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and Regime Fragility

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Suicide by Competition? Authoritarian Institutional Adaptation and Regime Fragility*

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Abstract

While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a strategy in the hopes of stabilizing and extending their tenure in power, this does not mean it is always effective. Indeed, an extant literature presents strong evidence that the opening of the pursuit of power to electoral competition can make authoritarianism vulnerable. Unless it is mediated by other factors, democratic emulation by authoritarian incumbents cannot simultaneously both stabilize their rule and make it more vulnerable to democratic transitions. These two literatures leave us with a set of contradictory generalizations. Some scholars argue that reiterated multiparty competitive elections present a gradual path from authoritarianism to democracy. Can they at the same time be a source of authoritarian stability? In this paper we seek to resolve this paradox by employing a unique combination of event history modeling to assess how experiences with multiparty elections influence patterns of authoritarian survival and transition in 108 countries from 1946-2010. Our results suggest that while authoritarian regimes face increasing odds of failure during the first three iterated multiparty and competitive election cycles, subsequent iterated cycles are far less dangerous to their survival. Given that few authoritarian regimes survive past three elections, these findings should be seen as more supportive of the democratization by elections thesis than democratic emulation as a way to enhance authoritarian survival.

Introduction

The explosion of regime change since the mid-1970s commonly referred to as the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) ironically has made the classification of regimes a moving target for scholars of comparative politics. As countries moved away from conventional authoritarianism, opening up to multiparty elections, the role and significance of elections in our understanding of regimes has shifted radically. Rather than the *sine qua non* of democracy, elections are now at best merely a necessary condition. The convening of contested multiparty elections ceased to be understood as incompatible with the persistence of authoritarianism.

An early literature on frozen transitions, diminished subtypes of democracy, and regimes that fell between the standard cold war non-democratic regime types (for a summary see Collier and Levitsky 1997) has given way to a literature on “electoral” or “competitive authoritarianism” in which authoritarian incumbents are able to syncretize democratic institutions and use them to their own ends (e.g. Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006, 2013). A large number of observers have even argued that by decreasing the institutional differences between dictatorship and democracy, this half-way house has made authoritarianism more durable (for a summary see Ghandi and Lust-Okar 2009).

The latter part of the third wave also challenged our assumptions about how countries traverse the path from authoritarianism to democracy. An influential early literature understood transition as a punctuated moment in which authoritarianism gave way to democracy via the convoking of democratic “founding” elections (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1991). If conditions were propitious, this transition could in turn lead to the consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992).

As the scope of the third wave expanded geographically, this neat disjunctural model ran into trouble. There was an element of ambiguity about democratization in some postcommunist countries where old elites managed the exit from communism, justifying their continuity in power as democratic reform. Some of these countries eventually achieved minimal democratization, but only after a second round of popular mobilization kicked out these refurbished authoritarian incumbents (Bunce and Wolchik 2010). Other postcommunist states, despite such mobilizations, continue to fall short of democracy (Kalandadze and Ornstein 2009). In Africa, the process of regime change has been highly uncertain and protracted. Democratic openings with multiparty elections rarely provided neat cut points between authoritarianism and democracy. Sometimes the process resulted in somewhat liberalized dictatorships, and

sometimes democracy came to fruition in a slower more evolutionary fashion where elections led to incremental improvements in democratic quality (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2006).¹ Today, we continue to find dictatorial African incumbents such as Togo's Faure Gnassingbé, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Djibouti's Ismail Omar Guelleh, and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe still comfortably in power despite repeated multiparty elections.

These two literatures leave us with a set of contradictory generalizations. Some scholars argue that reiterated multiparty competitive elections present a gradual path from authoritarianism to democracy. Can they at the same time be a source of authoritarian stability? In this paper we seek to resolve this paradox. We begin by reviewing the literatures on authoritarian stability by democratic emulation and democratization via elections. We then conduct a series of tests of the competing theories using event history models. Our analysis assesses how experiences with multiparty elections influence patterns of authoritarian survival and transition from 1946-2010. We draw on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project to develop new measures of multiparty and competitive elections, as well as distinct electoral authoritarian regime types (Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b). We find that the competing democratization-by-elections and stabilization-by-elections theories each have their own merits. Specifically, our results suggest that while authoritarian regimes face increasing odds of failure during the first three iterated multiparty and competitive elections, subsequent iterated cycles are far less dangerous to their survival. However, given that few authoritarian regimes survive past three elections, these findings should be seen as more supportive of the democratization by elections thesis than democratic emulation as a way to enhance authoritarian survival.

I. Neo-Authoritarian Stability by Democratic Emulation?

Democracy has the great advantage of creating legitimacy through a combination of procedural and charismatic elements. It holds regular elections that choose representatives of the people to legislatures who create policies under the rule of law. At the same time, the creation of democracy involves the devolution of sovereignty from rulers on the basis of traditional and religious, or other substantive claims, to the consent of the ruled transformed into the "people." This elevation of common subjects into citizens with a voice in whom exercises authority over them represents the permanent embedding of a charismatic element into leadership selection under democracy. This combination of elements helps to explain why among modern forms of

¹ The punctuated model of direct authoritarian transition to democracy did not make sense in other periods and places as well. This point is demonstrated adeptly by Capoccia and Ziblatt's (2010) framework for historical democratization in Europe. They do so by using a historical institutionalist framework to analyze multiple critical junctures by which democracy is constructed in a piecemeal fashion.

rule democracy is perhaps the most adept at securing legitimate rule and restoring it when it comes under threat.

Thus, it is no wonder that authoritarian regimes often attempt to emulate democracies in order to legitimize and prolong their tenure. It should be recalled that the first modern dictatorship, that of Louis Napoleon in France, relied heavily on plebiscitary elections. The first set of modern dictatorships to systematically attempt an emulation of this set of procedures were Soviet-type regimes. They created legislatures elected by universal suffrage and advanced the claim that they represented a form of “people’s democracy” superior to that of heretofore existing “bourgeois” democracies. These assertions were ultimately ineffectual in as much as the real system of power in Soviet-type systems was exercised outside the bounds of legislatures. Restrictions on candidacy, the lack of party sub-system autonomy, the lack of real competition, the less than secret nature of the ballot, and the rubber-stamping of policies prepared in advance by the ruling party rendered such claims unsubstantiable over time (Kaya and Bernhard 2013).

Things became more complex with the onset of the third wave and especially after the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, non-democratic forms of rule were increasingly seen as illegitimate by domestic populations. On the other hand, countries dependent on trade and aid from the west faced increasing external pressures to democratize. Scholars note how existing forms of authoritarianism began to liberalize their regimes, including the incorporation of electoral and representative elements, to shore up their power. Further, a large number of purported democrats, quite often former authoritarian incumbents, attempted to control pressures to democratize by introducing democratic elements meant to manage such pressure without fully submitting their hold on power to the uncertainty inherent in democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013).

Faced with these developments, the discipline either thought that some transitions were more protracted or that the resulting regimes were hybrids that combined elements of democracy and dictatorship. Most often, such half-way house regimes were labeled as deficient subtypes of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997). But as these regimes persisted and seemingly demonstrated a durability in the face of democratic challenges, there came a creeping realization that we were observing a new phenomenon: authoritarian regimes that emulate elements of democracy in their quest for survival. Since that realization, the discipline has increasingly focused on new forms of “electoral” and “competitive” authoritarianism (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). These regimes are not caught in limbo between democracy and authoritarianism, but rather are a new sub-type of authoritarianism.

Among the most elaborate treatments, Schedler's (2009) exploration of why authoritarian regimes pursue a strategy of democratic emulation finds a dialogic relationship between the risk posed to authoritarian incumbents by electoral contestation and their desire to survive in the face of global pressures for democratization. To the extent that elections are perceived as fairly contested, authoritarian incumbents receive a legitimacy boost. Too much repression of the opposition can undermine the legitimacy of the elections, and potentially the regime as well, or alienate key constituencies within the authoritarian elite. Yet, uncertainty over the outcome of contested elections introduces a greater chance of losing power. Thus the key problem for authoritarian incumbents is to increase competitiveness in a way that maximizes enhanced legitimacy yet minimizes the prospects of losing elections.

A number of other authors have also looked at ways in which democratic emulation can enhance the durability of authoritarianism. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that the existence of "nominally democratic" partisan legislatures extends the durability of authoritarian regimes by expanding the social basis of support for dictatorship through patronage and policy concessions. Such institutions, they maintain, give autocrats an advantage in heading off the threat of rebellion from outside the narrow ruling group of the regime. On the basis of a regression that predicts the optimal number of parties for survival based on threats to the regime, they argue that the institutionalization of authoritarian legislatures can enhance the chances of survival. They show that regimes that allow too few parties have poor survival prospects, while those that over institutionalize (i.e. have more parties than are predicted necessary) survive longer. For example, multipartism enhances the survival times of regimes predicted to be institutionalized with no-party or one party (10.06 > 8.79 > 5.28 years). Still, not all of their evidence shows that democratic emulation pays off for authoritarian incumbents. One-party dictatorships in general have greater mean survival times than either multiparty or no-party dictatorships (9.80 > 8.19 > 4.33). Thus while their results are suggestive, they do not unequivocally support the contention that partisan legislatures enhance the survival of authoritarian rule.²

Brownlee (2007) takes a more measured approach on the impact of elections, observing that they are neither "an unwitting step to full democratization" nor do they "automatically protect rulers by reducing international pressure or corralling the opposition" (9). He argues

² It is unclear how Gandhi's (2008) expansion of their argument pertains to this literature. She defines authoritarianism on the basis of rule without competitive elections. She focuses on the effects of legislatures and elections on authoritarian survival, arguing that they have coalitional cooperation and opposition cooptation effects. She is unable to statistically substantiate that these authoritarian institutions enhance the survival of dictatorship. Examination of her case list of authoritarian regimes and the cases covered in Levitsky and Way's (2010) discussion of competitive authoritarianism does not show substantial overlap between the two. So it seems that her work on definitional criteria leaves out the cases that we find most interesting substantively.

elections reveal information about the balance of power between authoritarian factions, and the authoritarian regime and its incumbents, rather than drive regime outcomes. In a regression analysis of the termination of authoritarian regimes from 1975-2000 in which he pits antecedent regime type against elections, he finds that elections have a positive coefficient but are not significant (31). Like Geddes (2003), whose data he uses, he finds that single party authoritarianism is the most durable whereas military regimes are most likely to fail. Ultimately he argues that institutionalized single party rule leads to durable authoritarianism because of its ability to promote elite unity and isolate opposition with or without elections. Here he echoes the arguments of a rich vein of studies (Levitsky and Way 2010; Slater 2008; Smith 2005).

Lust (2009) is more nuanced in her approach. While she gives credence to other research showing that elections offer pathways out of competitive forms of authoritarianism, she argues that in more “hegemonic” authoritarian regimes, elections have a stabilizing effect. This occurs because elections allow the ruling party to more effectively divvy up spoils among its factions. Ultimately in such regimes, she sees elections as inconsequential to the threats that mass action could pose to the authoritarian incumbent, and illustrates how elections rarely figure in mass protest, when it breaks out, in hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

Svolik (2012) makes a kindred argument. He shows that democratic emulation is useful to authoritarian power where it helps to maintain the coherence of the regime coalition in the face of potential popular challenges (also see Boix and Svolik 2013). He focuses on control of legislatures, which he shows leads to a lower hazard of regime collapse. While he does not address the question of elections, he implicitly raises the ability of the regime to manipulate the outcomes of elections in order to control the composition of the legislation. His findings are thus consistent with the proposition that dominant/hegemonic party authoritarianism is more stable than competitive authoritarianism (Svolik 2012, 190). Similarly, Wright and Escibà-Folch (2012) show that the existence of authoritarian legislatures fortifies authoritarian regimes, but in an interesting nuance that the number of parties has an undermining effect.

Another group of authors is more explicit about how elections help authoritarian leaders keep control. They argue that competitive elections need not threaten authoritarian regimes if there are sufficient clientelistic resources on hand to determine election outcomes. Greene (2007, 2010) shows how the politicization of state resources produces a reciprocity between dominant parties and voters, such that they can win elections without resorting to massive manipulation or repression. Blaydes (2010) not only argues that competitive elections help to determine who benefits from the system of patrimonial distributional conflicts, but stresses how elections themselves help to maintain authoritarianism by providing cover for corrupt practices

and ease international pressures for regime change. Magaloni (2008) focuses on the role that elections and political parties play in forging “credible commitments” between factions in the authoritarian elite by establishing regularized mechanisms for the distribution of spoils, thus increasing regime solidarity and survival. While all of the authors discussed above note that competitive elections within an authoritarian context are not without their risks, the novelty of their arguments lies in their focus on how contestation can produce stability.

II. Elections as Democratizing Mechanisms

If the literature on democratic emulation brought an end to teleological interpretations of authoritarian liberalization and the convoking of multiparty elections, a second literature on democratization via elections undermined the uniform punctuated model where founding elections marked a discrete democratic transition, followed by consolidation or eventual failure. Lindberg (2006, 2009) most prominently argues that contested elections are not only a feature of democracy, but can serve as a mechanism for democratization within authoritarian regimes. Electoral contestation becomes a learning process, he argues, for both mass publics and elites. Using a sample based on the third wave in Africa, he shows that reiterated multiparty elections lead to an improvement in the democratic qualities of states.

In response to Lindberg’s findings, scholars questioned whether this phenomenon was widespread or confined to third wave Africa. Parallel to his research, events in postcommunist Europe also drew scholars’ focus on authoritarian elections as a triggering mechanism for democratization. A string of Color Revolutions led to regime change in a series of states which had failed to attain minimal levels of democracy in the period 1989-91.³ Here the mechanisms specified have been somewhat different. Several authors have looked at the Color Revolutions as provoked by a conscious process of international diffusion whereby the same set of tactics (e.g. poll monitoring, civil society mobilization, unified oppositional electoral coalitions, etc.) have been successfully employed (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; McFaul 2002). Tucker (2007) has paid somewhat more attention to the role of electoral fraud by incumbents in creating junctures that focus discontent and provoke collective action to an extent not seen during times of “normal” politics. While the spectacular and riveting nature of such protest events cannot be denied, some observers have pointed to the temporary nature of the changes they have induced (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Kaya and Bernhard 2013).

³ Incumbents were successfully removed in Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. In a number of other countries electoral protest did not achieve this level of success (Belarus, Russia, Armenia, Moldova). Some observers include a number of other protest movements outside of the postcommunist region as kindred events (i.e., Lebanon, Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Myanmar).

Lindberg's original findings on Africa have been subjected to additional testing and the robustness of his findings have been generally confirmed, though with caveats (Rakner and van de Walle 2009; Morse 2015). Attempts to duplicate his findings in other regions have been less successful. McCoy and Hartlin (2009) have found little evidence of the democratizing effects of elections in Latin America. Kaya and Bernhard (2013) found for the postcommunist countries that elections themselves do not matter, but that the relative power balance between the state and contesting oppositional forces at electoral junctures is much more important to democratizing outcomes. And while she does not perform regression analysis, Lust (2009) makes a strong qualitative case against thinking that elections function in the Middle East like they do in Africa.

A number of studies have also examined this question on a global level for longer time frames and have found evidence that the democratizing effect of elections are not merely a case of African exceptionalism. Teorell and Hadenius (2009) examined a global sample and found a modest impact. In a follow-up study, Brownlee (2009) provides evidence that authoritarian regimes that permit competitive multiparty elections are more likely to become democratic when they fail compared to other forms of authoritarianism. However, he finds that, in general, they are no more likely to fail. Howard and Roessler (2006) examine the conditions under which authoritarian elections are likely to lead to regime liberalization. Their findings, while they do not explicitly consider full democratization, are congruent with the literature on the Color Revolutions. Liberalization is more likely when there is social mobilization prior to elections and the political opposition presents a united front in the electoral campaign.

Miller (2015) in a sample that includes both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries finds that electoral competition has a robust impact on both democratic transition and the subsequent survival of democracy. His sample includes competitive regimes from Western Europe and North America which had not yet extended universal suffrage, thus the scope conditions for his findings are somewhat different than studies motivated by the competitive authoritarianism of the most recent period. Knutsen and Nygård (2015) find that "semi-democratic" regimes are more likely to perish than democracies or autocracies, even controlling for past instability. However, their tests do not differentiate which forms of democratic emulation per se lead to their frailty. Edgell et al. (2015) look at the general impact of competitive multi-party elections on democratic quality for the period 1900-2010 and tease out several important time period and regional effects. While they find that the democratizing effect of elections hold over the sample as a whole, the effect is concentrated in the period of the third wave (1974-2010) and most strongly in Africa and the postcommunist countries.

III. The Boring of Hard Boards: Does Multiparty Competition Speed the End of Authoritarianism?

While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a strategy in the hopes of stabilizing and extending their tenure in power, this does not mean it is always effective. Unless it is mediated by other factors, democratic emulation by authoritarian incumbents cannot simultaneously both stabilize their rule and make it more vulnerable to democratic transitions. Therefore, if we are to reconcile the extant literatures, perhaps we need to first adjust how we conceptualize the experience of contested elections within authoritarian regimes.

In surveying the literatures above, there is sufficient reason to doubt the argument that elections are an effective mechanism for authoritarian survival. Much of the literature on the mechanisms behind neo-authoritarian stability draws on cases like Mexico (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2008), Egypt (Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007), and Indonesia (Slater 2008; Smith 2007), all three of which have strong records of authoritarian stability. Thus, it is hard to argue that competitive authoritarian elections in the end provided the kind of insulation that made them poor candidates for democratization. Such authors always note the contingent nature of the hypothesized relationship between democratic emulation and authoritarian stability. The problem of regime survival is a dilemma that plagues dictators to a much greater degree than it ever enters into the considerations of contemporary democratic politicians (Svolik 2012).

Further the findings produced by Lindberg (2006, 2009), Teorell and Hadenius (2009) and Edgell et al. (2015) tell us that it is not the mere existence of competitive authoritarianism that undermines regimes, but that its persistence stimulates democratization. It is the reiteration of contested multiparty elections that leads to the supplanting of authoritarianism with democracy. This would mean that democratic emulation incrementally sows the seeds of its own demise.

It is possible that democratic emulation by authoritarian regimes is a two edged sword. The effects could vary according to the timing or the nature of the electoral process itself. With regards to the former, Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig (*forthcoming*) highlight the proximity to elections. Specifically, they find that elections open up windows in which the risk of authoritarian regime failure is higher, and that this window contracts during the inter-election period. This is to some extent congruent with the findings of Howard and Roessler (2006) on the potential for liberalizing electoral outcomes and Tucker's (2007) insights on how elections open opportunities to solve collective action problems for the camp of opposition.

What are we to make of the conflicting claims of Lindberg (2006, 2009) and Brownlee (2009)? The former claims that the experience of multiparty elections can lead to authoritarian erosion and democratization in as few as four uninterrupted election cycles. The latter holds that while electoral authoritarian regimes tend to produce democracies after breakdown, they are no more prone to breakdown than other authoritarian sub-types. This would suggest that multiparty elections prepare societies and elites for democracy, but some other intervening force is necessary to demolish the prevailing authoritarian regime before democratization can occur. Does the antecedent authoritarian regime stand as a barrier preventing the experience of multiparty elections from taking root as a means to the alternation in power inherent in democracy? Do elections only matter when authoritarianism collapses?

However, one might argue that Brownlee (2009) is measuring something different from Lindberg (2006, 2009). Brownlee employs a regime typology, coding electoral authoritarianism based on *de jure* competition between multiple parties and then further disaggregating this into competitive and hegemonic electoral regimes. His assessment of the impact of electoral authoritarianism on regime breakdown is based upon the mere presence of multiparty elections, which ignores the *number of iterated multiparty elections* that have been held within these regimes. As a result, the impact of successive uninterrupted rounds of multiparty elections remains untested. The electoral authoritarian categories contain regimes with various multiparty electoral experiences. This can be especially problematic for cases that are right censored, i.e. do not experience a transition prior to the end of the coding period and may have only recently come into existence.

We take a somewhat different approach. First and foremost, we are interested in different effects over time. Accepting the notion that the convoking of elections by authoritarian regimes is fraught with danger for the initiators, we are more interested in the effects of reiterated sequences of elections. In this we focus on the *institutionalization of elections* as a feature of new forms of electoral authoritarianism. This grows out of the finding that the impact of elections on democratic quality (Lindberg 2009; Edgell et al. 2015) diminishes with reiteration. We believe that this potentially means that opening to competitive elections is dangerous in the short-run, but that some authoritarian regimes are capable of navigating the trade-offs between the potential for loss of power and the enhanced legitimacy that electoral competition brings. Thus we theorize that past a certain inflection point the continuation of electoral competition by authoritarian regimes represents a form of successful adaptation where the destabilizing effect of elections diminishes. Thus, we expect authoritarian regimes to be most vulnerable to suicide by competition early on in reiterated electoral sequences. Should we

find support, then this will mean that we need to take account of whether electoral authoritarian regimes can effectively institutionalize elections as part of their adaptive strategy or whether democratic emulation is a dead end for the perpetuation of authoritarianism.

We also move beyond the existing literature by accounting for the nature of elections. We differentiate between multiparty elections and multiparty elections with a higher degree of competition. In running our tests, we thus examine both electoral authoritarian regimes (that hold multiparty elections of any kind) and competitive authoritarian regimes (those that hold competitive multiparty elections). We do this because we believe that the lower the degree of manipulation by the authoritarian incumbents the more dangerous elections are in the short-term, but that this may boost their prospects for survival in the long-term because of the legitimizing effects of competitive elections.

We also run models for authoritarian regime breakdown and democratic transition, something that is not universal in this literature. We do this to gauge whether different degrees of opening not only have differential effects on regime survival, but whether the nature of opening has distinct effects on the nature of the successor regime. We thus both examine whether multiparty and competitive elections promote authoritarian survival, authoritarian replacement, or a transition to democracy.

IV. Methodology

We test these competing theories by employing a series of models estimating the correlates of regime survival and transition. We begin by replicating Brownlee (2009) by testing for the impact of discrete regime classifications, namely competitive and non-competitive electoral authoritarianism. Afterward, we test the democratization by elections hypothesis by including a count of the number of iterated multiparty elections. We add further nuance by delimiting competitive elections as a more restrictive class of multiparty elections.

Our analysis extends previous research by not only incorporating more precise measures of election cycles, but by also using a unique combination of event history modeling. We begin with discrete logistic models assessing the probability of authoritarian failure and the probability of democratic transition as two distinct outcomes. The basic logistic regression model is defined as (Long 1997):

$$\Pr(Y = 1 | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta\mathbf{x})}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta\mathbf{x})} \quad (1)$$

We adapt this model for discrete event history analysis using the methodology recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010), whereby time is modeled as a cubic polynomial.

The risk set is limited to cases coded as authoritarian. Thus countries leave the sample when they become democratic, but may re-enter at a later stage if they revert to authoritarianism. Authoritarian episodes that persist to 2010 are right censored. To account for multiple events within the same case, we include controls for previous authoritarian episodes and previous democratic transitions.

Noting that the classic event history models fail to take into account the possibility of one authoritarian regime being replaced by another (*authoritarian replacement*), we further investigate the effect of reiterated elections using competing risk models. We assume that there are three possible regime outcomes for a given country-year: authoritarian survival, authoritarian replacement, and democratic transition. We compare how experiences with iterated election cycles affect the relative odds of each potential outcome. The competing risks model is defined as a multinomial logistic regression model (Long 1997):

$$\Pr(Y = m | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{m|b})}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(\mathbf{x}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{j|b})} \quad (2)$$

where m is one of several possible mutually exclusive outcomes and j is the reference outcome. For example, we might compare the odds of democratic transition (m) to authoritarian survival (j). Again, to apply this model in discrete event history analysis, we incorporate a cubic polynomial of time and limit the sample to an authoritarian risk set.

Dependent Variables

For our dependent variables, we use the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (v1.2) developed by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). This dataset includes authoritarian regime trajectories for 120 countries from 1946-2010.⁴ Our first set of models test for the influence of elections and regime types on authoritarian failure and democratic transition. These two variables are coded as binaries, with zero (0) indicating authoritarian survival and one (1) indicating the outcome of interest.⁵ For the competing risk models, we use a multinomial variable measuring three potential (mutually-exclusive) outcomes: (0) authoritarian survival, (1) democratic transition, or (2) authoritarian replacement.⁶

⁴ Alternatively, the Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) dataset includes 219 countries (including democracies) from 1800-2010. However, their data only includes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns. This precludes analysis of authoritarian replacement. For robustness, we do, however, include estimates of democratic transition using this dataset (see Appendix Table A1).

⁵ We code authoritarian failure using the failure variable (variable: *fail*). We code democratic transition using the subsequent regime coding (variable: *fail_subregime*). See Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset.

⁶ We code this variable using the subsequent regime coding (variable: *fail_subregime*). See Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset.

Independent Variables

Our main independent variables draw upon the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (version 6.2; Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b). The V-Dem data provides a comprehensive set of indicators of democratic qualities for most countries from 1900 to 2015.⁷ Drawing on Brownlee (2009), we begin by testing whether differences in the electoral character of the regime affect authoritarian survival. We differentiate three types of authoritarian regimes: closed, non-competitive electoral, and competitive electoral.⁸ Closed authoritarian regimes are defined by the absence of multiparty elections (i.e. their multiparty election count is zero). These include traditional non-electoral regimes (e.g. absolute monarchies) and regimes that hold elections under which only a single or no parties are allowed to compete (e.g. single-party regimes). Non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes regularly hold multiparty elections but these do not meet the minimum competitive criteria for competitive elections. Finally, competitive electoral authoritarian regimes hold competitive elections but remain outside the minimum criteria to qualify as a democracy.⁹

Afterward, we focus on our main independent variables. These measure the effect of elections as cumulative over repeated uninterrupted cycles rather than as a discrete effect based on mere presence or absence. We utilize the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, v6.2) dataset to count the number of iterated elections (Coppedge et al. 2016a, 2016b). We begin by following Lindberg (2006, 2009) with a count of the number of multiparty elections held since the last electoral interruption. However, we also include a more restrictive measure of *competitive* iterated elections. Because countries hold elections at different intervals, we assume that elections for the more powerful branch of government will have the greatest impact on authoritarian (in)stability.¹⁰ Therefore both election variables are adjusted for system of government.¹¹ For

⁷ Each indicator is measured using survey data from at least 5 country experts. The values from each expert response are aggregated using a Bayesian measurement model (see Pemstein, Tzelgov, and Wang 2015; Pemstein et al. 2015).

⁸ The literature on electoral authoritarianism points to a distinct sub-class of *hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes*, or those that hold non-competitive multiparty elections. However, because we do not incorporate criteria regarding the distribution of seats in the legislature and/or votes for the executive, using this terminology might be misleading. Our sample of competitive authoritarian regimes includes several cases where the ruling party enjoys a relative hegemony in terms of distribution of power. For example, Tanzania has held five competitive elections since 1995, but the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has consistently won more than seventy percent of the seats in the legislature.

⁹ We code this binary based on the iterated competitive election count (see FN 11). Electoral authoritarian regimes have held at least one (1) multiparty election. Closed authoritarian regimes have an iterated multiparty election count of zero (0). Competitive electoral authoritarian regimes have held at least one (1) competitive election. Non-competitive authoritarian regimes have an iterated competitive election count of zero (0). We also run models estimating the more general effect of electoral authoritarianism combining the non-competitive and competitive categories (see Appendix Table A2). The results presented in the main models suggest that the combined effect of electoral authoritarianism is being driven by competitive electoral authoritarian regimes.

¹⁰ Where the executive is directly elected, we assume that executive elections will attract more attention and have greater repercussions for regime (in)stability. In many cases where executives and legislatures are both directly

regimes in which the chief executive is directly elected, we count only executive elections. For regimes in which the chief executive is not directly elected, we count only legislative elections.¹²

Based on the extant literature, we suspect that the relationship between iterated elections and authoritarian survival is non-linear. We run models to check for linear, quadratic, and cubic relationships. Our analysis of various measures of fit suggests that the functional form varies depending on which pair of outcomes we are comparing. Therefore, we only present the best fitting functional form for the logistic regression, but provide alternative specifications in the appendix (see Appendix Table A3). This includes a quadric relationship between elections and authoritarian failure, but a cubic relationship for democratic transition. For the multinomial models, we provide the full set of estimates and discuss variation in terms of functional form across pairs of outcomes.

Control Variables

The literature on authoritarian survival and democratic transition includes a robust set of potential confounders. As a result, wherever possible, we include these as covariates in all our models.

Both economic development and economic performance are commonly correlated with regime survival. Additionally, there is a substantial debate over whether more developed countries tend to democratize. We measure economic development as the natural log of per capita gross domestic product lagged by one year. In terms of economic performance, those regimes that perform poorly are more likely to be overthrown, while those that perform well are

elected, these occur within the same year. Thus a choice as to which election to count becomes irrelevant. In those cases, where legislative and executive elections are not held during the same year, we expect that the net effect of holding an additional legislative election is minimal. Our choices allow us to concentrate on those elections where turnovers in power are feasible.

¹¹ See Coppedge et al. 2016a. Legislative elections (v2eltype_0) and executive elections (v2eltype_6) for first round are included. An election counts as multiparty if it scores at or above 2 on the V-Dem variable v2elmulpar_ord. An election counts as competitive if it (a) fulfills the multiparty criteria; (b) scores at or above 2 on the Clean Elections Index (V-Dem variable v2xel_frefair); and (c) meets a minimum of 25% adult suffrage (V-Dem variable v2x_suffr). For seven observations, data was available on multiparty elections but not competitive elections. Thus we exclude these from the analysis to maintain the same sample of cases (N=4157). We use the V-Dem measure for electoral regime (v2x_elereg) to measure electoral interruptions. A country also experiences an electoral interruption when it experiences an election that fails to meet the minimum criteria for multiparty or competitive elections (where applicable). We also cross-checked each case. A list of cases where the authors disagreed with the V-Dem coding and recoded elections, multipartism, and/or breaks is available in the online appendix. We exclude observations where the country is not independent, but include pre-independence elections.

¹² Chief executive is operationalized as the executive office that wields the most power. In cases where the head of state and head of government are two separate individuals, we estimate the relative power of each based on their *de facto* powers (v2exdfcbhs, v2exdfdmhs, v2exdfdshs, v2exdfpphs, v2exdfvths, v2exdjcbhg, v2exdfdsbg, v2exdjdshg, v2exdfpphg, v2exdfvthg) and their *de facto* method of appointment (v2expathhs, v2expathhg). If a directly elected head of state serves as a figurehead or wields less power than an indirectly elected head of government, we count legislative elections.

likely to survive. We measure economic performance as per capita GDP growth lagged by one year.¹³

In addition to these measures of economic development and performance, regimes may also ensure their survival through the use of rents and repression. Rents can be used both to enhance repressive capacities and secure compliance by economic incentives, making regimes less likely to experience failure. Rents also allow elites to minimize calls for accountability that might occur where states are reliant upon extracting taxes from the population. We include a measure of oil production per capita to control for access to these rents.¹⁴ In addition to rents, authoritarian countries with larger militaries also have a greater potential capacity to repress threats to the regime. Therefore, we control for military personnel per capita.¹⁵

Regimes with polarized ethnic cleavages may be more likely to experience instability and governability issues. The literature also suggests that ethnic polarization can have detrimental effects for democratization. To control for its potential effects, we include a variable that captures ethnic fractionalization as the likelihood that any two randomly chosen persons will be from different ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The degree to which a country's civil society is capable of mobilizing to press demands against the incumbent regime may also affect the likelihood of authoritarian failure and subsequent regime outcomes. We include a measure of civil society participation over the past five years.¹⁶

The post-Cold War period is particularly known for regime instability and a larger number of democratic transitions when compared to other time periods within the sample.¹⁷ We include a dummy variable to control for this time period, coded as one (1) if the country-year occurs during or after 1989.

Specific states may be prone regime instability and experience multiple instances of authoritarian failure and/or democratic transition. Over time, past chronic regime instability might well enhance the probability of future failures or transitions. Therefore, when estimating

¹³ Estimates of GDP and GDP per capita growth come from the Maddison Project (measured in 1990 International GK dollars). See Bolt and Zanden (2014); Maddison-Project (2013).

¹⁴ Based on combined estimates from Ross 2013 and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2006.

¹⁵ We coded this variable using the National Material Capabilities (NMC) Dataset (variable = milper / tpop). Where data are missing in the NMC, particularly post-2007, we replaced missing values with data from the World Bank. See Greig and Enterline (2010), Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), and World Bank (2016).

¹⁶ We calculated this as a 5-year moving average of the country's score on the V-Dem Civil Society Participation Index (v2x_cspart). See Coppedge et al. 2016a.

¹⁷ The post-Cold War period makes up about one-third (33.02%) of the observations within our sample. Of the 215 authoritarian failures – roughly 36% of these occurred in the post-Cold War. While the post-Cold War period saw 55% of the democratic transitions within the sample, only 20% of the authoritarian reversals occurred during this same period. We also tested for whether other distinct time periods should be controlled for (i.e. post-1974 third wave). But found that only post-Cold War added substantively to the models.

authoritarian failure and in our competing risks models, we include a count of the country's previous authoritarian failures. When estimating democratic transition, we also include a count of previous democratic transitions.

In addition to previous endogenous experiences with regime fragility and democracy, geographic location within a particularly democratic or non-democratic neighborhood could exogenously influence regime outcomes. To control for this, we include an estimate of the average level of democracy within the region using the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index.¹⁸

The duration of the authoritarian regime may also influence (in)stability. Drawing on Brownlee (2009) and Carter and Signorino (2010), we model time as a curvilinear (cubic polynomial) relationship with regime survival. We expect that younger and older electoral and competitive authoritarian regimes will be more likely to fail when compared to those that have reached an average age.

Finally, in the Appendix (Table A5 and Table A6) we present results when controlling for Levitsky and Way's (2010) linkage and leverage argument using foreign aid and foreign direct investment both as share of GDP.¹⁹ We do not include these controls in the main models because extensive data for most cases is not available until after the 1970s. This would reduce our sample by over thirty years.

Results

We first present results for the discrete event history logistic regression models before delving into a more nuanced investigation of authoritarian trajectories using multinomial competing risks models. Table 1 presents results from our logistic regression models with binary outcomes for authoritarian failure (Models 1-3) and democratic transition (Models 4-6). Table 2 illustrates our findings from the competing risks models (Models 7-13). For purposes of interpretation, we present these results as the estimated coefficients predicting the change in odds of one outcome over another in three separate tables.

¹⁸ Coppedge et al 2016a; Teorell et al. 2016. We use this V-Dem measure to limit potential endogeneity with the outcome measures. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not use V-Dem to determine regime categories. We define seven geo-political regions as: (1) sub-Saharan Africa; (2) Middle East and North Africa; (3) Latin America and Caribbean; (4) Asia; (5) postcommunist Eurasia; (6) Oceania; and (7) Western democracies (including Europe, U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

¹⁹ We measure foreign aid as net official development assistance and official aid received (current US\$) using the World Bank (2016). We measure foreign direct investment inflows as estimated by the United Nations (2015).

Table 1. Estimates of Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratic Transition

| | Authoritarian Failure | | | Democratic Transition | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -0.23 (0.28) | | | -0.01 (0.45) | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 1.26*** (0.20) | | | 1.99*** (0.36) | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.39** (0.13) | | | 0.53* (0.24) | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | -0.06** (0.02) | | | -0.10* (0.05) | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | 0.00* (0.00) | | | 0.00* (0.00) | |
| Competitive Elections | | | 1.06*** (0.22) | | | 1.83*** (0.40) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | -0.19** (0.07) | | | -0.46** (0.14) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | 0.01^ (0.01) | | | 0.03** (0.01) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.07 (0.10) | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.08 (0.10) | 0.22 (0.19) | 0.34^ (0.18) | 0.28 (0.18) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -3.07** (1.15) | -3.00** (1.16) | -3.16** (1.16) | -4.78** (1.61) | -4.77** (1.62) | -4.75** (1.57) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | 0.09 (1.65) | -0.02 (1.67) | 0.13 (1.67) | -10.02 (14.02) | -13.22 (16.17) | -11.03 (18.09) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -25.25^ (14.65) | -18.91 (13.03) | -24.68^ (13.84) | -22.85 (23.83) | -16.09 (22.85) | -25.10 (23.92) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.17 (0.25) | -0.18 (0.24) | -0.13 (0.25) | -0.18 (0.49) | -0.05 (0.48) | -0.11 (0.51) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | 0.14 (0.43) | 0.88* (0.35) | 0.03 (0.41) | -0.76 (0.71) | 1.02* (0.52) | -0.50 (0.68) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | -0.45* (0.21) | -0.43* (0.20) | -0.45* (0.20) | 0.11 (0.36) | 0.08 (0.37) | 0.16 (0.36) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) | 0.09** (0.03) | 0.08** (0.03) | 0.09** (0.03) | | | |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | | | | 0.55** (0.17) | 0.48** (0.15) | 0.51** (0.17) |
| Regional Democracy Score (average) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.08*** (0.03) | 0.10* (0.04) | 0.12** (0.04) | 0.10* (0.04) |
| Age | -0.19*** (0.03) | -0.20*** (0.03) | -0.20*** (0.03) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| Age (square) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -0.93 (0.72) | -1.14 (0.69) | -0.79 (0.73) | -5.46*** (1.40) | -6.48*** (1.42) | -5.75*** (1.44) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.15 |
| Countries | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 |
| Observations | 4088 | 4088 | 4088 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 331.09 | 245.27 | 273.42 | 160.89 | 239.14 | 148.05 |
| AIC | 1813.58 | 1875.26 | 1825.97 | 796.76 | 847.89 | 811.93 |
| BIC | 1908.32 | 1976.31 | 1927.02 | 891.19 | 948.62 | 912.66 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. Reference for regime type in Model 1 and Model 4 is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

We begin by estimating the effect of electoral authoritarian regimes (Model 1 and Model 4). As anticipated, the results suggest that authoritarian regimes with regular competitive elections are both more likely to fail and more likely to democratize. All else equal, the odds of failure for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes are 2.5 times greater and the odds of democratic transition are over 6 times greater when compared to closed authoritarian regimes. In contrast, we find no difference between non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes and closed authoritarian regimes when it comes to authoritarian failure or democratic transition.

At odds with Brownlee (2009), our results support the hypothesis that competitive electoral environments make authoritarian regimes more prone to failure and to democratic transition. There are several reasons that might explain why our results depart from Brownlee (2009). First, our sample of cases includes most authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010, whereas Brownlee's is limited to 1975 to 2004. Secondly, the democratic transition outcome uses authoritarian persistence, either as the same regime or a new authoritarian regime, as its reference category. This heterogeneity in the reference could be problematic but avoids potential selection bias and small sample size resulting from a limited analysis of only those cases that experience authoritarian failure. In our set of competing risk models (Table 2), we address this problem more systematically by including all three potential regime outcomes. Finally, our analyses include different control variables. We exclude the regime classifications developed by Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014) because of likely correlation with electoral authoritarian categories (e.g. all single-party regimes are by definition closed regimes). We also exclude variables controlling for regions because we find that these are not significant for our sample. Our Appendix (Table A4) includes our replication of Brownlee (2009) using the expanded sample and our chosen covariates. These results again contradict his findings with regard to authoritarian failure. We continue to see a robust effect of competitive authoritarianism on authoritarian collapse.²⁰


The next set of models directly tests the democratization via elections thesis. Moving beyond the mere presence of multiparty (or competitive) elections, we estimate how each additional iterated multiparty or competitive election affects the likelihood of authoritarian failure and more accurately, democratic transition. We extend the previous literature by allowing for a non-linear relationship. The results show support for a cubic function when estimating both authoritarian failure and democratic transition.²¹ Unlike discrete regime classifications, we

²⁰ Indeed, these results and the results presented in Table A2 suggest that the destabilizing and democratizing effects of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes are driven primarily by the achievement of minimal levels of competition.

²¹ We base this on a series of estimates including Likelihood Ratio tests and AIC and BIC scores. We privilege the BIC over the AIC in comparing linear to quadratic and cubic specifications, because by its nature the AIC

find that under authoritarianism iterated multiparty elections, regardless if minimally competitive, exhibit an inverted-U shape relationship with regime failure (Models 2 and 3) and democratic transition (Models 5 and 6). For the first four rounds of multiparty (or competitive) elections, the odds of authoritarian failure are increasing. However, if authoritarian elites can survive these first four elections, each additional election *adds to* their odds of survival.²² Models 5 and 6 suggest that experiences with elections, whether multiparty or competitive, exhibit a similar pattern with regard to democratic transition. We see that the cumulative effect of iterated multiparty and competitive elections at first makes authoritarian regimes more likely to experience a democratic transition. The effect is substantially stronger for competitive elections; however, generally speaking after three electoral cycles, democratic transition becomes less likely with each additional uninterrupted election. Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship graphically. We constrain our predictions to within-sample and only present those with significant marginal effects ($p < 0.10$).

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regression Models



downgrades the fit of models with a larger number of independent variables. Models using alternative specifications are available in Table A3.

²² In our within sample estimates, we do find a slight upturn in the odds of authoritarian failure after 10 competitive elections; however, only two observations achieve 10 competitive elections. This prediction should be taken with caution, despite being significant at $p < 0.10$.

Our findings introduce a novel note of contingency into the theory that reiterated elections lead to democratization. They suggest that the introduction of competitive elections is most dangerous in the first few iterations, but that the risk diminishes as authoritarian regimes institutionalize elections. This suggests that when authoritarian incumbents successfully contend for power beyond the first four or five rounds of multiparty elections, each additional election actually lowers the risk of failure and democratic transition.

Table 2a. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Democratic Transition over Authoritarian Survival

| | Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Survival | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 0.03 (0.44) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 2.04*** (0.37) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.09 (0.11) | 0.55* (0.24) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.10* (0.05) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.00* (0.00) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | 0.19* (0.09) | 1.03*** (0.29) | 1.84*** (0.41) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.12* (0.06) | -0.46** (0.15) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.03** (0.01) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | 0.22 (0.20) | 0.35^ (0.18) | 0.34^ (0.19) | 0.33^ (0.19) | 0.30 (0.18) | 0.28 (0.19) | 0.28 (0.19) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -4.97** (1.62) | -4.64** (1.60) | -4.72** (1.61) | -5.00** (1.64) | -4.78** (1.60) | -4.81** (1.59) | -4.97** (1.59) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -9.82 (14.33) | -15.08 (16.85) | -15.50 (17.72) | -12.82 (16.31) | -18.98 (19.98) | -10.10 (15.56) | -11.03 (18.38) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -27.28 (26.12) | -21.56 (23.68) | -20.50 (24.00) | -19.45 (24.06) | -21.40 (23.11) | -29.40 (25.80) | -29.62 (25.84) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.15 (0.51) | -0.15 (0.50) | -0.13 (0.50) | -0.04 (0.51) | -0.10 (0.52) | -0.07 (0.54) | -0.08 (0.53) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -0.83 (0.71) | 1.07* (0.53) | 1.00^ (0.54) | 0.88 (0.54) | 0.54 (0.62) | -0.51 (0.67) | -0.61 (0.70) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | 0.02 (0.37) | 0.19 (0.34) | 0.18 (0.35) | 0.02 (0.37) | 0.19 (0.34) | 0.12 (0.36) | 0.08 (0.37) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | 0.20*** (0.06) | 0.17*** (0.05) | 0.18*** (0.05) | 0.18*** (0.05) | 0.18*** (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.06) | 0.19** (0.06) |
| Regional Democracy Score | 0.10* (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.11** (0.04) | 0.12** (0.04) | 0.11** (0.04) | 0.10* (0.04) | 0.09* (0.04) |
| Time | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -5.60*** (1.48) | -6.51*** (1.45) | -6.46*** (1.47) | -6.56*** (1.48) | -6.05*** (1.42) | -5.64*** (1.47) | -5.86*** (1.51) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Countries | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 |
| Observations | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 257.88 | 215.22 | 230.76 | 414.24 | 230.54 | 214.66 | 246.51 |
| AIC | 1787.03 | 1844.55 | 1848.09 | 1841.25 | 1840.66 | 1817.48 | 1808.89 |
| BIC | 1975.89 | 2020.82 | 2036.96 | 2042.70 | 2016.94 | 2006.34 | 2010.35 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Thus far we have limited our models to two potential outcomes for authoritarian regimes: survival and democratic transition. However, authoritarian failures can sometimes result in authoritarian replacement. Incumbents face threats from both would-be democratizers and authoritarian alternatives. These competing risks are modeled in Table 2. The multinomial logistic model predicts a separate set of coefficients (β) for each predictor (x) for each possible pair of outcomes (m/j). The exponentiated coefficients express the predicted change in odds of outcome m over outcome j . As a result, each model predicts separate coefficients for each independent variable for each possible pair of outcomes. For purposes of interpretation, we make three separate sets of comparisons (Table 2a, 2b, and 2c). It is important to remember that each of these tables presents results from the same set of models (Models 7-13), just different coefficients from those models based on the pair of outcomes being compared (i.e. how m and j are defined).

In Table 2a, we compare the odds of democratic transition (m) over authoritarian survival (j). By taking into account the potential for authoritarian replacement, these models not only replicate but also provide robustness for our logistic regressions in Table 1 (Models 4-6). The estimated effect of competitive authoritarianism on democratic transition increases when we account for the possibility of authoritarian replacement. All else equal, the odds of a democratic transition rather than survival are 8 times greater for a competitive electoral authoritarian regime when compared to a closed authoritarian regime. Non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes continue to be no more or less likely to experience democratic transition than closed regimes. The results in Models 8 to 13 also support the previous finding that if authoritarian leaders can survive the first few rounds of multiparty (or competitive) elections, they experience increasing odds of authoritarian survival over democratic transition with each subsequent election. Once again the effect of competitive elections is stronger when compared to multiparty elections (regardless of their level of competition).

Table 2b. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival

| | Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival | | | | | | |
|---|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -0.64 [^] (0.37) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 0.04 (0.32) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | -0.13 [^] (0.07) | -0.12 (0.14) | -0.13 (0.23) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.05) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | -0.05 (0.10) | 0.16 (0.26) | 0.27 (0.45) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.04 (0.05) | -0.09 (0.18) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.01 (0.01) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.22 [^] (0.14) | -0.18 (0.14) | -0.18 (0.14) | -0.18 (0.14) | -0.26 [^] (0.14) | -0.26 [^] (0.14) | -0.26 [^] (0.14) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -3.46* (1.63) | -3.43* (1.66) | -3.44* (1.66) | -3.43* (1.66) | -3.57* (1.66) | -3.59* (1.66) | -3.60* (1.66) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | 2.03 (1.35) | 1.82 (1.48) | 1.83 (1.48) | 1.83 (1.48) | 2.32 [^] (1.24) | 2.34 [^] (1.24) | 2.35 [^] (1.24) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -57.19* (23.35) | -58.21* (24.09) | -58.14* (24.09) | -58.05* (24.06) | -52.41* (22.24) | -52.81* (22.18) | -52.80* (22.17) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.31 (0.38) | -0.26 (0.37) | -0.25 (0.37) | -0.25 (0.37) | -0.29 (0.37) | -0.30 (0.36) | -0.30 (0.36) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | 0.41 (0.57) | 0.76 (0.54) | 0.75 (0.54) | 0.75 (0.54) | 0.53 (0.56) | 0.42 (0.56) | 0.41 (0.56) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | -0.88** (0.33) | -0.90** (0.31) | -0.90** (0.32) | -0.90** (0.33) | -0.93** (0.31) | -0.93** (0.31) | -0.94** (0.31) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) |
| Regional Democracy Score | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) |
| Time | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -0.81 (0.97) | -1.24 (1.02) | -1.24 (1.02) | -1.24 (1.02) | -0.73 (1.00) | -0.72 (0.99) | -0.73 (0.99) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Countries | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 |
| Observations | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 257.88 | 215.22 | 230.76 | 414.24 | 230.54 | 214.66 | 246.51 |
| AIC | 1787.03 | 1844.55 | 1848.09 | 1841.25 | 1840.66 | 1817.48 | 1808.89 |
| BIC | 1975.89 | 2020.82 | 2036.96 | 2042.70 | 2016.94 | 2006.34 | 2010.35 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. [^] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In Table 2b, we present results estimating the odds of authoritarian replacement (m) over survival (j). In Model 7, we find that, when compared to closed authoritarian regimes, the odds of authoritarian replacement for regimes with flawed multiparty elections (i.e. non-competitive) are 47.5% lower than authoritarian survival (but only at 90% confidence). This suggests that theories on how elections create credible commitments within authoritarian coalitions have some credence. Simultaneously, this finding could imply that where electoral competition is already constrained, stability is prioritized over (less certain) authoritarian alternatives. Likewise, the linear term for iterated multiparty elections in Model 8 is significant (at 90%), suggesting that

for each additional multiparty election, the odds of authoritarian replacement over survival decrease by about 12%. Yet we see no influence of iterated competitive election counts on the odds ratio of authoritarian replacement to authoritarian survival. Thus the results weakly support the hypothesis that regime types rather than electoral sequences differentiate between these two outcomes.

Table 2c. Results from Competing Risks Models estimating the odds of Democratic Transition over Authoritarian Replacement

| | Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Replacement | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 0.67 (0.53) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 2.00*** (0.48) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.16 [^] (0.09) | 0.21 (0.17) | 0.68* (0.32) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.11 (0.07) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | 0.24 [^] (0.12) | 0.87* (0.37) | 1.58** (0.54) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.08 (0.08) | -0.37 [^] (0.22) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.02 (0.02) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | 0.44 [^] (0.24) | 0.53* (0.24) | 0.52* (0.24) | 0.52* (0.24) | 0.56* (0.23) | 0.54* (0.23) | 0.54* (0.24) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -1.51 (2.08) | -1.21 (2.14) | -1.28 (2.14) | -1.57 (2.15) | -1.21 (2.14) | -1.22 (2.11) | -1.37 (2.09) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -11.86 (14.50) | -16.91 (17.02) | -17.32 (17.88) | -14.64 (16.45) | -21.29 (20.12) | -12.44 (15.68) | -13.38 (18.51) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | 29.92 (34.53) | 36.65 (33.24) | 37.63 (33.65) | 38.60 (33.72) | 31.01 (31.63) | 23.41 (34.00) | 23.18 (33.81) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.16 (0.64) | 0.10 (0.61) | 0.12 (0.61) | 0.21 (0.63) | 0.19 (0.62) | 0.23 (0.65) | 0.22 (0.65) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -1.24 (0.92) | 0.31 (0.77) | 0.24 (0.77) | 0.12 (0.78) | 0.01 (0.82) | -0.93 (0.89) | -1.02 (0.91) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | 0.90 [^] (0.54) | 1.09* (0.49) | 1.08* (0.50) | 0.93 [^] (0.52) | 1.12* (0.49) | 1.06* (0.51) | 1.01 [^] (0.52) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | 0.20* (0.09) | 0.18* (0.08) | 0.19* (0.08) | 0.19* (0.08) | 0.17* (0.08) | 0.18* (0.08) | 0.18* (0.08) |
| Regional Democracy Score | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.07) |
| Time | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.00 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.03 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.06) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -4.79** (1.74) | -5.27** (1.80) | -5.22** (1.81) | -5.33** (1.83) | -5.32** (1.75) | -4.92** (1.79) | -5.13** (1.82) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10 |
| Countries | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 | 108.00 |
| Observations | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 257.88 | 215.22 | 230.76 | 414.24 | 230.54 | 214.66 | 246.51 |
| AIC | 1787.03 | 1844.55 | 1848.09 | 1841.25 | 1840.66 | 1817.48 | 1808.89 |
| BIC | 1975.89 | 2020.82 | 2036.96 | 2042.70 | 2016.94 | 2006.34 | 2010.35 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. [^] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001


Finally, Table 2c estimates the effect of elections on the competing risks of democratic transition (m) versus authoritarian replacement (y). In other words, given that failure will occur, what are the odds of a democratic transition rather than authoritarian replacement? Model 7 suggests that, when compared to closed authoritarian regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes are about 7 times more likely to be replaced by a democracy rather than another authoritarian regime. This contrasts with non-competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, which are no more or less likely to experience democratic transition over authoritarian replacement when compared to closed regimes. This suggests that elections matter, and the character of these elections can dramatically increase the likelihood for democratic transition.

Models 8 to 13 further test this finding by accounting for the history of iterated elections within authoritarian countries. For this pair of outcomes, multiparty elections appear to exhibit a linear relationship, whereas the relationship for competitive elections is quadratic. For each additional multiparty election, the odds that an authoritarian failure will result in democratic transition rather than authoritarian replacement increase by about 97%. The shape of the relationship for competitive elections is less clear. While the count of competitive elections is significant, in Model 13, when we include a square and cube term, the inverted-U shape of the relationship returns, but only at 90% for the quadratic term. The cubic term remains insignificant. This suggests that authoritarian failures may be increasingly more likely to result in democratic transition during early competitive election cycles. However, for authoritarian regimes managing to survive past these early cycles, failure is increasingly *less likely* to result in democratic transition as the number of competitive cycles thereafter increases. This implies that longer histories of competition under authoritarianism may have a detrimental impact on the possibility for democracy should a breakdown occur, perhaps because authoritarian incumbents have demonstrated that despite free and fair elections, they are able to remain in power.

Our results suggest that overall, multipartism within authoritarian contexts can be a double-edged sword. First, there appears to be a stabilizing effect of non-competitive multiparty elections in fending off authoritarian challenges to incumbents. This suggests that flawed elections tend to support the status quo government if that government faces threats from an authoritarian alternative. This seems to provide some confirmation for arguments about how elections help incumbents maintain their position in power by revealing important informational cues or building credible commitments within the authoritarian ruling coalition. Yet the effect of elections is much more dangerous, at least in the early stages, when we consider the likelihood of democratic transition. Our models suggest that overall, competitive authoritarian regimes are more likely to fail and democratize. However, when we take into account electoral experience,

we find that autocrats face the highest threat of democratization during the first two or three election cycles. Afterward, the impact of elections diminishes and begins to approach nil with more and more elections. This is a new finding that merits some attention. Figure 2 plots these results for iterated elections from Table 2 using marginal effects to predict overall probabilities for democratic transition. Again, we constrain our estimates to within-sample using average values for all other predictors and only plot marginal effects that are significant ($p < 0.10$).


Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities from Multinomial Logistic Regression



To avoid overstating nature of these findings, it is important to understand empirically how often authoritarian regimes actually survive past two or three competitive elections. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the maximum number of multiparty and competitive multiparty iterated elections for the 108 authoritarian cases in our sample. Between 1946 and 2010, on average authoritarian regimes experienced 1.19 iterated multiparty elections or 0.38 competitive elections. While less than 30% of our cases experienced more than three iterated multiparty

elections, less than 11% survived past or held more than three competitive elections by 2010.²³ This helps to explain why we are unable to obtain significant predictions for marginal effects beyond seven multiparty elections and four competitive elections. More importantly, this suggests that while competitive elections have the potential to provide for authoritarian regime stability in the long-run, such outcomes are relatively rare. Ultimately then reiterated elections under authoritarianism are not a formidable barrier to democratic regime change. In most cases, authoritarian regimes have not managed to safely institutionalize electoral mechanisms and reap their potential benefits. This means that our tests using authoritarian sub-type variables and election counts are not that different despite the different effects over the iteration of elections. Most of the cases coded as electoral authoritarian have experienced fewer than three elections.

Figure 3. Maximum Observed Number of Multiparty and Competitive Elections



²³ This includes about 33 cases where the election count is censored at 2010.

Conclusion

While the collapse of a large number conventional authoritarian regimes in the final phases of the Cold War and in its aftermath did not lead to the kind of rapid emergence of universal democracy imagined by some (Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1992), it did radically change the mix of regimes globally. Beyond the expansion of the number of democracies, the most profound change was a fundamental shift in the nature of authoritarianism. The democratic zeitgeist compelled many dictators to convoke elections if they wanted to maintain their hold on power. The widespread holding of elections in regimes that fell short of the minimal conditions necessary for democracy led to two strands of thinking in the discipline about what this all meant. On one hand a group of scholars thought of the convocation of elections under authoritarian conditions represented a path to democracy by evolutionary, less disjunctive means than the classic literature on transition. Others saw in the ability of dictators to hold and win elections as a means to stabilize authoritarian rule by unlocking new and useful information, building durable authoritarian electoral coalitions, derailing opposition, or cementing credible commitments to the incumbent in coalitions of authoritarian rule.

While the literature has turned up a range of conflicting findings that could be read as being supportive of both positions, it seems unlikely that both could simultaneously be true without some attention to contingencies. We thus took a new approach and not only focused on authoritarian subtypes but also looked at the ability of authoritarian regimes to institutionalize elections as a component of durable authoritarian rule. Such an approach entailed three novel facets: 1) gauging the impact of reiterated elections over time, 2) distinguishing between more and less competitive elections under authoritarianism, and 3) looking at two alternatives to incumbent regime survival – democratization and authoritarian replacement. These tests yielded a range of novel findings for a sample of 108 authoritarian regimes for the period 1946 to 2010 using conventional event history and competing risk models.

Our results show that in the in the short run electoral competition is dangerous for authoritarian regimes and that this danger is magnified if elections are more competitive. However, those authoritarian regimes that manage to survive past the first few electoral cycles, i.e. those which successfully institutionalize elections, are more durable. This danger is enhanced in the short run where autocrats allow at least a minimal level of competition, but that danger also abates faster. To this we must add one important caveat -- few authoritarian regimes actually survive past the first three election cycles. This then means on balance that despite the non-linear effect we detected, we find more support for the theory of suicide by competition than survival via democratic emulation.

Our exploration of different forms of authoritarian failure yielded a set of interesting nuanced results as well. In our authoritarian survival models we found that multiparty elections (regardless of level of competition) do affect survival prospects, but that this exhibits an inverted-U shape, with higher risk in earlier elections diminishing over time. When we consider democratic transition as an outcome, we also found that both multiparty elections and competitive elections have a cubic relationship, with higher risk earlier on, followed by a period of diminished risk. The positive coefficient on the cubic term was quite modest and given the low number of observations of authoritarian regimes with a very high number of elections, not particularly noteworthy.

When we move to competing risk models, we continue to find a cubic relationship between the tradeoff between democratic transition versus authoritarian survival for both multiparty and competitive election counts, supporting our initial findings. When we looked at the tradeoff between authoritarian replacements versus authoritarian survival we found a negative linear relationship for both reiterated multiparty elections. This indicates for those authoritarian regimes that can contain efforts at democratization, holding elections can help to cement the hold of the authoritarian incumbent. This also adds some nuance to our finding on suicide by competition. While it promotes democratization generally, there is some smaller subset of durable authoritarian regimes it helps to fortify. Finally, for those authoritarian regimes that do fail, the holding of reiterated elections makes them more likely to transition to democracy than a new form of authoritarianism. For multiparty elections at a lower level of competition the effect is linear and positive. For competitive elections the effect is once again enhanced in the early stages of the electoral sequence but diminishes after the first few iterations.

Thus, we conclude that dictators that stage elections in the hope that democratic emulation will make their rule more durable are playing a dangerous game. In the earliest stages of this process they place their rule at enhanced risk of failure. If they can navigate this early risky period, they may buy more time for their rule, though the descriptive evidence on this shows that this is a relatively rare occurrence. For those authoritarian regimes that are able to stave off pressures for democratization, elections may indeed help them to contain alternative authoritarian contenders for power. But all in all, dictators who risk their future hold on power by democratic emulation are more like gamblers who are betting against the house, rather than contemporary Machiavellis.

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Appendix

Table A1: Estimating Democratic Transition from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)

| | (A1.1) | (A1.2) | (A1.3) | (A1.4) | (A1.5) | (A1.6) | (A1.7) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 1.87*** (0.53) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 4.23*** (0.55) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.28^ (0.16) | 0.99*** (0.22) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.17*** (0.05) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.01*** (0.00) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | 0.21** (0.07) | 1.58*** (0.35) | 2.48*** (0.40) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.22** (0.08) | -0.59*** (0.14) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.03*** (0.01) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | 0.13 (0.21) | 0.39* (0.19) | 0.34^ (0.19) | 0.33^ (0.19) | 0.40* (0.19) | 0.29 (0.19) | 0.27 (0.20) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -3.75* (1.66) | -3.61* (1.66) | -3.99* (1.65) | -4.36** (1.68) | -3.70* (1.65) | -3.68* (1.72) | -3.84* (1.69) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -7.90 (10.00) | -16.95 (18.00) | -17.31 (20.36) | -13.03 (17.31) | -23.36 (22.04) | -6.77 (9.24) | -6.49 (8.64) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -23.35 (23.47) | -31.89 (22.56) | -29.38 (21.73) | -23.89 (21.09) | -31.81 (22.19) | -47.54^ (25.96) | -49.58^ (26.42) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.01 (0.50) | -0.27 (0.50) | -0.21 (0.49) | -0.17 (0.51) | -0.14 (0.50) | -0.14 (0.55) | -0.08 (0.55) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -0.58 (0.72) | 2.25*** (0.60) | 1.99** (0.61) | 1.77** (0.60) | 1.69** (0.62) | 0.47 (0.68) | 0.21 (0.70) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | -0.57^ (0.34) | -0.26 (0.30) | -0.31 (0.32) | -0.50 (0.33) | -0.14 (0.30) | -0.37 (0.35) | -0.50 (0.35) |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | 0.58*** (0.15) | 0.34** (0.13) | 0.41** (0.13) | 0.51*** (0.14) | 0.33** (0.12) | 0.52*** (0.14) | 0.55*** (0.15) |
| Regional Democracy Score (average) | 0.10* (0.05) | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.12** (0.04) |
| Age | 0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Age (square) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00^ (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00^ (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.00* (0.00) | -0.00^ (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -7.53*** (1.55) | -7.29*** (1.47) | -7.18*** (1.47) | -7.75*** (1.47) | -7.32*** (1.47) | -6.88*** (1.48) | -7.03*** (1.49) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.28 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 0.21 |
| Countries | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| Observations | 4208 | 4208 | 4208 | 4208 | 4208 | 4208 | 4208 |
| Chi2 | 184.01 | 150.27 | 164.45 | 173.01 | 188.16 | 183 | 212.29 |
| AIC | 682.02 | 838.7 | 833.23 | 807.67 | 826.4 | 765.56 | 744.97 |
| BIC | 777.19 | 927.52 | 928.4 | 909.19 | 915.23 | 860.73 | 846.49 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. Reference for regime type in Model A1.1 is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A2: Estimates with Combined Electoral Authoritarian Dummy

| | Logit Authoritarian Failure vs. Authoritarian Survival (A2.1) | Logit Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Survival (A2.2) | M-Logit Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Survival (A2.3) | M-Logit Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival (A2.3) | M-Logit Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Replacement (A2.3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| Electoral Authoritarian | 0.67*** (0.19) | 1.15*** (0.31) | 1.19*** (0.31) | -0.29 (0.28) | 1.49*** (0.40) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.08 (0.09) | 0.22 (0.18) | 0.22 (0.19) | -0.23 [^] (0.14) | 0.46 [^] (0.24) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -2.95** (1.13) | -5.00** (1.57) | -5.18** (1.60) | -3.44* (1.63) | -1.74 (2.10) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | 0.08 (1.69) | -12.93 (16.87) | -12.74 (17.18) | 2.10 (1.30) | -14.84 (17.33) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -17.47 (12.96) | -7.41 (20.90) | -11.06 (22.50) | -54.98* (23.10) | 43.93 (32.39) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.17 (0.24) | -0.12 (0.46) | -0.12 (0.49) | -0.30 (0.37) | 0.17 (0.62) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | 0.81* (0.36) | 0.59 (0.57) | 0.47 (0.58) | 0.65 (0.57) | -0.19 (0.82) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | -0.43* (0.20) | 0.07 (0.37) | 0.02 (0.37) | -0.89** (0.33) | 0.91 [^] (0.54) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) | 0.08** (0.03) | | 0.20*** (0.05) | 0.00 (0.05) | 0.20* (0.08) |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | | 0.53*** (0.15) | | | |
| Regional Democracy Score (average) | 0.08** (0.03) | 0.10** (0.04) | 0.10* (0.04) | 0.08 [^] (0.04) | 0.02 (0.07) |
| Age | -0.19*** (0.03) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.05) |
| Age (square) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | -0.00** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -1.12 (0.68) | -5.87*** (1.40) | -6.04*** (1.47) | -0.85 (0.99) | -5.19** (1.77) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| Countries | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 |
| Observations | 4088 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 250.86 | 135.43 | 212.84 | 212.84 | 212.84 |
| AIC | 1866.63 | 834.54 | 1825.71 | 1825.71 | 1825.71 |
| BIC | 1955.05 | 922.67 | 2001.99 | 2001.99 | 2001.99 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. Reference for regime type is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). [^] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A3: Alternative Specifications of Elections for Table 1

| | Authoritarian Failure | | | | Democratic Transition | | | |
|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | (A3.1) | (A3.2) | (A3.3) | (A3.4) | (A3.5) | (A3.6) | (A3.7) | (A3.8) |
| Multiparty Elections | 0.06 [^] (0.03) | 0.18* (0.08) | | | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.07 (0.11) | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | -0.01 [^] (0.01) | | | | 0.00 (0.01) | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | 0.23** (0.08) | 0.77*** (0.12) | | | 0.18* (0.09) | 1.02*** (0.30) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | -0.07*** (0.01) | | | | -0.12* (0.06) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.06 (0.09) | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.09 (0.10) | -0.07 (0.10) | 0.34 [^] (0.18) | 0.34 [^] (0.18) | 0.30 [^] (0.18) | 0.28 (0.18) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -2.82* (1.13) | -2.98** (1.14) | -3.08** (1.13) | -3.10** (1.16) | -4.40** (1.58) | -4.47** (1.59) | -4.52** (1.57) | -4.57** (1.57) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -0.26 (1.62) | -0.23 (1.73) | -0.47 (1.90) | 0.21 (1.56) | -15.33 (16.76) | -15.63 (17.38) | -18.54 (19.05) | -9.98 (15.14) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -19.24 (13.27) | -18.40 (13.06) | -20.77 (13.25) | -24.34 [^] (13.63) | -17.42 (22.40) | -16.63 (22.70) | -16.87 (21.57) | -24.58 (23.85) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.22 (0.24) | -0.20 (0.24) | -0.13 (0.25) | -0.10 (0.25) | -0.14 (0.47) | -0.12 (0.47) | -0.10 (0.49) | -0.09 (0.51) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | 1.05** (0.34) | 0.94** (0.35) | 0.62 (0.39) | 0.05 (0.41) | 1.18* (0.51) | 1.12* (0.52) | 0.63 (0.60) | -0.42 (0.66) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | -0.36 [^] (0.19) | -0.38 [^] (0.20) | -0.39* (0.20) | -0.43* (0.20) | 0.25 (0.34) | 0.25 (0.35) | 0.26 (0.34) | 0.19 (0.36) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) | 0.07* (0.03) | 0.08* (0.03) | 0.08* (0.03) | 0.09** (0.03) | | | | |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | | | | | 0.46** (0.15) | 0.47** (0.15) | 0.49** (0.15) | 0.52** (0.17) |
| Regional Democracy Score (average) | 0.10*** (0.02) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.03) | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.11** (0.03) | 0.11** (0.04) |
| Age | -0.19*** (0.03) | -0.19*** (0.03) | -0.19*** (0.03) | -0.20*** (0.03) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.04) |
| Age (square) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | -0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -1.05 (0.69) | -1.08 (0.69) | -0.77 (0.70) | -0.80 (0.73) | -6.39*** (1.38) | -6.35*** (1.39) | -5.89*** (1.34) | -5.51*** (1.40) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
| Countries | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 108 |
| Observations | 4088 | 4088 | 4088 | 4088 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 | 4006 |
| Chi2 | 248.45 | 257.72 | 232.50 | 249.64 | 111.55 | 116.03 | 130.77 | 126.25 |
| AIC | 1883.99 | 1881.49 | 1860.66 | 1828.88 | 854.90 | 856.62 | 847.37 | 822.88 |
| BIC | 1972.41 | 1976.23 | 1949.08 | 1923.62 | 943.03 | 951.05 | 935.51 | 917.31 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. [^] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4: Replication of Brownlee (2009)

| | Authoritarian Failure | | Democratic Transition | | Democratic Transition (limited sample) | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---|-------------------|
| | (A4.1) | (A4.2) | (A4.3) | (A4.4) | (A4.5) | (A4.6) |
| Electoral Authoritarian | 0.65** (0.22) | | 1.54*** (0.34) | | 1.55*** (0.35) | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | | 1.28*** (0.23) | | 2.40*** (0.36) | | 1.80*** (0.38) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | | -0.30 (0.32) | | 0.13 (0.46) | | 0.86 (0.63) |
| Military Regime | 1.15*** (0.25) | 1.14*** (0.26) | 2.09*** (0.43) | 2.09*** (0.47) | 0.98* (0.47) | 0.84^ (0.50) |
| Military-Personal | 0.48** (0.19) | 0.54** (0.19) | 1.84*** (0.43) | 2.06*** (0.44) | 1.63* (0.71) | 1.58* (0.70) |
| Party Hybrid | -0.51^ (0.29) | -0.50^ (0.28) | -0.79 (0.65) | -0.64 (0.57) | -0.20 (0.54) | -0.32 (0.53) |
| Single Party | -0.94*** (0.23) | -1.17*** (0.24) | -0.98* (0.46) | -1.50** (0.47) | -0.88 (0.54) | -1.01^ (0.56) |
| Military-Personal-Party | -1.73** (0.60) | -1.53* (0.75) | -0.56 (0.57) | -0.30 (0.81) | | |
| Monarchy | -0.58 (0.41) | -0.87* (0.43) | -0.71 (1.31) | -1.58 (1.69) | -0.73 (1.07) | -0.70 (1.06) |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | 0.13 (0.14) | 0.13 (0.13) | 0.32^ (0.19) | 0.41** (0.16) | 0.27 (0.34) | 0.27 (0.33) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.12 (0.11) | -0.17 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.19) | -0.08 (0.18) | 0.78* (0.32) | 0.74* (0.33) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -4.21*** (1.28) | -4.06** (1.27) | -5.93*** (1.51) | -5.45*** (1.51) | -1.80 (2.66) | -1.68 (2.76) |
| Middle East & North Africa | -0.12 (0.36) | 0.03 (0.31) | -1.04 (0.92) | -0.62 (0.88) | -0.68 (0.86) | -0.78 (0.86) |
| Post-Communist Eurasia | -0.11 (0.26) | 0.06 (0.27) | 0.13 (0.58) | 0.51 (0.61) | -1.70^ (0.89) | -1.60^ (0.93) |
| Age | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.08 (0.08) | -0.08 (0.08) |
| Age (square) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Post-Cold War (1989-2012) | 0.00 (0.21) | -0.08 (0.20) | 0.78* (0.32) | 0.64* (0.30) | 2.12*** (0.53) | 2.05*** (0.54) |
| Constant | -2.10** (0.76) | -1.83* (0.75) | -5.73*** (1.25) | -5.12*** (1.10) | -7.47** (2.28) | -7.04** (2.34) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Countries | 109.00 | 109.00 | 109.00 | 109.00 | 90.00 | 90.00 |
| Observations | 4050.00 | 4050.00 | 4050.00 | 4050.00 | 210.00 | 210.00 |
| Chi2 | 139.14 | 182.10 | 168.39 | 244.09 | 54.57 | 59.38 |
| AIC | 1557.09 | 1512.65 | 770.15 | 719.99 | 227.99 | 227.57 |
| BIC | 1664.30 | 1626.16 | 877.36 | 833.51 | 281.55 | 284.47 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A5: Limited Sample with Leverage, 1985-2010

| | Authoritarian Failure | | | Democratic Transition | | |
|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | (A5.1) | (A5.2) | (A5.3) | (A5.4) | (A5.5) | (A5.6) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -1.00 [^] (0.56) | | | -0.67 (0.59) | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 0.70* (0.35) | | | 1.34** (0.47) | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.02 (0.23) | | | 0.12 (0.27) | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | 0.00 (0.03) | | | -0.03 (0.05) | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | 0.00 (0.00) | |
| Competitive Elections | | | 1.06** (0.36) | | | 1.80*** (0.51) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | -0.26 [^] (0.14) | | | -0.53** (0.19) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | 0.02 (0.01) | | | 0.04* (0.02) |
| FDI inflows (share of GDP) | 2.31 [^] (1.39) | 2.17 (1.50) | 2.19 (1.39) | 0.80 (3.39) | 0.58 (4.37) | 0.86 (3.44) |
| Total foreign aid (share of GDP) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.15 (0.27) | -0.16 (0.26) | -0.19 (0.27) | 0.03 (0.36) | 0.13 (0.34) | 0.03 (0.36) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -4.08* (1.78) | -4.40* (1.75) | -4.34* (1.70) | -5.05* (2.24) | -5.00* (2.25) | -5.21* (2.16) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -18.82 (12.98) | -22.76 [^] (12.56) | -17.33 (12.04) | -53.64 (50.84) | -61.26 (40.16) | -54.39 (49.77) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -42.53 (31.98) | -25.18 (29.93) | -39.44 (32.61) | -87.42 [^] (46.47) | -73.13 (46.55) | -90.28 [^] (49.57) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.24 (0.73) | 0.24 (0.66) | 0.36 (0.74) | -0.26 (1.03) | -0.21 (0.96) | -0.11 (1.06) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -0.61 (0.76) | 0.12 (0.67) | -0.90 (0.78) | -1.10 (0.94) | 0.40 (0.80) | -1.11 (1.00) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures (count) | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.11 (0.08) | | | |
| Previous Democratic Transitions (count) | | | | 0.40 (0.27) | 0.42 [^] (0.24) | 0.42 (0.27) |
| Regional Democracy Score (average) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.11 [^] (0.06) | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.11 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) |
| Age | -0.10* (0.05) | -0.13** (0.05) | -0.12** (0.04) | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) |
| Age (square) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00* (0.00) | 0.00* (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Age (cube) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -0.73 (2.09) | -0.94 (2.04) | -0.59 (2.13) | -2.98 (2.78) | -4.07 (2.73) | -3.19 (2.87) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.16 |
| Countries | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| Observations | 1138 | 1138 | 1138 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 |
| AIC | 559.38 | 581.08 | 567.15 | 363.09 | 386.29 | 366.53 |
| BIC | 634.94 | 661.67 | 647.75 | 438.35 | 466.57 | 446.81 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from logistic regressions. Reference for regime type in Model A5.1 and A5.4 is closed authoritarian regime (i.e. do not hold multiparty elections). [^] p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A6a. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage

| | Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Survival | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (A6.1) | (A6.2) | (A6.3) | (A6.4) | (A6.5) | (A6.6) | (A6.7) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -0.65 (0.59) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 1.33** (0.45) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.04 (0.07) | -0.03 (0.13) | 0.14 (0.28) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.05) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | 0.26** (0.08) | 0.71* (0.30) | 1.73*** (0.51) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.49** (0.19) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.04* (0.02) |
| FDI inflows (share of GDP) | 1.09 (3.01) | 1.07 (3.66) | 1.07 (3.73) | 0.96 (3.81) | 1.27 (3.51) | 1.28 (3.49) | 1.13 (2.99) |
| Total foreign aid (share of GDP) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | 0.12 (0.38) | 0.20 (0.36) | 0.21 (0.36) | 0.20 (0.35) | 0.11 (0.36) | 0.15 (0.37) | 0.11 (0.38) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -5.46* (2.31) | -5.36* (2.32) | -5.30* (2.35) | -5.37* (2.34) | -5.40* (2.31) | -5.38* (2.27) | -5.58* (2.24) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -56.68 (53.80) | -73.21 (47.96) | -67.85 (46.05) | -63.88 (42.15) | -64.22 (48.25) | -63.64 (51.60) | -56.58 (51.75) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -100.21* (47.50) | -86.06^ (46.77) | -87.03^ (46.76) | -87.87^ (47.40) | -91.25^ (49.03) | -100.62^ (53.16) | -102.04* (50.79) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.08 (1.06) | -0.04 (1.00) | -0.06 (0.99) | -0.05 (0.99) | 0.16 (1.06) | 0.06 (1.08) | 0.11 (1.10) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -1.31 (0.93) | -0.02 (0.77) | 0.07 (0.79) | 0.04 (0.79) | -0.96 (0.87) | -1.44 (0.99) | -1.40 (1.02) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | 0.17^ (0.10) | 0.19* (0.09) | 0.18* (0.09) | 0.18* (0.09) | 0.20* (0.09) | 0.19* (0.09) | 0.18^ (0.10) |
| Regional Democracy Score | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.11 (0.07) | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.09 (0.07) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.05 (0.07) |
| Time | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.00 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.07) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -3.85 (2.98) | -4.65^ (2.82) | -4.68^ (2.83) | -4.72^ (2.84) | -3.81 (2.86) | -3.85 (2.90) | -3.90 (3.02) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.14 |
| Countries | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| Observations | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 |
| AIC | 555.23 | 579.05 | 576.37 | 579.34 | 573.76 | 573.20 | 567.19 |
| BIC | 705.75 | 719.54 | 726.90 | 739.90 | 714.25 | 723.72 | 727.75 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A6b. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage

| | Authoritarian Replacement vs. Authoritarian Survival | | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (A6.1) | (A6.2) | (A6.3) | (A6.4) | (A6.5) | (A6.6) | (A6.7) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -1.79 [^] (1.07) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | -1.32 (0.99) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | -0.20 (0.33) | -0.88* (0.44) | -1.11 (0.81) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | 0.08* (0.04) | 0.15 (0.17) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.00 (0.01) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | -0.04 (0.23) | -0.22 (0.45) | -0.99 (1.00) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | 0.03 (0.05) | 0.35 (0.32) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | -0.03 (0.03) |
| FDI inflows (share of GDP) | 4.79*** (1.17) | 4.18*** (1.21) | 4.35*** (1.12) | 4.42*** (1.15) | 4.19** (1.30) | 4.19** (1.29) | 4.36** (1.35) |
| Total foreign aid (share of GDP) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | 0.16 (0.36) | 0.10 (0.45) | 0.22 (0.43) | 0.21 (0.42) | -0.04 (0.37) | -0.03 (0.37) | -0.01 (0.35) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -5.01* (2.27) | -5.09* (2.16) | -5.10* (2.24) | -5.04* (2.27) | -5.12* (2.14) | -5.16* (2.18) | -5.27* (2.22) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -40.12 (37.16) | -30.63 (28.07) | -39.06 (34.49) | -40.37 (36.35) | -25.29 (24.23) | -26.27 (24.84) | -27.22 (25.93) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -0.71 (52.49) | 1.37 (49.05) | 3.60 (53.88) | 4.59 (54.02) | 2.44 (45.55) | 3.84 (45.14) | 3.68 (45.75) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1.40 (1.11) | 1.13 (1.00) | 1.37 (1.16) | 1.36 (1.16) | 1.15 (1.02) | 1.22 (1.06) | 1.25 (1.06) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -0.16 (1.47) | -0.43 (1.42) | -0.01 (1.44) | 0.04 (1.40) | -0.78 (1.48) | -0.66 (1.51) | -0.66 (1.45) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | -0.14 (0.15) | -0.12 (0.14) | -0.15 (0.14) | -0.15 (0.15) | -0.10 (0.14) | -0.10 (0.14) | -0.10 (0.14) |
| Regional Democracy Score | 0.10 (0.13) | 0.04 (0.10) | 0.10 (0.12) | 0.11 (0.13) | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.03 (0.09) |
| Time | 0.14 (0.18) | 0.10 (0.19) | 0.14 (0.19) | 0.15 (0.20) | 0.07 (0.17) | 0.07 (0.17) | 0.09 (0.17) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | -6.07* (3.07) | -5.65 (3.77) | -6.69 [^] (3.64) | -6.63 [^] (3.55) | -4.57 (3.24) | -4.73 (3.32) | -4.83 (3.18) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.14 |
| Countries | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| Observations | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 |
| AIC | 555.23 | 579.05 | 576.37 | 579.34 | 573.76 | 573.20 | 567.19 |
| BIC | 705.75 | 719.54 | 726.90 | 739.90 | 714.25 | 723.72 | 727.75 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. [^] p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A6c. Results from Competing Risks Models with Linkage and Leverage

| | Democratic Transition vs. Authoritarian Replacement | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | (A6.1) | (A6.2) | (A6.3) | (A6.4) | (A6.5) | (A6.6) | (A6.7) |
| Non-Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 1.14 (1.12) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Electoral Authoritarian | 2.65* (1.09) | | | | | | |
| Multiparty Elections | | 0.24 (0.34) | 0.85 ^A (0.44) | 1.26 (0.79) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (square) | | | -0.07 ^A (0.04) | -0.18 (0.16) | | | |
| Multiparty Elections (cube) | | | | 0.01 (0.01) | | | |
| Competitive Elections | | | | | 0.30 (0.26) | 0.93 (0.57) | 2.72* (1.11) |
| Competitive Elections (square) | | | | | | -0.09 (0.07) | -0.85* (0.38) |
| Competitive Elections (cube) | | | | | | | 0.07* (0.03) |
| FDI inflows (share of GDP) | -3.71 (3.10) | -3.10 (3.96) | -3.28 (3.95) | -3.46 (4.01) | -2.92 (3.85) | -2.91 (3.81) | -3.24 (3.33) |
| Total foreign aid (share of GDP) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| GDP per capita (log, t-1) | -0.04 (0.54) | 0.10 (0.60) | -0.01 (0.59) | 0.00 (0.58) | 0.15 (0.54) | 0.17 (0.55) | 0.12 (0.54) |
| GDP per capita growth (t-1) | -0.46 (2.59) | -0.27 (2.66) | -0.19 (2.67) | -0.34 (2.68) | -0.28 (2.60) | -0.22 (2.63) | -0.32 (2.59) |
| Oil production per capita (t-1) | -16.56 (65.40) | -42.58 (57.22) | -28.79 (58.89) | -23.51 (56.63) | -38.93 (55.59) | -37.37 (58.96) | -29.36 (59.56) |
| Military personnel (per capita) | -99.51 (72.95) | -87.43 (71.93) | -90.63 (76.24) | -92.46 (76.80) | -93.69 (69.49) | -104.46 (72.46) | -105.72 (69.91) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -1.47 (1.51) | -1.17 (1.42) | -1.43 (1.56) | -1.41 (1.55) | -0.99 (1.49) | -1.16 (1.52) | -1.14 (1.51) |
| Civil Society Participation (t-5) | -1.15 (1.73) | 0.41 (1.62) | 0.08 (1.60) | 0.00 (1.56) | -0.18 (1.75) | -0.78 (1.85) | -0.74 (1.80) |
| Previous Authoritarian Failures | 0.31 ^A (0.18) | 0.31 ^A (0.17) | 0.32 ^A (0.17) | 0.33 ^A (0.18) | 0.31 ^A (0.17) | 0.30 ^A (0.17) | 0.27 (0.17) |
| Regional Democracy Score | -0.03 (0.14) | 0.06 (0.12) | 0.01 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.14) | 0.08 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.11) | 0.03 (0.11) |
| Time | -0.11 (0.19) | -0.07 (0.20) | -0.11 (0.20) | -0.12 (0.20) | -0.06 (0.17) | -0.06 (0.18) | -0.07 (0.18) |
| Time-Squared | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Time-Cubed | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Constant | 2.21 (4.37) | 1.00 (4.88) | 2.01 (4.76) | 1.91 (4.69) | 0.76 (4.49) | 0.88 (4.59) | 0.93 (4.55) |
| Pseudo_R2 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.14 |
| Countries | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |
| Observations | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 | 1116 |
| AIC | 555.23 | 579.05 | 576.37 | 579.34 | 573.76 | 573.20 | 567.19 |
| BIC | 705.75 | 719.54 | 726.90 | 739.90 | 714.25 | 723.72 | 727.75 |

Estimated coefficients and country-clustered standard errors from multinomial logistic regressions. ^A p< 0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001