Economic Rights and Women's Policy Influence in Africa: Portfolio Allocation across Executive Cabinets

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Abstract: While a growing number of women are becoming cabinet ministers in African governments, there is considerable cross-national variation in the extent to which women exercise influence across policy domains. We argue that this variation is the result of enduring cross-national differences in women's economic rights. Where women are legally subject to male authority in accessing economic resources, they are less able to build the political capital needed to negotiate for leadership positions in political systems that remain largely clientelistic. Using an original dataset on the allocation of ministerial portfolios in African countries, we show that women have less diversified policy portfolios and are less likely to be appointed to high prestige portfolios in countries where they face greater legal economic discrimination. Our results are robust to controlling for relevant factors such as female labor force participation, legislative quotas, and customary law.

Women's access to high-level government positions in African countries has improved considerably. The percentage of cabinet positions held by women has grown from an average of 3% in 1985 to 17% by 2005. Countries like Benin, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda are now among the leading countries in women's cabinet representation around the world. But as women's presence in government has grown in African countries and other parts of the world, more fundamental questions about the relationship between numeric representation and policy influence need to be asked. Are women cabinet ministers being appointed to the same kind of policy portfolios as their male counterparts, or are they systematically marginalized through appointment to less influential portfolios? Under what conditions are women cabinet ministers appointed to more diversified portfolios or more prestigious posts?

The scholarship on cabinets around the world suggests that women ministers generally lack policy influence commensurate with their growing numbers due to persistent patriarchal gender hierarchies that reinforce conceptions of "masculine" versus "feminine" spheres of government (Borrelli 2002; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Bauer and Tremblay 2011; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Surveying women's cabinet appointments around the world, Reynolds (1999b, 564) confirms "a worldwide tendency to place women in the softer sociocultural ministerial positions rather than the harder and politically more prestigious positions of economic planning, national security, and foreign affairs, which are often seen as stepping-stones to national leadership." Davis (1997, 19) argues that women's appointment to social welfare ministries allows national leaders to "accommodate [women's] presence while maintaining their prejudices." Duerst-Lahti (1997, 15) suggests that appointing women to more powerful ministries like defense or finance requires disrupting entrenched gender expectations. Ultimately, women are unlikely to secure greater political or

policy influence if they continue to be systematically appointed to less prestigious portfolios outside of the chief executive's inner circle.

The marginalization of women within government is particularly worrisome in African countries, where power has historically been concentrated in the chief executive's hands (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). The evidence on women's appointments in the region is, in fact, mixed. Table 1 confirms that, as in other parts of the world, portfolio appointments in African cabinets are clearly gendered. Over half of all cabinet portfolio years among women have been in the single policy area of social welfare. By contrast, only a fifth of men's portfolio years have been in the area of social welfare. Table 1 further shows that men occupy high prestige positions in the cabinet at more than twice the rate of women.

[TABLE 1]

African governments have, nevertheless, made steady progress in diversifying women's cabinet appointments since 1990 (Bauer 2011; Bauer and Okpotor 2013). As of 2005, women had served as either prime minister or vice-president in seven African countries and been appointed to such prestigious ministries as foreign affairs and finance in five others. The portfolio concentration indices shown in Figure 1 corroborate this shift.[1] Male ministers have consistently been nearly uniformly distributed across five policy areas — economic, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare — as reflected in the mean portfolio index score approaching 0.2 in Figure 1. While women ministers have traditionally been highly concentrated in one or two policy areas, they have been

[1] A score of one on the index indicates that all ministers are concentrated in a single policy area, while a score of 0.2 indicates that they are evenly distributed across five policy domains: economic, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare.

increasingly appointed to other policy areas since the 1990s, which is reflected in their declining mean portfolio concentration index score.

But Figure 1 also reveals that there remains considerable cross-national variation in the extent to which women's cabinet portfolios are diversified in African countries. The overall decrease in women's portfolio concentration has not eliminated the sizable cross-national variation reflected in the dotted confidence intervals around the mean. The scatterplot in Figure 2 further shows that the number of women relegated to social welfare portfolios shapes much of the variance in the mean portfolio concentration index for women — unlike men. By contrast, the confidence intervals around men's mean portfolio concentration in Figure 1 are nearly imperceptible, suggesting minor cross-national differences in the distribution of male ministers across policy areas. What explains such wide cross-national differences in women's portfolio concentration in African countries?

[FIGURES 1 & 2]

The existing literature generally focuses on political explanations. This is not surprising given the established relationship between political factors and women's proportion of legislative seats (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Tripp and Kang 2008; Reynolds 1999a, 1999b). Writing on Latin America, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) find that women enjoy greater access to prestigious appointments in countries with a larger women's presence in parliament and a leftist president. In global comparisons, Jacob, Sherpereel, and Adams (2014) find that a woman president is more likely to appointment women to high prestige appointments, while

Krook and O'Brien (2012) find that political institutions like legislative quotas are positively associated with women's access to diverse, prestigious portfolios.

We argue in this paper that women's access to more influential or prestigious cabinet positions is critically shaped by their economic empowerment. We contend that gendered patterns of cabinet appointments are more likely to occur in countries where women experience institutionalized forms of economic discrimination. A legal context that entrenches gender differences by obliging women to be subject to male authority in the ownership and administration of resources places women in an inferior bargaining position not only in their domestic, private relationships, but also in their public, political relationships. Resources are especially crucial for politicians seeking office in countries with the kind of clientelistic politics found in most African countries (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Wantchekon 2003; van de Walle 2007). Successful politicians in clientelistic systems require nearly continuous access to considerable sums of money in order to sustain a political clientele, finance election campaigns, offer gifts to voters, and meet the redistributive demands of constituents. Under such conditions, women who lack independent control of economic resources are unlikely to accumulate the political capital needed to negotiate over leadership positions or policy portfolios in government.

Using data on cabinet appointments in African countries between 1980 and 2005, we find that gender discrimination in economic rights explains a significant proportion of the cross-national variation in women's portfolio appointments. Women ministers are systematically more likely to be concentrated in social welfare portfolios and less likely to be appointed to high prestige portfolios where women lack equal marriage property rights or are unable to serve as the legal head of household. Our results are robust to the control of institutional factors such as the

practice of customary law as well as socioeconomic forces like women's labor force participation.

The findings presented here indicate that legally entrenched economic discrimination limits the political advancement of women. They suggest that efforts to improve women's political representation need to move beyond a focus on the reform of political institutions. Political institutions, like quotas or proportional representation, can increase the number of women in national office, but they do not ensure women's political influence. The dynamics that allow women to enter politics are not necessarily the same ones that shape their influence once in office. If women's political influence depends on their broader socioeconomic standing, as our findings suggest, then further advancing gender equality in politics will require legal reforms that create more equitable economic rights for women.

Women's Legal Status in African Countries

The law has been a particularly powerful tool for establishing and reshaping gender roles in African countries. Although powerful women in pre-colonial Africa often owed their political position to their link by blood or marriage to powerful men, gender hierarchies were more complex than European colonizers understood. Women in some pre-colonial societies held key leadership roles in both economic and political affairs, so European conceptual divisions between a private women's sphere and a public men's sphere did not easily match up with the pre-colonial African experience (Mikell 1997; Sudarkasa 1986).[2]

[2] Gender identities in some societies were relatively fluid prior to colonization: political power was often "masculine," but this did not prevent women from acquiring it. In some societies, kings' "wives" could be either men or women, since the title was associated with a set of functional duties; in other cases, women too could have "wives." For example, in Angelique Tadjo's (2009) recounting of the first Baoulé monarch, Queen Pokou becomes increasingly masculine as she leads her people to found a new nation.

As African customs were codified in the colonial era, however, women's status became less fluid and men's authority, particularly in economic affairs, more entrenched. In constructing legal systems for their colonial subjects, European colonial authorities called almost exclusively on the expertise of African men in positions of influence, including chiefs, elders, religious leaders, and colonial civil servants. The version of customary practice these men presented almost always reinforced their authority over women. Both colonial authorities and African elders were keen to reinforce stable, patriarchal marriages, but this generally came at the cost of women's property rights, particularly in instances of divorce. For example, in Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia, colonial authorities created native courts to enforce neo-customary marriage laws that enforced men's marital rights, granting them compensation in cases of wifely adultery (Lovett 1989, 28-30).

European statutes, when introduced in urban areas and applied to more "Europeanized" Africans, did not necessarily improve women's economic position. In British colonies, the English Married Women's Property Act of 1882 granted married women control over their separate property and forbade husbands from disposing of their wives' property. However, common law judges also tended to invalidate communal property in marriage, recognizing instead individual property rights and granting them by default to male heads of household. This placed married women at a distinct disadvantage in their household's economic affairs, as husbands' control over land as heads of household increased wives' dependency (Kang'ara 2012, 391-392). In French civil law colonies, male head of household laws limited women's economic opportunities and personal freedoms. The Napoleonic Code of 1804 applied in France's African colonies empowered husbands with full legal authority over their wives (Bop 2010). The French Civil Code of 1958 maintained head of household provisions that favored husbands, giving them

the legal right to choose the family' domicile, limit their wives' employment, mediate wives' access to bank accounts or loans, and serve as the family's exclusive interlocutor with the state.

In colonies with a significant Muslim population, Islamic law also became a mechanism for reinforcing male authority and limiting women's economic freedoms. On the one hand, Islamic law clearly recognized women's right to separate property. As daughters, women could inherit property, though at a lesser extent than their brothers, and women retained rights to any separate property they brought into the marriage. On the other hand, by maintaining separate property, Islamic law does not guarantee women's claim on, or control over, shared property accrued during marriage (El Hajjami 2013). Women's right to shared property in marriage is not at odds with Islamic law, but Islamic courts during the colonial period rarely recognized it. To the contrary, women were penalized when they sought a divorce. In colonial Senegal, for example, women had to repay the bridewealth paid by the husband to the father and return any gifts or property promptly upon divorce. The cost of divorce left it out of many women's reach.

The co-existence of customary, Islamic, and European legal systems in many African countries has enabled women to seek out the legal system most favorable to their interests, but the availability of multiple systems has not necessarily guaranteed women's rights. Jeppie, Moosa, and Roberts (2010) argue that African colonies should be conceptualized as having a single, interactive legal system that limits women's economic options and property accumulation, while reinforcing marital, and by extension state, stability. Both customary and Islamic laws were heavily influenced by European standards when colonial authorities first codified them. They oversaw the formalization of both legal systems, determined which customary or Islamic practices were acceptable, and chose whether to enforce rulings. While they rejected those aspects of customary and Islamic law that were inconsistent with European

standards, like the marriage of minors, they typically accepted unequal property rights that favored men. Moreover, when African women made excessive use of European statutes that facilitated divorce by protecting their property rights upon separation, colonial authorities proceeded to limit women's access to European courts.

By the time most African countries achieved independence in the 1960s, legal codes that prioritized men's economic power over women were well entrenched. Post-independence African legal codes remained remarkably similar to those established in the colonial period. Even where family laws were seen as key to reasserting African custom (Jeppie, Moosa, and Roberts 2010), "traditional" family laws often looked more like colonial laws than pre-colonial practices (Chanock 1989; Camara 2013). When Senegal rewrote its family law in 1972, it maintained French civil code provisions that granted husbands the exclusive status of head of household, giving wives no legal say in the choice of family residence, no right to establish a residence without their husband's permission, and no parental authority over their children (Camara 2013, 269). In many other former Francophone colonies, no major reforms to family law were undertaken in the decades after independence. In Chad, the French Civil Code of 1958 remains in place despite efforts to elaborate a new family code and enact minor statutory revisions.

While African countries today generally grant women fewer legal rights to property, particularly in marriage, than countries in other regions of the world (Gautier 2005, 66), there is notable variation in the equality of property and marriage rights regimes among African countries. Approximately half of African countries allow married women to serve as legal head of household. Yet, in more than a dozen African countries, head-of-household laws continue to empower husbands to manage and dispose of community property without the consent of wives. The financial implications of head-of-household laws can be immense for women (Hallward-

Driemeier and Hasan 2013, 61-62). Associated statutes can greatly limit women's ability to independently access and control economic resources. In Gabon, women require the permission of their husbands to open a bank account and to conduct bank transactions. In countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, husbands can legally limit a woman's right to pursue a profession outside the home. In Rwanda, up to the early 1990s, women were treated as legal minors who could only buy land or property in the name of a male relative or establish a corporation that represented her as a legal person (Joireman 2008, 1238).

Efforts to reform head-of-household laws have met resistance (Camara 2013), but some countries have abolished marital power laws.[3] Angola, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Zimbabwe did so in the 1980s, as have Benin, Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Namibia in the 2000s. Moreover, many former British colonies with common law systems have long formally recognized equality in marital property rights. Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, for example, grant husbands and wives equal rights to over property. And Muslim-majority, civil law countries like Mali and Senegal also recognize equal property rights in marriage, though the default marriage property right regime normally prioritizes separate rather than communal property.

The economic rights of women continue to be further shaped by the recognition of customary law in many African countries. Because customary law is often applied in cases of divorce, inheritance, and property disputes, it plays an outsized role in producing gendered patterns of resource allocation. Botswana and Nigeria rely almost exclusively on customary law, rather than common law, to determine women's control over property in marriage. And despite the property rights guarantees typically afforded to women in countries that inherited the

[3] The importance of gendered economic rights to women's daily lives can be seen in the campaigns of civil society activists who have lobbied to reform land tenure, property, and family laws that limit women's access to economic opportunity (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Kawamara-Mishambi and Ovonji-Odida 2003).

common law system, countries like Sierra Leone and Zambia exempt customary law from gender equality provisions. A third of all countries that recognize customary law in the constitution exempt it from non-discrimination laws (Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan 2013).

The Political Impact of Legal Economic Discrimination

We argue that gendered economic rights undermine the ability of women to gain greater policy influence. The legal economic status of women is politically consequential because in many countries access to resources is a key determinant of whether a politician is a viable candidate for elected or appointed office. Women politicians, however, often lack opportunities to accumulate such resources (Davis 1997).[4] Borrelli (2002, 54) suggests that women in the United States typically are unable to secure powerful cabinet positions because few have the resources to position themselves as "independent power brokers." Arriola and Johnson (2014) similarly find that relatively few women enter the cabinet in African countries because they tend to lack the resources needed to act as patrons who control blocs of their co-ethnics' votes.

We claim in this paper that legal economic discrimination handicaps women seeking greater policy influence or more powerful positions in government because they are made less efficient than men in transforming economic resources into political capital. By limiting the ability of women to directly control resources — or without explicit consent of husbands — gendered economic rights essentially constrain women's opportunities to accumulate political finance, forge alliances through campaign donations, or build political networks at the same rate as men. Without equal economic rights, otherwise capable women are likely to struggle in their

[4] The success of political widows and daughters in some countries demonstrates the importance of political capital in overcoming gender hierarchies (Paxton and Hughes 2014, 87). However, most women do not inherit political capital.

efforts to build the political capital needed to compete with their male counterparts for elected office, party leadership, or cabinet appointments.[5]

But where the law ensures that women can acquire and control resources on an equal basis with men, women are better positioned to build the political and financial capital needed to independently pursue their political goals.[6] As Paxton and Hughes (2014, 132) explain, the opportunity to work outside the home increases women's access to political networks like labor unions and professional associations. Women who can transform their contacts and relationships within such networks into political capital are better positioned to negotiate over their inclusion in government.

The political fortunes of women are inextricably linked to their legal economic status in countries with clientelistic politics. Competing for office is particularly expensive in clientelistic political systems, where generally there are no public funds for parties and election campaigns are largely self-financed. In African countries, politicians require considerable resources to distribute patronage and demonstrate their largesse (Lindberg 2003; van de Walle 2007). Those who seek to maintain or extend their clienteles need to be able to continuously mobilize resources to signal that they can deliver to their supporters whether in or out of office (Nugent 2001). Historically, political "big men" in African countries could build their clienteles through preferential access to state resources. In more recent decades, as elections have become more competitive, private wealth has begun to play a larger role (Arriola 2012). But women have

[5] The gender asset gap is, in fact, widest where women do not have equal legal rights to manage their careers, property, or assets (World Bank 2014). Married women's rights to equal property ownership, for example, is associated with higher rates of women's participation in formal financial institutions and entrepreneurial activity.
[6] In addition to the material mechanism emphasized here, there might be a sociological mechanism by which egalitarian economic rights can weaken gender norms limiting the policy influence of women. Gendered expectations about what constitutes "women's work" are likely to shift as equal economic rights allow women greater leeway in career choices, permitting them to enter professions or sectors traditionally reserved for men. At the same time, as they develop a greater awareness of gender-based inequities, women may become more politically active. Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn (1983) find that women with an independent source of income develop more gender egalitarian beliefs.

historically lacked the economic access needed to build and sustain a clientelistic following (Bauer 2011; Fatton 1989; Geisler 2004). Politically active women instead have often had to depend on men to secure access their access to patronage resources (Beck 2003; Goetz 2002; Tripp 2000, 2001).

Legal economic discrimination not only affects the ability of women to independently pursue political office. It also shapes their bargaining with allies and rivals. Women are unlikely to be able to negotiate as equals with men in the political sphere as long as prevailing laws lock them into inferior bargaining positions in the private sphere. Women's ability to engage in intra-household bargaining, for example, has been shown to depend on legal codes that establish whether they have a legitimate claim to resources (Kevane 2004). As a woman's household bargaining position improves, and thereby her access to material resources, she is better positioned to negotiate advantageous terms in economic interactions outside the household and raise her standing in the local community (Agarwal 1997). In countries with gendered economic rights, the political bargaining position of women may thus be systematically undercut when the law defines them as legal minors incapable of independently entering into contracts or transferring assets. Women thus become perceived as being unable to contribute to a political cause without the consent or cooperation of their husbands or male relatives.

Figure 3 underscores the link between women's legal economic rights and their subsequent influence in policymaking. The figure shows that household head rights, which often determine legal authority to administer property or access public resources, has virtually no impact on the likelihood of male ministers being appointed to social welfare portfolios, which are widely viewed as less influential or powerful in government. The proportion of men in those portfolios remains largely comparable regardless of the prevailing household head rights: 19% in

countries with equal rights versus 23% in countries with unequal rights. By contrast, Figure 3 shows that countries with gendered household head rights are associated with a greater concentration of women in social welfare portfolios: the mean proportion of social welfare portfolios jumps from 46% when they can serve as head of household to 71% when they are prohibited from doing so.

[FIGURE 3]

The cases of Benin and Ghana illustrate the impact of women's legal economic rights on their political influence. Although market women played a key role in Benin's initial democratization movement in the early 1990s (Heilbrunn 1993), Benin does not accord married women equal property rights or the legal right to serve as head of household. Ghanaian law, however, enshrines both rights for women. This difference in legal rights may have resulted in divergent recruitment patterns for women ministers. The two countries have had a comparable number of women ministers, but none of Benin's cabinet members have been independent business owners, as they have in Ghana. Moreover, despite women's political activism in Benin, Ghana's portfolio appointments in the cabinet have been notably less gendered. Ghanaian women ministers have held portfolios in economic affairs as well as social welfare. This difference is evident in the portfolio concentration index for the two countries. In the 2000-2005 period, the portfolio concentration index for Benin's women ministers is 0.81. By contrast, in the same time period, the portfolio concentration index for Ghana's women ministers is appreciably lower at 0.45.

Data and Methods

To assess our argument concerning the relationship between gendered economic rights and women's policy influence, we use cross-sectional time-series data on the portfolio appointments received by men and women in African ministerial cabinets. The data cover all cabinet ministers listed in annual volumes of *Africa South of the Sahara*, which includes approximately 6,500 individual ministers who held nearly 17,000 portfolios in 38 African countries between 1980 and 2005. The gender of cabinet ministers was coded using multiple sources, including electronic and print biographic guides, newspaper articles, and country case studies.

Dependent Variables

We operationalize three dependent variables to examine distinct manifestations of gendered portfolio appointments in African countries.

The first dependent variable is *women's portfolio concentration*. This measure is an index of portfolio concentration across five policy domains: economic policy, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare.[7] Modeled after the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the portfolio concentration index is calculated for every country by squaring the proportion of portfolios that fall in each policy area and then summing those numbers. Because it is constrained to five categories by design, the portfolio concentration index approaches a value of 0.2 when all portfolios are equally distributed. Higher values on the index reflect greater disparity in portfolio allocation across policy areas. The index approaches a maximum value of 1 as more portfolio appointments are made in a single policy domain.

[7] Appendix A shows cabinet portfolios classified by policy area.

For the purposes of this analysis, the portfolio concentration index is constructed for every country at five-year intervals between 1980 and 2005. Given the relatively low number of women in most African cabinets, this five-year aggregation ensures that the values of the index are more meaningful by including a larger number of portfolios in its calculation. The portfolio concentration index, as a dependent variable, is estimated using random effects linear regression.[8]

The second dependent variable is *women's appointment to high prestige cabinet portfolios*. It is coded dichotomously as 1 if a woman is assigned to a high prestige portfolio in a country-year; 0 if no such assignment is made. To code the prestige associated with individual portfolios, we rely on the consensus that has emerged in the literature on women's cabinet representation around prestige rankings offered first by White (1998) and later adapted by Studlar and Moncrief (1999) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005; 2009).[9] Our coding of portfolio prestige draws primarily from Krook and O'Brien's (2012) ranking system.[10] High prestige portfolios enjoy the closest contact with the president or prime minister and attract significant respect and status in government. These include such ministries as defense and foreign affairs.[11] Medium prestige portfolios have significant budgets, personnel, or socioeconomic impact. Examples include ministries of education and public works. Low prestige portfolios have small budgets, few personnel, and relatively narrow constituencies. Examples

[8] The Hausman test for random vs. fixed effects could not reject the null hypothesis that random effects is the preferred specification for all models examined in this paper.
[9] Studlar and Moncrief (1999) note at least four ways of measuring portfolio prestige: size of the budget, number of personnel, seniority of ministers, and degree of media attention. However, these metrics are unavailable for most African ministries.
[10] Appendix B shows cabinet portfolios classified by prestige level.
[11] We have added to the high prestige list any ministerial position in the president or prime minister's office, as it necessarily implies superior access to the chief executive. We have also included petroleum in the high prestige list because of its importance in Africa's oil exporting countries.

include ministries of culture and youth. The appointment of women to high prestige portfolios is estimated using random effects logistic regression.

The third dependent variable is *women's appointments to economic policy portfolios*. This variable is used to examine the factors influencing the appointment of women specifically to economic portfolios. Economic portfolios are generally perceived to be more influential than those in social welfare, the most common assignment for women as shown in Table 1. The variable is coded dichotomously as 1 if at least one woman in a cabinet is assigned to an economic portfolio in a country-year; 0 if no woman is assigned to such a portfolio. This dependent variable is estimated using random effects logistic regression.

Independent Variables

We argue that women's portfolio assignments are systematically influenced by the extent to which gender inequality is legally institutionalized in African countries. Our argument specifically concerns the socioeconomic discrimination faced by women, which can diminish their ability to accumulate the resources needed to pursue political office as well as bargain over leadership positions. Our main independent variables of interest are therefore intended to reflect whether a country's codified laws explicitly discriminate against women in their access to economic resources. We draw such variables from the *Women, Business and the Law* database at the World Bank.[12]

We employ an *economic discrimination index* that reflects the extent to which a country's laws recognize gender-based differences in access to resources or property rights. This unweighted additive index aggregates dichotomous scores in nine areas: unmarried women's property rights, married women's property rights, inheritance rights for sons and daughters,

[12] The data can be accessed at http://wbl.worldbank.org/.

inheritance rights for spouses, married women's right to act as head of household, married women's ability to pursue work outside the home, married women's ability to open a bank account, married women's ability to sign a contract, and married women's ability to initiate legal proceedings. Each is coded as 1 if there is a statute that recognizes gender-based differences or requires married women to be subject to male authority. Each is coded as 0 if there are no explicit restrictions in the legal treatment of women versus men. The *economic discrimination index* is then created by simply adding the scores and dividing their sum by nine. Given the logic outlined in previous sections, we expect women's portfolio concentration to be higher in countries with higher values on the economic discrimination index. Women should also receive relatively fewer appointments to high prestige portfolios or economic portfolios in such countries.

We also control for political and legal institutions that might impinge on the ability of women to secure greater influence in the cabinet. We include a dichotomous measure indicating whether customary law can discriminate on the basis of gender as well as a dichotomous measure for whether a country has a constitutional clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender. Both variables are from the World Bank's *Women, Business and the Law* database. Additionally, we control for the number of years since the adoption of a legislative quota for women (Tripp and Kang 2008). We expect women's portfolio concentration to be lower — and a greater likelihood of high prestige and economic portfolio appointments — in countries with a constitutional gender nondiscrimination clause or a legislative gender quota. We expect the opposite in countries where customary law can discriminate on the basis of gender.

Women's participation in national politics might be affected the supply of qualified candidates for different cabinet portfolios (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook

and O'Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999b). We therefore include variables for the number of women already serving in the cabinet as well as the percent of the legislature made up by women. The data on women in the legislature are from Paxton et al. (2008). As the supply of potential women ministers increases, we expect women's portfolio concentration to be lower. We also expect that a larger number of women in national politics should be associated with a greater likelihood of appointments to high prestige and economic portfolios.

The effect of democratization is captured through the aggregate Polity index from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). The Polity index is a 21-point scale that ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). Executives in more democratic regimes might be expected more likely to diversify the portfolio assignments of women cabinet ministers if their governments are driven by policy rather than patronage concerns. As countries become more democratic, we expect women's portfolio concentration to be lower and the likelihood of high prestige and economic portfolio appointments to be higher. Additionally, we control for a country's socialist history, since prior research suggests that leftists governments are more likely to appoint women to more prestigious positions (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). A count variable indicates the number of years a country is governed by a ruling party or constitution that explicitly espouses a commitment to socialism.

Previous research suggests that women's cabinet appointments are negatively affected by coalition politics (Arriola and Johnson 2014; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Studlar et al. 1997). We assess the impact of coalition dynamics in the African context through two variables. The first is the percentage of seats held by the government in the legislature. These data are from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The second is a count of politically relevant ethnic groups drawn from Cederman et al.'s Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. The EPR

measure includes only politicized ethnic groups rather than all ethnic groups in a country. Executives who are obliged to use cabinet appointments to accommodate demands from larger coalitions, measured either in legislative or ethnic terms, should be expected to have higher women's portfolio concentration levels. Women in such cases should also be expected to be relatively less likely to receive appointments to high prestige or economic portfolios.

To consider the possibility that religious norms might affect the portfolio appointments received by women, we add two dichotomous variables to indicate whether a country has either a Muslim majority or no religious majority. Christian majority countries serve as a reference category. The data on religious adherents are from the Association of Religion Data Archives.[13] Since previous research suggests that women are less likely to be included in the executive in Muslim majority countries (Reynolds 1999b), women's portfolio concentration might also be expected to be higher in such countries. Women in Muslim majority countries might also be expected to be relatively less likely to receive appointments to high prestige or economic portfolios.

We control for women's labor force participation because prior research has linked this factor to women's political participation (Paxton and Hughes 2014). We also control for level of development through per capita income at purchasing power parity (PPP).[14] We expect higher values on both measures to be associated with lower women's portfolio concentration as well as a greater likelihood of appointments to high prestige and economic portfolios.

[13] The data can be accessed at thearda.com.
[14] The data for women's labor force participation and GDP per capita are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

Empirical Analysis

The empirical results presented in Tables 2 through 4 are broadly consistent with this paper's theoretical expectations: women ministers in countries with a greater degree of legal economic discrimination are systematically relegated to less powerful positions in government when compared to their counterparts in countries with fewer gender-based restrictions on economic rights. Women ministers in countries with high levels of economic discrimination are more likely to be concentrated in social welfare portfolios, and they are less likely to receive appointment to high prestige or economic portfolios.

Table 2 reports the random effects linear regression analysis of women's portfolio concentration. The coefficient for the economic discrimination index attains its expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in two-tailed tests across all model specifications. The portfolio concentration index rises — meaning that portfolio assignments are clustered in a smaller number of policy areas — in tandem with the economic discrimination index. The estimated coefficient in Model 1 indicates that each 0.1 increase in the economic discrimination index is associated with a 0.03 increase in the women's portfolio concentration index, all else equal. The impact of this result is substantively large. Consider that moving from the minimum to the maximum levels of economic discrimination would entail an increase of 0.3 in the portfolio concentration index that runs from 0 to 1.[15]

[TABLE 2]

[15] The supplementary analysis presented in Appendix D indicates that countries with higher levels of gendered economic discrimination have higher portfolio concentration index scores because women ministers are systematically assigned to social welfare portfolios.

Table 3 presents the random effects logistic regression analysis of women's appointments to high prestige portfolios. The results are shown in log-odds units. The log odds on the economic discrimination index are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all model specifications. Model 5 indicates that the odds of a woman receiving a high prestige portfolio fall by 95%, on average, when moving from the minimum to the maximum levels of the economic discrimination index. The magnitude of the index's estimated effects remain relatively constant despite the addition of other legal and institutional variables. Note, for example, that even after controlling for a country's constitutional guarantee against gender discrimination in Model 7, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige appointment are still 94% lower, on average, in a country with the maximum versus the minimum level of economic discrimination.

[TABLE 3]

Table 4 presents the random effects logistic regression analysis of women's appointment to economic policy portfolios. The results are shown in log-odds units. The log odds on the economic discrimination index are again negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. According to Model 9, the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio are nearly 93% lower in countries with maximum versus minimum scores on the economic discrimination index. In Model 10, when the index's p-value equals 0.056 after controlling for gender discrimination permitted by customary law, the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio remain 89% lower in countries with the maximum versus the minim levels of economic discrimination.

[TABLE 4]

While legal economic discrimination appears to be systematically associated with gendered patterns of portfolio appointments, the results presented in Tables 2 through 4 are less consistent with regard to the potential impact of other institutional factors. The measures for customary law and constitutional nondiscrimination clauses attain statistical significance at conventional levels only in relationship to high prestige cabinet appointments in Table 3. In this instance, the log odds on both variables move in the hypothesized direction. In Model 6, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige post are approximately 40% higher in a country where customary law cannot discriminate on the basis of gender. In Model 7, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige cabinet position are 3 times as high in a country with a constitutional nondiscrimination clause as in one without such a guarantee.

The supply of potential ministers is a critical factor in portfolio diversification among women. African countries that include more women in government appear to be more likely to assign subsequent appointees to policy portfolios outside the social welfare domain. As shown in Model 4 in Table 2, the longer legislative quotas are in place, women's portfolio assignments become more diverse: each additional year is associated with nearly a 0.03 decrease in the portfolio concentration index. Legislative quotas are also associated with a greater likelihood of women receiving high prestige appointments, as shown in Model 8 in Table 3. A one-year increase in the duration of a legislative quota results in a 20% increase in the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige portfolio. Relatedly, in Model 12, a one-year increase in quota duration increases the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio by 44%.

The results in Tables 2 through 4 further suggest that the presence of more women in the cabinet is systematically associated with a greater likelihood of appointments in policy domains outside social welfare. In Model 9, for example, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige post is estimated to be 71% higher if the cabinet already includes a woman. Yet, while the number of women in the cabinet is a consistent predictor of portfolio diversification for subsequent women appointees, the percentage of women in the legislature is less so. The presence of women legislators is found to have little to no impact on portfolio diversification in Table 2 or on the likelihood of high prestige appointments in Table 3. But the statistically significant log odds on this variable in Table 4 suggest that women are more likely to receive cabinet appointments in economic policy when there are more women in the legislature. The potential influence of this variable on women's portfolio assignments may be attenuated because its main effect is already being channeled through the number of women in the cabinet. Previous research has shown that women are more likely to enter the cabinet in the first place as women enter the legislature in larger numbers (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

The level of democracy exhibits inconsistent effects on portfolio assignments among women cabinet ministers. This variable has no systematic relationship with portfolio diversification in Table 2 or on high prestige appointments in Table 3. In Table 4, the level of democracy is significantly associated with a greater likelihood of women being appointed to economic policy portfolios. These results are not limited to the Polity IV measure used for the level of democracy. Alternate measures, such as the Freedom House indices for political rights and civil liberties, produce comparable results. Moreover, a country's experience with socialism

appears to have had no lasting influence on women's portfolio diversification. This variable never attains statistical significance.

Coalition politics are not associated with any consistent patterns in women's portfolio assignments. The size of the ruling coalition, as measured by the share of government seats in the legislature, rarely attains statistical significance at conventional levels in most model specifications. Similarly, the number of politicized ethnic groups does not attain statistical significance across models.

A country's dominant religious tradition appears to have no impact on women's portfolio assignments. The variables used to indicate whether a country has a Muslim majority or no religious majority perform do not attain statistical significance in any model specification. This is partly due to the fact that religion-specific norms for gender roles are already integrated into the legal codes of countries. Muslim majority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, tend to legally recognize a married woman's right to property, but do not accord her legal recognition as a head of household. The exclusion of these variables from alternate model specifications — substituting Christian majority for Muslim majority or excluding all religion variables — do not change the main results.

Socioeconomic conditions, whether measured through women's labor force participation or per capita income, are not systematically associated with any pattern of women's portfolio assignments. These measures are statistically indistinguishable from zero in nearly all model specifications.

The findings presented in Tables 2 through 4 indicate that the policy influence of women remains limited in African countries where they are subjected to legal economic discrimination. Given the considerable resource disadvantage faced by women politicians in negotiating over

cabinet posts in Africa's clientelistic systems, this outcome is unlikely to change with the simple inclusion of more women in government. The problem can be seen in the supplementary analyses concerning the appointment of men to low prestige portfolios presented in Table 5. The log odds on the economic discrimination index are negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better across Models 13 through 16, indicating that men are less likely to be appointed to low prestige jobs when women face greater legal obstacles in accessing resources. This result suggests that — in spite of their greater numbers — many of the women brought into the cabinet are merely substituting for men at the lowest rungs of government.

[TABLE 5]

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that egalitarian economic laws may be a crucial, perhaps even necessary, condition for women's effective political empowerment. Political institutions like quotas can help expand the number of women present in national legislatures and cabinets, but they cannot ensure that women have access to the resources needed to exercise greater influence in politics and policymaking. When women depend on men for economic resources, they are poorly positioned to negotiate over leadership positions in parliament or in the cabinet. Previous studies, along with women's movements, have emphasized that women's legal status influences their economic opportunities as well as their sense of personal autonomy (World Bank 2014; Hallward-Driemeier and Ousmane Gajigo 2013; Matembe and Dorsey 2002). Ours is one of the first, however, to argue that women's economic rights are also a condition for political empowerment.

The findings presented here suggest that policymakers and scholars should broaden the lens with which they examine women's rights. The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, for example, explicitly prioritize women's economic and political equality. But that equality is measured in terms of girl's enrollment in primary and secondary education, women's share of the non-agricultural labor force participation, and women's proportion of parliamentary seats. These are important indicators of women's position in society, but they offer little insight into the legal economic rights that shape women's access to political power. Such rights typically do not command the attention of international development agencies. However, if they are not addressed, women politicians may not be able to rise to the positions of influence from which they could help advance the issues that disproportionately affect women, particularly in developing countries.

Table 1. Policy and Prestige Distribution of Cabinet Appointments (%)

	Men	Women
Policy Domain		
Economic	42.65	23.46
Foreign affairs & national defense	9.33	3.72
Government operations	17.86	10.98
Law & order	8.97	4.92
Social welfare	21.20	56.92
Prestige Level		
High	29.08	13.04
Medium	64.68	67.49
Low	6.24	19.51
Portfolio years	20,865	1,748

Note: Figures are column percentages for cabinet portfolio years between 1980 and 2005.

Figure 1. Cabinet Portfolio Concentration Indices for Men and Women



Note: The portfolio concentration index is calculated as the sum of the squares of cabinet portfolio shares in five policy areas: economic, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare. Vertical dashed lines around the mean portfolio concentration index are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2. Social Welfare Portfolio Appointments among Men and Women



Note: The scatterplot markers show country-level values aggregated at five-year periods.

Figure 3. Gendered Household Head Rights and Social Welfare Portfolio Appointments



Note: A country is classified as having unequal household head rights when it legally prohibits married women from acting as head of household. They are classified as equal when there are no such legal restrictions. Country classifications are drawn from the World Bank's *Women, Business and the Law* database.

Table 2. Women's Cabinet Portfolio Concentration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Economic discrimination index	0.326***	0.297**	0.326***	0.307**
	(0.124)	(0.140)	(0.126)	(0.122)
Customary law can discriminate		-0.036		
		(0.081)		
Constitution nondiscrimination clause			0.002	
			(0.074)	
Legislative gender quota duration				-0.028***
				(0.011)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.059***	-0.061***	-0.058***	-0.052***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Women's share of legislature, %	-0.011*	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Level of democracy	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Socialist regime duration	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Government seats in legislature, %	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Muslim majority	0.125	0.129	0.123	0.104
	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.116)
No religious majority	0.110	0.110	0.112	0.076
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.117)
Female labor force participation, %	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
GDP per capital PPP, log	0.054	0.057	0.055	0.036
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Constant	-0.296	-0.300	-0.309	-0.029
	(0.885)	(0.901)	(0.890)	(0.873)
R^2	0.373	0.374	0.372	0.399
Number of observations	73	73	73	73
Number of countries	27	27	27	27

Note. Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is women's portfolio concentration index. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 3. Women's High Prestige Cabinet Appointments

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Economic discrimination index	-3.065***	-3.651***	-2.966***	-3.045***
	(1.071)	(1.127)	(1.121)	(1.034)
Customary law can discriminate		-1.246*		
		(0.677)		
Constitution nondiscrimination clause			1.102**	
			(0.553)	
Legislative gender quota duration				0.181**
				(0.091)
Number of women in cabinet	0.539***	0.500***	0.531***	0.459***
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Women's share of legislature, %	0.029	0.021	0.007	0.018
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Level of democracy	0.036	0.055	0.019	0.038
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.042)
Socialist regime duration	0.002	-0.007	0.003	-0.051
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Government seats in legislature, %	-0.014	-0.011	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Politicized ethnic groups	-0.104	-0.116	-0.133	-0.100
	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.102)	(0.086)
Muslim majority	-0.771	-0.878	-0.411	-0.443
	(0.895)	(0.869)	(1.000)	(0.855)
No religious majority	-0.083	-0.249	-0.027	0.151
	(0.615)	(0.608)	(0.699)	(0.592)
Female labor force participation, %	0.031	0.038	0.019	0.044
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.060)
GDP per capital PPP, log	0.322	0.369	0.419	0.409*
	(0.232)	(0.240)	(0.283)	(0.244)
Constant	-4.547	-4.771	-5.061	-5.657
	(4.251)	(4.302)	(4.783)	(4.250)
Log likelihood	-168.352	-166.453	-165.827	-166.266
Number of observations	479	478	478	479
Number of countries	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to high prestige cabinet post. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 4. Women's Economic Policy Portfolio Appointments

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Economic discrimination index	-2.648**	-2.236*	-2.730**	-2.589**
	(1.183)	(1.172)	(1.189)	(1.151)
Customary law can discriminate		1.384		
		(0.848)		
Constitution nondiscrimination clause			-0.460	
			(0.615)	
Legislative gender quota duration				0.368**
				(0.183)
Number of women in cabinet	0.860***	0.908***	0.857***	0.835***
	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.170)	(0.172)
Women's share of legislature, %	0.165***	0.175***	0.175***	0.143***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Level of democracy	0.155***	0.136**	0.166***	0.148***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Socialist regime duration	0.014	0.021	0.011	-0.047
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.055)
Government seats in legislature, %	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.074	0.051	0.080	0.089
	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.120)
Muslim majority	-1.300	-1.303	-1.393	-1.011
	(1.150)	(1.080)	(1.154)	(1.110)
No religious majority	-0.043	0.081	-0.109	0.156
	(0.846)	(0.807)	(0.843)	(0.819)
Female labor force participation, %	-0.036	-0.044	-0.037	-0.025
	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.073)
GDP per capital PPP, log	-0.175	-0.205	-0.201	-0.107
	(0.273)	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.247)
Constant	-1.091	-0.801	-0.704	-2.244
	(4.899)	(4.812)	(4.986)	(4.653)
Log likelihood	-161.631	-160.346	-161.347	-159.169
Number of observations	479	478	478	479
Number of countries	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to economic portfolio. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 5. Men's Low Prestige Cabinet Appointments

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Economic discrimination index	-5.248**	-5.524***	-5.364**	-4.679**
	(2.179)	(2.127)	(2.256)	(2.112)
Customary law can discriminate		-3.300		
		(2.363)		
Constitution nondiscrimination clause			-2.107**	
			(0.864)	
Legislative gender quota duration				-0.407**
				(0.189)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.346*	-0.357*	-0.285	-0.208
	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.196)	(0.203)
Women's share of legislature, %	-0.025	-0.030	-0.016	-0.004
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Level of democracy	0.016	0.020	0.085	0.021
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.067)
Socialist regime duration	-0.044	-0.046	-0.065	-0.024
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Government seats in legislature, %	-0.040**	-0.039**	-0.036**	-0.036**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.435	0.483	0.501	0.387
	(0.335)	(0.322)	(0.353)	(0.321)
Muslim majority	5.834*	5.909*	5.432	4.778
	(3.368)	(3.335)	(3.379)	(3.319)
No religious majority	5.609*	5.215**	5.635*	4.922*
	(2.920)	(2.467)	(2.898)	(2.731)
Female labor force participation, %	0.308	0.282	0.274	0.252
	(0.220)	(0.198)	(0.203)	(0.207)
GDP per capital PPP, log	0.683	0.786	0.698	0.807
	(1.022)	(0.987)	(1.078)	(1.016)
Constant	-13.917	-13.006	-11.971	-12.699
	(15.001)	(13.931)	(14.944)	(15.079)
Log likelihood	-152.831	-152.131	-149.689	-149.800
Number of observations	479	478	478	479
Number of countries	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is men's appointment to low prestige portfolio. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

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Appendix A. Classification of Cabinet Portfolios by Policy Domain

Economic	Agriculture (Coffee, Fisheries, Food Security, Livestock, Rural Economy or Development) Construction (Equipment, Public Works, Reconstruction) Development (Rural, Communal) and Planning Energy (Power) Environment (National Parks, Natural Resources, Natural Disasters Reforestation, Resource Development, Water) Economy (Budgeting, Central Bank, Economic Sphere or Planning, Finance, Revenue, Treasury) Handicrafts (Crafts) Housing (Urban Affairs)	Industry (Commerce, Enterprise, Private Sector Development, Privatization, Productive Sphere, Small and Medium Business)Mining (Geology) Lands and Territorial Management Parastatals (State Corporations, Public Enterprises, Production Brigade) Petroleum (Hydrocarbons) Posts Poverty Alleviation Regional Planning, Development Statistics Tourism Trade Transportation (Civil Aviation, Maritime Affairs, Merchant Marine) Tourism Housing (Urban, City Affairs)
Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Defense (Armed Forces, Army, National/Territorial Security, Navy)	Foreign Affairs (External Relations, International Cooperation, NEPAD, Regional or African Cooperation and Integration)
Government Operations	Administrative Affairs and Management (Auditor, Capacity Building, Decentralization, Good Governance, Government Operations or Management, Inspection and Control, Modernization Policy Implementation, Reform, Special Commission on Government, State Protocol, Supply) Africanization (Nationalization) Chieftaincy Affairs Civil Service (Public Service, Human Resources) Cooperation Communication (Information, Ideology, Propaganda, Press, Marketing) Internal Affairs National Affairs	Parliamentary Affairs (Constitutional Affairs,, Relations with State Organs) Party, Cabinet, or Government Leadership (Cabinet Secretariat, Chairman, Party Secretary, National or Political Affairs) Political Affairs Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office with no specific portfolio) President's Office (with no specific portfolio, Vice President) Regional Affairs (Regional Coordination, Local Affairs, National Integration, Territorial/Provincial Administration or Development, Federal Affairs)

Law & Order	Home Affairs Interior (Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Internal Affairs, Prisons, Public or State Security, State or Social Control)	Justice (Keeper of the Seals/Law) Drug Control
Social Welfare	Civil Society (Civic Affairs, Community, Community Services, Communal Development) Culture (Arts, National Heritage) Education (Literacy) Empowerment Family (Children) Health (AIDS, Prevention) Human (Citizen) Rights and Liberties Immigration Employment (Labor, Manpower)[16] Minority (Indian) Affairs Nationals Abroad (Expatriates, Immigration, Institute of Nationalities, Expatriates) National Recovery (Guidance, Orientation, Organization, Integration, Solidarity, Peace Process)	Rural Affairs (Peasant Affairs, Rural Life) Population Poverty Alleviation Refugees (Displaced Persons, Relocation, Resettlement, Relief) Rehabilitation Religious Affairs Science and Technology[17] Social Welfare (Social Affairs, Assistance, Protection, Reintegration, Services, Equipment) Sports Veterans Youth

[16] Although labor and employment are related to economic policy, they are often combined with social affairs and welfare because of their link to pension systems; therefore we have chosen to keep them in the same functional category.

[17] Similarly, because science and technology are often included in the education portfolio, we have kept them in the same functional category despite their connection to economic policy.

Appendix B. Classification of Cabinet Portfolios by Prestige[18]

High

- Defense (Armed Forces, Army, National/Territorial Security, Navy)
- Economy (Budgeting, Central Bank, Economic Sphere or Planning, Finance, Revenue, Treasury)
- Foreign Affairs (External Relations, International Cooperation, NEPAD, Regional/African Cooperation and Integration)
- Home Affairs
- Interior (Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Internal Affairs, Prisons, Public Security, State or Social Control)
- Party, Cabinet, or Government Leadership (Cabinet Secretariat, Chairman, Party Secretary, National or Political Affairs)
- Petroleum (Hydrocarbons)
- President or Prime Minister's Office

Medium

- Administrative Affairs and Management (Auditor, Capacity Building, Decentralization, Good Governance, Government Operations or Management, Inspection and Control, Modernization Policy Implementation, Reform, Special Commission on Government, State Protocol, Supply)
- Africanization (Nationalization)
- Agriculture (Coffee, Fisheries, Food Security, Livestock, Rural Economy or Development)
- Civil Service
- Civil Society (Civic Affairs, Community, Communal Development)
- Communication (Information, Ideology, Propaganda, Press)
- Parliamentary Affairs (Constitutional Affairs,, Relations with State Organs)
- Construction (Equipment, Public Works, Reconstruction)
- Cooperation[19]
- Health (AIDS, Prevention)
- Housing (Urban Affairs)
- Immigration
- Industry (Commerce, Enterprise, Private Sector Development, Privatization, Productive Sphere, Small and Medium Business)
- Justice (Keeper of the Seals, Law)
- Lands and Territorial Management
- Mining (Geology)
- National Recovery (Guidance, Orientation, Organization, Integration, Solidarity, Peace Process)
- Nationals Abroad (Expatriates)
- National Service
- Parastatals (State Corporations, Public Enterprises, Production Brigade)
- Posts
- Regional Affairs (Regional Coordination, Local Affairs, Territorial/Provincial Administration or Development, Federal Affairs, National Integration)[20]
- Religious Affairs

[18] Prestige rankings are based on Krook and O'Brien (2012). When ministries were not included in their rankings, we assigned a prestige level based on similarity of tasks and responsibilities.

[19] The title cooperation does not specify whether a minister is responsible for international or domestic affairs. If the area of focus is not specified, cooperation is ranked as a medium prestige portfolio related to government operations.

[20] Specific regions were also ranked as medium prestige and categorized as government operations.

Development and Planning
Drug Control
Education (Literacy)
Employment (Labor, Manpower)
Energy (Power)
Environment (National Parks, Natural Resources, Natural Disasters, Reforestation, Resource Development, Water)
Rural Affairs (Chieftaincy Affairs, Peasant Affairs, Rural Life)
Social Welfare (Social Affairs, Assistance, Reintegration, Protection, Services, Equipment)
Trade
Transportation (Civil Aviation, Maritime Affairs, Merchant Marine)
Vice President's Office

Low

Community Services
Culture (Arts, National Heritage)
Empowerment
Family (Children)
Fleet of Cars and Motorcycles
Handicrafts (Crafts)
Human (Citizen) Rights and Liberties
Institute of Nationalities
Minority (Indian) Affairs
Refugees (Displaced Persons, Relocation, Resettlement, Relief)
Population
Poverty Alleviation
Special Missions or Affairs
Sports
Statistics
Science and Technology
Tourism
Veterans
Women's Affairs
Youth

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Economic discrimination index	0.244	0.225	0	1	479
Customary law can discriminate	0.220	0.414	0	1	478
Constitution nondiscrimination clause	0.437	0.497	0	1	478
Legislative gender quota duration	0.676	2.735	0	19	479
Number of women in cabinet	1.898	1.681	0	12	479
Women's share of legislature, %	9.795	6.858	0	48.80	443
Level of democracy	-1.585	5.744	-9	9	479
Socialist regime duration	2.271	6.670	0	40	479
Government seats in legislature, %	82.10	20.17	0	100	473
Politicized ethnic groups	4.825	3.036	0	13	479
Muslim majority	0.102	0.303	0	1	479
No religious majority	0.248	0.433	0	1	479
Female labor force participation, %	44.55	5.650	25.80	53.62	479
GDP per capital PPP, log	7.204	0.942	0.771	9.767	479

Appendix D. Women's Social Welfare Portfolio Concentration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Economic discrimination index	0.487***	0.400**	0.476***	0.477***
	(0.123)	(0.156)	(0.124)	(0.127)
Customary law can discriminate		-0.109		
		(0.080)		
Constitution nondiscrimination clause			-0.008	
			(0.076)	
Legislative gender quota duration				-0.024
				(0.016)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.018	-0.026	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Women's share of legislature, %	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Level of democracy	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Socialist regime duration	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Government seats in legislature, %	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.016	0.019*	0.016	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Muslim majority	0.022	0.037	0.014	-0.001
	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.165)	(0.157)
No religious majority	0.098	0.095	0.099	0.071
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.094)
Female labor force participation, %	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
GDP per capital PPP, log	-0.081**	-0.071*	-0.081*	-0.096***
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.032)
Constant	1.140*	1.155*	1.138	1.338**
	(0.688)	(0.699)	(0.697)	(0.652)
R^2	0.373	0.374	0.372	0.399
Number of observations	73	73	73	73
Number of countries	27	27	27	27

Note: Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of social welfare portfolios among all portfolios held by women cabinet ministers. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.