Bridging the Sectarian Divide:
An Experiment on Intersectarian Cooperation in Lebanon

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Societies divided along ethnic or religious lines suffer from persistent conflict and under-provision of public goods. Scholarly understanding of the means by which intergroup cooperation can be strengthened remains extremely limited. In this study, we set out to test the effectiveness of two interventions on intergroup cooperation: cross-group expert appeal and participation in a cross-group discussion. The laboratory-in-the-field experiment is set in Lebanon's capital Beirut and involves interactions between 180 Shia and 180 Sunni Muslim participants. We distinguish between two types of cooperation: strategic (entails calculations about the other group's response) and nonstrategic (such calculations absent). We also test the impact of the two interventions on the effectiveness of clientelistic vote buying. We find that the expert appeal increases non-strategic intersectarian cooperation, and there is weak evidence suggesting that it diminishes the effectiveness of clientelism. The effect of group discussion is heterogeneous: on average, group discussion has no effect, but a deep substantive engagement with the other group increases both strategic and non-strategic cooperation. The policy implication of our study is that intergroup cooperation can be strengthened even in regions as bitterly divided as the Middle East.

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1. Introduction

Societies that are home to multiple ethnic or religious groups are known to have lower levels of public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) and higher levels of conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985). This is because cooperation is generally lower across group boundaries than within groups, and prevalence of ingroup favoritism impedes outcomes that are beneficial to society as a whole (Tajfel et al. 1971; Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Chen and Li 2009). Difficulty of cooperation across group boundaries is a common problem globally, but in recent decades it has been particularly acute in the Middle East. There, sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims and doctrinal divisions within sects have brought about spirals of civil conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and waves of protests in Pakistan and Bahrain. In this project, we use experimental methods to test the various means of encouraging cooperation across sectarian lines between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

In a laboratory in the field experiment involving 180 Sunnis and 180 Shias in Beirut, Lebanon, we test what effect watching a short pre-recorded *expert appeal* to cooperate and, separately, participation in a *cross-sectarian discussion* have on the level of intersectarian cooperation. The first intervention—the expert appeal—is modeled after a televised political talk show. In an unscripted conversation, four prominent journalists— two Sunnis and two Shias—discuss Lebanon's problems caused by sectarianism and conclude that the country would benefit substantially from greater cooperation across the sectarian lines. This intervention exposes participants to a consensual position expressed

by elites from two opposite groups. In the second intervention, participants in mixed six-person Sunni-Shia groups engage in face-to-face discussions about issues relating to intersectarian cooperation. This treatment is designed to test the effect of engagement with the opposite group.

The effectiveness of the two interventions is tested in a series of games. These capture the non-strategic and strategic aspects of cooperation. Non-strategic cooperation occurs when an individual from a given group takes an action that benefits the opposite group without any expectation of reciprocal action. Non-strategic cooperation is associated with a reduction in ingroup favoritism and an increase in positive attitudes toward the outgroup. We measure this type of behavior by observing participants' votes for sectarian candidates in simulated elections with a plurality rule and allocation of a fixed amount of resources between anonymous members of one's own and the opposite sect in the other-other allocation game. Strategic cooperation, in contrast, entails reciprocity and factors in individuals' expectations about the behavior of those from the opposite group. This is measured by observing the level of contributions in a standard public goods game. In addition, the study exposes a random sample of participants to a clientelistic exchange, where the selected subjects are offered a financial incentive to vote for their co-sectarian in the election game. We introduce this manipulation out of the concern that clientelism in the form of one-shot payments in exchange for votes is common in Lebanon and across much of the Middle East (Corstange 2016). The presence of this intervention allows us to test the effect of the expert appeal and group discussions on clientelism.

We find that watching experts discuss the benefits of intersectarian cooperation and recommend greater cooperation decreases ingroup favoritism and increases non-strategic cooperation. However, exposure to the expert appeal has no effect on strategic cooperation. This is because watching experts engage in a discussion amongst themselves fails to increase cross-group trust, which is one of the preconditions for strategic cooperation. Participation in a cross-sectarian group discussion about cooperation appears to have no effect either on non-strategic or strategic cooperation. In fact, participants randomly assigned to the group discussion intervention tend to become less cooperative across all tasks, and group discussion seems to enhance the impact of clientelism. However, the effectiveness of group discussion turns out to be highly heterogeneous as a product of the substantive depth of discussion. A deep and substantive exchange that touches on many topics relating to intergroup cooperation increases both non-strategic and strategic cooperation by a large margin. We also illustrate how clientelism impedes intergroup cooperation in divided societies. Neither intervention diminishes the effectiveness of clientelism, although exposure to the expert appeal comes close to having the desired effect.

Ours is the first study to examine the impact of an expert appeal on intergroup cooperation. While existing scholarship suggests that elites influence mass opinion either by virtue of their authority or by improving the information environment (Broockman and Butler 2015; Gabel and Scheve 2007), few studies have considered the influence of expert appeals on members of the public (e.g. Bidwell, Casey, and Glennerster 2016). Yet, expert appeals are ubiquitous on television and define a whole genre of political

programming. The effects of group discussions on social dilemmas, in contrast, are well studied (for reviews see Thompson 2008; Balliet 2010). Our contribution to that literature is in pinpointing the mechanism by which discussion affects intergroup cooperation. We find that it is the substance of the discussion, and not the mere act of interacting with members of the opposite group, that increases cooperation. Our study makes an additional theoretical contribution to the literature on the determinants of intergroup cooperation in that we draw a distinction between nonstrategic cooperation that does not involve interaction with members of the opposite group and strategic cooperation that involves interactive exchanges. Our findings suggest that willingness to cooperate in non-strategic exchanges is more easily altered than predisposition toward cooperation with the outgroup in settings that involve strategic considerations. Finally, ours is also the first study to consider how interventions designed to increase intergroup cooperation interact with clientelism.

Our research suggests that intergroup cooperation can be strengthened even in places as bitterly divided on issues as fundamental as religious differences as the Middle East. The primary policy implication of this study is that dissemination of consensual cross-sectarian expert calls to cooperation may in fact bring about greater cooperation across group lines, at least in non-strategic exchanges. Our findings also indicate that intersectarian cooperation in divided societies is unlikely to take root as long as clientelistic vote buying remains a common practice.

2. Hypotheses

We expect both interventions—expert appeal and group discussion—to increase

nonstrategic and strategic intersectarian cooperation. An appeal by experts to cooperate

across sectarian lines is likely to have an effect by virtue of increasing the regard for the

other group and planting the expectation that the opposite sect's regard for one's own

group has also increased. Group discussion is likely to lay the groundwork for

cooperation by facilitating greater familiarity with members of the opposite group and by

providing substantive information about their willingness to cooperate. These

expectations give rise to the following two hypotheses:

> H1: Participants randomized into the *expert appeal intervention* will be more likely
> to cooperate with members of the opposite sect in both nonstrategic and strategic
> exchanges.
> H2: Participants randomized into the *group discussion intervention* will be more
> likely to cooperate with members of the opposite sect in both nonstrategic and
> strategic exchanges.

In addition, we hypothesize that both interventions will diminish the effectiveness of

clientelism by engaging intrinsic motivation and heightening the feeling that one is doing

the morally right thing by not letting financial incentives sway one's decisions:

> H3: Participants assigned to expert appeal and group discussion interventions will
> be *less likely* to vote for a co-sectarian candidate in simulated elections after being
> offered a financial incentive to do so.

3. Context

Lebanon is the most fractured country in the Middle East. Fractures run along the lines

of religious sectarian identities and are rooted in the legacies of pre-Ottoman and

Ottoman political arrangements (Makdisi 2000). Sectarianism is institutionalized. The

1943 National Pact heralding Lebanon's independence from France and the 1989

National Reconciliation Accord (the Taif Agreement) that concluded the intersectarian civil war (1975-1990) organize the system of government around sectarian differences. The very question of the relative size of the three largest sects is extremely sensitive, and the only national population census in Lebanon's fraught history took place in 1932. Estimates suggest that Christians comprise about 40% of the population, while Sunni and Shia Muslims are 27% and 26% of the population respectively (e.g. Faour 2007). Maronite Christians are guaranteed the office of the presidency, Sunni Muslims the office of the prime minister, and Shia Muslims the office of the parliamentary speaker. The three sects have quotas in parliament: 64 seats are assigned to Christians, 27 each to Shia and Sunni Muslims, and the remaining 10 seats to other Muslim minorities. Administrative positions in the executive branch are generally evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. Basic services are commonly provided along sectarian lines, and the population is highly segregated regionally within the country and by neighborhood in the capital of Beirut. Marital practices are regulated independently by separate confessional courts, and most high school students attend schools captured by a single confession (Baytiyeh 2016). Later in life, sectarian nepotism continues to shape the professional life of many graduates (Kingston 2013). In addition, external actors exert pressure on behalf of the competing sects: notably, Iran supports Lebanon's Shias, whereas Saudi Arabia supports the Sunnis.

This environment of institutionalized sectarianism gives rise to clientelism. Most commonly, clientelism takes the form of vote buying on the polling day (Corstange 2012, 2016), although longer-term clientelistic arrangements that entail selective service

provision are also present (Cammett and Isaar 2010). Using the list-experiment

technique, Corstange (2012) estimates that about 55% of the Lebanese sold their votes in

the 2009 parliamentary election. Although the incidence of vote trafficking is very high,

there is mounting evidence that the public is gradually coming to view sectarianism as

inimical to Lebanon's development. Sustained mass protests against institutionalized

sectarianism took place in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring (Fakhoury 2011), and the

"garbage protests" of July-August 2016 sparked another wave of mass critique of

sectarian politics.[1] In the survey that was administered at the conclusion of our study,

80% of respondents said that they favored the dismantling of the exclusively sectarian

party system.[2]

4. Research Design

To test whether intersectarian cooperation might be improved among members of

competing sectarian communities we designed a laboratory-in-the-field experiment built

around two interventions:

(1) Viewing of a pre-recorded expert appeal about the benefits of intersectarian

cooperation, and

(2) Participation in a small-group discussion about intersectarianism.

The two interventions are followed by a series of tasks—a simulated election, other-other

allocation game, and a standard public goods game—to measure the effectiveness of the

treatments. There is also a third intervention, which is designed to test the effectiveness

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[1] The protests came about as a result of the failure of highly divided municipal elites to agree on a location of a new landfill site for Beirut.
[2] This result is likely inflated by comparison to the population average given that the interventions were designed to encourage inter-sectarian cooperation.

of the preceding two and exposes a random sample of participants to a clientelistic appeal intended to sway them away from intersectarian cooperation. The clientelism intervention is tested specifically in the simulated elections. All tasks, from watching the expert discussion to playing the games, are undertaken within small groups in a series of face-to-face interactions. The groups are made up of three Sunni and three Shia participants for the total of six participants within each group; membership in these groups remains fixed over the course of the study. The participants were not informed about the structure of the study and at the time of exposure to the interventions did not know which tasks would follow next.

4.1 Study population

It is important to us to test the interventions not with students but with a sample of individuals as close as possible to the overall population. The participants in this experiment are drawn from across Lebanon's capital Beirut. Two-thirds are from neighborhoods dominated by a single sect, and the remainder are from mixed neighborhoods. The average age of participants is 37, and participants range in age from 18 to 64.[3] Men and women, and Sunni and Shia Muslims are all equally represented. The total number of individuals who participated in the study is 360 for the total of 60 six-member teams.

4.2 Setting

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[3] On advice of our implementing partner we capped participant age at 64 in order increase the likelihood that participants were literate and able to follow instructions.

The study was administered on the premises of a major Lebanese public opinion firm that recruited the participants and assisted with the implementation of the experiment.[4] On arrival, individuals were randomly assigned to the six-member groups. Each group was balanced with regard to sect (three Sunni and three Shia), gender (three men and three women), and age (three participants aged 18-40 and three aged 41-64) in order to minimize possible social pressure on women and younger participants and to control for heterogeneity in the nature of social pressure across groups. None of the group participants had met beforehand, and we asked participants not to speak with one another until instructed to do so by our assistants. Participants were asked to keep their names secret throughout the study (names are often a marker of sectarian affiliation). Our assistants acted as group moderators: they informed the members of their group that there are three Sunni and three Shia Muslims in the group (without revealing which specific participants belonged to which sect or introducing them), read out instructions for every task in Arabic and moderated the group discussion. The five assistants are employees of the public opinion firm: all of them are Lebanese nationals and native Arabic speakers; three are men; three are Shia, one is Sunni, and one is Christian. Assistants followed written scripts and were trained not to deviate from pre-agreed instructions. The experiment took place in November 2016 over the course of twelve separate sessions that were completed in eight days. Five six-person groups were recruited for every session. Each group was seated around its own table out of earshot of the other four groups; there was no communication across groups. In the analyses that follow we control for group moderator effects to ensure that these do not contaminate the effect of the interventions.

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[4] Our implementing partner was Information International S.A.L.

4.3 Interventions

The experimental conditions are summarized in Table 1. The two principal interventions are the viewing of a pre-recorded discussion among experts and participation in a face-to-face discussion within six-person groups. The expert appeal intervention is set up to maximally resemble a political talk show of the kind that one commonly sees on television. In the video, four experts—two Sunni and two Shia male journalists in their 50s—discuss pressing problems in contemporary Lebanese politics and the promise of intersectarian cooperation in potentially solving these. The discussion is moderated by a female Christian journalist, is recorded in a formal setting, and is unscripted. The four experts and the moderator are all prominent in Lebanese media, contributing opinion pieces in major newspapers and appearing on national television. In their public appearances, all the experts consistently advocate for intersectarian cooperation. The views that the experts express in their public appearances are identical to their statements in the debate that we recorded. This is important because about a quarter of the respondents remembered encountering at least one of the experts either on television or in print. There is no difference in the rate of expert recognition among participants assigned to the expert appeal and group discussion conditions.

Table 1. Experimental conditions

Experimental condition	Expert Appeal	Participant Discussion	Clientelism	Number of groups	Number of participants
1 (Control)	No	No	No	10	60
2 (Expert Appeal)	Yes	No	No	10	60
3 (Participant Discussion)	Yes	Yes	No	10	60
4 (Clientelism)	No	No	Yes	10	60
5 (Expert Appeal + Clientelism)	Yes	No	Yes	10	60
6 (Participant Discussion + Clientelism)	Yes	Yes	Yes	10	60

The expert discussion is 15 minutes in duration. This is considerably shorter than a standard political talk show on television but, in our experience, close to the maximum attention span on a passive task of this kind in a laboratory setting. The shorter discussion duration in this case might lead us to underestimate the real-world effects of exposure to an expert discussion. The discussion opens with all the experts agreeing that sectarianism is the main problem in Lebanese politics. The nature of the problem is then illustrated in a series of remarks: sectarianism is linked to corruption and nepotism, lack of a unifying Lebanese national identity, infrequent social mixing across sects, and institutional sclerosis and poor quality of basic governmental services. The discussion closes with participants appealing for intersectarian cooperation in the interest of subsequent generations. The transcript of the video (in English) and the video itself (in Arabic) are available in Appendices A and B.

The expert debate is shown to 240 participants (of the total of 360) in their small groups (experimental conditions 2, 3, 5, and 6). Of this total, 120 go on to discuss intersectarian cooperation in a face-to-face conversation with other members of the six-person Sunni-Shia groups (conditions 3 and 6). The group discussion intervention is designed to follow on from experts' appeal so that we have some way to impose bounds on the nature of the group discussion. Group discussions lasted 30 minutes on average. They were relatively freewheeling; group moderators were asked to pose a series of questions (see Appendix C) in order to direct the discussion and to encourage all group participants to express opinions. The discussions effectively took the form of a focus group on the content of the expert appeal and in this resembled the kind of conversations that

acquaintances might have about a political talk show. While all participants agreed in principle with the message that intersectarian cooperation is good, there was quite a bit of variation on the depth of engagement. Participants in some groups provided multiple examples of the harms of sectarianism, while, in other groups, discussion remained shallow and did not get much beyond superficial agreement with the experts. Group discussion transcripts (in English) are available in Appendix D.[5]

In designing the study we tried to approximate Lebanon's actual political environment as closely as possible. One obvious challenge to studying the effectiveness of expert appeals or deliberative discussions on political behavior and attitudes is that actual political behavior in Lebanon, just like in many developing democracies, is not simply a product of personal political preferences but is subject to pressure from vote-buying intermediaries. The question then is not just whether our interventions can sway members of feuding sects to cooperate across the sectarian divide but, more realistically, whether these interventions can have an effect in the presence of widespread clientelism. To test this second proposition we assigned 180 participants in their six-person groups to a clientelism intervention (conditions 4-6). Of this total, a third of the groups were exposed only to the clientelistic message without been subject to any other interventions (condition 4), a third were exposed to clientelism after seeing the expert appeal (condition 5), and the remaining third received the clientelistic offer after both watching the expert appeal and then discussing it within their groups (condition 6).

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[5] These transcripts are generated from audio recordings of group discussions. One participant objected to being recorded, and therefore transcripts are available for 19 out of 20 group discussions.

The clientelism intervention was delivered in the following manner. Before proceeding onto the games that measure the effectiveness of the interventions every participant in the experiment was asked to meet with an employee of the implementing firm to confirm their contact details. The employees in question—one Sunni and one Shia, both male, and in their mid-20s—were our confederates. Participants always met with a confederate who was their co-sectarian. All the meetings were one-on-one and held in private rooms with the door closed. The confederates first checked the subject's contact details against a list and then briefly described the first game, a simulated election with multiple rounds where participants would be asked to vote for a Sunni or Shia candidate running on different platforms. Those not assigned to the clientelism treatment were then instructed to return to their six-member group. Those who were subject to the clientelism treatment were then subject to a clientelistic offer. In it, the confederate, posing as an election broker, explained that unbeknownst to researchers a good friend and co-sectarian of the confederate was running in the simulated elections as a candidate, and that winning candidates would earn more. The confederate then offered the subject $10, ostensibly "in secret," to vote for the candidate of the same sect as theirs across all the simulated elections irrespective of the candidate's policy platform.[6] The script of what was said by election brokers is available in Appendix E. Subjects were free to accept or reject the monetary offer. Seventy-six percent of the subjects accepted the offer; those who rejected it mostly did so stating explicitly that they wanted to hear the candidates' programs.

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[6] US dollars are used commonly alongside the national currency (Lebanese pounds), and all the transactions in this study took place in USD. $10 is equivalent to about 2-hours of work on an average salary in Beirut.

4.4 Measurements

In measuring the effectiveness of the interventions we consider voting behavior in simulated elections, monetary allocation to an anonymous member of the opposite sect in the other-other allocation game, and contributions to the common pool in a standard public goods game. All of these measures are a way to get at the same underlying phenomenon of willingness to engage in intersectarian cooperation but in slightly different ways. Voting for a candidate of a different sect in a simulated election or allocating funds to an individual on the opposite side of the sectarian divide are both expressions of a subject's personal preference and are a measure of nonstrategic cooperation. In contrast, contributions in a public goods game are subject to strategic calculations about the behavior of other group members, including those from the opposite sect. This set of measurements allows us to observe how the interventions have affected the participants' nonstrategic preferences and their strategic calculations.

The simulated election took place over the course of four separate rounds. In each round, two candidates—one Sunni, one Shia; both besuited men in their late 50s of similar body shape and demeanor—appeared in person before the six-person group to deliver competing policy proposals with regards to how to divide a certain amount of money between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the group. Prior to this, all participants were endowed with 40 tokens each (a single token is equivalent to $0.5), and 20 tokens were then collected from every participant by way of what was described to participants as a tax. The resultant 120 tokens ($60) were placed at the center of the table, and it was this amount that was to be divided according to the proposal made by the winning candidate.

Over the course of the four elections the candidates delivered competing proposals for how to divide "the tax" between the two sects. Votes were cast in writing by secret ballot. Election winners were determined after all the games had been completed.[7] Instructions read out to participants by group moderators for this and all other games are available in Appendix F. Templates of decision sheets that participants had to complete in each game are in Appendix G.

Table 2: Candidate messages in the election game

	Sunni candidate	*Shia candidate*
Election 1	Egalitarian distribution: (20/20)	Sectarian distribution: Shia only (0/40)
Election 2	Sectarian distribution: Sunni only (40/0)	Egalitarian distribution (20/20)
Election 3	Egalitarian distribution: (20/20)	Sectarian distribution: Sunni and Shia (10/30)
Election 4	Sectarian distribution: Sunni and Shia (30/10)	Egalitarian distribution (20/20)

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to number of tokens offered to Sunni (first number) and Shia (second number) participants.

The proposals delivered by election candidates are summarized in Table 2. The order of elections was fixed to facilitate the implementation of the study, and the two candidates alternated as to who spoke first in every election. In every election, one of the candidates proposed equal distribution of tokens—20 per person—to both Sunni and Shia participants. The other candidate then proposed some form of unequal distribution favoring his own sect by suggesting that either all (40 per person) or most (30 per person) of the tokens should go to his co-sectarians. The script of statements delivered from memory by the two candidates is available in Appendix H. We define sectarian voters as

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[7] In the event of a tie, election winner was determined by the group moderator tossing a coin.

those who vote for a candidate from their sect across all four elections irrespective of the candidate's policy proposal.

The second game is the so-called other-other allocation game, which is commonly used in studies of intergroup cooperation as a measure of other-regarding preferences (e.g. Habyarimana et al. 2007; Chen and Li 2009). In this game, participants are given 10 tokens that they must spend and are asked to allocate a certain amount of tokens to an anonymous co-ethnic and an anonymous person from the opposite group. In our specific case, every participant had to decide how many of the 10 tokens to allocate to a co-sectarian and how many to a person from a different sect. Participants were informed that their decisions determined the earnings of two other people in their six-person group, but not which specific individuals were impacted. The allocation decision had to be recorded in writing in secret. Allocation decisions were tallied at the very end of the study.

The third and final game that the subjects participated in is the standard public goods game, which is used to measure the strength of cooperation within groups. In this task, participants had to decide how many of 10 tokens to keep for themselves and how many to surrender into the common pool. All tokens in the common pool were multiplied by two and the resultant sum was shared equally across all the group members. Higher contributions to the common pool are reflective of a higher willingness to cooperate with others. A classical free-riding problem arises where participants benefit from not contributing to the common pool while hoping that others will contribute (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, contributions are most likely when participants trust others to contribute too.

This game was repeated for five rounds. Before playing the game, participants had a chance to practice three hypothetical scenarios in order to learn how the free-riding incentive operates. Group moderators walked the participants through scenarios with contribution vectors (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10), and (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). During the actual rounds of the game, every group member recorded their contribution in writing secretly, and the group moderator wrote out the individual contributions and resultant distributions on a whiteboard at the end of every round without linking individuals and specific contributions.

4.5 Compensation and Ethics

With the three games finished, participants were asked to complete a brief survey, and then earnings were tallied. One election of four and a single round of the public goods game were picked at random for the purposes of calculating the winnings from games one and three. Allocations from game two were added to these. In addition, every participant received a show-up fee of $18. Participants earned $48 on average, a little more than a day's average wage in Beirut. Those who had been assigned to the clientelism treatment and accepted the $10 reward were permitted to keep that too. These are relatively high amounts for just a few hours of work. We purposefully kept remuneration high in order to motivate participants to think carefully through their decisions and to try and imitate the high stakes of regular political interactions.

It was paramount to us that all individual decisions were completely confidential so as not to create conflict between members of small groups. To this end, decisions in all the

games were made in writing and in secret. We used a system of multiple identification numbers to track participants' decisions. This study involved deception for those assigned to the clientelism intervention. These participants, who were half of the total number of subjects, were led to believe that election brokers were trying to influence the outcome of simulated elections unbeknownst to the research team. All those in the clientelism intervention were debriefed on the nature of deception; there were no adverse reactions in the debriefing.

5. Results

In this section, we first explore how being exposed to a cross-sectarian experts' appeal for cooperation and participating in a group discussion affects non-strategic and strategic cooperation. With the baseline effect of the interventions established, we subsequently examine the impact of the interventions on the effectiveness of clientelism. The results section concludes with a discussion of the heterogeneous effect of discussion quality on preferences for cooperation.

5.1. Balance

Results from a randomization check are reported in Appendix I. By design there is the same number of women (50%) and Sunni/Shia participants (50%+50%) across the six treatment conditions. The groups are also identical with regards to age, education level, religiosity, wealth, feelings of physical insecurity, and their ability to understand group moderator's instructions. There is some mild heterogeneity across groups on the level of interest in politics, frequency of discussions with family and friends about

intersectarianism, and feelings of financial insecurity.[8] Such slight imbalance is common

in experimental studies, especially when population sizes are quite small. In the analyses

that follow, we include all the demographic and attitudinal variables as controls.

5.2. Non-strategic interactions

Two tasks were designed to measure the effect of the interventions on non-strategic

cooperation: voting in four simulated elections with an ingroup and outgroup candidate

(task 1) and allocation decisions in the other-other allocation game where the participant

has to decide how to divide a sum of money between an anonymous ingroup member and

an anonymous outgroup member (task 2).

The results are reported in Table 3.[9] In Panel A, we report the results for the effectiveness

of the expert appeal. Panel B contains the results for the group discussion intervention.

In the case of the elections, the dependent variable is the average proportion of sectarian

voters, i.e. those who voted for the candidate of their sect across all four elections

irrespective of what distribution policy the candidate advocated.[10] We expect both

interventions to decrease this proportion. In the other-other allocation game, the

dependent variable is the number of tokens (of 10) allocated to a co-sectarian. This

number should also diminish if interventions were effective. Half of the participants in

each task were in groups that were subject to the clientelism treatment and had been

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[8] Balance tests are constructed from responses to survey questions. The wording of survey questions and answer options is available in Appendix J.

[9] The total number of participants in the study was 360. However, some participants made ambiguous markings on the decision sheets (e.g. two distribution options selected). That is why the *n* in Table 3 is short of 360. In subsequent analyses that include controls from survey questions, the *n* is sometimes considerably lower than 360 because there were missing responses on the survey.

[10] Results for each election and separated by experimental group are available in Appendix K.

offered a financial incentive to favor the ingroup . We report each treatment effect in the

aggregate and then disaggregate it by whether or not the clientelistic intervention was

present. The results are differences of means; the t-statistic is from a two-tailed test of

statistical significance.

Table 3: Treatment effects by manipulation (tasks 1 and 2). Dependent variables: proportion of votes cast for co-sectarian across all elections in task 1, and number of tokens allocated to co-sectarian in task 2.

Panel A: Expert Appeal Manipulation		No Expert Appeal	Expert Appeal	t-value	Num. of Obs.
	Aggregate	**0.46**	**0.27**	**3.04****	**238**
		(0.05)	**(0.04)**		
Task 1	No clientelism	0.35 (0.06)	0.19 (0.05)	2.03*	119
(Elections)	Clientelism	0.57 (0.06)	0.36 (0.06)	2.34*	119
	Aggregate	**7.01**	**5.98**	**3.27****	**238**
		(0.24)	**(0.20)**		
Task 2	No clientelism	6.57 (0.29)	5.60 (0.25)	2.52**	120
(Allocation)	Clientelism	7.46 (0.38)	6.37 (0.30)	2.22*	118

| Panel B: Participant Discussion Manipulation		No Participant Discussion	Participant Discussion	t-value	Num. of Obs.
	Aggregate	**0.27**	**0.36**	**-1.45**	**238**
		(0.04)	**(0.04)**		
Task 1	No clientelism	0.19 (0.05)	0.22 (0.05)	-0.41	119
(Elections)	Clientelism	0.36 (0.06)	0.5 (0.07)	-1.59	119
	Aggregate	**5.98**	**6.39**	**-1.36**	**239**
		(0.20)	**(0.22)**		
Task 2	No clientelism	5.60 (0.25)	6.35 (0.29)	-1.96	120
(Allocation)	Clientelism	6.37 (0.30)	6.43 (0.34)	-0.13	119

Note: Panel A compares results from experimental conditions 1&4 vs. 2&5; Panel B compares conditions 2&5 vs. 3&6 (see Table 1 for information on experimental groups); two tailed t-tests are used; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

The results indicate that watching the expert appeal improved attitudes toward the

outgroup thus increasing non-strategic cooperation. After exposure to the expert debate,

the proportion of sectarian voters fell on average by 19 percentage points. Likewise,

those who watched the video allocated on average one additional token to a member of

the opposite sect in the other-other allocation game. Both of these treatment effects are

statistically significant. In contrast, participation in a group discussion had no

statistically distinguishable effect on intersectarian cooperation. If anything, group

discussion generally appears to nudge ingroup favoritism upward and diminish the

potential for non-strategic cooperation. In section 5.4, we examine in depth the

effectiveness of clientelism in simulated elections and how clientelism interacts with the

two interventions.

5.3. Strategic interactions

Figure 1: Average contribution levels in the public goods game across the experimental conditions.

Note: Dots correspond to average contributions; vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

To explore whether exposure to an expert appeal for cooperation and participation in a

group discussion might affect intersectarian cooperation in a setting involving strategic

decisions we had the participants play a public goods game within their mixed-sect

groups. We hypothesized that strategic cooperation will increase in both treatment

conditions. Thus, we expect that participants assigned to the expert appeal and group

discussion interventions should make higher contributions.

Table 4: Treatment effects by manipulation (task 3).

Model	Expert Appeal				Participant Discussion			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Expert Appeal	0.33	0.33	0.37	0.21				
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.47)				
Participant Discussion					0.06	0.06	0.08	0.23
					(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Lagged group contribution	0.07**	0.07**	0.05**	0.04*	0.09**	0.09**	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.33**	3.50**	4.41**	-0.09	2.96**	3.06**	3.54**	0.35
	(0.77)	(0.86)	(0.88)	(1.49)	(0.67)	(0.73)	(0.66)	(1.73)
Clientelism	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Control variables	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	960	960	960	792	960	960	960	780
R^2	0.30	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.32

*Note: Models 1-4 examine treatment effects in experimental conditions 2&5 against the baseline of conditions 1&4. Models 5-8 look at treatment effects in experimental conditions 3&6 against the baseline of 2&5; standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

The public goods game consisted of five separate rounds. Average contributions by

experimental condition for each round are plotted in Figure 1. Generally, contributions

remain stable at a little above 5 tokens (of 10) and rise slightly in later rounds. The

results are reported in Table 4. One's contribution in the previous round is likely to

affect how much one contributes in the current round; to account for this we add a

variable for average group contribution in the preceding round to the analyses. The effect

of exposure to the expert appeal is tested in models 1-4 and of participation in a group

discussion in models 5-8. In each subsequent model we add controls for exposure to a

clientelistic message, group moderator effects, and demographic and attitudinal variables from the balance tests. Both interventions increase the amount that participants contribute, but these effects are not statistically significant across any specification. Our theoretical expectations with regards to the impact of the two treatments on strategic cooperation are not supported by the data.

One possible reason why the interventions have had no effect is because they failed to increase cross-sectarian trust, which is one of the main prerequisites for cooperation in strategic settings. In this instance, we have measures of cross-sectarian trust from surveys that were administered immediately at the completion of the study. This allows us to test the validity of the claim that cross-sectarian trust had not been affected by the treatments. We constructed measures of absolute and relative trust in the opposite sect. The absolute cross-sectarian trust measure reflects a participant's trust in the opposite sect on a four-point scale, where 1 is "no trust at all" and 4 is "complete trust" (for question wording see Appendix J). One concern is that a participant's trust in the opposite sect might be a lot lower, identical to, or a lot higher than her trust in her own sect, and that the absolute trust measure might not reflect this important variation. To address this concern we also designed a measure of relative cross-sectarian trust, which is calculated by subtracting a participant's trust in her own sect from her trust in the opposite sect. This latter measure is on a seven-point scale.

Table 5. Treatment effects on cross-sectarian trust (models 1-4), and effect of trust on contributions in a public goods game (models 5 and 6).

	Panel A (ordinal logit): Absolute cross-sectarian trust		Panel B (ordinal logit): Relative cross-sectarian trust		Panel C (OLS): Contribution	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Expert Appeal	1.02 (0.32)		1.64 (0.52)		0.10 (0.50)	-0.04 (0.53)
Participant Discussion		1.62 (0.50)		1.05 (0.33)	0.20 (0.46)	0.32 (0.46)
Absolute cross-sectarian trust					0.72** (0.21)	
Relative cross-sectarian trust						0.41* (0.20)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant					-1.25 (1.59)	1.32 (1.83)
/cut1	-4.71 (1.66)	-3.28 (1.63)	0.01 (1.56)	-0.97 (1.67)		
/cut2	-2.20 (1.63)	-0.60 (1.61)	1.37 (1.55)	0.51 (1.66)		
/cut3	-0.74 (1.62)	1.05 (1.61)	2.49 (1.57)	1.59 (1.67)		
/cut4			5.87 (1.62)	5.35 (1.72)		
/cut5			7.32 (1.74)	6.64 (1.82)		
/cut6			8.03 (1.88)	7.34 (1.95)		
Observations	168	169	165	169	1008	996
R^2	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.32	0.32

*Note: Regressions in Panels A&B are ordinal logistic regressions, and coefficients are odds ratios. OLS is used in Panel C; models 1 and 3 use observations from experimental conditions 1-2 and 4-5; models 2 and 4 use observations from experimental conditions 2-3 and 5-6; models 5 and 6 use observations from all experimental conditions; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

In panels A and B of Table 5, we report the effect of the interventions on cross-sectarian trust. As absolute cross-sectarian trust is measured on a four-point scale, we analyze the effect of treatments on trust using ordinal logistic regression, and

coefficients in panel A are odds ratios. For ease of comparison, panel B regression is also an ordinal logistic with coefficients being odds ratios.[11] We use OLS regressions to estimate the effects in panel C. Across all the specifications we control for the presence of the clientelism intervention, group moderator effects, and same demographic and attitudinal variables as earlier. Exposure to the expert appeal and participation in a group discussion both appear to increase cross-sectarian trust. However, this effect is not statistically significant. These results confirm that the interventions have failed to increase cross-sectarian trust.

In Panel C, we check the assumption that higher levels of cross-sectarian trust (absolute trust in model 5 and relative trust in model 6) result in higher contributions in the public goods game. Consistent with expectations, we find that a one-unit increase in absolute trust (on a four-point scale) is associated with an additional contribution of 0.72 of a token (of 10). The magnitude of the effect for relative cross-sectarian trust is similar. Both effects are statistically significant.

5.4. Clientelism

In designing the experiment, we set out to establish whether or not the expert appeal and group discussion might mitigate against the positive effect of clientelism on sectarian voting. We hypothesized that the interventions would diminish the effectiveness of clientelism given that the treatments appeal to ideational intrinsic motives, which might override financial motivations activated through vote buying.

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[11] The relative trust measure is on a seven-point scale, and therefore OLS is preferable to ordered logit. Results from an OLS regression are reported in Appendix L; they are consistent with results from ordered logit with regards to direction of the effect and statistical significance.

We now test this hypothesis in the context of the simulated elections. The clientelism intervention was designed specifically to incentivize participants to vote for co-sectarians irrespective of the content of the candidates' policy proposals.[12] Everyone assigned to the clientelism treatment was offered a financial incentive to vote for a co-sectarian in subsequent elections. However, as mentioned in the research design section, 24% of those offered the incentive declined to accept it, usually saying that they wanted to hear candidates' platforms.[13] As a result, in testing the effectiveness of vote buying we use two different measures of the treatment: whether the participant was part of the treatment (*Clientelism*) and, separately, whether they accepted the financial incentive (*Accepted Clientelistic Offer*). It might be useful to think of this difference as that between the average treatment effect (ATE) and the complier average causal effect (CACE), i.e. the difference in treatment effects between everyone assigned to the treatment and only those who took it up. Among those who accepted the financial incentive across all experimental conditions, 60% voted consistently for their co-sectarian—this is the average follow-through rate in this study after accepting a payment in exchange for one's vote. Among those who refused the incentive, only 10% on average voted for their co-sectarian candidate in all four elections.

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[12] In fact, the clientelistic offer also increased financial contributions to anonymous co-sectarians in the other-other allocation game (task 2); this can be gleaned from Table 3. This suggests that clientelistic payments might affect not only voting but also a broader set of behaviors.

[13] Refusals to accept the incentive were as follows: 14/60 in the Clientelism condition (experimental condition 4), 12/60 in the Expert Appeal+Clientelism condition (5), and 17/60 in the Participant Discussion+Clientelism condition (6).

Table 6: Effects of clientelism on the likelihood of sectarian voting (logistic regressions; coefficients are odds ratios).

Model	Expert Appeal				Participation Discussion			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Clientelism	2.59** (0.90)	2.58* (1.20)			3.31** (1.19)	2.71 (1.41)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer			5.05** (1.93)	6.47** (3.38)			6.90** (2.70)	3.01* (1.62)
Expert Appeal	0.41* (0.15)	0.40 (0.22)	0.37** (0.14)	0.47 (0.23)				
Clientelism × Expert Appeal		1.01 (0.71)						
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Expert Appeal				0.58 (0.44)				
Participant Discussion					1.64 (0.58)	1.32 (0.71)	2.06 (0.78)	0.99 (0.50)
Clientelism × Participant Discussion						1.45 (1.02)		
Accepted Clientelistic Offer × Participant Discussion								5.44* (4.35)
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	198	198	198	198	194	194	194	194
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.14	0.14	0.21	0.23

Note: Accepted Clientelistic Offer *is coded as 0 for participants in experimental conditions without clientelism (1-3) and for those in clientelism conditions (4-6) who did not accept the incentive; models 1-4 use data from conditions 1-2 and 4-5; models 5-8 use data from conditions 2-3 and 5-6; coefficients are odds ratios; standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.*

The effectiveness of the clientelism manipulation in encouraging sectarian voting and the impact of expert appeal and group discussion on clientelism are explored in Table 6. Given that the dependent variable is binary—whether participants are sectarian voters (which would mean voting for a co-sectarian in all four elections)—we use logistic regressions in all the models. The coefficients are odds ratios. We

find that clientelism is highly effective at encouraging sectarian voting. The odds of consistently voting for a co-sectarian are about three times higher for those assigned to the clientelism treatment by comparison to those who were not approached with a clientelistic offer. Among those who accepted the clientelistic offer, the odds of voting for a co-sectarian are between three and seven times higher by comparison to those who were not subject to the clientelism treatment or refused the offer. These are substantial effects, especially given that election brokers did not ask participants to commit to voting for a co-sectarian and did not mention any sanctions for not following through.

Whether the two interventions mitigate the positive effect of clientelism on sectarian voting is tested using interaction terms between *Clientelism/Accepted Clientelistic Offer* and each of the treatments in models 2 and 4 for the expert appeal and models 6 and 8 for group discussion. The expert appeal intervention appears to diminish the effectiveness of clientelism only weakly, if at all. In models 2 and 4, the coefficients for clientelism are greater than 1 and significant, whereas the coefficients for the interaction terms are either 1 (interaction between *Clientelism* and *Expert Appeal*) or less than 1 (interaction between *Accepted Clientelistic Offer* and *Expert Appeal*) but not statistically significant. In contrast, participation in a group discussion not only does not diminish the effectiveness of clientelism on sectarian voting but seems to increase it. In models 6 and 8, the coefficients for clientelism are greater than 1 and significant, and the coefficients for interaction terms are also greater than 1 and significant in the case of the interaction between acceptance of the clientelistic offer and participation in group discussion.

To better understand these results we compute the marginal effects of exposure to the clientelism manipulation and acceptance of the clientelistic offer by absence/presence of the appeal/discussion interventions using the estimated coefficients in Table 6. The marginal effects are plotted in Figure 2. The graphs illustrate that the expert appeal manipulation tends to *reduce* the positive effect of clientelism on sectarian voting, whereas the participant discussion manipulation tends to *increase* these positive effects.

Figure 2. Average marginal effects of receiving a clientelistic offer/accepting it on probability of sectarian voting by absence/presence of expert appeal/group discussion manipulations.

Note: Graphs in top row are generated from models 2 and 4 in Table 6; graphs in the bottom row are generated based on models 6 and 8. Dots are average marginal average effects of receiving clientelistic offer/accepting it; vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.

5.5. Heterogeneous effects of discussion quality

Participation in a group discussion seems to have no effect either or non-strategic or strategic cooperation and enhances the effectiveness of clientelism. This is contrary to our initial expectation. It is not immediately obvious why an interaction with members of an opposite sect on a subject of mutual interest does not lead to greater cooperation. One possibility is that group discussions varied substantially as to what was said. Group discussions were entirely unscripted, and group moderators were instructed to pose very general questions about the nature of the negative effects of sectarianism, the sources of the phenomenon, and possible solutions to the problem to help guide the discussion (for the list of questions see Appendix C).

To test for possible heterogeneity in group discussion effects we constructed an index that measures the substantive depth of these discussions. Substantive depth might matter insofar as discussions that lack it might fail to alter participants' preferences. The index of discussion depth consists of 25 indicators corresponding to three broad categories of issues raised over the course of group discussions: types of negative effects of sectarianism (three subcategories), causes of sectarianism (eight subcategories), and possible ways to encourage intersectarian cooperation (14 subcategories). The indicators were generated from actual statements made by participants. Coding rules for group discussions can be found in Appendix M. The authors proposed a coding rubric, and the Arabic-speaking research assistant who transcribed the discussions from Arabic into English then coded the transcripts (the RA was at liberty to add additional categories and subcategories). In the coding,

each group member receives a *discussion depth* score. Every time the participant talked about an issue touching on one of the 25 subcategories she received a score of 1 if she agreed that subcategory was relevant to cooperation or of -1 if she thought it was irrelevant. By way of an illustration, 5 of 20 instances of a -1 score come from participants disagreeing with the idea that protests are a good way to strengthen intersectarian cooperation. If the participant had nothing to say about an issue then they received a score of 0 against the relevant subcategory. Group scores are compiled by adding the individual scores of the six participants and are then rescaled to run from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest *actual* discussion depth score for a group in our data and 0 the lowest. Prior to rescaling, discussion depth scores for six-member groups range from the lowest of 15 to the highest of 41.

The results of the analyses examining the effect of discussion depth on the outcomes of the three games are presented in Table 7. The outcomes are voting for a co-sectarian across four elections (Panel A), number of tokens allocated to a co-sectarian (Panel B), and the amount of contribution in the public goods game (Panel C). Each of the panels contains two models: one without controls for demographic and attitudinal variables and one with these controls (the are controls for the clientelism manipulation and group moderator effects in every model). In panel A, we use logistic regressions because the dependent variable is binary, and the coefficients are odds ratios. OLS is used in panels B and C. We also add two additional variables that measure how active women and those under 40 were in the discussion. Existing studies suggest that women and young people might participate

at different rates than men and older people depending on the setting (e.g. Karpowitz

and Mendelberg 2014), and this might have an independent effect on the outcomes.[14]

Table 7: Effect of discussion intensity on sectarian voting (task 1), ingroup favoritism (task 2), and average contribution in a public goods game (task 3).

Model	Panel A (logit): Sectarian voting		Panel B (OLS): Ingroup favoritism		Panel C (OLS): Public goods contribution	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Discussion depth	0.06**	0.01*	-3.67**	-4.65**	2.81**	3.10*
	(0.07)	(0.00)	(0.99)	(1.23)	(0.84)	(1.33)
Female participation	0.70	0.72	-0.34	-0.75	0.80	1.67*
	(0.48)	(0.70)	(0.62)	(0.72)	(0.43)	(0.68)
Youth participation	1.04	0.49	-0.49	-0.95	1.08**	1.09**
	(0.48)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.24)	(0.37)
Lagged group contribution					0.07**	0.07**
					(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	1.36	4.36	9.56**	10.45**	-0.58	-2.30
	(2.72)	(22.59)	(1.72)	(3.53)	(1.20)	(4.33)
Clientelism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Control variables	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	114	90	114	90	456	360
R^2	0.20	0.44	0.16	0.34	0.28	0.36

*Note: All models use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6; Panel A reports odds ratios from a logistic regression. Panels B and C report OLS coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.*

The results suggest that discussion quality matters enormously in determining the

outcomes. Going from a shallow discussion that contains little substance to a

substantive discussion that touches on many aspects of intersectarian cooperation

(i.e. moving from 0 to 1 along the index) reduces the odds of voting for a sectarian

by about 99% in the election game (model 2), decreases the allocation to a co-

sectarian in the other-other allocation game by 4.7 tokens (model 4), and increases

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[14] We do not control for how actively the members of the two sects participated because, according to group moderators, there was no difference on this variable across the two groups.

the contribution in the public goods game by about 3.1 tokens (model 6). These are very substantial effects. Addition of a single statement per group coded as 1 against any subcategory reduces the odds of sectarian voting by 16%, decreases the allocation to a co-sectarian by 0.17 of a token, and increases the contribution to public goods by 0.12 of a token. This result suggests that the overall ineffectiveness of the group discussion intervention in bringing about greater inter-sectarian cooperation, and an occasional positive effect on the incidence of sectarianism, masks a great deal of heterogeneity. That heterogeneity is a product of the substantive depth of discussions. A word of caution is in order: our results are based on the analyses of 19 group discussions, and therefore additional work would be necessary to confirm the validity of this finding.

In earlier analyses, we sought to demonstrate that higher levels of cross-sectarian trust are associated with higher contributions in a public goods game and therefore with higher levels of intersectarian cooperation in strategic exchanges. We test for whether more substantive group discussion increases cross-sectarian trust; we expect this effect to be present because deeper discussion increases the level of contributions in the public goods game. Substantive discussion does tend to increase absolute and relative trust, but the effects fall slightly short of conventional levels of statistical significance and are therefore only suggestive. These results are reported in Appendix N. Finally, we also examine whether substantive discussion reduces the positive effect of clientelism on sectarian voting. Substantive discussion has no impact on the effectiveness clientelism—the relevant results are available in

Appendix O. In short, only experts' appeal for cooperation seems to have the potential to diminish the effectiveness of clientelism in fostering sectarian voting.

6. Conclusion

In a laboratory-in-the-field experiment among the residents of Beirut, Lebanon, we set out to examine how to increase cooperation between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Our results indicate that exposure to a cross-sectarian consensual message calling for greater cooperation and delivered by experts can effectively increase intersectarian cooperation in non-strategic exchanges where there is no expectation of reciprocal action. Pro-cooperation appeal by experts has no effect in strategic exchanges involving reciprocity because the appeal fails to increase cross-sectarian trust. Participation in a group discussion with members of the opposite sect does not increase cooperation on average, and, if anything, makes participants less cooperative. Yet, this effect is highly heterogeneous. A substantive discussion touching on many aspects of intersectarian relations increases cooperation by a large margin. The set of findings on the effectiveness of group discussion suggests that the mechanism by which group exchanges impact cooperation is one of substantive engagement on issues and not of a mere physical interaction between members of conflicting groups. Finally, we find that neither intervention succeeds in diminishing the effectiveness of clientelism. There is, however, suggestive evidence that the experts' appeal might weaken the effect of clientelism.

These findings give rise to two important questions for follow-up research. We find that cross-sectarian trust is an important prerequisite for strategic cooperation across sectarian

lines. More research is needed to establish how to augment cross-sectarian trust; one promising possibility would be to attempt to increase the salience of an overarching identity that encompasses both groups (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). The finding on the heterogeneous effect of group discussion suggests that substantive discussions are important, and additional research is needed to establish how discussion partners might be incentivized to engage in a more substantive exchange (e.g. Humphreys, Masters, and Sambu 2006; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012).

As with any experiment, there are important issues of external validity to consider. The reason that the expert appeal was effective is likely because Sunni and Shia speakers strongly agreed that intersectarian cooperation is desirable. Yet, many televised political discussions are confrontational; consensual appeals do not usually make for good entertainment. An important next step in this research agenda would be to examine the effect of a confrontational expert debate on viewers' willingness to cooperate across sectarian lines. With regards to generalizability, it is important to note that Sunni and Shia Muslims in Lebanon are close to being numerically balanced. In contrast, in many Middle Eastern countries one group dominates the other numerically (e.g. Sunnis in Pakistan or Afghanistan) or politically (e.g. Shias in Syria). In future research, it would be important to explore whether the treatments have the same effect in societies where the two groups are highly unequal either in terms of relative numbers or political influence.

The primary policy implication of this project is that dissemination of a cross-sectarian appeal by experts to cooperate across group boundaries is likely to increase intersectarian cooperation in nonstrategic exchanges. In addition, our findings suggest that a reduction in the incidence of clientelism is likely to result in greater intersectarian cooperation.

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APPENDIX A: EXPERT VIDEO TRANSCRIPT (English)

Josephine Zoughaib (moderator): We have now reached the end of 2016. We have a lot of big problems in the country. Lebanon has become one of the most corrupt countries. I imagine we have a lot of big problems, so I don't know Mr. Radwan if you have reached a conclusion that there is a problem bigger than the others, which have gotten us here. Can you give us a little bit…[of what you think]

Radwan Mortada (Shia): The main idea is that the biggest problem, which is bigger than all the rest, which if we solve we can reach a better country, in principle is the crisis of sectarianism and the sectarianism that exists in Lebanon and the parties' leaders who are accordingly dividing the country and transforming Lebanon to…

JZ: So the sectarianism is leading to the quota system? Everyone is taking their own share and that's why we got here?

RM: Everyone is taking their own share and in the same time when they are corrupt and from a certain sect, the other sects cannot reach them (hold them accountable) unless their own sect lifts the political cover (political immunity) over them.

JZ: What is the reason to why we got to this system, which has become a corrupt system and all countries acknowledge this issue, we have ranked the 3rd most corrupt country in the world?

Nabil Moukaddem (Sunni): I think the main problem we have is the sectarian distribution. Our main and first problem is our election system. I want to talk a little bit about our election system. I think if we make a new and modern electoral system and we get rid of sectarianism, we are able to solve a big part of the problem. I think, today, the question asked is, after a couple of months we will be having parliamentary elections if everything goes smoothly supposedly. We are still today prisoners of laws and legislations that are so far from…

JZ: The 60's Law [*Election Law*] is being discussed today.

NM: Yes true…that are so far from the spirit and progress. The question that we want to ask is: Until when are we going to keep digging out worn out and silly laws and until when is Lebanon going to keep perpetuating this sectarian system. I want to tell you something. The process of dismantling sectarianism, just so we are not very hopeful, doesn't come from changing only the electoral text. It is a long-term educational process. It starts from history books, starts from the way we raise our kids, a number of things, but an electoral law is one of the examples. Lebanon today is susceptible to explode at any second. [*unclear*] That is why if we do not have an established national unity, we are susceptible to things escalating at any second as a result to certain regional factors. These guys know it better than I do.

JZ: But the Lebanese society is finding the problem elsewhere. It is finding that if there is no cooperation currently between 2 very big sects, which are the Sunni and the Shia, I can't imagine that we can agree on an electoral law or a transparent judiciary system.

Mohammad Abdullah (Sunni): After we called it the Cedar Revolution in 2005, the big phenomenon that we witnessed in Martyr's Square, we saw that the hunkering down came back over a certain political period. Until there was a major crisis in Lebanon that unified all of Lebanon, that is the garbage crisis that generated another phenomenon: everyone, the Sunni, the Shiaa, the Christian, and other religions went down to the streets for a certain cause. But we know that regardless of the size of

movement in Lebanon, we know that sectarianism leads to no results. When the garbage crisis happened and what we call the civic movement, which I participated in, sectarianism came in to break down this collective. You are going today to the streets because you saw that the garbage is at your doorstep, but when it became such that my leader or your leader or his leader are supposed to take action and responsibility, there was a smart political move, if you may, from the leaders of the sects to dismantle this gathering…

JZ: You are confirming that the citizen is unable to abandon sectarianism for the sake of his leader even over a very important issue such as the garbage crisis.

MA: The citizen did abandon it, and he protested in the streets. However, afterwards, there was work done to dismantle this movement because they united, then they became factions again and politics entered with its divisional, confessional, and sectarian methodology and led to a division and inability to arrive at a conclusion.

Radwan Aqil (Shia): Starting from what my colleagues have talked about, we don't live in a normal country. For example, if Lebanon were to play a soccer game with any foreign country, we wouldn't find all the Lebanese people. While we find the Iranian people all as one, in a soccer game for example, the same with Egypt, we live in a state of sectarianism, as soon we mention the name of the street, we know the political affiliation of the street and the area. Let's admit it, if today we want to go buy a house from a person from another sect, it hasn't been that easy to do it and its very well known. Today there is a percentage, but this doesn't mean…

JZ: It has to be 10% Sunni in a certain building…

RA: But this doesn't mean that the relationships in the country between people is really that bad. No! On the contrary, we still have communities in universities and institutions etc. But I, as a journalist, I say we do not live normally in a normal country. To go back to the Sunni/Shia conversations, which has been brought up a lot. I don't want to say it's a disagreement; it's a contrast that goes back 1400 years and unfortunately is still until today used to bring up a conflict. Let's also admit that in the last 10 years the marriage between the Sunni and Shia has decreased, before it hasn't been this bad. I want to talk a little bit about the Shia movement. In the civil war, the Shia movement was a container for the National Movement led by Kamal Jounblat. It wasn't lead by a Shia leader although there were a lot of Shia leaders. Lately there has been a lot of talk about the conflict, I just want to say, today, there is a Sunni in Tripoli who doesn't know Tyre, and there is a Shia in Tyre who doesn't know Tarii Ljdideh and doesn't know Tripoli.

JZ: They don't know or they're not letting them know?

RA: We all take responsibility as press, as political powers, as parties, and sects. And because they are scared. Imagine this happens in this small country. Lets go back to the problem, which is that once someone is born, his confession follows him from birth to the grave. And today, let us admit it, Wasta is killing us. Wherever it is: in getting a degree, a job, etc. The Sunni-Shia conflict also made us think about the region with the Gulf countries and the Arab countries and how it affects this region. Otherwise, we as Sunni and Shia in this country, we lived together. Shia, still until today, Jamal Abdel Naser pictures are put up in Shia houses. Our sectarian system, the quota system, and sectarianism are pushing for continuation of this conflict. Also in this country, there is no nationality. For example, why are the quotas calculated for the

biggest sects: Maronites, Otrthodox, Shia, Sunna, and the Druze have no right to be represented. If Einstein were Druze he wouldn't be allowed to run the ministry of foreign affairs. Kamal Jounblat ran the Ministry of interior and he was amongst the best ministers. Prince Majeed Erslen ran the Ministry of Defense. Today everything is constrained and there is injustice even within the same sect.

RM: So we have the option: we either agree to rebuild the country on the right fundamentals and I agree that we cannot do this before we transcend sectarianism in our Electoral Law, because the big figures with the influence to change things, are benefiting from the current situation.

JZ: we are talking about benefits between the sects today.

RM: True because and there is another issue in the sectarian realm if we can say. When the youth want to apply for the military, or the judiciary school, or any job, they first need to go to the alleged leader of their sect so he can work it out for them. And they can't make him angry because he controls what they do for a living. He is the one who guarantees whether they are accepted or not.

JZ: Where is the Lebanese society going and if there is an opportunity to fix this sectarian system or the elections, how far can we go as you see it as Lebanese citizens, not as journalists? As a Lebanese citizen Radwan, where are we headed?

RM: When someone knows what his or her problem is, that is half of the treatment. At least we know that we have a problem, and we know that sectarianism is a problem, and we know that if we don't agree to sit together and actually sit together to discuss and plan a common future that is good for everyone, we won't be able to succeed. And it seems that in all the sects, all the Lebanese people, educated or not, know that this is the problem.

NM: I want to stress on one thing about the word "peoples". We are one unified peoples with unified goals and benefits, there are political and sectarian disagreements, yes, but it can be fixed even if it's very difficult at times. There is still in inter-religious marriage in Lebanon, this also a very important thing. Even the Lebanese people, in their nature, are peaceful not violent. Of course in the Civil war there were people from all sects that held weapons and fought, but the majority was expressing their opinion verbally, the percentage that held weapons and killed people depending on religion is small relative to the rest of the Lebanese people. Even the people who forced the migration of others, they are minority in their sects. If you are thorough in checking, you will see that in every sect the majority refuses these actions and practices and the evidence is that after the war the harmony, more or less, resurfaced again.

JZ: So we are confirming that the Lebanese people are not sectarian in nature.

NM: The Lebanese people are not sectarian. They are creative people who love life but the only problem is that they are constrained by sectarian laws after the false independence in 1943. The Lebanese people need to look after their benefits. As my colleagues were saying, if you want to put your child in schools or get a job, you need to go back to your sect's political reference and leader. I, as a Lebanese person today, they are saying they are forming a government, why do I care if it is all Muslims or all Christians if the members are qualified and are able to perform their tasks, why do I care if they are 30 Muslims and 30 Christians as long as they are providing me good service and look after me. If they are all Orthodox, why do I care?

RA: It is your right to be with a political leader and you have the right to support him/her, but regardless, this leader today can deprive you from [*unclear word*]. Be open to the other and marry whomever you want. Hopefully, that with the new generation we are able to reach real nationalism that Hussein Fadl-Allāh and Gregoire Haddad used to talk about, and hopefully we think about what we are leaving our children and grandchildren in this country.

JZ: Thank you. I want to conclude now about how much we are connected to this country, which is why we are staying and I imagine that the Lebanese youth who is participating in the streets and in university elections is insisting to stay with good values. I think we started the conversation with Sunni-Shia conflict and ended with Gregoire Haddad and Sir Fadl-Allāh, we arrived at the conclusion that we are sitting together on one table with one hope that hopefully hopefully hopefully in a new era or an era in the future because I have hope in the youth as you said Radwan, the coming generations that are raised on these values and that what we witness over the past 40 years isn't going to get us anywhere.

APPENDIX B. EXPERT VIDEO FILE (Arabic)

APPENDIX C. GUIDANCE QUESTIONS FOR MODERATORS FOR GROUP DISCUSSIONS (English)

Introduction:
With regards to the general direction and tenor of the discussion, it is very important that the message that comes out strongly and consistently is that intersectarian cooperation is good and desirable. It is also vital that by way of illustrating their arguments participants use plenty of examples. Abstract arguments can be difficult to grasp, and our aim is to ensure that participants understand how the lack of intersectarian cooperation makes the lives of ordinary people worse and how their lives could be made better if there was a greater amount of intersectarian cooperation. The issues that could be used as examples of why intersectarian cooperation is bad for everyday life include (but are not limited to): garbage collection in Beirut in August 2015, political corruption, institutional sclerosis, insecurity and inefficiency facilitated by the rigid quota system, lack of political accountability among politicians because of the widespread practice of vote buying. In other words, one of the key messages of this discussion should be that lack of intersectarian cooperation is not just some abstract issue that affects only the political elites, but that this issue has direct bearing on ordinary people's daily lives. Likewise, if possible, we would like participants to stress that problems of sectarianism begin with ordinary people (segregationist behavior, petty hatreds, etc.) and is not something that exists only at elite level. Thus, the change in attitudes and behavior must start in one daily's life and not just be initiated at the apex of society. Finally, because there are no Christians in the study, we would like the experts to focus as much as possible on intersectarian relations between the Shi'a and Sunni (of course, it is important to also mention the Christians, but we would prefer the bulk of the discussion to focus on Sunni-Shi'a relations).

In short, the most important guidelines are as follows:
- Use plenty of examples to illustrate arguments. Try to stay away from complex abstract concepts.
- Try to make the arguments relatable to everyday lives of ordinary people instead of focusing exclusively on political elites and dynamics in parliament and government.
- Insofar as possible, focus specifically on Sunni-Shi'a relations.

Some Draft Questions for Discussion Moderator:
1. What are the biggest problems in Lebanese political life at this time?
2. Would you say that there is sufficient cooperation across the sectarian lines among the political elites in parliament and elsewhere?
3. In your opinion, what are the reasons why the situation is currently as it is?
4. Many people feel that lack of cross-sectarian cooperation among the Sunni and Shia'a specifically is one of the biggest problems in contemporary Lebanon. Would you agree or not?
5. Specifically, and thinking very practically about our daily lives and provision of basic services, what types of problems arise as a result of this lack of inter-sectarian cooperation?

6. Thinking about Lebanon's long-term future, what are our country's prospects if the various religious sects, but especially the Sunni and the Shia'a, do not learn how to cooperate?
7. Do you think Lebanon as a whole would benefit if there was more cooperation between the Sunni and the Shia'a? What would be the benefits of such increased cooperation?
8. In your opinion, what would it take to increase the level of cooperation across the sectarian lines? Can ordinary people help change the situation for the better or does this have to be an elite project?

APPENDIX D. TRANSCRIPTS OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS (English) -- Sample

Session 11, Table D
   *- This discussion group has the **highest** discussion score among the 19 groups.*
   - Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as "unidentified".

Moderator: We are Session 11 Table D. Welcome. After we saw the 30 min video, there were a lot of topics discussed: How can there be cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects? They talked about this problem as a historical problem. Some talked about the judiciary system and the problems with this system. Someone also traced back the problems in Lebanon to the electoral law. The political parties and sectarian parties were also mentioned in details. Was the video clear to everyone? And first, do you agree with everything that was said in the video?

73: Not everything.

Moderator: You do not agree on everything.

Unidentified: Same.

Unidentified: Me too.

Moderator: Ok. What are the specific things said that are beneficial in your opinion? Or the ideas that you support in this discussion.

72: I support one of the ideas someone suggested about the necessity of cooperation between sects. In principle, they are mostly talking about Sunni-Shia. As he said it is necessary to have cooperation between Sunni and Shia sects, but some people suggested ways of cooperation that are rejected. It doesn't mean that if we have civil marriage then we've cooperated. Some religions forbid civil marriage from a religious point of view not legislative one. But we support what they said about the issue of renting houses and the issue of education and the necessity to raise our kids from a young age that the Sunni is their brother and the Shia is their brother and the Christian is their brother and that they are all the same. We shouldn't be raising them that certain areas have certain sectarian affiliations. We were also raised on this perspective. We'd be in the car with our parents and we get to a specific area…

Unidentified: "oh this is Tariq Jdide"

72: Tariq Jdide for example, we'd directly ask, "oh dad, whose is this area?" "This area is not with us, they are all against us." That is wrong.

72: We should teach them that this is all Lebanon.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Sir, what did you object about?

73: I objected about the Parliamentary elections and about the idea that the delegates can be anyone. They are saying if the delegates are all Sunni or all Christians…

Moderator: But as long as they are good, if they are all Christian then where is the problem?

Unidentified: If they all serve the country, where is the problem?

73: No this is wrong.

Moderator: It's wrong. They need to be divided.

73: They need to be divided. Because as we all know, the country is divided.

Moderator: He talked about the sectarian politics and the quotas system. Sometimes the wrong or bad person fills a position just because they need to fill it with someone from a certain sect.

73: Yes but the country is divided, and this is known.

Moderator: So it is still better to divide it over all the sects.

73: Yes, of course.

Moderator: Who among the speakers was the most convincing in your opinion?

71: The one who was talking about the elections and how the candidates should be from all sects not limited to one sect. He even talked with respect to Druze, Muslims, and Christians. And regarding whether or not the country is divided, after it was divided in 1970's and 1980's, it honestly never went back to how it was and it has just been worsening. As the guy here said that every generation is teaching its children that these people are X and these follow X and those follow Y. So it was divided and it has only been in decline.

Unidentified: To the worse.

71: We want to work against this flow that the rising youth is following. And it is very unfortunate that the ministers and rulers support everyone who supports their sects and follow them. Although, we want leaders and rulers to work with all sects and solve the problem from the roots.

73: Why are they focused on Sunni-Shia only?

69: The study is just about Sunni-Shia.

71: Because it is the most intense.

Unidentified: Sunni-Shia is the more prevalent.

Moderator: Sir, after watching the video and in your opinion, is the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia the reason behind all these problems?

69: No, its reason is the lack of love for the country and citizenship as they say because that is fundamental. The Sunni is Sunni and the Shia is Shia, to each his/her own personal life, but they should talk about patriotism. Patriotism is fundamental to raise a good society that doesn't think about its sects but rather about Lebanon, the country, and the civic society. This is the basis. Three quarters of what they were saying was about sects. They didn't talk about the country and patriotism.

Moderator: So if we switch the rhetoric to talk about how this cooperation can serve the national interest, do you think this cooperation will affect the political, economical, and societal situation as a whole?

69: Of course. Everything changes. The citizen will be psychologically relived.

73: Why can't the country be for all sects and not necessarily the Sunni and Shia sects? We are a diverse country and we have many sects.

Moderator: So your opinion is that it is not just about limiting the cooperation between the Sunni and Shia?

73: Yes, cooperate with everyone. It doesn't have to become Sunni-Shia. In the end of the day, both Sunni and Shia are Muslims. The same Qur'an.

Unidentified: Same Qur'an.

72: But we need to pay attention that when she addressed the questions, she addressed them based on a Sunni-Shia rhetoric because the aim of the study is explore the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

Moderator: Yes that is the aim of the study but his opinion is that the problem is not just a Sunni-Shia one.

72: Oh ok.

73: Yes as a whole. Lebanon as a whole, we want to live together.

71: We want to live together.

Moderator: In your opinion and from what you saw in the video, what are the barriers that stand in the way of the cooperation between sects and specifically between Sunni and Shia sects?

74: Just like she said that we raise our kids on how this area is ours and that area is not ours and this is Sunni and that is Shia. Please repeat the question, I forget.

Moderator: So in your opinion, are these reasons that prevent the cooperation between these two sects?

74: Yes of course. And the leaders who give incitement speeches and that religion and politics should not mix in the government. Even as someone here said, they go on podiums during Friday prayers and they talk about politics. You are here to talk about religion, what does politics have anything to do with this?

Moderator: So clerics…

74: Should stick to religion.

Moderator: affect this cooperation negatively?

74: Yes, yes.

71: Yes.

73: There needs to be a separation between clerics and politics. It is necessary.

71: Yes.

74: If I go to the mosque to pray, I want to hear a religious talk that I can understand. I can watch the news to know about politics.

Moderator: Go ahead.

70: I want to say something. Why don't we unite like we united once for the garbage crisis and at some point they managed to break us apart?

Moderator: Why?

70: They started sending infiltrators to vandalize and beat people. In the end, we are all Muslims, whether Sunni or Shia, we cannot abandon each other. It is absolutely impossible for these two sects to abandon each other because there are a lot of Sunni married to Shia and vice versa.

Unidentified: Me.

70: What are the sects of the children of mixed parents then? Sunni or Shia? His mom is Shia and his dad is Sunni. We need to get rid of these things and distinctions between Sunni and Shia. I liked the idea of eliminating the sect from the ID cards.

73: Yes the sect.

70: So that the person taking your ID card at a checkpoint, he might be Shia and sees you are Sunni, so he might start showing off and act superior to you. The first step in order to fix the country, we need to get rid of the…

73: sect.

74: sect.

70: the sect from ID cards. When that happens, no one will know who is what.

74: True.

Moderator: The sect is also on the Personal Status Record.

70: The sect should be taken off the ID cards and the Personal Status Records. We need to get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric.

74: You can tell from the names though.

70: I am from the south and I live in the middle Tariq Jdide. If I am sitting in a group of people and I say my last name they get surprised and they start winking at each other. Why would you do that? You've known me for a while now! I live with you and I have Sunni kids. Why are you discriminating? If I discriminate I wouldn't have married one of you and my husband wouldn't have married me. And I speak Beiruti more than they do. Why do they discriminate? There is discrimination from my sect and from the Sunni sect as well, I am not saying one or the other.

73: Both sects the same.

70: We need to get rid of this idea of labeling Sunni or Shia. Eliminate it on the ID cards as well. It starts with the ID cards and once your sect is erased, everything gets erased.

71: We wish.

70: It will unite all the Muslims and we won't have this Sunni-Shia issue.

Moderator: The madam gave a reason on why she thinks there is a lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia in the society. Can you give us another example that proves the lack of cooperation between Sunni and Shia? From your daily life.

71: I'm going to tell you a story about something that happened with a friend of mine. Her daughter went to apply somewhere. Her last name is not very clear to what her sect is and whether she is Sunni or Shia. They accepted her and everything and told her to bring her ID card. After showing them her ID he asked her if she was from X city. His face turned yellow and told her that we will contact you later after he had confirmed with her and everything. These stories about the hatred between Sunni and Shia in general, of course there are a lot of people from both sects who love each other, have become serious and the problem is so complicated and it is very difficult to be resolved. From what I see there is a Sunni-Shia problem and it is just as prevalent among the youth as it is among the elders. It has become a very difficult problem, but we hope that it gets resolved somehow.

70: By the way, the new rising generation will eliminate the idea of Sunni-Shia because while our grandparents still hold grudges and hatred from the civil war, the new generation is going to be more aware. It will not care about the Sunni and Shia labels because the Lebanese economy is on decline and we are the reason behind that due to our backwards mentality. It shouldn't be about Sunni or Shia. We are all Muslims and we all have the Qur'an. Why don't we say that? Why do we discriminate between Sunni and Shia when half of our children are Sunni and the other half is Shia? Why? For example if someone from Tariq Jdide went to Barboor *(Predominantly Shia)* they start winking to let each other know that he's from Tariq Jdide. And it the same thing the other way around. Why?

74: They'd beat him.

70: Why? You are his friend! Why are you acting like this? The main reason is that the big important figures squeezed this idea into the regular people's heads. I hope that any mother and any father would take this idea of Sunni-Shia out of their heads and the head of any child.

73: This has to be done through clerics.

Unidentified: Clerics and leaders.

73: No just clerics.

72: We also need to shed light that clerics and political leaders are not the only ones to blame. I will give an example from both sects. First, the Sunni religion prohibits cursing any faith and they say that our without Ali, prophet Omar would've perished *(Ali being Shia and Omar being Sunni)*. In the same time, the big religious Shia references such as Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah and Sayyed Ali Khamenei, they absolutely prohibit cursing any *(unclear word)*.

70: Yes.

74: It still happens though.

72: Any ignorant Sunni or Shia guy, not an educated one, curses X or Y to their friends. By that, he is provoking the other side. As a Sunni or Shia guy, if I hear someone cursing Imam Ali or Omar, I will inevitably react.

73: True.

70: You will feel something.

74: Yes.

72: So the youth's ignorance is what got us here not the politicians at all.

73: I was just saying that.

72: Because we cannot just blame clerics and politicians.

73: On the contrary, this is the cleric's business.

74: No as he said, it is these ignorant people on the streets.

73: Clerics need to raise awareness among the youth.

Moderator: He said in the video that in the internal circles, the clerics' speeches are going to be sectarian.

70: Yes exactly, sectarian.

73: Why can't it be unifying? All the clerics need to unite…

Moderator: So you think there is a responsibility on clerics?

73: Of course.

70: Any cleric that goes on TV needs to promote love between Muslims and not use the Sunni and Shia labels but instead use Muslims.

73: Sayyed Mohammad Hussein used to talk about the Islamic unity.

Moderator: I want to hear your opinion on this, the absence of cooperation and its reasons, and how we can solve it.

69: The main reasons lies in the civic society. We were divided because of our clerics and because of our leaders. They constructed their own schools like Al Maqased or *(unclear)*.

74: Al Masharee'.

69: And that was the beginning of the Sunni-Shia division in this country. On this principle, they started teaching religion in their own ways. Whether Sunni or Shia, they founded sectarianism. And sectarianism, as I told you, does not end except if with our love and commitment to the country. That is fundamental because if we keep thinking Sunni-Shia or Christian-Druze we will not be able to make it.

74: I swear; before they used to all marry each other.

69: They need to unify the schoolbooks and not allow schools to teach its own thing so that they can feed into sectarianism.

Moderator: Do you think that someone ordinary like you can contribute in enhancing this cooperation?

69: He can contribute through his family. He can contribute through his neighbor if he trusts them. He can make a change but very slightly. The main contribution needs to come form the leaders and clerics. They are the ones who need to make a change.

74: For example, I am Sunni and you are Sunni and you are Shia and we are really good friends. But if my Shia neighbor or Sunni neighbor interferes, my friend turns against me.

70: Yes.

Moderator: This happens?

74: Yes, I hear them. We would be sitting together and all is well but when someone from her sect joins, she just becomes aggressive.

70: That's our problem. We become sectarian.

74: I have been married twice: one was Sunni and one was Shia. I have Sunni and Shia kids.

73: Nice.

74: Both of them are with me and they do not know he is Sunni or he is Shia, they just know that they are Muslims.

70: I lived in an area where no one knew where I was from. And everyone loved me. When they knew where I was from they said, "We wish they are all like you." I do not involve myself in politics. I tell them if either of you, Shia or Sunni, wants to talk politics you have to respect each other. They ask me where I'm from; I say I'm Muslim. It is not your business.

74: I have a Shia neighbor whom I didn't know was Shia. We used to laugh and joke about things and even Sunni and Shia tease each other. In the end I learned that she was Shia and she never showed it.

Moderator: The video discussed that the judiciary is a problem and the electoral law is a problem. And someone considered the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party are actual political parties because they include people from different sects while other parties are sectarian parties because they are not represented by all the sects.

Unidentified: True.

Moderator: Which topic convinced you most? The one about the judiciary, the electoral law, or the talk about political and sectarian parties?

74: The political parties and sectarianism. Because these are the ones who ruined the country.

70: True, same. A whole sect follows certain parties.

71: Yes, political parties and sectarianism. If we resolve the sectarianism problem, everything will be resolved.

70: If they get rid of all parties, Lebanon will become a great country again.

Moderator: Get rid of sectarian parties?

70: Yes sectarian ones.

71: Yes.

Moderator: So you agree that in Lebanon there are political parties represented by different sects and there are sectarian parties?

70: Yes of course.

Unidentified: They should make a shared party.

70: They should found parties to unite all the Muslims together. Why does the Lebanese Army indulge in sectarianism? Because it is part of their training and teachings not to be sectarian.

Moderator: I asked a question: if we achieve this cooperation, does it affect the economy and political and social situations? Give me examples.

74: Yes, they start to like each other.

71: Of course!

70: The Shia will start employing the Sunni and the Sunni will start employing the Shia.

74: True.

70: You'll stop needing a Wasta to find an opportunity or employment. And the same goes for the Sunni.

73: the regions mix.

70: Finding a job then just becomes about competency and degrees not about Wasta.

Moderator: On the societal level, you think that will create some sort of familiarity between the citizens?

73: Of course. Someone from Tripoli wouldn't go to Dahyeh.

70: True.

71: That's what I wanted to say.

73: Or take someone from Dahyeh to Tripoli… last time there were fights and people beat each other.

71: That's too bad, Lebanon is for everyone not for certain sects.

73: The whole country would just freshen up. Dahyeh freshens up, Beirut freshens up, Tripoli freshens up…There'd be communication between the citizens.

Moderator: How would the cooperation affect the political situation?

70: The politicians will start liking each other.

69: You witness how that helped the political atmosphere.

Moderator: how they recently were all in agreement?

73: Yes.

69: In agreement but it is all about personal interests. When the parliamentary system is changed and when the electoral law is changed, then you'll have a hope to build something for the future. But while they are sticking with these outdated laws, nothing is going to change.

Moderator: So you are focusing on the electoral as the basis?

69: Of course.

Moderator: Do you consider that it is part of solving the problem and it is not just about the text because there are a lot of reasons that can lead to the absence of cooperation?

69: But the majority of it is about the electoral law. Three quarters of our problems are because of the law. When the law enforces that only Sunni can occupy this position and only Shia can occupy that position, then it is dividing between Sunni and Shia.

72: I just want to say that legislatively, the president shouldn't be Christian. They made it this way based on customs.

71: It was imposed on us.

73: That is the Lebanese constitution.

72: Legally, the Prime Minister, or the Chairman of the House of Representatives, or the President of the Republic is not limited to one sect. Legally that is.

73: Our constitution says that.

72: No, legally it is not. That is just customs.

71: This law was set by the French colonialists.

Moderator: But what is the origin of these customs? Al Taif Agreement.

72: Yes.

Moderator: Al Taif Agreement is the constitution of this country.

72: But I am saying that the Lebanese law does not specify sectarian requirements for certain positions. If our politicians follow the Lebanese Law properly, we'd get rid of sectarianism in politics.

73: Yes you mean eliminating sectarian politics.

72: But everyone has their own law tailored to fit their needs. If the politicians follow the proper Lebanese law, it is a good law. But each of them wants to customize their own laws. They were the ones to specify that the Prime Minister is Shia and Chairman of the House of Representatives is Sunni…But legally, this law doesn't exist.

Moderator: Now I want you to think about what kind of societies your children will live in 20-30 years from today. Will they live in a society that actually has cooperation or is it going to be the same society we live in today? How do you imagine their society would look like?

70: Same society. Let me tell you something. The Sunni-Shia issue might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years it will spark again.

74: True.

71: In my opinion, it is not going to disappear to start with.

70: No matter how much it disappears, a day will come when one of the leaders will need something and will need to exploit this country and its weakest point, which is the Sunni-Shia conflict, so he will incite the people and walk away.

72: I'm going to say it again: if the politicians start eliminating sectarianism from the top, and treating everyone equally where all of Lebanon is for us regardless of which area, and get rid of the Sunni-Shia rhetoric even on the ID cards, I think we can improve bit by bit and this issue will be over.

73: I have hope that things will change.

Moderator: Is there hope?

73: Yes.

Moderator: Is there something that we should do for our children so that such change can happen in the future?

73: Of course! We need to put in a big effort, and there should be civic activities mainly to distance clerics from politics.

74: Yes.

69: There is no change.

Moderator: You think it will stay like this?

69: As it is.

70: It might disappear but in 7, 10, 12 years but one day a leader will want something and will create a conflict, which is the easiest thing to do in Lebanon because we have birds-brains. If someone curses Omar go beat him and if someone curses the Hussein go beat him. That's how it works here.

73: That is wrong.

70: Just so that the leaders can exploit his position so that they can benefit on our children's sake.

74: We need a leader whose mom is Shia and dad is Sunni or otherwise so that they wouldn't dare marginalize either group.

73: We are still doing the same mistakes and our clerics are wrong. The speeches are wrong, Friday speeches are wrong, everything is wrong whether in this sect or that one.

70: Who told you though that Shia don't love the Sunni or the Sunni don't love the Shia.

Moderator: there is love.

70: There is love.

74: But it is subtle.

71: We are talking in general. Of course there are some who love each other, but generally, the conflict is there.

74: I love my husband and my children.

70: No there is love. There is love.

Moderator: Ok we are end the discussion about the video now.

   *- This discussion group has the **lowest** discussion score among the 19 groups.*
   - Participants are indicated with the experimental IDs. Unidentified participants are referred to as "unidentified".

Moderator: Welcome to Table D Session 6. After listening to the video and the topics that were discussed, I would like to start with those topics. First, do you agree with everything that was said in the video? Who would like to start?

73: What is being said is all about the situation we are living in. They are not adding anything more to what is really going on: sectarianism, quota system, job opportunities, ministers, House of Representatives…This is what is actually happening. Nothing is changing, whether it is in the Sunni sect or Shia sect or Christian sect or Druze sect, they all have a quota system. And the people are the ones paying. For example, X leader or minister has his own group and says, "No I'll serve my group so that they can back me up in the elections, why would I serve the other sect?"

Moderator: His benefit is only in his sect.

73: his benefit is more important than anything. More important than the country to be honest. His priority is in his personal benefits more than it is in the benefits of the country. If the country meant anything to him, he wouldn't have created this group around him so that it backs him with its votes. They'd say "I have nothing to do with the Mountain region or South region. I am from Beirut or the North or Biqaa. Every leader is controlling his sect and even if they approve of him or not, he says to them "who else are you going to vote for? To the Sunni or the Shia or the Christian?" That is what is happening.

69: The theory he is talking about is true. But also, you cannot say that the country is following this path. For example, you get a representative who you vote for but you don't see him. This is called the complete lists where you just vote for everyone on the list.

73: True.

69: There are a lot of representatives who come and do not serve anyone, not even themselves. He sits in an office for a short while then he's out.

74: Yes.

73: 100%.

73: This depends on the cluster and the person because I might want the people on this list to all make it. You don't look at the individuals you just like the title of the group so you vote for all of them. That's the wrong thing to do.

69: 100%.

71: Sometimes the names change. Sometimes someone from a sect other than your own serves you better than someone from your own sect.

72: True.

Moderator: And that was said in the video that sometimes better service comes from outside your sect. Is that happening?

71: Yes of course.

74: Yes.

72: What I liked about the video most is that we all united over the garbage crisis and we all protested: Sunni, Shia, and Christians. That was what united us. Other than that, unfortunately, everyone follows his or her own leader.

71: But generally, sectarianism was not as deeply rooted.

69: True true. We used to live as one, we didn't use to think X is Shia, Y is Sunni, Z is Christian. You might find a better friend from another sect than your own.

74: They also even said that if someone is Shia he couldn't go to Tripoli, why not?

71: yea why not?

74: That he fears that he'd be killed because they are not from the same sect as him. All of this also…

71: This recently started happening.

74: Yes.

69: But if you look back at the wars in 1975 and 1981 and the elimination war, there wasn't this Sunni-Shia rhetoric. Yes sure we passed through a Muslim-Christian period during the elimination war, but the Sunni-Shia thing only started after the 1996.

74: True.

71: Absolutely true.

69: That we only witness after 1996. If you want to look at us, the people present in this room, we lived half of our lives 1996, 1997, 1998 and we still live normally, then someone introduced this conflict. Of course nothing happens out of nothing, as they say "there is no smoke without a fire."

74: Of course.

69: They introduced this conflict for political and divisional reasons.

74: True.

71: It serves their purposes.

Moderator: And sectarianism furthered this.

69: Of course.

Moderator: It is a tool.

69: Exactly.

72: And since they assassinated the martyr Rafic Al Hariri, these things started happening.

74: That's true.

71: True.

72: They got what they wanted.

Moderator: By assassinating the martyr Rafic Al Hariri?

72: Yes.

74: Yes, this never used to show before.

71: Yes.

Moderator: I want to hear your voice now. Do you agree about most things said in the video? First I want to ask you, are we one people or multiple peoples? So are we just sects or do we truly belong to one Lebanese people.

74: Sects

Unidentified: Sects, and very much so.

71: No but our belonging is to Lebanon if you want the truth.

73: The truth is that we are 18 sects.

71: Even if 20 sects, but who do we belong to?

73: To our leaders.

Moderator: In their opinion, we are more sectarian than we are nationalistic.

71: True, but in the end our belonging is to our country.

73: They only agree with each other when they are abroad and they love Lebanon.

71: No here too.

72: Yes.

74: True.

73: You see a Lebanese abroad, you love him but when you're in Lebanon…

71: True.

73: you got into a hospital for example, you see someone and you start thinking, "they are from my sect so they will do me more favors than someone from another sect."

Unidentified: In hospitals, they are all the same.

74: We are saying that even sometimes people in our own sect don't help us, so we have to go to another sect to get help.

71: True.

73: There is something we need to pay attention to is that, true we have sects but for example, if you are not affiliated with a specific leader or political party you find that you won't get as much help. That is the idea. Even religious figures do not cooperate to unite a certain sect.

74: True.

72: True.

71: True.

73: They've done this so that they can create this sort of an army. The Lebanese people are people who love life and fun in life. They made them poor.

Moderator: So you stress that the people in Lebanon are not sectarian but they love life.

73: 100%. But they are exploiting that you are poor.

74: True.

69: Take for example the events that happened on the 7th of May and other events; it was all about money. Who sent protesters to the streets other than those who have money? They paid them $500.

73: They are after the poor people. There are no jobs so they pushed you to follow political parties. The day I get a job I won't care about weapons. If I cannot support myself, I have to follow them so that I can survive. That's the point.

74: True.

69: From 2000 until the end of 2004, it was the best 4 years ever. After 2005…

73: Because people were busy with work. Now you sit at home and you bring it out on your family because there is nothing that is distracting you.

69: Yes, true. Before 2005 everyone was working and no one had time for anything. Now you find yourself without work, you go to your relative's place and you start fighting. Unemployment makes problems.

74: True.

71: And generally, one person cannot support the family.

74: Of course, one hand doesn't clap.

73: Even if you notice, in every house the dad is married to either a Sunni or Shia women. There is no mixing. There are slogans and things they say in schools that are wrong. The government wants this disorder.

69: You've seen the extremists that we've been hearing about. Where do these people come from? From the education.

73: That is wrong education and wrong mentality.

69: Someone is teaching them to be like that. They're not born like that.

74: Someone is paying for them to become like that.

73: Lebanon is small and has 18 sects not like the countries around us that have 2 or 3 sects.

70*:* They plant the doctrine.

73: She is right.

69: Even words like doctrine, funding…These are words that the media started using only recently.

70: Yes these are new.

72: The media also plays a big role.

69: The media war is more important even than the actual war and influences a lot.

72: Even if there is nothing happening they start exaggerating things.

Moderator: In your opinion these problems that we have in Lebanon are the result of the lack of cooperation between sects specifically, Sunni-Shia?

70: Yes of course. If they were united we wouldn't have gotten here.

Moderator: Is it possible that if this cooperation happens, it can improve the social, political, and economical situation? And how can this cooperation be translated in your opinion?

70: When the big shots agree with each other, the ones below them follow.

72: True.

71: True.

72: Unfortunately, we are talking about people above and people below.

73: The big shots are agreeing not for the people, but for their own benefits.

74: Of course.

73: They are just playing roles like in a play.

69: If we go back a couple of months, it was chaos. The people who were shooting each other are now fine but those who died, it is now over for them.

72: Yes.

74: Yes.

69: Their worth has become nothing.

71: they can make us love each other and they can make us hate each other.

69: Any leader of any sect goes on TV and starts threatening. The country goes into chaos.

73: But why? If you are working and have money you wouldn't follow a leader, you can support yourself. But they have made the people poor so they keep following them.

74: Where can you find jobs anyway? There are no jobs.

73: Even if you find the ministers and leaders fighting with each other, it is not for us, it is because of their benefits. I'm sorry but we keep saying Lebanon was united over the garbage crisis, no it wasn't united. There was just portions to be divided between the Druze and Sunni sect.

74: They united over the garbage crisis. Why don't we actually become all one hand in everything without caring about Druze sect or Sunni sect or Shia sect.

73: I mean we united to get rid of the garbage and smell that is surrounding us. But if you actually listen to them speak, because…before 2005 or even now as they make the new quotas, the Druze sect was the most benefited because there was someone from the Sunni sect who was also involved and made a huge deal about it *(negatively)*. Because the people of X or not the people of Y are going to benefit, they agitate the citizens whenever they want. Just like in the civic movement. There were a lot of people who had a benefit in it. When they found that it was getting risky they sent their forces to beat people up.

74: True.

71: True.

73: Even there were officers who talked. The government is the base. For example, I as Shia, or Sunni or Druze and you as Shia you want to take 4 officers, Sunni 4 officers, Druze 2 officers and Christians 3 officers. This is our law. Even first class officers are Christians. They force it on you.

69: True that is what is requested.

Moderator: So sectarianism is rooted in the law even.

74: Yes.

73: Exactly, they are forcing it on you.

69: You are talking about the 60's law.

Moderator: Election Law then.

69 *(12:50 – 13:08)***:** Yes, we are talking about a law that has been followed for a while. When they were done with all the benefits, they created sectarianism.

73: True true.

69: And if we manage to get rid of sectarianism, they'll create something else.

71: They'll distract us with something else, true.

72: They enforced this system. House of Representatives is for Shia, the head of government is for Sunni's, president for Christians.

73: True.

Moderator: is this something wrong in your opinion?

72: In my opinion, if there is someone Sunni and he is qualified, I do not mind if he becomes president.

74: But it is important that he provides us with what we want.

71: This is an old law; they didn't set it up recently. It is since we got our independence. Because they were all united back then, so they divided and it's been like that since then.

73: Yes, but they took away the authority from the president. In another words, he has no role, just a chair to be filled.

Moderator *(13:5***:** So the parliament is for the Shia sect and the government is for the Sunni sect, which was since Al Taif in 1990 until today.

71: True.

69: Yes from 1975 until the 1990s we didn't have a country. After the 90's they set up Al Taif and we've been following it since.

71: Yes that's it. It's a wrong law and we haven't changed it.

Moderator: Ok. In your opinion, what should be done to reinforce this cooperation? We talked about a lot of problems and the reasons behind this absence of cooperation. Now what should we do so that we create this cooperation? And let's try to be realistic in our answers.

71: If the people all come to an agreement…

73: But the people cannot come to an agreement if the big leaders don't resolve these issues. What is supposed to happen is…

69: Are we talking about predictions? Or something on the ground?

Moderator: No not predictions. On the ground, yes.

69: It is impossible.

73: Everything can be fixed in Lebanon today, but how? For example, there wasn't going to be a president. A couple of days before, they pushed for it and we got one. Everything will work if you want it to happen.

71: True.

Moderator: Ok. People like you, do you think you are capable of making a changing that can lead to more cooperation? You as ordinary people, you don't think you play a role?

74: No no.

73: No we don't have an influence.

71: Of course not.

69: No. In dreams maybe.

73: When the civic movement happened, we supported them thinking that they were doing something for the better. Turned out people involved in it were politicized and political parties pushed them to talk in certain ways. It was revealed in the end. This one is affiliated with X and that one is affiliated with Y. They identified them in pictures and names. You need to eliminate or fix the law of political parties in Lebanon. When this is resolved and we'll stop having political parties, you become just a Lebanese citizen without affiliations.

69: This is very difficult.

73: No we can get rid of political parties.

69: It is impossible.

69: Why did someone become a leader? Because of his group. Take away his support and he becomes just like anyone one of us.

73: My friend, yes but they'll become leaders because of their popularity not his political group. When you say "movement" or whatever, take out the word "parties" in the Lebanese law, you'll become just citizens…

69: Let me just give you this example. They told Wiaam Wahaab that they wanted to dismantle his United Party, so he made it the United Movement.

73: No just dismantle all parties in the law. You can still love your leader but not under a specific party.

69: It won't work.

73: Why not!

Moderator: In your opinion, if we want to think about our children and as youth, in our future. Do you think we're going to be living in a similar society as the one we are living in today or maybe it'll be better?

69: 100%. It will not change.

72: Of course. It'll be the same.

74: Depends on our optimism.

73: If you want Ziad El Rahbani plays *(satirical plays that discussed the political and social problems in Lebanon)* they are still the same reality. What our parents watched and laughed about, we can still relate to and laugh about as well.

71: No hopefully everything changes. Nothing stays the same.

74: We just need to be hopeful.

69: The lady here. You've witnessed so many governments and ministries and it is still the same.

71: We used to live a more luxurious life. Older people know how it was. A man used to get 300,000 LBP and live like a king, now if he gets a million it's not enough.

74: yes true.

73: The economical situation is like that globally.

71: Yes, I'm telling you, it just might change again.

74: because back then you didn't pay TVA. They drown you. No you pay 10% of your salary, on the food you buy, on everything. In the end up of the day you find that you've paid 30-40% of your salary. There are policies that me and you don't know about.

71: I'm telling you everything changed. And you never know, maybe it'll change again one day.

Moderator: I want to thank you for this effective discussion.

APPENDIX E. ELECTION BROKERS SCRIPTS (English)

E-1. Sunni Broker

No clientelism:

"Hi, my name is Rabih. I want to check your records: name, age, phone number, and region. These records and confidential and no one other than us sees it. Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.

[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]

Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time."

Clientelism:

"But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor because the Sunni candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you $10 just to go in and vote for him. And this topic is a secret. No one can know about it. Thank you. You can go back to your table."

E-2. Shia Broker

No clientelism:

"Hi, my name is Akram. I want to check your records: Name, age, telephone, and address. These records are secret, no one know other than us sees it. Neither New York nor Abu Dhabi knows about it.

[checking name, age, telephone, and religion]

Your records are all correct. You can continue with us the simulated elections, which consist of 4 parts and you are eligible to win money in the end of the elections according to the results. The table manager will tell you the details. Thank you for your time."

Clientelism:

"But before you leave I want to ask you for a favor. The Shia candidate is my friend and I care that he wins because he gets more earnings. I will give you $10 just to go in and vote for him. This is only between us. Thank you. You can go back to your table."

APPENDIX F. INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL THE GAMES (English)

1. DECISION TASK 1: SIMULATED ELECTIONS
We are now ready to begin the decision tasks. In the first task, you will have a chance to vote in simulated elections to decide how to divide some resources held in common. First, I will distribute 40 tokens to each of you. Then, 20 out of these 40 tokens will be taken away—think of it as a tax—and the resultant amount of 120 tokens will be placed in the center of the table. You will have a chance to decide how the 120 tokens in the common pool should be divided between the participants around your table. Specifically, we will ask you to vote in four simulated elections. Prior to each election two candidates will address your group and propose different ways to divide the 120 tokens. You will then have a chance to vote for a candidate whom you liked best by secretly recording your vote in writing. Remember that your decision affects how much money you will receive at the conclusion of the study. Your vote, just like all the decisions that you make later, must be completely confidential. Please cover your sheet and when you mark your choice make sure that no one sees it. After all the decision tasks are completed we will examine the results of just one of the four elections, for ease of calculation, and will implement the winning policy proposal to determine how many tokens each participant around our table will receive. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is $10 and the maximum is $30.

2. DECISION TASK 2: OTHER-OTHER ALLOCATION GAME
In this next task, you have to decide how to divide 10 tokens between two members of your group—one Sunni and one Shi'a. Only the organizers know which two members of your group will be affected by your decision, and you, yourself, are not one of the people affected. Your decision will not be made public. Please turn to the decision sheet for the second task in your packet. Out of 10 tokens, how many will you give to a Sunni at this table? And how many to a Shi'a? The table on the decision sheet details all the different ways of dividing 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shi'a. Please circle just one option that corresponds to your preference (in complete secret; shielding your decision sheet from others) and hand the decision sheet back to me. Somebody else's decision at this table will determine how much money you will receive; your compensation will be between $0 and $5. You will receive the payment once all the decision tasks are completed.

3. DECISION TASK 3: PUBLIC GOODS GAME
In this next task, you also receive 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 tokens to put into a common pool to be divided among all the participants. Once everyone has made their decision, the money in the common pool will be multiplied by two and divided equally among all the group members. Whatever tokens you do not put in the common pool are yours to keep. Your earnings then are whatever tokens you do not contribute to the common pool and the tokens that you receive once the common pool is divided among all members of the group.

Let us try this to see how the decision task works; these practice rounds do not count towards your earnings. [The table manager distributes ten tokens to every participant.]

Imagine that no one contributes to the common pool; then everyone is left with their 10 tokens in earnings. Now, imagine that everyone contributes their whole amount to the common pool. [Table manager ensures that all participants put 10 tokens in the middle, adds another 60 tokens to the common pool, and returns 20 tokens to every participant.] Everyone receives 20 tokens back. In this final round, imagine that people around the table contribute 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 tokens. [The table manager ensures that these are the contributions made by participants; multiplies 30 by 2 [=60], adds 30 tokens to the common pool, and distributes 10 tokens back to every participant.]

Now we are ready to do this task properly. We will play the decision game for five rounds. At the beginning of every round you will start with just 10 tokens. We are not going to use actual tokens though; we would like you to write down how many of the 10 tokens you contribute towards the common pool in every round. You will write down your contributions towards the common pool for every round secretly, shielding your decision sheet from others, on a decision sheet that is in your packet. At the end of every round I will announce how many tokens every participant contributed without revealing anyone's identity; what the total contribution was; and how much every participant would receive from the common pool. After all the tasks are completed, we will calculate your actual earnings by picking one of the five rounds at random. The minimum amount that you can earn from this task is $2 and the maximum is $13.

APPENDIX G. DECISION SHEETS (English)

I. Decision Task 1: simulated elections

Election #

Vote for your preferred candidate by placing a checkmark against his name (example: ☑ Candidate XXXXXXX). You may only vote for ONE candidate.

☐ Candidate XXXXXXXXX   ☐ Candidate YYYYYYYYY

II. Decision Task 2: other-other allocation game

You have 10 tokens to distribute. You must distribute all 10 tokens. You cannot know whom specifically the tokens will go to, and you yourself are not a recipient.

Each row in the table below shows a different way to divide 10 tokens between a Sunni and a Shia. From the options below please decide how many tokens you will give to another member of YOUR OWN RELIGIOUS SECT at this table and how many will go to the member of the different religious sect at the table. Circle your ONE preferred option in the last row.

Option	Token allocation										
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)
TO A SUNNI	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
TO A SHIA	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
CIRCLE ONE PREFERRED OPTION	**(a)**	**(b)**	**(c)**	**(d)**	**(e)**	**(f)**	**(g)**	**(h)**	**(i)**	**(j)**	**(k)**

III. Decision Task 3: Public Goods Game

You have 10 tokens. Now you must decide how many of the 10 to put in the common pool and how many to keep for yourself. All tokens in the common pool will be multiplied by two and shared EQUALLY among everyone at this table. The tokens that you do not put in the common pool you can keep for yourself as earnings.

Of the 10 tokens, how many will you put in the common pool? (The remainder will automatically be set aside for you as earnings).

	FOR THE COMMON POOL ONLY (enter a number of tokens between 0 and 10)
ROUND XX:	

APPENDIX H. SCRIPT DELIVERED BY ELECTION CANDIDATES (English)

Election 1:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, only the Shi'a at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Shi'a, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 2:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, only the Sunni at this table will receive money. That means that if you are Sunni, you will receive 40 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 3:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Sunni and Shi'a alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, the Shi'a and Sunni at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Shi'a will receive 30 tokens and each Sunni will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.

Election 4:

Sunni candidate: Hello, my name is Ahmad Moussalli and I am Sunni. If I am elected, the Sunni and Shi'a at this table will receive different amounts of money. Each Sunni will receive 30 tokens and each Shi'a will receive 10 tokens. Please vote for me.

Shi'a candidate: Hello, my name is Hussein Noun and I am Shi'a. If I am elected, everyone at this table, Shi'a and Sunni alike, will receive the same amount of money. That means that everyone will receive 20 tokens. Please vote for me.

APPENDIX I. RANDOMIZATION CHECK

Note: Numbers on the horizontal line indicate Experimental Conditions (1: Control, 2: Expert Video, 3: Participant Discussion, 4: Clientelism, 5: Expert Video + Clientelism, and 6: Participant Discussion + Clientelism); Interest in Politics differs only between experimental conditions 2 and 6 (diff.=0.31 and t=2.01); Daily discussion differs only between experimental conditions 4 and 5 (diff.=0.48 and t=2.76); Financial insecurity differs between experimental conditions 1 and 2 (diff.=0.51 and t=3.58), between experimental conditions 2 and 4 (diff.=-0.29 and t=-2.09), and between experimental conditions 2 and 6 (diff.=-0.40 and t=-2.87).

APPENDIX J. SURVEY QUESTOINS

Understanding: "How well were you able to understand the instructions for what you were supposed to do as part of this study? (0) Did not understand the instructions at all; (1) Understood instructions quite poorly; (2) Understood instructions quietly well; (3) Understood instructions fully."

Interest in Politics: "Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? (0) Very uninterested; (1) Quite uninterested; (2) Quite interested; (3) Very interested."

Daily Discussion: "In you daily life, how often do you discuss the topic of inter-sectarian cooperation with individuals from a different Muslim religious sect? (0) Never; (1) Rarely; (2) Sometimes; (3) Often."

Religiosity: "Would you describe yourself as religious, somewhat religious, or not at all religious? (0)Not at all religious; (1) Somewhat religious; (2) Religious."

Physical Insecurity: "Speaking generally, how safe do you and your family feel nowadays? (0) Very safe; (1) Quite safe; (2) Quite unsafe; (3) Very unsafe."

Financial Insecurity: "Speaking generally, how financially secure do you and your family feel nowadays? (0) Very secure; (1) Quite secure; (2) Quite insecure; (3) Very insecure."

Age: "How old are you? Please write your age in the space provided." Open question.

Education: "What is your education level? (0) Illiterate/ No formal education; (1) Elementary; (2) Preparatory/ Basic; (3) Secondary; (4) Mid-level diploma/ Professional or technical; (5) BA; (6) MA or above."

Household Income: "What is your HOUSEHOLD'S monthly income? (0) Under 1,000,000 LBP; (1) 1,000,001 – 3,000,000 LBP; (2) 3,000,001 – 5,000,000 LBP; (3) 5,000,001 – 7,000,000 LBP; (4) 7,000,001 – 9,000,000 LBP; (5) 9,000,001 – 11,000,000 LBP; (6) Over 11,000,001 LBP."

Household Items: "Please put a checkmark against every item from the list below that you already have in your household. (a) Refrigerator; (b) Microwave; (c) Flat screen TV; (d) Computer; (e) Internet; (f) Bicycle; (g) Motorcycle/moped; (h) Car." Checked items counted.

Trust in Sunni and Shia groups: How much do you trust the members of each of the following groups? Shia Muslim/ Sunni Muslim. (0) Do not trust at all; (1) Mostly don't trust; (2) Mostly trust; (3) Trust completely."

APPENDIX K. VOTE CHOICE DISAGGREGATED BY ELECTION AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

Note: Numbers on the horizontal line indicate Experimental Conditions (1: Control, 2: Expert Video, 3: Participant Discussion, 4: Clientelism, 5: Expert Video + Clientelism, and 6: Participant Discussion + Clientelism).

APPENDIX L. RELATIVE CROSS-SECTARIAN TRUST REGRESSION FROM TABLE 5 (OLS)

	Relative cross-sectarian trust	
	Model 1	Model 2
Expert Video	0.28 (0.18)	
Participant Discussion		0.02 (0.16)
Constant	-2.35** (0.87)	-1.90* (0.83)
Clientelism	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y
Observations	165	169
R^2	0.13	0.10

Note: Model 1 uses observations from experimental conditions 1-2 and 4-5, whereas Model 2 uses observations from experimental conditions 2-3 and 5-6. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

APPENDIX M. DISCUSSION CODING RULES

M-1. Coding rules
 (1) Regardless of the discussion stage, a participant's statement is coded if it addresses any of the 25 subcategories listed below.
 (2) A participant's agreement on a subcategory as a cause of sectarianism does not necessarily mean his or her agreement on the same or an equivalent subcategory as a solution to sectarianism (he or she may think infeasible). Make a mark on a subcategory only when a participant explicitly indicates the category as a source or solution.
 (3) Participants often express their opinions by stating a few words or short statements (e.g., "True", "right", or "No, I disagree") after others'. Those expressions are counted as valid statements against the categories to which the preceding statements are classified.
 (4) If a participant repeatedly makes statements that can be classified to a same category, the statements are counted just once against the category.
 (5) Agreement and disagreement are coded as 1 and -1, respectively. If a participant does not make a statement against a category, just leave his or her cell empty.
 (6) For some statements, the speakers remain unidentified. If an unidentified statement concerns one of the subcategories, it is counted in the row for "unidentified statement" in the coding spreadsheet. Since we cannot distinguish speakers, every unidentified statement should be counted as an independent and valid one.

M-2. 25 subcategories

Broad categories	Subcategories	Examples
Negative effects of sectarianism	Inter-sectarian conflict, tension, or threat	
	Inter-sectarian friendship or marriage/ family issues	
	Job, hospital, or school admission (*Wasta*)	
Causes of sectarianism	Political leadership or institutions	Quota system, sectarian assignment of governmental offices, or hereditary political power
	Lack of individual awareness	
	Foreign force	Neighboring Muslim countries, Israel, or USA
	Mass media	
	Sectarian education at school	
	Lack of nationalism or patriotism	
	Religious leadership	Friday Prayer or Mosque
	Syrian refugees	
Solutions to	Political system reform	About political leaders, Quota

sectarianism		system abolition, direct presidential election
	Civic education	
	Parental education	
	Independence from foreign forces	
	Mass media control	
	Non-sectarian education at school	Common textbooks
	Remove sect information from Personal Status Records or ID card	
	Nationalism or patriotism	
	Participation in protest or social movement	
	Separate religion from politics	About religious leaders, prohibit religious leaders from intervening in politics
	Pension	
	Military coup	
	Mixing residential areas	
	Inter-sectarian marriage	

APPENDIX N. DISCUSSION DEPTH EFFECTS ON CROSS-SECTARIAN TRUST

	Absolute cross-sectarian trust Model 1 (Ordered logistic)	Relative cross-sectarian trust Model 2 (OLS)
Discussion depth	1.40 (1.69)	0.78 (0.47)
Female participation	1.56 (1.10)	0.83** (0.27)
Youth participation	2.48* (1.15)	0.49** (0.18)
Clientelism	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y
/cut1	-7.84 (3.53)	
/cut2	-4.61 (3.43)	
/cut3	-2.36 (3.41)	
Constant		-1.64 (1.38)
Observations	79	79
R^2	0.20	0.39

Note: Models 1 and 2 use observations from experimental conditions 3 and 6.
Coefficients in Model 1 are odds ratios.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$.

APPENDIX O. MODERATING EFFECTS OF DISCUSSION DEPTH ON CLIENTELISM

Model	Sectarian voting	
	1	2
Discussion Depth	-11.53*	-11.89
	(5.62)	(6.53)
Clientelism	-0.08	
	(1.97)	
Discussion Depth × Clientelism	8.71	
	(6.19)	
Accepted Clientelistic Offer		3.23
		(2.75)
Discussion Depth × Accepted Clientelistic Offer		7.46
		(7.33)
Female participation	-0.71	1.31
	(0.99)	(1.61)
Youth participation	-1.73	-1.71
	(1.02)	(1.43)
Constant	4.42	2.87
	(5.57)	(7.87)
Clientelism	Y	Y
Group moderator indicator	Y	Y
Control variables	Y	Y
Observations	90	90
R^2	0.46	0.63

Note: Accepted Clientelistic Offer *is coded as 0 for participants in experimental conditions without clientelism (1-3) and for those in clientelism conditions (4-6) who did not accept the incentive.*

Both models analyze observations from the election game in experimental conditions 3 and 6, using logistic regressions. The dependent variable is a binary one for sectarian voting. Coefficients are not odds ratios.

Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.