Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence from China's National Assemblies (1983–2007)

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Abstract

Recent studies of authoritarian legislatures have underscored the importance of institutions for cooptation and information collection, yet scholars have not paid much attention to legislative behavior in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argue that authoritarian legislatures could be important arenas of contestation. Specifically, government agencies use them to build policy coalitions in order to advance their policy agendas. Delegates serve as proxy fighters for key party and government elites with different policy preferences. The success of coalition building hinges on two factors. The more incongruence there is among ruling elites, the better government agencies exert influence in authoritarian legislatures. The weaker electoral connections are between delegate selection and the masses, the more bureaucratic influence exists. To evaluate our arguments, we provide supporting evidence based on a unique dataset containing education related bills and policy proposals submitted to both national assemblies between 1983 and 2007 in China.

China's national assemblies—the National People's Congress (NPC) and People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—are often considered ceremonial institutions. Although scholars have suggested that Chinese legislators have been more assertive in congressional oversight in the last two decades,[1] Melanie Manion pointed out the "most lively congresses are found not at the centre of power in Beijing but in the localities" (Manion 2008: 608). While the voting outcomes in the NPC seem to corroborate this claim, our dataset of NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals reveals a surprisingly vibrant dynamic. According to Tanner (1995) bills submitted to the NPC should have already received approval from the top leadership, yet despite over 16,000 NPC bills[2] introduced in the NPC between 1983 and 2007, only 486 legislations have been promulgated. In addition, CPPCC delegates submitted 20,075 policy proposals during the same period. The dynamics of bill and proposal submissions offer an interesting puzzle: why do NPC and CPPCC delegates actively submit bills and proposals in seemingly ceremonial national assemblies?

Recent studies of authoritarian legislatures have provided many important insights, but they cannot offer a satisfactory answer to delegate behavior in the NPC and CPPCC. Extant studies largely focus on two mechanisms: cooptation and information collection. Specifically, some argue that formal institutions facilitate cooptation and power sharing among allies and the opposition;[3] others contend that elections in authoritarian regimes reveal critical information enabling ruling

[1] See for example Cho (2009), MacFarquhar (1998), Manion (2014a), and Xia (2008).
[2] These are the bills (*yi'an*) submitted by the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, special committees of the NPC, and a group of more than 30 delegates; these bills are eligible for promulgation.
[3] Boix and Svolik (2013), Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008), Svolik (2012).

elites to distribute public spending and spoils to targeted populations in order to maintain regime stability.[4]

Nonetheless, the Chinese regime has developed better tools for cooptation and information gathering than what the NPC and CPPCC may provide. In terms of cooptation, the Chinese ruling elites have offered preferential treatments that favor their allies' businesses and political careers. The emergence of the "princeling" group is a prominent example, as various reports have shown that its members have accumulated massive wealth and political power since the reform era.[5] The depth and breadth of economic and political networks among the relatives of the Central Committee and Politburo members in publicly traded firms and the real estate market offer another telling example.[6]

When it comes to information gathering, the Chinese government has built many efficient channels to assess local conditions and discontent. For example, Dimitrov (2014) maintains that the Chinese government, similar to other Communist autocracies, has used internal government assessments of its governance through citizens' petitions in order to identify and address public discontent. Meanwhile, public protests serve as another channel for the Chinese government to gather information concerning local stability (Huang et al. Forthcoming; Lorentzen 2013, 2014). Finally, the rise of information technology has prompted the Chinese government to build various national and local apparatuses to manage and collect information over the internet (King et al. 2014).

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[4] Blaydes (2010), (Mahdavi) 2015, Malesky and Shuler (2011), Miller (2015), Reuter and Robertson (2015). For micro-level evidence to corroborate these mechanisms, see for example Desposato (2001), Malesky and Schuler (2010), Manion (2014a, 2014b), and Truex (2014).

[5] See for example the *New York Times* article entitled "'Princelings' in China Use Family Ties to Gain Riches" and the Wall Street Journal article entitled "Children of the Revolution". (accessed on March 30 2016)

[6] Wang (Forthcoming) investigates political connections in public traded firms; Kung and Chen (2016) studies the real estate market.

If cooptation and information are not the primary mechanisms for the existence of the NPC and CPPCC, what role do they play in authoritarian politics? We shift to a new analytical lens—bureaucratic influence—in order to understand the role of authoritarian legislatures. Our premises are that policymaking is often conflictive in nature, and government bureaucracies are unlikely to share the same policy preferences. Hence, there exist persistent structural conflicts among bureaucracies and other functioning groups. These structural conflicts are not unique to the Chinese system, as previous scholars who study Soviet politics have documented that structural conflicts among the existing party and government systems play a significant role during the policymaking process (Hough and Fainsod 1979; Skilling and Griffiths 1971; Skilling 1983).

As a result of these structural conflicts, we argue that authoritarian legislatures can provide an opportunity to allow regime insiders, such as central government agencies, to build policy coalitions, which serve as a signaling device to advance their policymaking agenda. That is, authoritarian legislatures become one of the platforms upon which policy battles are fought and coalitions are formed. Our paper generates two important implications. First, one key purpose of authoritarian legislatures are winning policy battles among regime insiders. Second, delegates in the national assembly may serve as proxy fighters on behalf of various government agencies.

We further contend that the degree of bureaucratic influence in authoritarian legislatures hinges on the strength of electoral connections and the incongruence of power sharing among ruling elites. The institutional design of authoritarian elections often weakens the link between mass preferences and legislative behaviors but provides opportunity for bureaucratic influence. Meanwhile, building policy coalitions is risky in authoritarian regimes because strong autocrats view coalitions among regime insiders as threats to their power. As a result, policy coalitions are more likely to be formed when top ruling elites are incongruent in their power sharing.

To evaluate our claims, we explore the variation of delegate selection processes in China's two national assemblies—the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. On the one hand, NPC delegates are elected by the delegates in provincial People's Congresses, thus providing electoral connection to local interests to some extent. On the other hand, the CPPCC delegates are selected by the central government and party agencies, thus offering a channel for government agencies to influence their legislative behaviors. Our research design allows us to assess the extent to which the strength of electoral connection influences legislative behavior in an authoritarian regime.

To overcome the challenges in data collection when studying legislative behavior in authoritarian regimes, we focus on legislation related to education and constructed a dataset containing all the NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals concerning compulsory education between 1983 and 2007. The empirical results of our paper are threefold. First, we show that policy coalitions exist in both Chinese national assemblies, but are more pronounced in the CPPCC because it is more susceptible to bureaucratic influence. Second, delegates working in central government agencies and having employment ties to education are more likely to participate in the policy coalitions concerning education. We further demonstrate that the success of coalition building depends on the incongruence of ruling elites but does not correlate with local conditions. In other words, these bills and proposals are not necessarily aggregating mass preferences but the preferences of central government agencies. We provide various robustness checks, and our results remain consistent even after taking into account the policy diffusion effect and the media environment since 1983. Finally, we use network analysis to identify the channels through which actors build policy coalitions.

This paper sheds light on legislative behavior in authoritarian regimes in several ways. First, it contributes to a small but growing literature that pinpoints the micro-foundations of authoritarian politics. While existing studies focus largely on the cooptation and information mechanisms, we contend that authoritarian legislatures provide another important function—signaling policy preferences among regime insiders in order to set policy agendas and win policy battles. This is an important mechanism for a class of authoritarian regimes with a matrix of government and party organizations, which generate structural conflicts among them. In democracies, legislative sessions are often considered the platform for political elites' strategic interaction in order to advance their policy preferences. By the same token, legislative behavior in these authoritarian regimes reflect the policy struggles among government agencies.

Second, our paper provides a theoretical framework that combines bureaucratic politics and legislative behavior. Our study extends the previous studies on interest groups in Communist regimes as well as elite policymaking in China. Scholars of Soviet politics have proposed an interest group model (Skilling 1966), arguing that the policymaking process is deeply influenced by differential institutional interests during the post-Stalin era. Meanwhile, one prominent theory in the study of Chinese politics is "fragmented authoritarianism," which describes policymaking as involving multiple bureaucratic interests in China (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). We contend that "fragmented authoritarianism" and interest group influence manifest themselves in the Chinese national assemblies, which have been increasingly used by various central government agencies to signal their preferences and build policy coalitions in recent years.

The roadmap of this paper is as follows: The next section offers a theoretical framework of legislative behavior in a competitive authoritarian regime. We then describe our research design

and data collection, providing a variety of empirical evidence. We conclude the paper by offering some implications.

A Theoretical Framework

In this section, we first discuss delegates' incentive structure in authoritarian regimes. We then detail the logic of bureaucratic influence through policy coalition building in the authoritarian legislature. Finally, we specify the conditions under which coalition building intensifies.

The Motivations of Delegates in Authoritarian Legislatures

What key motivations drive delegate behavior? David Mayhew (1974) argues in his canonical study of the U.S. Congress that reelection is the exclusive goal of legislators. One may argue that legislators have other goals, such as policy-seeking and power-seeking within the legislature (Fenno 1978); however, reelection remains the first order priority for delegates because other goals can hardly be achieved without first securing a place in the legislature. We start with the same premise that delegates in authoritarian legislatures are driven by their desire to hold office for a range of benefits.[7] For example, studies have shown that serving in the legislature is associated with legislators' economic gains in democracies (Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; Fishman et al. 2012) and autocracies (Hou 2015; Truex 2014); furthermore, many countries have laws assuring some level of immunity to the legislator, and this is also the case in China.[8] More importantly, serving in the legislature provides a unique opportunity for individuals to access the inner circle of political power, where they can participate in key policy debates and network with other important political actors.

[7] For a review of the benefits of serving in an authoritarian legislature, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009).
[8] According to Article 44 *of Organic Law of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*, "No delegate to the National People's Congress may be arrested or placed on criminal trial without the consent of the Presidium of the National People's Congress or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, of its Standing Committee."

If reelection is a primary goal, appealing to constituents is critical to delegates' political survival. The constituents of the delegates in an authoritarian legislature are not necessarily the masses they supposedly represent; instead the selectorate of delegates in authoritarian regimes often comprises ruling elites and parties. Even if legislators are elected locally, signaling their loyalty to ruling elites remains critical because placement on the ballot, not to mention winning local elections, often requires strong endorsement from the ruling party.[9] Unsurprisingly, many consider an authoritarian legislature a rubber stamp because delegates primarily represent the interests of their de facto constituents.

Although we agree that many authoritarian legislatures are likely to be rubber stamps, we suggest that this characterization overlooks the fact that the selectorate of the delegates may include a diverse group of elites, ranging from various government agencies to party organizations, who may not always share the same policy preferences (Gallagher and Hanson 2015). Even if the regime is dominated by one party, the sources of different delegates' political support may be connected with different factions or interest groups. Hence, delegate behavior is likely to be heterogeneous because different delegates respond to different groups of elites, especially in an authoritarian regime with embedded structural conflicts among different functioning groups. If serving in the legislature is a part-time job, delegates' legislative behavior is more subject to the impact of different groups of elites, who have the power to influence delegates' formal employment opportunities.

One strategy by which delegates appeal to their selectorate is by casting votes as well as submitting bills and policy proposals on their behalf. Casting the nay vote in an authoritarian legislature, however, is often not a viable option and is highly costly to the delegates because the

[9] The need for party support for local elections in authoritarian regimes is a common theme. See for example Chu and Lin (2001) on Taiwan and Magaloni (2006) on Mexico.

bills reaching the voting stage have already obtained endorsement from the ruling elites. Alternatively, submitting bills and policy proposals is sometimes less risky because ruling elites may not have reached consensus on certain policy issues. We can even conceptualize the bills and policy proposals as an alternative "voting process" on policy issues in a highly controlled authoritarian legislature.

These bills and policy proposals allow delegates to put forth their selectorate's policy agendas outside the legislature. In this sense, we argue that delegates in the national assemblies are merely proxy fighters for key party elites and government agencies. This observation is consistent with other studies of authoritarian legislatures. For example, Remington (2001) finds that government ministries were the principal sponsors of legislation in the new Russian parliament. Malesky and Schuler (2010) also show that centrally nominated candidates in the Vietnamese national assembly are less likely to be critical of the regime. In fact, Tanner (1995) points out that central-level party and government organizations are responsible for many bills submitted in the NPC in China.

The Logic of Bureaucratic Influence

Insofar as we have specified the incentive structure of delegates, the existence of bureaucratic influence on delegate behavior remains puzzling. The conventional wisdom is that an authoritarian legislature is inconsequential in policymaking. Key policy decisions have already gone through internal debates, and disagreements have been resolved among party elites and government ministries before they are subject to debate in an authoritarian legislature, which many argue is only a formality.

We certainly agree that authoritarian legislatures often lack the open debates and contestation that we observe in democratic legislatures. Policymaking, however, always involves a struggle among elites, regardless of regime type. This is particularly the case for a class of authoritarian

regimes that have created a massive bureaucratic system. For example, in part due to the central planning economic system in Communist regimes, the strongest political actors below the leadership level are vertical branches, not regional officials (Hough and Fainsod 1979). The complexity of the economy made it clear to the Soviet leadership that they must allow a reverse stream of influence from its massive bureaucracy. During the policymaking process, group interests are being promoted and conflicts often occurred during the agenda setting process. In a similar vein, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) observe deeply divided bureaucratic interests during the policymaking process in China, and they coined the term *fragmented authoritarianism* to describe bureaucratic politics in policymaking. Although the Chinese government has gone through multiple government reforms aiming to create an administrative state in China since the 1980s (Yang 2004), structural conflicts among government bureaucracies persist.

Given that bills reaching the final voting stage often allow little debate in a highly controlled authoritarian legislature, submitting bills and policy proposals could serve as an alternative venue for policy debate. We argue that signaling is the main mechanism that motivates bureaucratic influence by government agencies in the national assembly to set the policy agenda. First, bill and policy proposals in the national assembly allow government agencies to publicly signal their policy preferences to their opposition and the key ruling elites. In particular, policy coalitions in authoritarian legislatures send a credible signal about the strength of policy support from regime insiders behind a specific policy. Both the opposition and ruling elites take notice when a large policy coalition is formed within the legislature. Essentially, policy coalitions in the legislature are an effective signal to the ruling elites, who face many demands from different party and government agencies.

Second, signaling policy preferences in the legislature has relatively lower transaction costs compared to other venues. Although one could pursue other means, such as the media or closed-door sessions to build the policy coalition, these kinds of activities are more costly to organize. For instance, medias are often highly controlled by the state in authoritarian regimes. Closed-door sessions put less powerful government agencies in a disadvantaged position and their voices may not even be heard by the ruling elites. In contrast, legislative sessions allow bureaucracies to approach a large number of delegates in one setting, many of whom are important insiders holding key positions in the party and government.

Essentially, we suggest that one key function of authoritarian legislatures is signaling among bureaucracies for agenda setting. Note that only a small percentage of bills materialize in both democratic and authoritarian legislatures, but unsuccessful legislation is not necessarily a wasted effort. Submitting these unsuccessful bills and policy proposals is intra-legislative signaling in an authoritarian regime instead of the extra-legislative signaling in democratic regimes.[10] This is the case when most of bills and policy proposals are not often made public.

Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature

Now that we have highlighted the incentives for bureaucratic influence in an authoritarian legislature, why do we not always observe policy coalitions? We argue that the incongruence of power sharing among ruling elites allows coalition building by government agencies in the national assemblies.

Specifically, building policy coalitions in authoritarian legislatures is not without risk. Any form of coalition building among regime insiders is always discouraged or prohibited because dictators fear the potential for overthrow. The balance of power among ruling elites may shift,

[10] Studies of the U.S. Congress have offered similar arguments in their studies of cosponsorship among U.S. legislators (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996).

however, from time to time, resulting in different degrees of elite incongruence. When elite incongruence among ruling elites is low, ruling elites discourage coalition building in the legislature, and they intervene in policy negotiation and force an agreement. Meanwhile, delegates are also unwilling to submit bills and proposals to challenge ruling elites' intervention because they may risk their careers in this political environment. Hence, we should observe fewer policy coalitions in the national assembly when elite incongruence is low.

When elite incongruence is high, government agencies seize the opportunity to build a policy coalition in the legislature to pressure their oppositions. This is particularly true when no elite has the dominant power in this inner political circle to help force an agreement in policy negotiation. In this political environment, delegates perceive less risk in submitting bills and policy proposals because ruling elites are in conflict and they are unlikely to have a consensus on policy issues.

In summary, our theoretical framework generates several testable hypotheses. First, we should observe policy coalitions through bill submissions in authoritarian legislatures on issue areas from different functional groups. Second, employment ties to the central government and their corresponding sectors provide key leverage for bureaucratic influence of legislative behavior. Finally, the degree of elite incongruence is a primary factor driving the submission of bills and policy proposals as well as the success of coalition building in authoritarian national assemblies.

Research Design

To empirically evaluate our theoretical argument, we face two challenges. First, one key to bureaucratic influence is the delegate selection process in the national assembly; however, cross-national analysis is subject to omitted variable bias because the institutional design of the selection process in authoritarian legislatures could be the result of many observed and unobserved factors. To address this issue, we explore the within-country variation in the selection of delegates in the

national assemblies in China. One unique feature of the Chinese political system is the co-existence of two national assemblies—the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and they have different selection mechanisms.

The second challenge is data collection on legislative activities in authoritarian regimes, and China is no exception. We focus on one policy area in our data collection: compulsory education. Our choice is driven by three considerations. First, education is distributive in nature and a large share of the Chinese government budget is allocated to education. Second, if an authoritarian legislature aggregates mass preferences, we should observe it reflected in education policies because citizens care deeply about it. Third, we follow the insights from a study of Soviet politics, which argues that education policies are not politically sensitive, thus they are more subject to bureaucratic influence (Kelly 1972).

In this section, we briefly discuss the differences in these two national assemblies. We then introduce our dataset that consists of NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals concerning compulsory education between 1983 and 2007.

Background of NPC and CPPCC

The National People's Congress, founded in 1954, is the national legislature holding the highest de jure political power in China with constitutional rights to amend the constitution and enact laws as well as to approve annual government budgets and appoint individuals to national political posts. Precisely because China's constitution stipulates the NPC's de jure power, the Chinese Communist Party maintains tight control over delegate selection and bill submission in the NPC to ensure its monopoly on political power in agenda setting (O'Brien 1990; Tanner 1999).

Compared to the NPC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference holds weaker political power in China's political hierarchy largely because it does not have de jure power in

lawmaking and political appointments. The CPPCC was initially founded in 1945 as the national legislature during negotiations between the CCP and the Kuomintang. After relegating this function to the NPC in 1954, the CPPCC serves as a "united front" to incorporate elites in different sectors of society, especially from those political organizations other than the CCP, in order to inform policymaking. The CPPCC functions like a consultative body by collecting feedback and suggestions from the delegates.

The NPC and CPPCC delegates are selected through different processes. NPC delegates are elected by the delegates in the provincial People's Congress, not directly elected by local residents. Hence, NPC delegates are organized by provinces, and they are supposed to represent the interests of their provinces.[11] In contrast, CPPCC delegates are not elected but selected by the central government and party agencies, and delegates consist of leading figures of different sectors and parties in Chinese society in addition to the CCP, such as different democratic parties, mass organizations, ethnic groups, and various sectors of society. Candidates for the CPPCC are first recommended by their corresponding groups,[12] and then these candidates are evaluated by the CCP's Organization Department and the United Front Work Department for CCP and non-CCP delegates, respectively. Finally, the CPPCC standing committee approves the final list of CPPCC delegates. It is worth noting that serving in either national assembly is a part-time job, and most of these delegates have full-time employment elsewhere. Both NPC and CPPCC delegates have five-year terms with no term limits.

The initiation processes of an NPC bill (*yi'an*) and a CPPCC policy proposal (*ti'an*) are also different. According to NPC regulations, only a bill with at least 30 NPC delegates' signatures can

[11] The exception is that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has its own delegation.
[12] See Appendix 1 for the list of all 34 groups.

move forward in the promulgation process.[13] In contrast, CPPCC delegates can submit a policy proposal without any cosponsor. Furthermore, CPPCC delegates enjoy greater freedom in the content of policy proposals that they submit, because not all proposals are intended for promulgation into laws.[14] As a result, the members of the CPPCC are more susceptible to the bureaucratic influence.

Data on NPC Bills and CPPCC Proposals

We focused on bills and policy proposals concerning compulsory education in both the NPC and CPPCC in our data collection. Notably, neither NPC bills nor CPPCC policy proposals have been published systematically because general legal requirements are lacking. We collected the data in two steps. First, we obtained all the NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals concerning compulsory education submitted between 1983 and 2007 through the corresponding committees handling bills and proposals in the NPC and CPPCC, resulting in 210 NPC bills and 1,255 CPPCC policy proposals. Each bill and policy proposal consists of basic information: the name of the proposal initiator, the title of the proposal, the number of cosponsors, and the year of submission. CPPCC proposals also contain the departments or ministries from which the delegates requested a response to their policy proposals.

Two patterns emerge from Figure 1, which illustrates data on the number of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals concerning compulsory education between 1983 and 2007. First, the number of proposals has risen in recent years in both the NPC and CPPCC, especially after 2000. Second, both NPC and CPPCC proposals exhibit cycles of submission over time, and the cyclical patterns

[13] Bills may be submitted to the NPC by the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, special committees of the NPC, and a group of more than 30 delegates.

[14] The difference between NPC and CPPCC delegates with regard to freedom is consistent with our field research as well as news media reports. (What is the difference between NPC and CPPCC? *Beijing News*, 2013 (http://www.bjnews.com.cn/feature/2013/03/01/250419.html, accessed on Feb. 10, 2016).

broadly correlate in both groups. These patterns suggest that the submissions in both national assemblies are likely to be driven by similar factors.

[Figure 1]

To the best of our ability, we then collected background information on the delegates who initiated these bills and proposals from internal government documents and the Internet. Specifically, we identified the delegates' party and province affiliation as well as the characteristics of their employment. We also collected data on the demographics and work experience as well as the characteristics of the delegates' provinces. Note that our data contained only the names of the NPC and CPPCC delegates who initiated the bills and policy proposals, and we had no information on the names of other cosponsors of bills or proposals except the total number of cosponsors. The missing data on cosponsors' names do not undermine our empirical tests because we aim to identify those individuals with the mobilization capacity to signal their loyalty to their constituents by initiating bills or policy proposals and mobilizing other delegates to cosponsor them. Table A1 in the online appendix reports the summary statistics of bill and proposal initiators.

Empirical Findings: Policy Coalitions in the NPC and CPPCC

We open this section with our qualitative evidence to illustrate the bureaucratic influence in the NPC and CPPCC. Building on the insights from our in-depth interviews, we report empirical findings based on analysis of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals in three parts.

Qualitative Evidence: Bureaucratic Influence by the Ministry of Education

To understand the patterns of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals on education between 1983 and 2007, we conducted over 30 interviews with individuals who were involved in the lawmaking and policymaking processes. Our interviews have provided numerous insights of the MOE's efforts to

build policy coalitions in China's national assemblies. Similar to the functioning of interest groups in the Soviet Union (Hough and Fainsod 1979), we observe that those who work in the same institution are likely to develop a sense of common interests, and those who hold significant administrative posts will use their official positions to advance the importance of their issues.

For example, one senior Ministry of Education official (Interview ID: BJ10302012) emphatically told us that the MOE always tries to persuade NPC and CPPCC delegates to submit bills and policy proposals on their behalf, especially those who have employment ties with the MOE. This revelation is consistent with an observation by another interviewee (Interview ID: BJ12202012), who has served in various working groups that drafted the education related laws. He disclosed that the MOE is always deeply involved in various important education-related legislation, but it was not always successful in pushing its agenda, given the opposition from other ministries. For example, MOE has intended to write the "4%" education spending target[15] into the *Education Law* in 1993; nonetheless, the "4%" target has met strong resistance from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and local governments. Eventually the "4%" target was in the revision of the *Education Law* in 1995. Given that it is an unfunded mandate that pressured provincial governments to invest more in education spending, the MOE was not very successful in building a policy coalition in the NPC, because few delegates were willing to help pressure provincial governments.

The coalition building in the 2000s serves as another illuminating case. One NPC delegate (Interview ID: HB03112013) detailed his involvement in the process. Prior to the 2003 NPC convention, this NPC delegate was approached by a MOE official to submit NPC bills concerning the revision of the *Compulsory Education Law*. One major agenda is that the MOE would like to

[15] The 4% target refers to the requirement that government education spending reach at least 4% of the GDP.

pressure the central government to provide greater education funding. Given the extensive personal network of this NPC delegate, he actively lobbied delegates in his own province as well as those in other provinces to submit similar bills. This delegate also mobilized CPPCC delegates through his party networks, eventually leading to a significant media exposure on the issue of free compulsory education in China. Note that the party network is an important venue for coalition building because coordination among party members is highly organized within the party, as revealed by a senior official in one of the democratic parties in China (Interview ID: BJ02132015). The party always reviews the potential CPPCC proposals that delegates plan to submit. It also decides which issues to focus on during each CPPCC session. For those delegates who comply with the party, the party chairman help advance their careers by contacting high-level officials.

Quantitative Evidence: The Existence of Policy Coalitions

In other contexts, the number of cosponsors or roll-call votes behind a bill is seen to reflect a policy coalition. In the Chinese national assemblies, however, these measures are not meaningful in capturing the phenomenon of policy coalitions for three reasons. First, casting a nay vote is costly and not very effective in the NPC: When the bills reach the voting stage, they have already received endorsement from the top leadership, and NPC delegates rarely challenge the bills at this stage (Tanner 1995). Furthermore, the CPPCC does not even have an opportunity to vote on individual policy proposals. Second, all the NPC bills have to garner 30 or more cosponsors before the standing committee of the NPC can consider proposals for promulgation. As a result, the number of cosponsors for NPC bills is artificially inflated. Third, the names of cosponsors behind a NPC bill or a CPPCC policy proposal are not public information even among the delegates; thus cosponsors receive less credit from their selectorates. In contrast, the identity of the lead sponsor

who submits a bill or proposal is always public information; hence, CPPCC delegates prefer submitting a policy proposal to cosponsoring one.

Given these considerations, we argue that policy coalitions can be observed when separate NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals are highly coordinated on specific policy issues. We adopt two strategies in identifying policy coalitions in the NPC and CPPCC. For the NPC, our interviews reveal an unspoken norm in NPC bill sponsorship: Cross-province cosponsorship of a bill is discouraged, and sometimes even prohibited. Hence, a typical NPC proposal is cosponsored by delegates from one province. To circumvent this unspoken norm, some NPC delegates from different provinces submit similar bills, and sometimes these bills even share the same title. Informed by this insight, we make use of two definitions of *policy coalition* in this paper. The narrow definition of *policy coalition* includes only the bills that share exactly the same bill title in a given year. The broad definition includes bills that have very similar titles but differ by a few words.

Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of policy coalition in the NPC by using the narrow definition. As shown, the average number of provinces behind a bill was around one, and the frequency of provinces joining the policy coalition was zero in many NPC sessions. Notably, we observe two cycles of policy coalitions in the 1980s and 2000s, and the policy coalition building was significantly higher in the 2000s, peaking in 2005. Panel B in Figure 2 uses the broad definition, and the pattern is consistent with the figure in Panel A. More interestingly, we identify some small policy coalitions during the 1990s by using this broad definition.

[Figure 2]

Because the CPPCC does not have the same unspoken norm that discourages delegates from cosponsoring a policy proposal across provinces, CPPCC policy proposals are more heterogeneous

and rarely share the same title. Our interviews, however, reveal that a policy coalition can be observed in two forms. First, although the CPPCC allows for policy proposals to target a specific region, the policy coalition organized by the MOE tends to focus on issues concerning the entire country instead of a specific region. Thus, the MOE could indirectly pressure the central government, especially the Ministry of Finance, for greater education funding because the local governments are not supposed to be responsible for a national issue. Second, the MOE sometimes encourages delegates to directly pressure the central government for greater education spending by making explicit demands for financial resources in the proposals. Some proposals may even single out the Ministry of Finance to provide a response to such demands.

Figure 3 illustrates the policy coalition of CPPCC proposals concerning national policy and demanding financial responsibility from the central governance, and two interesting patterns emerge. First, we observe that the coalition of national policy occurs more frequently than the coalition demanding financial resources from the central government in most CPPCC sessions. This is not very surprising largely because joining the coalition for national policy is less risky than the coalition demanding the central government's fiscal commitment because the second coalition is a direct challenge to the Ministry of Finance (MOF)—a powerful agency in the central government. Second, the rise and fall of the coalition demanding the central government's financial commitment mimics the patterns of coalition building that we observed in the NPC. More importantly, a greater number of policy proposals have made financial demands upon the central government since 2000.

[Figure 3]

The Participation of Policy Coalitions

Our theoretical framework suggests two observable implications of bureaucratic influence in the NPC and CPPCC. First, bureaucratic influence operates mainly through delegates with specific employment ties to central government agencies. Second, NPC delegates are less susceptible to bureaucratic influence than the CPPCC delegates because of different selection processes for NPC and CPPCC delegates.

To evaluate these two claims, we first estimated a probit model to identify the correlation between the characteristics of the sponsor and participation in policy coalitions in the NPC and CPPCC. Table 1 reports the estimation results. First, we find little evidence that employment ties to central government agencies or to the education sector positively correlate with participation in policy coalitions in the NPC (Columns 1–4). We find evidence, however, that employment ties to the central government agencies positively correlate with participation in the national policy coalition in the CPPCC (Columns 5–6). More importantly, those CPPCC delegates with employment ties to the education sector, especially the education institutions controlled by the MOE, are more likely to join the coalition that demands the central government's financial commitment (Columns 7–8). Notably, the estimate of employment ties to central government agencies is negative and statistically significant in the model when we include the interaction term of employment ties to both central government agencies and the education sector (Column 8). Our interpretation is that delegates working for the local government are more eager to demand central government funding because fiscal transfers from the central government are windfall revenues to their local governments.

Another interesting result emerging from this analysis is that parties serve as one of the main venues for coalition building. Both CCP party members as well as non-CCP party members are more likely to participate in the coalitions than nonparty members. In particular, non-CCP party

members are more active in the CPPCC, which is subject to less control by the CCP. This finding is consistent with our qualitative studies showing that the party is an important institution for coalition building among NPC and CPPCC delegates.

Table 1 about there

One may argue that we have not adequately controlled for local conditions that correlate with the participation of these policy coalitions. Table A2 in the online appendix reports our robustness checks after including provincial dummies. Estimates of our main independent variables and employment ties to central government agencies and the education sector as well as their interaction terms are quantitatively consistent with those reported in Table 1. Investigating the estimates of provincial dummies, we note that no provinces consistently participate in policy coalitions in the NPC largely because of CCP control of cross-province coalition building in the NPC.

Explaining the Cycle of Coalition Building

To this point we have identified the existence of policy coalitions and factors associated with their participation in the Chinese national assemblies; however, our theoretical framework suggests that coalition building is often discouraged and even prohibited by the ruling elites because they fear the potential of overthrow. Indeed, Figure 1 illustrates the rise and fall of policy coalitions in both the NPC and CPPCC. To explain this cyclical pattern, we argue that elite incongruence provides an opportunity for coalition building in the national assemblies. In this section, we empirically evaluate this claim. Below, we first describe our measures of elite incongruence in the Chinese context, then analyze the determinants of NPC and CPPCC proposal submissions concerning compulsory education.

The Measures of Elite Incongruence

Students of Chinese politics have long noted that the Chinese political system is marked by constant power shifts, resulting in policy cycles. Studying the reform era, Baum (1993) attributes the cycles of economic policies to the shifting power balance among top elites. Liu et al. (2013) extend this argument through a detailed analysis of the composition of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the cycles of economic decentralization since 1949. Shih (2008) documents the elite conflicts behind monetary policies in China. Tanner (1995) observes that these cycles provide opportunities for legislative entrepreneurs to advocate their policy proposals to the top leaders.

Empirically capturing elite incongruence is challenging because the inner political struggle among top elites is difficult to observe. We employed two strategies to measure elite incongruence. Our first measure relies on the removal or investigation of CCP Politburo members. The Politburo is considered the command headquarters of the CCP. It typically has fourteen to twenty-five members, who are the top power elites (Lieberthal 2004). Since the 1980s, the norm is that Politburo members usually serve at least two terms and retire after they reach the age of 70. However, the power struggle among ruling elites could result in irregularities in personnel changes in the Politburo. One prominent example is CCP General Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Politburo Standing Committee Member Hu Qili, who were removed from the Politburo after the 1989 Tiananmen student protests. Another example is the removal of Beijing Party Secretary Chen Xitong in 1995 and Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006 due to corruption charges. This type of "irregular" personnel changes in the Politburo indicates intense power struggle among ruling elites. Following this observation, we created a dummy variable, and coded it one when at least one or more Politburo members was under investigation, dismissed from their position or expelled from the party, and sentenced to prison at any given year, and zero otherwise. Because

elite struggle often occurs before these events were made public, we also coded the year before the occurrence of these events as one. [16]

Our second measure of elite incongruence hinges on the demand of power sharing among ruling elites. To capture this phenomenon in China, we constructed a variable measuring the frequency of calling for intraparty democracy (*dangnei minzhu*) in the *People's Daily*, the official propaganda newspaper of the CCP, between 1983 and 2007. [17] At the end of Mao's era, Deng Xiaoping called for the institutionalization of collective leadership within the CCP, which implies greater power sharing among party elites for collective leadership (Miller 2008). One essential principle of collective leadership is intraparty democracy, which implies that decision making must follow the majority rule among ruling elites in order to prevent the domination of a small number of people with greater political power (Li 2009). We suggest that the call for intraparty democracy is a means for the ruling coalition to demand the reconfiguration of power sharing among top elites.

Empirical Results

To adjudicate the effects of elite incongruence with the rising-responsiveness argument, we constructed a province–year panel dataset for all the NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals between 1983 and 2007. Our main dependent variable is the total number of proposals submitted by delegates from province *i* in year *t*. We employed a negative binomial model because of the overdispersion of our dependent variable: A large number of provinces submitted no education-related bills or proposals in any given year. Our secondary dependent variables include only the NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals that are part of the policy coalition defined above.

[16] See Appendix 2 for the complete list of events and our coding rule.
[17] We collected the data by searching the keyword *intraparty democracy* (*dangnei minzhu*) in the *People's Daily* Archive.

We had two sets of key independent variables. The first set captures the elite-centered mechanism—elite incongruence—and it consisted of either the indicator of irregular" Politburo personnel change or the percentage of *People's Daily* articles calling for intraparty democracy.

The second set of key independent variables measures the rising-responsiveness mechanism, the indicators of provincial education and labor market conditions, which allow us to evaluate whether delegates channel information about local conditions to influence national policymaking. These provincial characteristics include provincial education conditions, such as the percentage of government spending on education, culture, and science as an indicator for local education input and the percentage of teachers in the local labor force as a proxy for the strength of the local education system. We also use the total number of students in compulsory education in the province as the indicator for the need to invest in education. We include a number of variables indicating the fiscal capacity and the structure of the local labor market for education spending. We use the percentage of changes from the previous year of these provincial indicators in our estimation models. The actual values of these provincial characteristics are static from one year to another, and our aim is to capture in our model the way that changing provincial characteristics motivate delegates to submit related proposals. All the model specifications include provincial fixed effects in order to capture unobserved time–invariant provincial characteristics.[18]

Table 2 reports the estimation results, and we find consistent evidence that elite incongruence, but not local education or labor market conditions, can better explain the patterns of NPC bill and CPPCC policy proposal submission.[19] The estimates of both measures of elite incongruence are

[18] We cannot use year fixed effects because our measures of elite-centered mechanisms vary only across years but not within any given year.

[19] In an alternative specification, we lagged our independent variables that measure elite incongruence because one could argue that NPC bill and CPPPC policy proposals in year *t* can be affected only by elite power struggle in year *t-1*. Tables A3 in Appendix 3 show that most estimates of our key independent variables for elite incongruence remain statistically significant and are quantitatively similar to the estimates reported in Tables 3.

positive and statistically significant across all model specifications in both the NPC and CPPCC. That is, the greater incongruence among ruling elites, the greater the number of NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals submitted.

Table 2 about there

Turning to the analysis of the rising-responsiveness mechanism, we find that most variables of provincial characteristics have little correlation with either NPC bill or CPPCC proposal submissions. Even when they are statistically significant, the signs of estimates point in the opposite direction of our expectations. For example, a change in the percentage of students enrolling in compulsory education negatively correlates with NPC bill submissions. We would, however, expect a positive correlation because an increase in student enrollment in compulsory education would lead to a preference for greater attention to compulsory education.

We then reanalyze a subset of our data that include only NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals joining the policy coalitions. The estimation results reported in Table 3 show patterns similar to those in Table 2. Measures of elite incongruence positively correlate with the submission of NPC bills and CPPCC policy proposals. Note that the estimates of *Irregular Politburo Personnel Change* are not statistically significant in two models. Our interpretation is that this measure is a binary, which is less likely to be estimated precisely than our second continuous measure. However, all the estimates of this measure have the corrected sign. Meanwhile, the estimates of *Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"* are larger for the analysis of CPPCC coalitions, indicating that CPPCC delegates are more susceptible to bureaucratic influence.

Again, there is no evidence that local conditions predict policy coalitions in the NPC and CPPCC. For example, the rising student enrollment and labor force in the primary sector (agriculture) should associate with rising demand for investment in primary education, but the

estimates of these variables negatively correlate with coalition participation in the NPC and are mostly not statistically significant with coalition participation in the CPPCC. In addition, most estimates of local conditions have no statistically significant correlation with the CPPCC policy coalitions that demand central government financial resources.

Table 3 about there

Evaluating Alternative Explanations to the Bill and Policy Proposal Cycles

One major concern with the model specification above is that we have insufficiently addressed potential spatial diffusion during the policy coalition building process, especially given that our main independent variable, the incongruence of power sharing among top elites, is a common shock to all the provinces. Failing to incorporate the spatial and temporal lags could lead to omitted variable bias (Franzese and Hays 2007). To address this concern, we include a spatial lag in our model.[20] As Table A4 in the appendix shows, we observe evidence of spatial diffusion in both NPC and CPPCC policy coalition across provinces. The spatial lag is stronger in the NPC than the CPPCC, largely because NPC delegates are organized by provinces and they are more likely to build cross-province coalitions. Meanwhile, the estimates of our main measures of elite incongruence remain largely consistent with the main results reported in Table 3.[21]

Second, one may argue that the patterns of NPC bill and CPPCC policy proposals could be driven by the overall media environment that facilitates the flow of information. As a result, NPC and CPPCC delegates merely channel local demand into national policymaking when the media turns its attention to certain policy issues. To control for the effect of media influence, we include

[20] The spatial lag is the weighted average of y_{jt}, where j is the geographically adjacent provinces of province i.
[21] Although only one of the estimates of *Irregular Politburo Personnel Change* is statistically significant, they all have the correct signs. Meanwhile, the estimates of *Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"* remain statistically significant in three out of four models. One reason for the weaker results is that the diffusion process is driven by elite incongruence, thus they are highly correlated.

variables measuring national and provincial newspaper circulation in our models. Table A5 in the appendix reports the results of the analysis of NPC coalitions, and Table A6 reports the results for CPPCC coalitions. This set of analyses offers three main findings. First, the estimates of media influence are mostly positive and statistically significant in the analyses of both NPC and CPPCC coalitions. Second, the estimates of elite incongruence are quantitatively similar to the baseline models but statistically significant only for the CPPCC analysis in a consistent manner. Our interpretation is that elite incongruence and media environment are highly correlated in our data; thus the correlation removes the explanation power of our measures of elite incongruence. Further, our theoretical argument suggests that CPPCC is more subject to bureaucratic influence, thus the results are more robust in the CPPCC analysis.

Third, one could argue that these results are driven by the "harmonious society initiative" of the Hu–Wen regime of 2002, which emphasized the provision of public goods and abolished school tuition and fees for compulsory education in 2006. We re-analyzed our data by excluding observations after 2002. As shown in Tables A7, our results are weakened to some extent, but the estimates of elite incongruence remain statistically significant in the CPPCC analysis. We still do not find any evidence that local conditions are correlated with coalition building in the NPC and CPPCC.

Finally, some may still argue that our provincial indicators are not good measures of local demand, and we should consider public opinion data to directly measure local residents' policy preferences. Unfortunately, China does not have comprehensive public opinion data to evaluate constituency influence in the legislature. Nonetheless, we explore one way to approximate the existing literature on constituency influence by taking advantage of the 2004 "Chinese Attitudes toward Inequality and Distributive Injustice," designed and implemented by a team of scholars

from academic institutions in both the United States and China.[22] We used the only variable in the survey measuring citizens' demand for greater government spending in education and calculated the average response for each province.[23] Our analysis shows little positive correlation between citizens' demand and delegate behavior in each province, whether before, during, or after the 2004 survey in both the NPC and CPPCC. Figures B1 and B2 in the Appendix 4 shows that the fitted regression lines of NPC bills and CPPCC proposals are negative in most years, and the estimates are not statistically significant.

Policy Coalition Building through Network Mediation and Brokerage

One remaining question is identifying the ways through which key actors build policy coalitions. Our qualitative evidence has shown that delegates with employment ties to the MOE are crucial in the coalition building process. However, if MOE exclusively relies on delegates with employment ties, the size of the policy coalition would be small because these delegates do not occupy majority seats in the national assemblies. Alternatively, a more effective coalition building strategy is that these delegates use their own personal networks to recruit other delegates during the policy coalition building process.

As demonstrated in our interviews, two types of personal networks facilitate the recruitment. The first type is party affiliation, because party discipline and coordination help a delegate recruit other delegates within the same party. The second type is geographical location of employment. Residing in the same locations allows some delegates to interact with others and persuade them to submit bills and proposals.

[22] See Whyte (2010) for more details about the first wave of the survey conducted in 2004.
[23] Note that these numbers are only approximates and may not be representative for the province because the sampling strategy in the 2004 survey aimed to achieve representation for the national sample instead of the provincial sample.

To illustrate how party and geographical networks facilitate policy coalition building, we employed network analysis to investigate CPPCC policy proposals. One may argue that network analysis does not provide direct evidence that delegates lobby and mobilize each other during the policy coalition building process. However, this technique allows us to show that some key delegates use their party and location affiliations as the social ties linking other delegates together within a policy coalition. Our network analysis primarily focuses on the CPPCC for three reasons. First, the CPPCC is subject to less control by the CCP than the NPC; thus we observe stronger policy coalition building in the CPPCC. Second, CPPCC delegates are selected by the central elites without competitive elections, so they are more susceptible to bureaucratic influence. Finally, CPPCC data contain more delegates for our network analysis than NPC data.

Based on the characteristics of the delegates who initiated the CPPCC proposal, we mapped their connections through party and location ties for every year between 1983 and 2007. We used the *Fruchterman-Reingold* layout algorithm to draw the undirected network such that the distance between delegates is proportional to the shortest path linking them. The figures of all 25 yearly CPPCC networks are reported in Appendix 5 (Figures C1 – C25). Each figure presents two networks for the policy coalitions of *National Policy* and *Demanding Central Government Financial Resources*, respectively. In each network, the nodes represent delegates who submitted a policy proposal for a coalition in a given year, and the color and shape of the nodes indicate the employment ties with central government agencies and/or the education sector. The linkages between delegates are based on both party affiliation and provincial location of their employment.

Due to space limitations, we focus our discussion on networks in selected years that exemplify coalition building in the CPPCC. We first focus on 1985 (Figure 4), the height of coalition building in the 1980s; all three key CPPCC delegates linking different subgroups together in both the

coalition of *National Policy* and the coalition of *Demanding Central Governance Finance* are central elites, who use their party network (CCP) and location network (Beijing) to build the policy coalitions. In a similar vein, we observe the same pattern in 2005 (Figure 5), the height of coalition building in the 2000s. The difference is that policy coalition building was more intensified. Not only did a greater number of delegates participate in submitting education-related proposals, but several subgroups of delegates, who have no employment ties with the education sector, are mobilized by key brokers through the party connection as well as the location connection. When we investigate the low points of policy coalitions, such as 1991 (Figures 6), we do not observe dense networks of delegates using party or location ties in either policy coalition, nor do we observe that delegates with employment ties to the MOE played an central role in linking delegates together.

[Figure 4]

[Figure 5]

[Figure 6]

These figures offer important insights into coalition building in the CPPCC. To formally analyze these networks, we calculated the centrality measures to identify the key delegates in each network. The first network centrality indicator is betweenness, which identifies a node's position within a network in terms of its ability to make connections to other pairs in a network. This indicator allows us to identify the delegate who has the most influence in connecting other delegates who otherwise would not have been connected. A second network centrality measure is eigenvalue, an indicator measuring the degree to which a node is connected to another highly connected node. This indicator allows us to capture the ability of a delegate to connect with other influential delegates who also have high mobilization capacity with many connections. Finally, we

follow Gould and Fernandez (1989) by calculating the brokerage measure, which allows us to identify the key delegates who connect various subgroups of delegates instead of individual delegates.

Table 4 reports the summary statistics of these centrality measures in CPPCC policy coalitions. We find consistent evidence that delegates with employment ties to the Ministry of Education played a critical role in bridging delegates in the policy coalitions. Across all different network centrality measures, these delegates have a higher scores than other delegates, and the differences are statistically significant. Taken together, our results suggest that employment ties to the MOE are critical in creating bridges between delegates as well as connecting influential delegates who have greater mobilization capacity themselves. Substantively, these results corroborate our argument that delegates need to signal their loyalty to central government agencies; thus they are more active not only in bill initiation but also in building policy coalitions in the national assemblies.

Table 4 about there

Conclusion

Studying authoritarian institutions has captured renewed interest among scholars in recent years, yet most studies focus on cooperation and information mechanisms. Using a new analytical lens, we argue that authoritarian legislatures could serve as a signaling mechanism among bureaucracies to advance their agenda in policymaking. Studying China's national assemblies between 1983 and 2007, we show that bureaucratic influence leads to policy coalition building in the NPC and CPPCC despite the control of these institutions by the CCP.

Our paper is among the emerging scholarship of authoritarian legislatures that is built on micro-level evidence. Other researchers have investigated the query sessions in the Vietnamese

national assembly (Malesky and Schuler 2010) and roll-call votes in authoritarian Brazil (Desposato 2001) to understand cooptation mechanisms. We analyze twenty-five years' bills and policy proposals in the Chinese national assemblies and show that bureaucratic influence is another important function in authoritarian legislatures. Our finding is particularly relevant to a class of authoritarian regimes whose political systems produce persistent structural conflicts among different functioning groups. In this institutional setting, legislative behavior reflects strategic interaction and coalition building among different groups of elites.

Our paper also contributes to the scholarship that emphasizes the importance of bargaining among government bureaucracies in policymaking in China (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2009). We show that bureaucratic bargaining even spills over into the NPC and CPPCC, especially when ruling elites lack congruence in their power sharing. As a result, legislative activism is not necessarily confined to the local congresses in China. One important new insight of our paper is that legislative activism exists even in the national assemblies. It does so through building policy coalitions via bills and proposals.

This paper offers three important implications for understanding the politics of authoritarian legislatures. First, these kinds of so-called democratic institutions are still driven primarily by elite politics, especially when the electoral connection to the masses is weak or absent. Second, we observe a potential pattern of logrolling behaviors among delegates in Chinese national assemblies because delegates without employment ties to education were mobilized at the height of coalition building.[24] Investigating more sophisticated delegate behaviors in these seemingly ceremonial national assemblies could be a fruitful future research direction. Third, despite its limitations, authoritarian legislatures provide an important opportunity for a larger set of regime insiders to

[24] Due to data limitation, we cannot test this argument in our paper.

influence policymaking. This may be considered a form of institutional pluralism, not unlike that observed in Soviet politics (Hough 1983). The skirmishes of the proxy fighters may well be an important step toward a more inclusive political system.

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

Figure 1: NPC and CPPCC Compulsory Education Proposals (1983 – 2007)

Panel A:



Panel B:



Figure 2: Policy Coalition in the NPC (1983 – 2007)



Figure 3: Policy Coalition in the CPPCC (1983 – 2007)



Figure 4: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1985



Figure 5: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2005



Figure 6: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1991

Table 1: Determinants of Policy Coalition Participation (1983-2007)

	NPC Bills				CPPCC Proposals			
	Narrow Coalition Definition		Broad Coalition Definition		Coalition of National Policy		Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Central Work Unit	0.280	-0.073	-0.063	-0.252	0.805***	0.562***	-0.150	-0.607***
	(0.239)	(0.643)	(0.289)	(0.465)	(0.151)	(0.205)	(0.105)	(0.138)
Education Sector Tie	-0.132	-0.253	-0.146	-0.216	-0.020	-0.085	0.149**	0.012
	(0.196)	(0.276)	(0.260)	(0.301)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Central Work Unit × Education Sector Tie		0.548		0.295		0.386		0.629***
		(0.784)		(0.589)		(0.241)		(0.188)
Female	-0.129	-0.123	0.181	0.183	0.346***	0.355***	-0.181	-0.168
	(0.225)	(0.235)	(0.335)	(0.333)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Years of Experience in National Assemblies	0.005	0.004	-0.012	-0.013	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
CCP Party Member	0.349	0.378	0.900*	0.916*	0.192*	0.213**	0.056	0.106
	(0.473)	(0.472)	(0.472)	(0.470)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.119)	(0.124)
Non-CCP Party Member	0.531	0.543	1.256**	1.266**	0.770***	0.783***	0.188*	0.209*
	(0.467)	(0.464)	(0.595)	(0.594)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.108)
Observations	169	169	169	169	1,136	1,136	1,136	1,136

Note: The estimation results are based on probit models. Dependent variable is coded 1 if a NPC bill or CPPCC proposal is part of the coalition defined above. Clustered standard errors for a given year are reported in the parentheses. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Determinants of NPC & CPPCC Proposal Submission by Province (1983-2007)

	# of NPC Bills					# of CPPCC Proposals				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Elite Incongruence										
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.408***			0.367**		0.387***			0.342***	
	(0.138)			(0.157)		(0.093)			(0.110)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		6.692***			4.954***		5.120***			5.510***
		(1.096)			(1.381)		(0.680)			(0.655)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions										
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending			-0.007	-0.006	-0.000			-0.003	-0.003	0.008
			(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment			0.069***	0.057**	0.038			0.030***	0.020	0.022*
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)			(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)			-2.878***	-2.741***	-1.802**			-0.287	-0.296	0.202
			(0.668)	(0.647)	(0.714)			(0.270)	(0.266)	(0.274)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)			0.047	0.036	0.071			0.065	0.062	0.131**
			(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.088)			(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.055)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector			-0.088***	-0.086***	-0.032*			-0.026	-0.028	0.000
			(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)			(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector			-0.015	-0.009	0.001			-0.005	-0.003	0.001
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	790	760	754	754	729	790	760	754	754	729

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant and provincial fixed effects dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Determinants of Coalition Participation in NPC and CPPCC by Province (1983-2007)

	NPC Bills				CPPCC Proposals			
	Narrow Coalition Definition		Broad Coalition Definition		Coalition of National Policy		Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elite Incongruence								
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.215		0.307*		0.469***		0.228	
	(0.221)		(0.166)		(0.095)		(0.158)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		4.338***		4.990***		5.273***		10.938***
		(1.461)		(1.395)		(0.653)		(0.672)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions								
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	0.004	0.009	-0.006	-0.001	-0.001	0.011*	-0.021*	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.134***	0.106*	0.077**	0.052*	0.024	0.033***	0.029	0.018
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-5.857***	-5.113***	-3.348***	-2.368***	-0.475*	0.047	-0.891**	-0.096
	(0.766)	(0.779)	(0.635)	(0.703)	(0.268)	(0.193)	(0.374)	(0.458)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.080	0.078	0.007	0.030	0.029	0.110*	-0.056	0.045
	(0.132)	(0.147)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.070)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.161***	-0.105***	-0.100***	-0.040*	-0.031	-0.003	-0.062	0.004
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.048)	(0.027)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	-0.006	0.012	-0.019	-0.004	-0.002	0.001	-0.017	-0.008
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	754	729	754	729	754	729	754	729

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year that is part of a NPC bill coalition or a CPPCC policy coalition as defined above. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant and provincial fixed effects dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Network Analysis of Policy Coalition

		Coalition of National Policy			Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources		
		Betweenness	**Eigenvalue**	**Brokerage**	**Betweenness**	**Eigenvalue**	**Brokerage**
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Direct MOE Employment Tie = 1	Mean	0.035	0.566	-0.592	0.034	0.532	-0.339
	Std. Err	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.124)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.161)
	N	207	207	207	91	91	91
Direct MOE Employment Tie = 0	Mean	0.023	0.306	-1.272	0.024	0.301	-0.997
	Std. Err	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.046)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.062)
	N	685	685	685	347	349	345
Sig. Diff. Level		0.003***	0.000***	0.000***	0.138	0.000***	0.000***

Note: We reported the means of network centrality measures between the group of delegates with direct employment ties to the MOE and otherwise. We code direct MOE employment tie to one when the delegate's employment is linked to both the central government agency and education sector. All the network centrality measures are standardized. T-test results are based on the assumption of unequal variances. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 1: The list of CPPCC formal organized groups

1. Communist Party
2. Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang
3. China Democratic League
4. China Democratic National Construction Association
5. China Association for Promoting Democracy
6. Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party
7. China Zhi Gong Party
8. Jiu San Society
9. Taiwan Democratic Self-government League
10. Personages without party affiliation
11. Communist Youth League of China
12. All-China Federation of Trade Unions
13. All-China Women's Federation
14. All-China Youth Federation
15. All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce
16. China Association for Science and Technology
17. All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots
18. All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese
19. Literature and art Circles
20. Science and technology Circles
21. Social sciences Circles
22. Economic Circles
23. Agriculture Circles
24. Education Circles
25. Sports Circles
26. Press and publication Circles
27. Medicine and health Circles
28. Group for Friendship with Foreign Countries
29. Group for Welfare and Social Security
30. Ethnic minorities
31. Religious bodies
32. Specially invited figures from Hong Kong
33. Specially invited figures from Macao
34. Other specially invited figures

Appendix 2: The Coding Rule of *Irregular Politburo Personnel Change*

We consider the following events as the indicators of irregular personnel change in the Chinese Communist Party Politburo between 1983 and 2007:

1987: Hu Yaobang resigned from the position of General Party Secretary of the CCP.

1987: Ni Zhifou retired from the Politburo.

1989: Zhao Ziyang was stripped of his positions of General Party Secretary of the CCP and the Politburo Standing Committee.

1989: Hu Qili was stripped of his position in the Politburo Standing Committee.

1995: Chen Xitong was stripped of his position in the Politburo.

1997: Chen Xitong was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party.

1998: Chen Xitong was formally sentenced to prison.

2006: Chen Liangyu was stripped of his position in the Politburo.

2007: Chen Liangyu was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party.

We coded the variable *Irregular Politburo Personnel Change* as one for the years above as well as the year prior to any of these events.

Appendix 3: Additional Tables

Table A1: The Characteristics of NPC Bill & CPPCC Proposal on Compulsory Education (1983-2007)

	NPC Bill		CPPCC Proposal	
	Mean	*N*	Mean	*N*
Central Work Unit	23.2%	194	28.0%	1220
Education Sector Tie	60.5%	190	62.5%	1215
Female	32.8%	201	23.1%	1221
Years of Experience in National Assemblies	4.29	199	5.17	1208
CCP Party Member	59.4%	170	22.7%	1186
Non-CCP Party Member	36.5%	170	53.6%	1186
No Party	4.1%	170	23.7%	1186

Note: Authors' database, which include 210 NPC bills and 1255 CPPCC policy proposal on compulsory education between 1983 and 2007.

Table A2: Determinants of Policy Coalition Participation with Provincial Fixed Effects (1983-2007)

	NPC Bills				CPPCC Proposals			
	Narrow Coalition Definition		Broad Coalition Definition		Coalition of National Policy		Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Central Work Unit	0.259	-0.244	-0.185	-0.766	0.446***	0.220	0.100	-0.297*
	(0.300)	(0.872)	(0.280)	(0.569)	(0.128)	(0.213)	(0.123)	(0.161)
Education Sector Tie	-0.122	-0.270	-0.098	-0.233	0.049	-0.026	0.169**	0.050
	(0.279)	(0.371)	(0.324)	(0.346)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.083)	(0.092)
Central Work Unit ×		0.778		0.827		0.359		0.517***
Education Sector Tie		(0.985)		(0.729)		(0.251)		(0.200)
Female	-0.259	-0.272	0.493	0.497	0.426***	0.433***	-0.101	-0.094
	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.386)	(0.387)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Years of Experience in	0.001	-0.000	-0.045	-0.045	-0.020*	-0.021*	-0.002	-0.003
National Assemblies	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
CCP Party Member	0.410	0.380	1.052*	1.064*	0.160	0.183	0.084	0.121
	(0.696)	(0.678)	(0.571)	(0.578)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.122)	(0.125)
Non-CCP Party Member	0.556	0.524	1.101**	1.164**	0.466***	0.478***	0.213**	0.232**
	(0.721)	(0.700)	(0.534)	(0.520)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.107)	(0.105)
Anhui	0.137	-0.188	0.704	0.279			1.219***	1.176***
	(1.067)	(0.903)	(0.704)	(0.831)			(0.364)	(0.370)
Fujian	1.456*	1.184			-0.374	-0.408	0.517**	0.463*
	(0.835)	(0.782)			(0.256)	(0.273)	(0.244)	(0.245)
Gansu					-0.809***	-0.830***	0.473**	0.440**
					(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.192)	(0.196)
Guangdong	0.447	0.150	0.225	-0.158	0.797*	0.768*	0.779***	0.720***
	(1.015)	(0.943)	(0.706)	(0.714)	(0.453)	(0.457)	(0.168)	(0.173)
Guangxi					-1.160***	-1.193***	0.376	0.314
					(0.362)	(0.356)	(0.270)	(0.275)
Guizhou					-0.704**	-0.726**	0.564*	0.517*
					(0.301)	(0.305)	(0.307)	(0.307)
Hebei							0.851***	0.782**
							(0.313)	(0.320)
Henan					0.171	0.134	0.570	0.505
					(0.345)	(0.352)	(0.402)	(0.416)
Heilongjiang	0.501	0.139			-0.659	-0.712	0.316	0.233
	(1.313)	(1.375)			(0.462)	(0.444)	(0.519)	(0.533)
Hubei	0.568	0.348					0.981***	0.921***
	(1.218)	(1.011)					(0.195)	(0.195)
Hunan	-0.595	-0.994			-0.007	-0.031	0.822***	0.777***
	(0.985)	(0.898)			(0.354)	(0.347)	(0.266)	(0.259)
Jilin	0.778	0.395	0.030	-0.462	-0.276	-0.302	-0.480*	-0.500*
	(1.144)	(0.907)	(0.753)	(0.836)	(0.346)	(0.352)	(0.284)	(0.278)
Jiangsu	0.368	0.071	0.939	0.548	0.682	0.663	0.681***	0.631***
	(1.084)	(1.009)	(0.710)	(0.825)	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.222)	(0.221)
Jiangxi	0.512	0.343			0.548	0.515	0.634**	0.575**
	(0.733)	(0.641)			(0.500)	(0.502)	(0.296)	(0.286)
Liaoning	0.343	0.045	0.715	0.353			0.107	0.072
	(1.126)	(1.144)	(0.647)	(0.746)			(0.381)	(0.376)
Neimenggu					-0.694**	-0.699**	0.556***	0.537***
					(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.185)	(0.189)
Ningxia					-0.580*	-0.606*	0.816***	0.767***
					(0.323)	(0.320)	(0.268)	(0.260)
Qinghai					-1.783***	-1.791***	0.710***	0.686***
					(0.289)	(0.283)	(0.263)	(0.254)
Shandong	0.731	0.519	0.657	0.378			0.389	0.390
	(0.975)	(0.862)	(0.617)	(0.681)			(0.243)	(0.242)
Shanxi	0.294	0.029			0.239	0.236	-0.489	-0.516
	(1.289)	(1.256)			(0.589)	(0.586)	(0.501)	(0.486)
Shaanxi	0.830	0.525			-0.246	-0.259	0.384	0.360
	(1.303)	(1.124)			(0.318)	(0.314)	(0.262)	(0.266)
Shanghai	0.384	0.150	0.432	0.093			-0.218	-0.285
	(1.271)	(1.202)	(0.743)	(0.777)			(0.245)	(0.250)
Sichuan	0.425	0.205			0.054	0.037	0.604***	0.559***
	(1.246)	(1.105)			(0.276)	(0.267)	(0.163)	(0.177)
Tianjin	1.008	0.661	0.919**	0.440			-0.493*	-0.548*
	(0.907)	(0.692)	(0.378)	(0.556)			(0.278)	(0.284)
Tibet					-1.864***	-1.879***	0.082	0.057
					(0.335)	(0.340)	(0.412)	(0.420)
Xinjiang					-1.216***	-1.240***	0.468***	0.421***
					(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.176)	(0.162)
Yunnan			.	-0.611	-0.904***	-0.925***	0.376*	0.332*
			(0.816)	(0.937)	(0.285)	(0.286)	(0.199)	(0.190)
Zhejiang	0.332	0.025	0.615	0.228			-0.311	-0.338
	(0.797)	(0.785)	(0.507)	(0.634)			(0.271)	(0.268)
Chongqing	1.178	0.884					0.725**	0.665**
	(1.134)	(1.103)					(0.296)	(0.302)
Hainan							0.495	0.489
							(0.904)	(0.907)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	154	154	99	99	902	902	1,134	1,134

Note: The estimation results are based on probit models. Dependent variable is coded 1 if a proposal is part of the coalition defined above. The omiteed provincial dummy is Beijing. Clustered standard errors for a given year are reported in the parentheses. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3: Determinants of NPC & CPPCC Proposal Submission by Province (1983-2007) (Lagged One Year)

	NPC Bills			CPPCC Proposals		
	All	Narrow Coalition Definition	Broad Coalition Definition	All	Coalition of National Policy	Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elite Incongruence						
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"	5.252***	2.358	4.964***	4.711***	4.636***	9.714***
	(1.357)	(1.531)	(1.299)	(0.761)	(0.741)	(0.739)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions						
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	-0.002	0.008	-0.001	0.006	0.008	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.031	0.079	0.046	0.015	0.024*	0.004
	(0.028)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.026)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-1.824***	-5.662***	-2.467***	0.023	-0.083	-0.149
	(0.699)	(0.892)	(0.693)	(0.218)	(0.177)	(0.329)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.057	0.072	0.021	0.114**	0.086	0.053
	(0.097)	(0.142)	(0.107)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.041*	-0.111***	-0.053**	-0.010	-0.012	-0.027
	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.034)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	-0.005	0.005	-0.012	-0.006	-0.005	-0.024**
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	703	703	703	703	703	703

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant as well as provincial dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Determinants of Coalition Participation in NPC and CPPCC by Province (1983-2007) (Controlling for Spatial Diffusion)

	NPC Bills				CPPCC Proposals			
	Narrow Coalition Definition		Broad Coalition Definition		Coalition of National Policy		Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Spatial Lag	1.326***	1.072***	0.863***	0.713***	0.182**	0.019	0.788***	0.199***
	(0.293)	(0.305)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.080)	(0.034)	(0.088)	(0.073)
Elite Incongruence								
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.080		0.158		0.335***		0.049	
	(0.220)		(0.166)		(0.103)		(0.138)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		2.578		2.964**		5.116***		9.103***
		(1.655)		(1.435)		(0.784)		(0.908)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions								
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	-0.004	0.002	-0.009	-0.005	-0.002	0.011*	-0.018*	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.119**	0.101*	0.055*	0.039	0.020	0.032**	0.007	0.012
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-4.852***	-4.650***	-2.078***	-1.736**	-0.396*	0.039	-0.415	-0.125
	(0.809)	(0.845)	(0.657)	(0.757)	(0.220)	(0.194)	(0.325)	(0.463)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.033	0.049	-0.002	0.008	0.040	0.108*	-0.045	0.027
	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.071)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.122***	-0.092***	-0.038	-0.010	-0.023	-0.003	-0.021	0.003
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	0.007	0.016	-0.004	0.003	-0.001	0.001	-0.011	-0.008
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	754	729	754	729	754	729	754	729

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year that is part of a NPC bill coalition or a CPPCC policy coalition as defined above.We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant and provincial fixed effects dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5: Coalition Building in NPC (1983-2007) (Controlling for Media)

	Narrow Coalition Definition				Broad Coalition Definition			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elite Incongruence								
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.118		0.072		0.263*		0.226	
	(0.232)		(0.250)		(0.154)		(0.165)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		6.296**		3.351		3.326		2.241
		(2.648)		(2.506)		(2.163)		(1.887)
Log(Total National Printed Newspapers Copies)	0.552	-0.625			1.198***	0.576		
	(0.499)	(0.761)			(0.415)	(0.584)		
Log(Total Provincial Printed Newspapers Copies)			0.720*	0.280			1.078***	0.802*
			(0.433)	(0.616)			(0.329)	(0.429)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions								
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.099*	0.114**	0.091	0.098	0.026	0.041	0.014	0.024
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-5.827***	-4.943***	-5.669***	-5.150***	-2.855***	-2.476***	-2.811***	-2.548***
	(0.728)	(0.832)	(0.774)	(0.764)	(0.643)	(0.728)	(0.593)	(0.656)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.076	0.085	0.093	0.086	0.025	0.031	0.045	0.051
	(0.143)	(0.147)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.098)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.123***	-0.110***	-0.108***	-0.099**	-0.040	-0.034	-0.032	-0.025
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	0.007	0.011	0.011	0.014	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	729	729	715	715	729	729	715	715

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant as well as provincial dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Coalition Building in CPPCC (1983-2007) (Controlling for Media)

	Coalition of National Policy				Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elite Incongruence								
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.416***		0.389***		0.019		0.086	
	(0.086)		(0.095)		(0.134)		(0.164)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		4.845***		4.215***		3.075**		7.091***
		(1.001)		(0.719)		(1.249)		(0.987)
Log(Total National Printed Newspapers Copies)	1.043***	0.161			4.026***	3.103***		
	(0.278)	(0.354)			(0.414)	(0.637)		
Log(Total Provincial Printed Newspapers Copies)			0.896***	0.373			2.690***	1.475***
			(0.227)	(0.238)			(0.336)	(0.344)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions								
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	0.008	0.011*	0.006	0.010*	0.003	0.004	-0.005	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.009	0.031**	-0.002	0.025**	-0.021	-0.012	-0.044	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-0.255	0.053	-0.298	-0.014	-0.133	-0.098	-0.317	-0.068
	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.205)	(0.164)	(0.259)	(0.305)	(0.229)	(0.356)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.062	0.108*	0.045	0.098	0.070	0.054	-0.004	0.017
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.013	-0.003	-0.009	0.001	0.014	0.016	-0.006	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.011	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	729	729	715	715	729	729	715	715

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant as well as provincial dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7: Coalition Building in NPC and CPPCC during the Pre-Hu-Wen Regime (1983-2001)

	NPC Bills				CPPCC Proposals			
	Narrow Coalition Definition		Broad Coalition Definition		Coalition of National Policy		Coalition of Demanding Central Gov. Financial Resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elite Incongruence								
Irregular Politburo Personnel Change	0.393		0.178		0.304**		-0.534***	
	(0.380)		(0.189)		(0.129)		(0.205)	
Call for "Intra-Party Democracy"		4.238		0.633		4.826***		9.502***
		(4.626)		(3.698)		(1.300)		(2.514)
Responsiveness to Local Conditions								
Δ % of Edu, Culture, & Science in Total Gov. Spending	0.016	0.018	-0.002	0.001	0.011	0.016*	0.011	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Δ % of Teachers in Total Employment	0.169***	0.150**	0.102**	0.086*	0.030*	0.026*	0.091***	0.062*
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Δ Log(# of Students in Compulsory Education)	-5.328***	-5.178***	-1.939***	-1.965***	0.187	0.424*	-0.013	0.035
	(0.803)	(0.818)	(0.704)	(0.750)	(0.210)	(0.226)	(0.590)	(0.639)
Δ Log(Total Gov. Spending Per Capita)	0.264*	0.304*	0.088	0.093	0.103	0.149**	0.152*	0.206***
	(0.135)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.068)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Primary Sector	-0.134***	-0.118***	-0.046*	-0.040*	-0.011	-0.000	0.038	0.041
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Δ % of Labor Force in the Secondary Sector	-0.010	-0.008	-0.019	-0.018	-0.016	-0.009	-0.024**	-0.009
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Provincial FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	601	576	601	576	601	576	601	576

Note: The estimation results are based on negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in the parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of proposal submitted by a province in a given year. We did not report the coefficient estimates of the constant as well as provincial dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 4: Additional Figures



Figure B1: Evaluating Constituency Influence in the NPC



Figure B2: Evaluating Constituency Influence in the CPPCC

Appendix 5: Additional Network Graphs

Figure C1: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1983



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C2: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1984



Figure C3: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1985





Central & Edu
Central & Non−Edu
Local & Edu
Local & Non−Edu
Prov Link
Non−CCP Party Link
CCP Party Link
Party & Prov Link

Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C4: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1986



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C5: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1987



Figure C6: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1988



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C7: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1989



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C8: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1990



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C9: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1991



Figure C10: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1992



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C11: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1993



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C12: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1994



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C13: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1995



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C14: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1996



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C15: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1997



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C16: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1998



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C17: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 1999



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C18: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2000



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C19: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2001



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C20: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2002



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C21: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2003



Coalition of National Policy

Coalition of Demand Central Gov. Financial Resource

Figure C22: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2004







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Figure C23: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2005



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

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

Figure C24: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2006



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Figure C25: CPPCC Policy Coalition Network 2007







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