-totalitarian total exposure			.0262**	.0220**				
			(.0069)	(.0041)				
Reform comm. total exposure			.0297**	.0177**				
			(.0060)	(.0026)				
Early communist exposure					.0103*	.0083*	.0069	.0083
					(.0055)	(.0044)	(.0079)	(.0067)
Adult communist exposure					.0200**	.0216**	.0189**	.0216**
					(.0018)	(.0016)	(.0031)	(.0026)
Early X Adult communist exposure							.0001	.00001
							(.0003)	(.0002)
Post-communist citizen	.490		.451		.581#		.614#	
	(.325)		(.328)		(.330)		(.333)	
Age	-.0077**	-.0085**	-.0077**	-.0085**	-.0079**	-.0088**	-.0079**	-.0088**
	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)	(.0010)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pre-communist controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Late-communist controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-comm econ controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-comm pol controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	281,157	281,157	281,157	281,157	281,157	281,157	281,157	281,157
R-squared	.1034	.1243	.1040	.1243	.1035	.1228	.1035	.1244

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 5: Country-level moderators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Total communist exposure	.0260**	.0264	.0238**	.0259**	.0264**	.0223**	.0209**	.0231**
	(.0036)	(.0220)	(.0013)	(.0049)	(.0018)	(.0024)	(.0027)	(.0023)
Literacy in 1920s* Total comm exposure	-.0006							
	(.0009)							
Literacy 1920s	.0654							
	(.0656)							
Pre-comm GDP/cap* Total comm exposure		-.0003						
		(.0029)						
Pre-comm GDP/cap		.2586						
		(.1643)						
Avg. regime score (1920-39)* Total comm exposure			-.0001					
			(.0002)					
Avg. regime score (1920-39)			.0002					
			(.0160)					
Comm econ growth* Total comm exposure				-.0005				
				(.0012)				
Comm econ growth				.0590				
				(.0764)				
Native communist regime* Total comm exposure					-.0073**			
					(.0028)			
Native communist regime					.4146*			
					(.1758)			
Proportion hardline * Total comm exposure						.0031		
						(.0041)		
Proportion hardline						-.7865**		
						(.2440)		
Econ growth 1981-88* Total comm exposure							.0019	
							(.0017)	
Econ growth 1981-88							.1318	
							(.1265)	
Regime score(1989)* Total comm exposure								-.0003
								(.0004)
Regime score(1989)								.0313
								(.0236)
Observations	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Table 6: Individual-level moderators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total communist exposure	.0224**	.0246**	.0224**	.0181**	.0212**	.0237**
	(.0018)	(.0015)	(.0018)	(.0050)	(.0018)	(.0017)
Catholic resp.* Total comm exposure	-.0022					
	(.0031)					
Protestant resp.* Total comm exposure	.0049					
	(.0048)					
Eastern Orthodox resp.* Total comm exposure	.0060*					
	(.0027)					
Muslim resp.* Total comm exposure	-.0020					
	(.0031)					
Catholic resp.	.1569					
	(.1406)					
Protestant resp.	.0094					
	(.1588)					
Eastern Orthodox resp.	-.1335					
	(.1368)					
Muslim resp.	.1109					
	(.1568)					
Relig attendance often* Total comm exposure		-.0016				
		(.0022)				
Relig attendance often		.0358				
		(.0828)				
Catholic frequent attendance* Total comm exposure			-.0026			
			(.0039)			
Protestant frequent attendance* Total comm exposure			.0135#			
			(.0072)			
Muslim frequent attendance* Total comm exposure			.0055			
			(.0046)			
Orthodox frequent attendance* Total comm exposure			.0017			
			(.0033)			
Other Catholic* Total comm exposure			-.0015			
			(.0037)			
Other Protestant* Total comm exposure			-.0007			
			(.0054)			
Other Muslim* Total comm exposure			-.0041			
			(.0038)			
Other Orthodox* Total comm exposure			.0076**			
			(.0028)			
Primary educ* Total comm exposure				.0028		
				(.0051)		
Secondary educ* Total comm exposure				.0078		
				(.0053)		
Higher educ* Total comm exposure				.0066		
				(.0058)		
Urban resident* Total comm exposure					.0063**	
					(.0019)	
Urban resident					-.2520**	
					(.0763)	
Male* Total comm exposure						.0008
						(.0017)
Male	-.2853**	-.2947**	-.2871**	-.2944**	-.2916**	-.3157**
	(.0328)	(.0336)	(.0334)	(.0328)	(.0326)	(.0632)
Observations	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334	81,334

Table 7: CP party membership effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total communist exposure	.0013*	.0011	.0011	.0011	.0011	.0011
	(.0006)	(.0007)	(.0007)	(.0007)	(.0007)	(.0007)
Own CP membership		.0319*	.0249	.0144	.0356**	.0366**
		(.0125)	(.0292)	(.0167)	(.0114)	(.0114)
Own CP membership*			.0002			
Total communist exposure			(.0008)			
Own CP membership* Male				.0347#		
				(.0204)		
Parents CP membership					-.0131#	
					(.0076)	
Mother CP membership						-.0370*
						(.0149)
Father CP membership						.0010
						(.0113)
Post-communist citizen	.1178	.1165	.1166	.1162	.1169	.1170
	(.1333)	(.1340)	(.1341)	(.1341)	(.1337)	(.1337)
Age	-.0015**	-.0013*	-.0013*	-.0013*	-.0013*	-.0013*
	(.0005)	(.0006)	(.0006)	(.0006)	(.0006)	(.0006)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No
Pre-communist controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Late-communist controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-comm econ controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-comm pol controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	67,818	65,763	65,763	65,763	65,763	65,763
R-squared	.0814	.0781	.0781	.0782	.0783	.0783

Table 8: Parental socialization and unemployment attitudes in Hungary

`	(1) Oppose unempl	(2) Oppose unempl	(3) Oppose unempl	(4) Oppose unempl	(5) More opp to unempl	(6) Unempl benefits	(7) Unempl benefits	(8) Unempl benefits	(9) Unempl benefits	(10) Ch unempl benefits
Both parents accept	-.401**									
unemployment (t)	(.124)									
Both parents oppose	.546**									
unemployment (t)	(.112)									
Both parents accept		-.502**	-.391**	-.413*						
unemployment (t-1)		(.122)	(.123)	(.172)						
Both parents oppose		.173	.041	.386*						
unemployment (t-1)		(.115)	(.116)	(.169)						
Respondent opposed			.821**							
unemployment (t-1)			(.096)							
Parents more unempl					.354**					
opposed (t-1→t)					(.094)					
Parents more unempl					-.385**					
accepting (t-1→t)					(.103)					
Both parents lower						-.443**				
unempl benefits (t)						(.159)				
One parent lower						-.091				
unempl benefits (t)						(.231)				
One parent higher						.206				
unempl benefits (t)						(.166)				
Both parents higher						.681**				
unempl benefits (t)						(.126)				
Both parents lower							-.426**	-.334*	-.384*	
unempl benefits (t-1)							(.156)	(.154)	(.191)	
One parent lower							-.464*	-.496**	-.079	
unempl benefits (t-1)							(.189)	(.186)	(.222)	
One parent higher							.272	.167	.236	
unempl benefits (t-1)							(.172)	(.176)	(.193)	
Both parents higher							.383**	.193	.295#	
unempl benefits (t-1)							(.125)	(.129)	(.156)	
Respondent unempl								.431**		
benefits (t-1)								(.077)		
Parents more unempl										.020
benefits support (t-1→t)										(.115)
Parents less unempl										-.470**
benefits support (t-1→t)										(.114)
Female	.263**	.240**	.170*	.222#	-.022	.001	.023	.058	-.104	.145#
	(.088)	(.087)	(.083)	(.128)	(.063)	(.101)	(.103)	(.100)	(.118)	(.087)
Age	-.002	.003	.004	.004	-.000	.003	.012*	.012*	-.001	.006
	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.010)	(.004)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.010)	(.005)
Town	-.075	-.085	-.038	-.403*	.076	-.129	-.069	-.058	.027	-.093
	(.127)	(.126)	(.115)	(.178)	(.082)	(.144)	(.144)	(.137)	(.156)	(.105)
City	-.102	-.139	-.087	-.176	.093	-.063	.025	-.030	.287	-.160
	(.165)	(.164)	(.156)	(.216)	(.119)	(.211)	(.221)	(.212)	(.256)	(.157)
Budapest	-.124	-.164	-.082	-.215	.146#	-.087	-.069	-.053	-.265#	.009
	(.117)	(.113)	(.108)	(.165)	(.084)	(.121)	(.120)	(.117)	(.155)	(.105)
Primary educ	-.506	-.600	-.542	.534*	-.120	-.466	-.501	-.291	.024	.425*
	(.358)	(.367)	(.400)	(.266)	(.257)	(.402)	(.460)	(.479)	(.306)	(.214)
Vocational educ	-.608#	-.704#	-.593	.770*	-.071	-.710#	-.808#	-.554	.006	.350
	(.358)	(.369)	(.402)	(.334)	(.262)	(.409)	(.464)	(.483)	(.336)	(.223)
Secondary educ	-1.160**	-1.254**	-1.004*	-.096	-.043	-.675#	-.833#	-.554	-.440	.450*
	(.359)	(.370)	(.406)	(.296)	(.264)	(.409)	(.465)	(.485)	(.322)	(.223)
Higher educ	-1.443**	-1.521**	-1.274**		-.167	-1.018*	-1.157*	-.949#	-.386	-.006
	(.394)	(.406)		(.441)	(.290)	(.456)	(.498)	(.513)	(.378)	(.273)
Chg. in HH	-.071#	-.058	-.082*		-.109**	.099**	.014	-.005	-.065	-.000
income/capita	(.039)	(.039)	(.040)		(.037)	(.036)	(.032)	(.031)	(.155)	(.031)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,117	1,117	1,117	465	1,117	618	618	618	417	618

Table 9: Heterogeneity in parental socialization effects

VARIABLES	(1) Oppose unempl	(2) Oppose unempl	(3) Oppose unempl	(4) Oppose unempl	(5) Oppose unempl	(6) Unempl benefits	(7) Unempl benefits	(8) Unempl benefits	(9) Unempl benefits	(10) Unempl benefits
Both parents accept	-.450**	-.244*		-.436**	-.449*					
unemployment (t-1)	(.147)	(.124)		(.100)	(.210)					
Both parents oppose	.390**	.246*		.187*	.248					
unemployment (t-1)	(.144)	(.125)		(.094)	(.180)					
Father opposed			.348**							
unemployment (t-1)			(.089)							
Mother opposed			.241*							
unemployment (t-1)			(.095)							
CP member HH* Both parents				.028						
accept unempl (t-1)				(.247)						
CP member HH* Both parents				.109						
oppose unempl (t-1)				(.281)						
CP member HH				-.048					.060	
				(.189)					(.180)	
Catholic resp* Both parents					-.130					
accept unempl (t-1)					(.266)					
Catholic resp* Both parents					.005					
oppose unempl (t-1)					(.235)					
Catholic respondent					.078					.097
					(.204)					(.200)
Both parents lower						-.515**	-.300*		-.372**	-.215
unempl benefits (t-1)						(.197)	(.149)		(.109)	(.293)
One parent lower						-.086	-.428#		-.358*	-.239
unempl benefits (t-1)						(.214)	(.222)		(.148)	(.355)
One parent higher						.246	.234		.295*	.268
unempl benefits (t-1)						(.185)	(.160)		(.125)	(.297)
Both parents higher						.345*	.222		.298**	.368#
unempl benefits (t-1)						(.142)	(.139)		(.093)	(.205)
Father lower								-.280*		
unempl benefits (t-1)								(.122)		
Father higher								.119		
unempl benefits (t-1)								(.106)		
Mother lower								-.118		
unempl benefits (t-1)								(.129)		
Mother higher								.246*		
unempl benefits (t-1)								(.104)		
CP member HH* Both parents									.175	
lower unempl benefits (t-1)									(.276)	
CP member HH* One parent									.297	
lower unempl benefits (t-1)									(.448)	
CP member HH* One parent									-.602#	
higher unempl benefits (t-1)									(.320)	
CP member HH* Both parents									-.042	
higher unempl benefits (t-1)									(.248)	
Catholic resp* Both parents										-.255
lower unempl benefits (t-1)										(.360)
Catholic resp* One parent										-.143
lower unempl benefits (t-1)										(.421)
Catholic resp* One parent										.176
higher unempl benefits (t-1)										(.357)
Catholic resp* Both parents										.038
higher unempl benefits (t-1)										(.255)
Demog ctrls & year f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	664	895	1,299	2,109	988	462	632	852	1,476	641

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

Fig. 6.1: Communist regime origins, exposure and gov't responsibility preferences



Fig 6.2: Residence, exposure and gov't responsibility preferences



Appendix

Table A.1: Communist Experience by Year and Country

Country	Transition to Communism	Stalinist	Post-Stalinist Hardline	Post-Totalitarian	Reformist
Bulgaria	1945	1946-53	1954-89		1990
Czechoslovakia	1945-47	1948-52	1953-67, 1969-89		1968
East Germany	1945-48	1949-62	1971-89		1963-70
Hungary	1945-47	1948-53	1957-60	1961-1989	1954-56
Poland	1945	1946-1956	1982-83	1963-1981, 1984-87	1957-62, 1988-89
Romania	1945-47	1948-1964	1971-89		1965-70
*USSR**	1918-20	1928-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1921-27, 1956-64, 1985-91
Yugoslavia	1945	1946-1948			1949-90

* The Baltic republics and Western Ukraine were coded as starting Communism in 1945 and exposure to regime subtypes was adjusted accordingly.

With the goal of effectively capturing these different phases, Table 2.1 breaks down the communist experience into five subcategories that represent different "types" of communist experiences. As with any attempt at classification, we face a trade-off between level of detail, comparability, and parsimony. Thus we do not mean to claim that Stalinism in Albania in the 1980s was exactly the same thing as Stalinism in Romania in the early 1950s, but at the same time we hope that the classification scheme represents a useful first step in identifying different types of communist-era experiences.

Our five-fold classification scheme works as follows.[33] First, we consider the initial years in which countries were in the process of installing communist systems of government. The next

[33] We were surprised to find that no one else had previously attempted this sort of classification, and are much in debt to the many people who offered us suggestions on the classification scheme following various presentations of our research. We in particular thank Andrew Janos, Radek Markowski, and Maria Popova who also provided us with written comments and suggestions.

category is the Stalinist period, essentially the high-water mark of communist orthodoxy and repression. With the exception of Albania, the communist countries then all moved beyond Stalinism, and we break down these "post-Stalinist experiences" into three categories. "Post-Stalinist Hardline" refers to regimes that moved beyond Stalinism, but essentially still pursued hardline policies (e.g., low dissent tolerance, an active repressive state apparatus but without widespread terror, active security services, etc.). The concept of "Post-Totalitarianism" is taken from Linz and Stepan (1996), and refers to communist regimes where the communist monopoly on power was still in place, but true believers in the ideology were few and far between, with most party members now associating with the party for careerist as opposed to ideological reasons. Post-Totalitarian regimes are also known for the tacit trade-off of political power for economic security; limited pluralism was tolerated so long as the state was not directly targeted. Finally, Reformist communism refers to periods like the Prague Spring, Gorbachev's *perestroika*, Poland's various flirtations with greater political openness and independent trade unions like Solidarity (Brzezinski 1989; Ash 1990; Sakwa 1990; Williams 1970; Janos 2000).

Appendix Figure A.1.: Distribution of Dependent Variables:

Panel 1: World Values Survey: Government Responsibility Variable



Panel 2. LiTS Government Responsibility Index





Source: Hungarian Household Panel Survey (1992-97)



Source: Hungarian Household Panel Survey (1992-97)