Protest & Development in Aspiring Global Cities

Chapter 1

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Theoretical context and contribution

Redevelopment, inequality, and dispossession

With accelerated efforts over the last two decades, city governments around the world have shifted from facilitators to initiators of systematic redevelopment (see for example N. Smith, 2002; Uitermark, Duyvendak, & Kleinhans, 2007), to the point that much scholarship considers “contemporary urban policy to be a form of state-led gentrification” (L. Lees, 2003, p.62). The impetus to redevelopment can be explained as a strategic response to new political economic contexts at the local level. Fiscal austerity (Blyth, 2013), the pursuit of global status (Pasotti, 2009), and neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), were embraced as prominent modes of urban governance following the Thatcher and Reagan governments, and consolidated with Third-Way and Washington consensus approaches. While largely starting in high-income countries, the approach took hold even more acutely in many middle and lower income countries, especially in the aftermath of currency and real estate crises, amidst a weakening of organized labor; the privatization of public goods; and the responsibilization of the poor (Peck, 2011; Wacquant, 2010).

On an immediate budgetary level, the upgrading of neighborhoods allows municipalities to receive funds from a variety of sources: in the form of permit, fees and taxes from developers; in increased real estate taxes from the overall increase in property prices; from tourism; from direct and indirect taxes emerging from new high-income residents; and from investors, more likely to settle in cities where their mobile high-skill workforce will enjoy residence.

Redevelopment in this economic and political context often leads to spatialized inequalities, i.e. inequalities that are expressed in the differential access to urban space (Brenner, 2014). Low-income neighborhoods with strategic locations, usually close to downtown, are targeted to satisfy the increased middle class demand for urban living because they offer the highest rent gap, i.e. the greatest disparity between actual value and potential value in real estate (N. Smith, 2002). When a neighborhood is identified as a good candidate for redevelopment, prospective investors and municipalities can further depress actual real estate values. There are several paths and patterns in displacement and gentrification (Loretta Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales, 2015). Two common practices to depress value consist in attracting residents viewed by existing owners as “undesirable” (a practice called blockbusting), and labeling the neighborhood as “blighted,” which discourages banks from funding housing renovation, thereby fulfilling the prophecy of blight (this second strategy is called redlining). Such territorial stigmatization – through both
symbolic denigration and physical neglect - is critical to inserting neighborhoods into the real estate circuit because it promotes public support for redevelopment: “When urban degradation and symbolic devaluation intensify to the point where neighborhoods of relegation appear to be beyond salvage, they provide political leaders and state bureaucrats with warrants for deploying aggressive policies of containment, discipline, and dispersal that further disorganize the urban poor under the pretext of improving their opportunities” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 218). Once investors gauge that property values have hit bottom, they can buy property en masse directly or through agreements with the municipality, and proceed with redevelopment and resale.

Hence, all too often the opportunity for profit comes at the expense of displacement of previous residents, leading to “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 1978). Notwithstanding important variation, the effect is often what Smith defined as third-wave gentrification: “retaking the city for the middle classes”, for residential use but also to turn whole areas “into landscaped complexes that pioneer a comprehensive class-inflected urban re-make . . . based on recreation, consumption, production and pleasure as well as residence” (N. Smith, 2002, p. 443). In this context, Lefebvre’s “right to the city” is rearticulated as the “right to consume the city,” and “quality of life” is conflated with “quality of lifestyle” (Kern, 2010, p. 170; Rae, 2015).

**Cultural industries**

With its emphasis on consumption, this approach to redevelopment has contributed to a new focus on cultural economic strategies. Zukin, one of the first scholars to identify the link, points to the emergence of the “Artistic Mode of Production:” an approach to economic growth based on revalorizing the built environment around cultural consumption and historic preservation; promoting cultural industries to address youth unemployment; and deploying cultural meanings that value urban space and labor for their aesthetic rather than productive contributions (see also Hutton, 2015; Zukin, 1987, p. 260). However, what might be called for is instead a revised notion of “productivity.” According to the activists interviewed for this project, the city is in fact “the new factory:” a site of production no longer of industrial goods, but of desire materialized through consumption and lifestyle (Schäfer, 2010).

Especially influential in the debate over the value of cultural economic strategies was the intervention by Richard Florida. According to Florida, the knowledge economy has become the main site of competition among global cities, and governments’ priority is attracting and retaining high skilled labor, which follows amenities associated with the “creative class” (Florida, 2002;
Florida was criticized for his overly broad definition of creatives,¹ and I therefore follow other scholars’ preference for “cultural producers,” i.e. contributors to the cultural industries who “combine cultural expression and creativity with material production, tradable goods and, to a greater or lesser extent, market-based consumption” (Krätke, 2010; Montgomery, 2005, p. 340; Novy & Colomb, 2012).

Even after adopting the tighter definition of “creatives,” the key point remains that Florida’s prescription catalyzed urban redevelopment because the promotion of creative industries requires a specific infrastructure. Institutions of higher education and appealing residential spaces are critical factors to attract and retain middle classes associated with the knowledge economy. But in order to fully embrace Florida’s recipe, governments also seek to meet their consumption demands and display the creative potential of an area. This prompts additional socio-spatial transformations aimed at providing experiences and leisure facilities that can be marketed as fostering hipness, cultural vibrancy, as well as cultural and social diversity. The extent to which this focus on the provision of cultural consumption for middle class and elites departs from previous neoliberal approaches has been legitimately questioned: the creative industries’ need for physical infrastructure, marked by “the starchitect-designed galleries, convention centers, luxury hotels, office buildings and car parks” can make “it look rather like neoliberal development-as-usual” (Shaw, 2013).

Redistributive impact

Like prior versions of neoliberal strategies, the present emphasis on culture-led growth has a redistributive impact, which extends well beyond the development of physical infrastructure (Porter & Shaw, 2013). City governments often shift resources to new sectors (such as biotech, high-tech, and design), but also promote culture-led growth by privileging the marketing of some areas, the creation of cultural content for tourists, and cultural production that has easy appeal. For example, creative city programming tends to shift resources to “marketable” diversity (Boudreau, Keil, & Young, 2009) thereby entrenching racial and class inequalities (Atkinson & Easthope, 2009; Catungal, Leslie, & Hii, 2009; Grundy & Boudreau, 2008; Parker, 2008; Peck, 2005, 2011; Shaw, 2006) while at the same time fetishizing ethnic diversity and inclusion through

¹ According to Florida, creatives are an occupational profile that includes traditional cultural management (museums, libraries, festivals, crafts, etc.), contemporary cultural art management (arts and entertainment activities, exhibition spaces and production), media (audio-visual products, books, magazines, etc.), and design (software, digital content, advertising, architecture, etc.) as well as scientific research.
the “spectacular commodification of difference” (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2005, p.672), primarily with events and spaces that appeal to the tastes of middle-class professionals.

The result of such culture-led regenerations is frequently gentrification and displacement. It is hard to quantify displacement as a consequence of gentrification (Atkinson, 2002; Shaw, 2005). This book discusses displacement as the perceived or actual risk expressed by the resistance organizers that I interview. Sometimes, as in Istanbul, there is documented displacement; other times, evidence is anecdotal. Tracing the degree of actually occurring physical displacement is not central to the argument, and for 30 cases it would require several books. Moreover, the loss of place can be inequitable and disorienting even for residents who manage to remain, as it alienates them from the experience of their lived space and its daily practices (Davidson, 2008; Marcuse, 1985; Shaw & Hagemans, 2015; Zukin, 2010). This dynamic is illustrated in various cases below, which show how residents develop and embrace “their” version of neighborhood identity precisely as they seek to affirm a right to stay.

The displacement caused by culture-led growth paradoxically also often affects artists, with the effect that “places that seek to differentiate themselves end up creating a kind of serial replication of homogeneity’ (Harvey, 1993, p.8). In addition to rising real estate costs, artists and art organizations face funding challenges wherever neoliberal cultural polices slash resources for grassroots organizations while shifting to competitive grants that “pressure artists to form boosterist partnerships with businesses and community groups” (McLean, 2014). Participants in indie subcultures are particularly affected because they tend to be marginal in economic (though not class) terms. They need central and cheap locations and thus face the choice between displacement or fighting for their space in the city (Shaw, 2005, 2013). Thus, even squats, as illustrated in several cases below, repeatedly turn to the provision of cultural services in order to gain legitimacy and local clout, and thereby ensure survival: they too are trapped, in that “under the hopeful cover of creativity - rather than austerity - the same old neoliberal logic prevails: performance, marketization of public services, meritocracy, auditing, contracting out, and individualization” (Boudreau et al., 2009).

**New political actors**

The shift to cultural industries coupled with intensified redevelopment brings about a new political landscape (Pasotti, 2009), and raises questions about the strategies available to the citizenry to exercise resistance against their local governments. In this context, cultural producers emerge as an important and understudied political actor. While tremendously fragmented and heterogeneous, many in this sector are often eager and capable to express their voice for at least
two reasons: because the new focus on culture-led growth lends them a privileged status, but also, paradoxically, because they are often threatened by spatial exclusion and further economic marginalization.

Deep and widespread structural shifts facilitate the rise of these voices in the political arena. The mobilizing structures that supported social movements in the 1960s and 1970s no longer offer the same ideological, material and organizational resources. Unions have declined in membership and influence (Wallerstein & Western, 2000). Programmatic mass parties of the left and far left have entered a protracted phase of deep crisis (Huber & Stephens, 2001).

In addition, the Internet has fundamentally changed the way mobilization takes place. While television, radio, and the press connected one-to-many, and telephones connected one-to-one, the Internet is a platform that connects many-to-many. Thus, the barrier between information producers and consumers is broken. And as all media turned digital, the internet shifted to combining information provision with social coordination, as viewers react individually and collectively to new content (Shirky, 2008). The effect has been a new form of mobilization, where “movements ignored political parties, distrusted the media, did not recognize [almost] any leadership and rejected all formal organization, relying on the internet and local assemblies for collective debate and decision-making” (Castells, 2015, p.4). Far from the vertical mobilization of parties and unions, participation today is fluid and transversal and depends on the self-identification of the prospective participant (Collier & Handlin, 2009). These changes affect the spatial dimension of protest: Internet social networks combine with physical space in neighborhoods, which is appropriated with events or outright occupations, “connecting cyberspace and urban space in relentless interaction, constituting, technologically and culturally, instant communities of transformative practice” (Castells, 2015, p.11). Moreover, the pace of technological change over the decade of research conducted for this book had a profound effect on the role of the Internet in protest. Digital media evolved from being broadcast instruments for neighborhood groups, as poignantly captured by the 2005 slogan of vecinos in Santiago, which called for spreading their message (“difundir, difundir, difundir”), to acquiring multiple and complex functions, including constituting a key site of protest, as illustrated in Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights in 2015.

It is on the backdrop of these profound structural changes that many cities witness intensified redevelopment. With an intricate landscape of winners, losers, and bystanders, these physical and symbolic makeovers are carefully managed to persuade both public opinion and potential veto players. In most cases, city governments and/or developers engage in sophisticated marketing campaigns, which contribute to the stigmatization of the areas facing renovation, and entice the
imagination with dreamlike futuristic renditions of upcoming sites distinguished by serene, productive, and sustainable spaces for the middle class and elites.

In this environment, the definition of what constitutes the “legitimate” and “authentic” urban experience has turned into a crucial territory of struggle. The party capable of shaping and delivering the most persuasive narrative of “authenticity” (Lakoff, 2008; Silver, Clark, & Navarro Yanez, 2010; Zukin, 2010) gains political legitimacy, which can in turn facilitate the mobilization of support needed to set forth claims over city space, its use and its meaning. Far from immaterial, the production of the urban experience and its subjectivity – while rooted in symbols, discourse, or everyday practices - has thus major effects on the ability of different actors to influence redevelopment, and consequently on the redistribution of space and resources.

While governments and developers pursue persuasion with marketing and branding, experiential and emotional communication is increasingly reflected in the ways activists approach protest struggles, a shift that gives cultural producers a special advantage. As Hamburg artist and activist Christoph Schäfer argued “If subjectivity is the new front of capitalism, then artistic practices get, potentially, more power” in protest (Schäfer, 2010). In other words, in Schaefer’s view, current capitalism – including as pursued by city governments - deploys marketing that aims to shape experience, identity, and meaning. Since these goals are inherently associated with artistic production, the new context puts artistic practices and cultural agents in a privileged position to shape protest and political participation.

According to this view, where government and protestors face similar challenges in the mobilization of support - made fluid by the lack of strong political ideologies or alternative mobilizing structures – they both focus on shaping subjective notions of identity, belonging, and space among potential supporters. In fact, sometimes protest is articulated in direct reaction to city branding campaigns: in Hamburg’s Gängeviertel or Seoul’s Mullae Art Village, for example, protestors countered institutional branding by developing their own responses within the very same discursive logic. In both of these cities, where redevelopment was deeply enmeshed with a turn to culture-led growth, cultural producers did not question the governments’ turn to cultural industries per se, but rather the ways in which governments understood and implemented such strategies, due to regressive and exclusionary outcomes.

Thus, the new political and economic landscape has turned cultural producers into potentially powerful political actors who can play an understudied and underestimated role in local politics and redevelopment. The turn to subjectivity in politics provides cultural producers with unprecedented levels of influence despite their relatively low economic status, thanks to high
cultural and social capital and their ability to shape worldviews and communicate them to the public through emotional appeals and impactful experiences.

Thus the focus here is not on the (highly contested) economic contribution of cultural producers to urban growth (Grodach, 2013; Silver & Miller, 2013) but rather on their impact as political actors as result of their status in a creativity-led growth paradigm. In this context, of course, cultural producers do not behave as a monolith – after all, creative industry policies do not affect them the same way (Bain & McLean, 2012; Leslie & Catungal, 2012). Reactions range from leadership in radical protest, to cooptation by real estate developers at the expense of lower income residents left behind by culture-led growth.

In most cases, within the same protest campaign, some cultural producers at least implicitly support redevelopment plans, while others oppose them. The variation in stance is accompanied by a variation in reaction. At times cultural producers are squarely in the leadership of protest movements (for instance in Hamburg, and in Seoul); other times they are indispensible partners and supporters (as in Santiago, and on Los Angeles’ Skid Row). Cultural producers that implicitly support redevelopment plans are often also eager to distance themselves from those policies (these tensions are clearly displayed by cultural producers in Buenos Aires). At times cultural producers risk displacement, and yet witness protest from the sidelines (for example in cases in Melbourne). At times some lucky few are co-opted beneficiaries of gentrification (as some Toronto cases illustrate). At other times, cooptation is undertaken consciously and instrumentally by artists who are actually deeply critical of redevelopment policies but find in cooptation the best strategy for resistance (Seoul’s Mullae provides a vivid illustration). Among the cases discussed in this book, perhaps nowhere are cultural producers more divided than in the case of Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights, where they are key partners in a protest, but also the campaign’s main target.

Multiple factors inhibit or promote the behavior of cultural producers, and the trends that emerge from the case studies are discussed below. Before proceeding, it is helpful to introduce an important contribution of cultural producers to protest: the newfound prominence of experiential tools.

**Experiential tools**

The case studies that follow examine resistance against redevelopment in many forms, ranging from traditional strategies of protest to more novel forms focused on experience. An important contribution of cultural producers is the shift in the repertoire of contention (Tilly, 1976) towards a much increased reliance on a thereto understudied set of tools, which I call *experiential tools.*
These instruments of mobilization and protest warrant special attention not only because they have not been sufficiently examined, but also because they emerge as especially effective in providing residents with political influence as they seek to resist or shape redevelopment.

Experiential tools are aimed at heightening the enthusiasm and commitment of participants by providing an experience that helps them define their identity, gives them a sense of self-worth and embodies values with which they seek association. They are typically presented as primarily social, and only secondarily political moments. The emphasis is on the activity, which elicits positive feelings such as joy, hope, belonging, and hipness. Political messages are rare and usually implicit. Political goals are not imposed from above, but rather they result from the self-discovery that comes from experience. Participants’ perception of coming to a political stance through self-discovery as opposed to instruction greatly raises the level of commitment (Aronson, 1999), which is further heightened if the experience involves self-sacrifice (Grant, Dutton, & Rosso, 2008). Rather than putting participants in a passive, listening position, a successful experiential tool therefore actively engages, and even requires some kind of contribution.

Because of their educational and professional background, creative producers are especially endowed with the skills suited to the creation and deployment of experiential tools. Thus the emergence of this approach to mobilization is accompanied by a new prominence of this group in resistance (Novy & Colomb, 2012). In addition to positive feelings, the artists’ sophisticated communicative and evocative skills enable the use of irony, which is often part of experiential tools, and not by chance. As Bertold Brecht (and before him the Russian Formalists) understood, such forms of de-familiarization (Verfremdung) intrigue the audience, and shock it into questioning underlying conditions and becoming a conscious critical observer. As opposed to being instructed, this approach allows participants the agency involved in self-discovery and interpretation. And that is the core of experience.

Experiential tools are often expressed as activities or events that promote memories and emotional linkages and thus develop loyalty among participants. In addition, these activities or events can provide the occasion to present specific initiatives or campaigns. They also offer the occasion for core activists to coalesce around a challenge and be energized by its success. Among a great variety of activities and events, one or two can be selected as flag carriers and become persistently linked with the protest group. These activities or events mobilize previously latent observers, as well as outsiders (usually civil society actors, and sometimes including institutional actors). Therefore, successful experiential events and activities are targeted to suit broad tastes and transmit catchall values and messages. In the cases that follow, experiential tools will be deployed both effectively (when they inspire participation among different groups of residents,
stakeholders, and veto players) and ineffectively (when they fail cross-cleavage targeting). Thus, the mere adoption of experiential tools – no matter how creative - is far from guaranteeing substantive mobilization.

Four categories of experiential tools emerge with most frequency. First are entertainment events, which range from festivals full of family activities (as illustrated in Santiago and Hamburg) to encampments (iconically displayed in the discussion of protest in Tel Aviv and Gezi Park). Second are the archives, which when successful focus on grassroots narratives (such as in Toronto’s Lawrence Heights, as well as Santiago and Hamburg). Third are tours, which in successful cases (such as in Santiago) elicit proud self-identification with the neighborhood, instead of resignation with redevelopment (such as in Istanbul). Finally, there are games, for example local versions of Monopoly, which in Hamburg involved residents in play and consciousness-raising. Thus, in successful cases, experiential tools were targeted to attract residents across different cleavages, such as socio-economic status, age, ethnic and religious background, as well as the critical cleavage of renters and owners. In these cases, heterogeneity turned into a point of strength because the broad base lent legitimacy to the protestors’ claims.

As discussed below, research reveals that experiential tools are especially likely to be deployed in contexts where traditional mobilization structures are weak or unwilling to provide support for the struggle at hand. Therefore, while experiential tools might not be entirely new, their role has gained much prominence in the many sites where union membership and influence has waned over recent decades.

**Contributions: collective action revisited**

Taking stock and looking forward, this book aims to contribute to the literature on collective action and contentious politics in four ways. First, the interpretation of experiential tools in mobilization offered here turns some social movement theory on its head: collective entertainment, in the form of festivals, games, or other ludic activities, is no longer the result of successful urban movements (Castells, 1983) but rather a key tool for both mobilization and protest action. I do not mean to say that experiential tools were never deployed before the cases examined in this book. Yet, the rise to prominence - and the observed effectiveness - of this approach to protest over the last decade is remarkable. Moreover, in the cases that follow, interviewees who were involved in experiential campaigns strongly emphasized that this approach to protest was new to them and to their cities, and consistently described it as a radical departure rather than adaptation from previous struggle strategies. These opinions find confirmation in the respective literatures, where Hamburg, Santiago, and Seoul set the most
dramatic shifts from militancy to experiential protest (on militancy legacy in these cities, see for example Birke, 2014; Davis, 2011; Espinoza, 1998; Garcés, 2002; Herrmann, Lenger, Reemtsma, & Roth, 1987; Lee, 1990; Lehne, 1994).

Organizers who devise experiential tools display a remarkable ability in creating events that animate their constituencies, and therefore experiential tools certainly fit in a strategic protest toolbox (Swidler, 1986). The approach of experiential tools builds on Snow et al seminal contribution of “frame alignment processes” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p.464), i.e. processes that social movement organizations deploy to align their interpretative orientations with target audiences in order to increase mobilization or support. In both approaches, tools are successful when they “resonate”, i.e. they offer “believable and compelling” (Snow et al., 1986, p.477) renditions of a given concern. Also, in both emotions play a fundamental role. While Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish among diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, Gould emphasizes the motivational aspect of framing and connects frames and emotions, highlighting how they are joined in the emotional management undertaken by protest organizers (Gould, 2004). This persuasive observation applies also to experiential tools, in which too, organizers manage events to elicit emotions that are good for the movement. Specifically, as illustrated in the case studies, successful experiential tools elicit joy and pride in participation, espousing Alinsky’s rule that “a good tactic is one your people enjoy” (Alinsky, 1971).

However, there are also interesting differences between frames and experiential tools. These stem from the observation that experiential tools only materialize when participants appropriate them, through life-stories and in their material experience of the neighborhood. Irony and defamiliarization are more common in experiential tools than in framing because experiential tools often rely on surprising the target audience in order to elicit attention and commitment. In contrast, framing is more squarely based on messaging that resonates with the target audience’s pre-existing worldviews. Further, while framing is focused on the verbal, written or visual communication, experiential tools focus instead on the production of lived experiences. They materialize through grassroots appropriation and performance, and in this sense they share an essential bottom-up component with protest tools such as story-telling (Polletta, 2006) and the physical and emotional interaction with the neighborhood eloquently described by Auyero (2003).

A second contribution of this book is the theoretical connections it draws between the social movement literature – largely housed in sociology - and the urban social movement literature, which is cross-disciplinary and very diverse, including in the definition of the object of study. For example, Castells at various points defined urban movements by their outcomes (1977, pp. 360-
375), and by their relation to a specific spatial community (Castells, 1983). Other definitions put more weight on the political context within which urban movements operate, for example defining urban movements as a type of social movement rooted in a “collective with a communal base and/or with the local state as their target of action” (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1985). Skepticism about non-confrontational forms of civil society engagement led some scholars to privilege informal groups over associations and NGOs (Mayer, 2003). Yet, other scholars saw urban movements as taking a variety of forms, “from counter-cultural squatters to middle class-neighborhood associations and shanty town defense groups” (Castells, 1983, p.328), with strategies that vary tremendously, including lobbying, protesting, rent strikes, squatting, re-appropriation and other forms of subversive reclaiming. Notwithstanding this variety, a macrosociological emphasis on the movement dimension of protest is confirmed in studies connecting urban movements to the political system in which they are channeled and contained (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1985; Katzenelson, 1982; Lipsky, 1970).

Over recent years, the translations of Right to the City (Lefebvre, 1996, 2003) launched a new wave of scholarly interest in social justice and resistance against neoliberalism (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer, 2011; Harvey, 2008, 2012; Leitner, Peck, & Sheppard, 2007; Marcuse, 2009; Mitchell, 2003; Purcell, 2008, 2013). One of this literature’s key contributions was the study of space in urban protest, identifying urban space as “the central stage for contesting hegemonic power relations,” especially visible in the wave of mass protests that shook the world between 2010 and 2013 (Miller & Nicholls, 2013, p.452). Despite the focus on urban space, the literature actually spanned beyond strictly urban issues and into political, economic, and social justice.

The effort to explain place-as-rhetoric is critical to the present analysis because it connects the location of protest to strategic communication. Endres and Senda-Cook were especially effective in explaining how place becomes an inherent component of the protest message: according to their account, protestors can build on pre-existing meanings associated to a site; or challenge (and temporarily reconstruct) a dominant meaning; or repeatedly build a meaning by continuous reference to a specific place, where repeated use is what provides the meaning to a site (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011). Confirming their argument, several of these approaches appear in the case studies below. In a similar vein, Salmenkari (2009) offers further interpretative tools as she identifies different types of spaces (government buildings, commercial spaces, and spaces that invoke important historical, moral, or cultural moments) aimed at different target audiences depending on demonstrators’ demands, protest cultures, state power, and elite norms. The literature focuses on the symbolic and political valence of space in cases of mass protest, yet the case studies that follow illustrate how the phenomenon affects also small-scale mobilizations.
More recently, the discourse of the Right to the City has been revisited, as scholars have argued that it displays an urban and intellectual bias (Uitermark, Nicholls, & Loopmans, 2012) and that its institutional endorsement depoliticized and de-radicalized the message. In this reading, the Right to the City rests not on reformist politics, but inherently on political struggle, and a transformation of everyday life in which residents fully reclaim use value at the expense of exchange value of urban space and often aim to overcome the logic of private property (Belda-Miquel, Peris Blanes, & Frediani, 2016). As the cases below illustrate, the claims in the name of the Right to the City often defend particular interests of middle-class urbanites (Brenner et al., 2011), and can actually weaken and fragment movement waves (Blokland, Hentschel, Holm, Lebuhn, & Margalit, 2015).

Notwithstanding this broad arc, there is an enduring paucity in cross-fertilization between urban movements scholarship and the social movement literature (Pickvance, 2003, p. 104). Recently, a relatively small group of scholars has begun to bridge the gap, most notably with important collections (Belda-Miquel et al., 2016; Mayer, Thörn, & Thörn, 2016; Miller & Nicholls, 2013). This book aims to contribute to the effort.

A third contribution of this project is to build on recent work that emphasizes local collective action rather than the macro-dimension of social movement studies. While much is to be learned from broad societal perspectives, this book embraces McAdam and Boudet’s (2012) exhortation to identify the kind of actors described below as instances of collective action, rather than social movements. Despite differences in the emphases on ideas vs. structure, there is relative consensus on the definition of social movement. For example, on the ideational end, Goodwin and Jaspers define a social movement “as a collective, organized, sustained, and noninstitutional challenge to authorities, power-holders, or cultural beliefs and practices” (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p.4). On the structural end, Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998, p.4). Both sides understand social movements as waves or industries of organizations (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Yet, sometimes the agents of social movements are hard to identify as organizations, and they are better described as protest groups: “a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their shared goal or goals by influencing the decisions of a target” (Opp, 2009), or what McAdam and Boudet (2012) call “emergent collective action.” Thus, my analysis focuses on protest groups. Many of the cases of resistance described below are highly local and limited in scope (for example in Seoul, Toronto, and Melbourne). Often they transfer their struggles to other sites (as in Hamburg and Tel Aviv) and sometimes in the process they attempt to scale up and institutionalize (for
example in Santiago). Other times, they are participants in a social movement, where they can even cover leadership positions (evidently in the case of PAH in Madrid, but also in some Los Angeles organizations).

The fourth contribution of this book to the study of (urban) collective action is to bring renewed attention to institutions in explaining both organizers’ strategic choices and the likely impact of their mobilizations. The focus on political structures is notwithstanding a close appreciation for ideational factors, evident in the discussion at the opening of this chapter. It emerges from the observation that, despite attention to system politics, the recent urban movement literature does not explicitly incorporate the notion (mainstream among social movement scholars) that the structural potential for a movement is found in the combined presence of political opportunities and mobilizing structures independent of elite control (McAdam, 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly & Wood, 2015).

This book builds on both traditions as it traces two connected but separate outcomes of interest: the degree of mobilization achieved by a given resident group in a given campaign, and the degree of impact in meeting the campaign’s demands. Both outcomes are facilitated by structural and ideational elements. The analysis of mobilization considers structural factors such as the strength of supporting networks and unions, but also ideational factors such as the crafting of collective identity through experiential tools. The examination of impact, the second outcome of interest, emphasizes the institutional environment, and focuses on the presence of allies in city council and on the degree of partisan harmony (or conflict) between executives at the local level and at higher levels of government.

Beyond these two outcomes of interests, which constitute the principal goals of the present inquiry, the comparison lends itself to structural analysis as it seeks to assess underlying trends in the strategic choices taken by organizers and cultural producers in the various cases. The quest finds critical insights in the rich literatures of varieties of capitalism (following the seminal work by Soskice & Hall, 2001) and legal origins theory (building on La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Both literatures draw a key distinction between Anglo-Saxon countries (liberal market economies with English legal origins) and other countries (coordinated and hierarchical market economies, whether with French or German legal origins). The low formalism of Anglo-Saxon legal systems, and their emphasis on contract enforcement and

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2 In this study, I refer to collective identity as a property of individual participants, who acquire a sense of membership in or affinity towards a community or cause. A collective identity thus requires that group members develop “shared views of the social environment, shared goals and shared opinions about the possibilities and limits of collective action” (Klandermans, 1992, p.81).
market-based solutions to economic conflicts, draws a sharp distinction with the other two systems, in which governments are more likely to play interventionist and regulatory roles, and where economic conflicts are more likely to be addressed through corporatist negotiation or institutional authority.

These deep and systematic differences in political economy shape the regulatory landscapes and the institutional avenues available to protestors. They also influence the culture and expectations regarding conflict resolutions, and the role that private agents or the government might have in them. The distinction is therefore helpful in providing insights into several questions, which although not the principal outcomes of interest, are nevertheless connected to the analysis. For example, the staunch enforcement of private contracts and especially property rights helps explain why protestors are less likely to pursue squats in liberal market economies, and even less likely to succeed in establishing long term occupations, while their counterparts in coordinated market economies and some hierarchical market economies are more likely to have squats tolerated and even turned into officially sanctioned arrangements. Another example of the insights provided by this theoretical turn is found in the degree to which cultural producers are more likely to be coopted by developers through the assignment of live-work spaces in new high-rises: it is not surprising that this kind of arrangement is prominent in liberal market economies, which privilege a culture of market-based solutions and compensation for grievances (and were cultural producers are already more likely to operate in an environment marked by competitive grants and boosterist partnerships with business and the government). On the other hand, in coordinated and hierarchical market economies (as long as governments are not openly hostile to protestors), organizers are more likely to seek government intervention and regulatory outcomes.

Overall, the benefit of this theoretical borrowing and extension appears notable. Having concluded setting the theoretical context for this work, it is now time to turn to the modality for its execution, and first of all to the parameters for comparison and scope in the upcoming analysis.

**Scope**

Recent debates – for example on the globalizing of urban policy, the circulation of expertise, the networks of urban activism, or the export and reproductions of urban cultures - fueled a renewed interest in comparative urban analysis. This work joins the literature in aiming to develop “knowledge, understanding, and generalization at a level between what is true of all cities and what is true of one city at a given point in time” (Nijman, 2007). While recognizing the obvious differences (for example in economic, political and infrastructural contexts), my goal is
to focus on what lessons we can draw from the similarities that join the cases. Given the range of cities analyzed, the phenomena no doubt are influenced by each locale’s history and position. While the phenomena described are molded by the local context, the parallels are powerful enough to deserve attention. Some critical scholars discourage what they see as “quasi-scientific” approaches to comparative urban studies, deemed “inappropriate to the multi-dimensional, contextual, interconnected, and endogenous nature of urban processes” (McFarlane & Robinson, 2012, p. 767; Robinson, 2011). However, the price of declining this opportunity is to abandon any claim that even remotely approaches some form of generalization, no matter how limited in scope (McFarlane, 2010).

This book is written in a different vein. It isolates a set of cities and cases as comparable sites for inquiry, and argues that we can learn from the juxtaposition of both similarities and differences. Indeed “given an appropriate intellectual definition and scope for a comparative research project, cities from many different contexts might well be considered alongside one another” (Robinson, 2011, p.5). The intention is to produce hypotheses that can be tested and aid the analysis of other sites under similar scope conditions. The result need not be, as Robinson (2011) warns against, a theory that is based on deductive theories derived from the American city. The focus on relatively wealthy cities – such are the aspiring global cities – is theoretically justified because it is the resistance politics that emerges in this specific political and economic landscape that is of interest in the present analysis. Yet, as discussed below, hypothesis building in my endeavor starts with Santiago, and proceeds inductively, rather than deductively, with an increasingly broad set of cases. It thereby espouses the call for a “repertoire of comparative methods open to ‘thinking with elsewhere,’” and an approach able to “mobilize the potential to start conceptualization from any city and to draw insights from a wide array of contexts while acknowledging the locatedness of all theoretical endeavor” (Robinson, 2016).

As discussed below, and contrary to the concerns expressed by Robinson regarding quasi-scientific comparative approaches, such inductive approach does well when clear parameters are set as pertains the kind of units being compared. Without thereby excluding other possible approaches to comparison, the definition of scope and selection is helpful in managing the comparison, but also in buttressing the validity of resulting theoretical claims (as in Kantor & Savitch, 2005). In other words, this approach might indicate a space for compatibility between Robinson and Scott and Storper (2015), while it follows their conceptualization of city and espouses their observation that “beneath the obvious empirical differences between” cases we can encounter widely observable shared mechanisms.
This project spans across several regions that transcend the usual Global North and South bifurcations, and displays dramatic variation in outcomes. Some cities illustrate how citizens can engage in exceptionally effective and innovative strategies to influence their governments, despite the obstacles. Other cities show how, despite valid concerns, citizens are unable to unite against their own governments. To illustrate, in Santiago, the group that I examine stands out for its effectiveness. It was able to stop redevelopment and prevented residential displacement by obtaining landmark status for the area from national authorities. On the basis of its legitimacy and clout among residents, it also made important institutional gains, including the shift from mayoral appointment to competitive elections for a key municipal governing body. Moreover, it gained seats on city council and on the national civil society council. In other words, the group succeeded at extraordinary mobilization, in winning long-term policy changes, and even in changing the rules of local representative government, thus altering the structural balance of power in decision making itself. Citizens in other cities were less successful in challenging the political establishment. The high degree of urban variation in outcomes points to an interesting theoretical terrain. Yet, a project based on qualitative research in ten cities across the world posed new challenges in thinking about comparisons.

Thus, the context for this project was delimited by a focus on recent neighborhood-centered protest in aspiring global cities with regular and competitive elections. Let me discuss and justify each constraint to set the scope of the investigation. Aspiring global cities are cities that share an approach to urban political economy that is widespread but not universal, and which is characterized by urban governments that make economic competitiveness their priority. Competitiveness involves a complex array of policies largely oriented towards attracting investment and high-skilled labor on international markets. No single or even handful of measures can capture the phenomenon but several existing indexes can be used to identify the population of aspiring global cities. Two following prominent indexes were especially helpful in conceptualizing and identifying the population of aspiring global cities:

1. The Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Index, which is innovative because it measures globalization not through the internal structures of individual cities, but rather with measures of relations between cities. It ranks over 230 cities worldwide based on network analysis of the office locations for 175 advanced producer service firms.

2. The Economist Intelligence Unit Global City Competitiveness Index, which ranks 120 cities on the extent to which they are able to attract capital, businesses, talent and visitors. It
assigns higher relative weight than other indexes\footnote{Three additional indexes were analyzed for the study, but do not directly determine the population selection. First, I examined the Anholt-GfK Roper City Brands Index, which is based on the idea that cities compete for limited resources such as investors, tourists, and consumers; and that brand promotion is the key element of their “competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007). This index uses online surveys to rank about 50 cities worldwide based on respondents’ perceptions of economic, political and cultural influence of given cities. Second, I examined the Global Power City Index, in which eminent scholars rank cities building on the seminal concept of “global city” (Sassen, 1994). It ranks 35 cities based on six main functions representing city strength (such as economy, research, culture and livability) and the degree to which cities attract the five groups identified as key to city strength (managers, researchers, artists, visitors and residents). Third, I examined the A.T.Kearney Global City Index, in which expert assessment ranks about 66 cities based on market influence, ability to attract high-skill labor, media and internet penetration, cultural experience and political influence (Hales & Pena, 2012).} to a city’s ability to attract capital and business, with higher focus on economic, institutional, financial and infrastructural strength.

There is considerable overlap in the city rankings in these indexes and other indexes of global cities. These two indexes are the most useful for the current project because they rank a relatively high number of cities. The GaWC Index benefits from relying entirely on objective data (the network of firm offices), as opposed to expert evaluations. However, its reliance on a single variable limits its usefulness for the current study. The EIU Global City Competitiveness Index emerges as the most useful index to set the scope here because of its specific and richly developed focus on economic competitiveness, and its lower weighting of cultural and political influence compared to other indexes, which attribute larger weights to factors (such as the presence of cultural venues and intergovernmental institutions) that are less relevant to the study’s theoretical focus.

Therefore, the EIU Index, with its 120 ranked cities, serves as the main basis for identifying the population of cities under scrutiny. However, not all cities in the index are viable for a direct comparison. First of all, the current study focuses on politics in aspiring global cities – thus, it is necessary to eliminate cities that are global due to their position and structural features and regardless of specific government policy choices – by these I refer to the established global cities discussed for example in Sassen (1994). In order to differentiate established from aspiring global cities, the GaWC Index breaks down the rankings into several intervals, according to which such structurally established global cities can be identified as belonging to the two top groups (Alpha++ and Alpha+ cities), while aspiring global cities can be identified as the ones in the Beta groups and below. The EIU Index does not introduce such discrete intervals. Therefore, I used the
GaWC list to identify the ranked position of Alpha cities in the EUI index, in order to deduce the associated categorical thresholds. The comparison indicates that in order to eliminate Alpha cities from the population, all cities that rank above 64 points in globalization in the 120-strong EUI list should be disregarded from the analysis. As a result, I eliminated the cities that in fact top nearly all globality indexes: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Zurich, Frankfurt, Washington, Chicago, Boston, Singapore and Hong Kong.

The project focuses on politics in democratic contexts. Therefore, I also eliminated cities in countries that were not democratic according to Polity IV scores for regime type over the period 2010-2013. (In the Polity scale, 8 is the lowest and 10 is the highest value for a democracy. I therefore selected cities in countries, which over that period averaged at least 8). Further, to facilitate comparison, I restricted the population to cities that are relatively large (at least 1.5 million residents) and relatively rich (at least 23,000 dollars in city GDP/capita, PPP, in 2014). Finally, since this book examines variation on the success (and not the presence) of relevant protest, I eliminated cities that lacked neighborhood-centered protest against urban redevelopment that was: 1) sustained (at least six months of activity); 2) significant (at least two public protest events reported in the local press); and 3) occurring within the period from 2003 to 2015 (although a given protest group might have begun activities before 2003, or continue them after 2015). The period is chosen because new media technologies became widespread in the first years of the new millennium. As can be expected, hardly any cases needed to be excluded because they lacked contention over redevelopment (the most prominent exclusion was Vienna).

**Selection**

Among the large remaining set from the EUI Index, which constitutes the population under analysis, I proceeded to select ten cities for investigation. A few principles guided this selection. First, I sought to maximize geographical diversity. The regions that emerge as most prominent from the indexes are: North America, Europe, Pacific Asia, South America, and the Middle East (in that order). Therefore, out of the remaining set of ranked cities in the EUI Index, I selected the two top-ranked cities from each of these regions. To maximize geographic, but also institutional variation, I selected only one city per country. When two cities from the country were adjacent in ranking, I selected the one where protest provided the most helpful variation in the underlying features of interest (such selection was made in the cases of Berlin vs. Hamburg; as well as Sydney vs. Melbourne). The cities thus selected from the EUI Index for further analysis are: Toronto and Los Angeles for North America; Melbourne and Seoul for Pacific Asia; Santiago and
Buenos Aires for South America; Tel Aviv and Istanbul for the Middle East; Madrid and Hamburg for Europe.

The process of population selection highlights how the book engages with the debate in comparative urban politics around the tension between global and “non-global” cities. Sassen’s (1994) early focus on a few urban centers generated an artificial split between cities viewed as integral to globalization, and cities that were considered as relatively immune to international forces (McCann 2002; Robinson 2002). In response, an opposed line of scholarship has argued that developing-world cities will follow in the footsteps of their advanced industrial counterparts on a path of urban internationalization. Yet a third perspective ascribes to cities in the so-called Global South specific political challenges and opportunities as local elites seek to integrate into the global economy (Moncada 2013).

In contrast, the medium-n design deployed in this project leaves the outcome open. The process of hypotheses formulation reflected awareness of these debates in determining the sequence of research in the ten selected cities. The first fieldwork site was a city located in the South precisely in order to limit undue theoretical influence from the North. Specifically, hypotheses formulation started on the first observation of a critical puzzling case: the emergence of strong resistance in Santiago, the historical hotbed of neoliberal policies.

However, hypotheses were also immediately put in conversation with the North, as the second case study was based on research carried out in Hamburg. I searched for an interesting case of resistance against redevelopment in a different setting, and Hamburg stood out because Hafencity was the largest redevelopment project in Europe. At this point, hypotheses formulation led me to examine Istanbul to increase geographic span and because it constitutes a dramatic instance of a government-led globalization. The sequence of study largely continued to alternate North and South cities in subsequent investigations.

Selection of the policy area

Once the set of cities under consideration was determined, the comparative investigation of protest required choosing a specific policy arena. This book focuses on resistance to urban redevelopment for several reasons.

First, urban redevelopment is probably the most common and direct policy expression of aspiring global city governments. Zoning and planning determine the rules that govern the geographical distribution of activities in the city, and through regulation of density, land use, and subsidies, they determine the shape of the city and designate privileged users of its space. Political choices dictate how zoning and planning materialize redistribution between groups and
classes, either through direct allocation by the government, or regulation of transfers from one
group to another. Second, planning explicitly involves public and private actors. In most other
policy areas, the role and interests of the private sector vary and are less transparent than those
displayed by real estate developers and commercial entrepreneurs in urban redevelopment.

Third, urban planning is largely under municipal jurisdiction (as opposed to regional or
national jurisdiction). Therefore, planning choices are likely to reflect municipal priorities, and do
so more reliably across the world than many other policy areas (for example, transportation,
social policy or education, which even when locally administered often reflect political
preferences of higher levels of government). Fourth, and related, urban planning is relatively
more amenable to international comparison. Even when important differences between cities are
present, they are more commensurate than is typically the case in other policy areas, where the
different arrangements with national authorities make international comparisons extremely
challenging. In contrast, it is surprising how land use plans, challenges, and debates resonate even
among cities on opposite sides of the world.

**Selection of the cases**

The reader should be aware that cities are not cases in this book. The selection of cities
provides the theoretically justified environment within which I set the investigation. The units of
analysis in this book are campaigns against redevelopment and/or gentrification led by groups
that consider themselves related to a specific territorially defined community, usually a
neighborhood.\(^4\) For ease of comparison, the project largely focuses on conflicts over
redevelopment of formal areas in central low- and lower-middle class neighborhoods, rather than
the suburban outskirts or informal settlements.

A variety of phenomena are linked to neighborhood resistance against redevelopment, such as:

1) conflict over redevelopment of formal housing or surrounding public spaces
2) resistance against gentrification in formal neighborhoods
3) resistance against evictions of legal renters in formal neighborhoods
4) resistance against evictions of occupiers in formal neighborhoods
5) resistance against evictions of owners or renters in informal neighborhoods
6) calls to formalize or improve infrastructure in informal neighborhoods
7) homeless services

\(^4\) Following Sampson, a neighborhood is defined “in theoretical terms as a geographic section of a
larger community or region (e.g., city) that usually contains residents or institutions and has socially
distinctive characteristics” (Sampson, 2012, p. 56).
Comparative work amidst this complex environment demands a selection. First, while I cover temporary protest encampments, I do not focus on permanent or semi-permanent informal settlements (a.k.a. slums, gecekondular, villas miserias, villas de emergencia, asentamientos), despite the fact that they often are in the center of the city and in areas of extremely high rent gap. The logics and demands of informal settlements are different from formal settlements, and are not covered across cities in this book, thus their inclusion would impair comparability. Cases in the book focus on categories 1-4 above. This set includes housing that, while formal in the sense of having land titles, is decrepit enough that it is not sanctioned for residence, and thus is squatted. It is not viable to exclude this housing from the analysis, specifically because owners or the state often deploy safety concerns as administrative tools to justify displacement. This consideration does not undermine the fact that housing can indeed be barely habitable, lacking sewage, electricity or other basic infrastructural necessities, often due to lack of maintenance or occupation prior to completion.

Cases are therefore defined by a specific protest group engaged in a specific campaign. Within the set of the ten selected cities, case selection of the protest groups and campaigns follows an “at risk population” approach. Anecdotal evidence makes clear that it is exceedingly rare for neighbors in aspiring global cities to be able to significantly organize, and even rarer to succeed in modifying redevelopment plans. Therefore, an efficient approach to the investigation requires focusing on the cases most likely to display the two traits of interest, success in mobilization and success in policy impact. This is not equivalent to selection on the dependent variable. I do not select cases based on their success – and in fact the dataset includes several cases of failed mobilization or policy impact. Rather, I select cases within each of the ten cities by focusing on the most prominent neighborhood-level protests against redevelopment and displacement during the period of interest because groups that have not even achieved recognition in a given campaign are least likely to teach us about what explains success. I identify prominence through Internet and archival research, press analysis, as well as expert consultation. This approach led me to choose, for example, a protest group active in a campaign in the neighborhood of Fener and Balat in Istanbul instead of Süleymaniye, because the latter, despite even more dramatic displacement, did not exhibit significant collective resistance.

As a result, within each city, I study between two and five protest groups engaged in specific campaigns. The total number of cases is 30. The within-city comparative component provides theoretical leverage by limiting variation between cases in the same city. The approach thus addresses concerns over incommensurability across cities and regions, and facilitates the comparative analysis of the factors that are specifically “strategic,” rather than structural.
**Variables selection and operationalization**

This book explores two outcomes of interest: 1) group impact on mobilization and 2) group impact on policy and institutional change. Table 1 presents the two outcomes of interest and the respective contributing factors. There are challenges to selecting and operationalizing explanatory factors in cities so different from each other. Despite the qualitative approach of this project, I strived to identify factors that could be easily coded, to facilitate future extensions and testing by other scholars.

Mobilization is operationalized based on the number of participants in the largest events (as indicated by interviews, and corroborated by photographs, press reports, or other archival tools). The factors deployed to explain paths to mobilization are union support, the deployment of city-level networks of supporting groups and organizations, local legacy in protest against redevelopment, experiential tools, and city income levels. As detailed in the analysis below, the social movement literature provides much support for the role of the first three factors in supporting mobilization. I regard the analysis of experiential tools as one of the key theoretical contributions of the project because it shows how organized collective experiences can be not the output of urban movements but rather a key input. The analysis aims to assess the impact of experiential tools and their interaction with the three other factors in order to explain mobilization.

City income per capita was added as a commonly considered underlying factor. In addition to city income per capita, there are other aspects of market dynamics that were considered for examination but dismissed for lack of variation. In nearly all cases, informal economies played a role, especially in the livelihood of at-risk residents, making them especially vulnerable to uprooting and displacement. Also, I do not control for the role of real estate investors because aspiring global cities prioritize attracting investment, and thus I observe minimal variation in the role of real estate investors: in each city they constitute an extremely influential lobby.

**Outcome of interest 1:**

- Union support
- Deployment of experiential tools
- City-level organizational support network
- Local legacy in protest against redevelopment
- City income levels

Mobilization
To assess group impact, the second outcome of interest, I adopt Gamson’s focus on recognition and achieving advantages (Gamson, 1995). However, I change Gamson’s taxonomy because there is no case of preemption (where the protest group does not gain acceptance but gains advantages). Instead, I focus on gaining a more fine-grained reading of the degree of policy impact. I therefore distinguish between no impact, minimal impact (when only marginal demands are met, e.g. protestors were fighting a new high-rise, but all they achieved was the elimination of a couple of floors), partial impact (when some key demands are met), and full impact (when most key demands are met and sometimes there are also policy or procedural changes). With the exception of the Tel Aviv and Gezi protests, campaigns discussed in this book are led by relatively small groups, often in coalitions; disagreement and ambiguity pertaining goals were noted whenever reported.

Among many possible outcomes that scholars of social movements often emphasize is the degree to which collective action prompts cultural effects, or gives voice to participants (Jasper, 2008). This is surely essential to the analysis that follows, but it is discussed as a possible gateway to mobilization, rather than one of the two outcomes of interest.

Mobilization, the first outcome of interest, becomes a contributing factor in the analysis of impact. Thus, the factors examined to explain impact are: the degree of mobilization, the degree of support by councilors (because they can provide access to crucial institutions), and the degree of partisan disharmony between local and higher-level executives (because political harmony greatly strengthens the hand of municipal governments against protestors, while disharmony provides protestors with a crucial avenue to counter local executives).

**Outcome of interest 2:**
- Mobilization
- Ally in city council
- Partisan disharmony

Impact
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Factors</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union support</strong></td>
<td>No support</td>
<td>Minimal turn around support without official coordination or endorsement</td>
<td>Significant logistical &amp; turn around support</td>
<td>Union leaders publicly involved with the campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experiential tools</strong></td>
<td>No experiential tools</td>
<td>Minimal &amp; ineffective use (e.g. only one small community event in a whole campaign)</td>
<td>Significant use (e.g. multiple community events), but not very creative or hip</td>
<td>Extreme use of sustained creative events to attract protest participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within-city networks</strong></td>
<td>Less than 3 groups are involved in the campaign</td>
<td>Few groups involved (3-5)</td>
<td>Several groups involved (6-10)</td>
<td>More than 10 groups involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legacy</strong></td>
<td>No prior experience in protest against displacement among protestors or in the neighborhood</td>
<td>Moderate prior experience in protest against displacement either by protestors or in the neighborhood</td>
<td>Prior experience in protest against displacement either by protestors or in the neighborhood that reached significant local press coverage for its impact</td>
<td>Prior experience in protest against displacement among protestors or in the neighborhood that reached national and/or academic coverage for its impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita PPP (2014, US$)</strong></td>
<td>23,000&lt;GDP/c&lt;30,000</td>
<td>30,000&lt;GDP/c&lt;38,000</td>
<td>38,000&lt;GDP/c&lt;43,000</td>
<td>43,000&lt;GDP/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>&lt;50 participants in major events</td>
<td>50-150</td>
<td>150-300</td>
<td>Over 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ally in city council</strong></td>
<td>Councilor is against protestors</td>
<td>Councilor supports protestors at rally, but not in council</td>
<td>Councilor provides moderate support in council</td>
<td>Protestors place their own representative in council, or state that result would not be achieved without councilor support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher level of government</strong></td>
<td>Higher level of government is in deep partisan conflict with the mayoralty (socialist vs. conservative)</td>
<td>Higher level of government is in moderate partisan disharmony (both are close to political center)</td>
<td>Higher level of government is in moderate partisan harmony with mayoralty (within same side of political spectrum)</td>
<td>Higher level of government is in deep partisan harmony with the mayoralty (same party &amp; leadership lineage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Collapse - the protest group gains neither acceptance nor advantages</td>
<td>Cooptation – the protest group gains acceptance without advantages; at the most marginal demands are met</td>
<td>Partial response- the protest group gains full acceptance as well as some advantages</td>
<td>Full response – the protest group gains full acceptance as well as many advantages; Including key demands &amp; institutional change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Operationalization of the factors
Comparing across time

This project considers cases within a span of time of just over a decade. Thus, it does not consider time as a variable (except, indirectly, in the assessment of mobilization legacy and learning across protest groups). Comparing across time as well as space would introduce an unmanageable degree of variation. In order to provide readers with an updated account, I regularly followed up all the cases, as long as the cities remained within the scope of the investigation (following the 2016 Polity updates, Istanbul was no longer considered a democracy and its cases were thus no longer updated).

While the reader might be interested in knowing how cases develop over time, the narrative highlights the period, in which the case is most theoretically relevant. For example, the case in Santiago illustrates the beneficial role of having a national government rival to a municipal government. This took place during the Bachelet administration (2006-2010), when national bodies supported the group’s petition for landmark status and invited its leaders to the council for civil society. The government subsequently changed political color with the election of Sebastián Piñera, and while a continued analysis of the group is interesting, the actual theoretical contribution of the case is diminished in this second period. Thus, case selection is not only geographical but also by time period, as over time, new laws and elections change the institutional variables that influence the likelihood of policy impact.

Another concern related to time is that the relationship between variables might change over the course of the project. In particular, this issue presents itself regarding learning and strategic updating on the part of protest groups, organized interests, and governments. As I begun research in 2009, interviews did not reveal any cross-reference, and rather indicated that organizers had no knowledge of other groups using similar approaches. In subsequent years, interviews revealed a great deal of imitation and cross-reference among groups. Moreover, locations that would have been interesting given their high globality index ranking were not included in the study simply because at the time of case selection, resistance was not yet articulated. Truly, the scholar is subject to the happenstance state of the world in which research takes place. Including legacy as a factor to explain mobilization lessens concerns about case independence because legacy captures both prior mobilization on similar issues and learning from related cases of collective action.

Data collection

Drawing on multiple methods and triangulating varied forms of data helped identify parallels and contrasts as the comparison proceeded. Fieldwork was conducted between 2009 and 2016 in all cities except the English-speaking sites of Toronto, Los Angeles, and Melbourne, where
interviews were conducted remotely. During fieldwork, I combined participant observation in neighborhood life and associational meetings with in-depth and follow-up interviews with academics, activists, and members of civil society identified through a snowball approach. The frequency with which an individual was named suggested her influence in the organization or relevance to the research question. Interviews for each resistance case continued until reaching “saturation” (Small, 2009), i.e. when additional interviews did not lead to further significant explanation in the empirical analysis. Nearly all interviews lasted between one and two hours. The number of interviews ranged from five to twenty-five per city (fewer interviews were needed where archival data were especially rich). Interviews’ recordings and transcripts are available upon request. I was not directly involved in any of the protest cases described in this book.

In addition, I relied on archival research, press analysis, and a thorough examination of activists’ internet-based sources. This included the examination of videos and photos of protests, which I used to triangulate, verify and confirm the reported attendance at protest events and the degree of demographic inclusiveness (providing an approximate estimate of age, gender and ethnic background of participants). While interviews provided a static perspective on the cases because they largely consisted of ex-post reflections, several online sources such as social networking sites, blogs, chat spaces, photos, videos, and list-serves typically date their entries and therefore allow the reconstruction of protest strategies and events as they develop. Similarly, fieldwork provided a snapshot of neighborhoods after protest events had culminated. I integrated my spatial analysis with historical Google Street View data from different periods in order to trace the different stages of spatial contestation.

The book has the benefits and weaknesses of a single author. While I strived for coherence and consistency that is hard to achieve in multi-authored projects, in order to set the context of the cases and improve the depth of the analysis, I relied on secondary literature and on the generous help and advice of many area specialists. This was necessary given the number of sites, and the fact that I conducted all interviews and fieldwork myself.

**Fuzzy set analysis and results**

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is deployed to aid the analysis because the number of cases at 30 requires software support for interpretation. QCA allows isolating cross-case patterns, while appreciating the heterogeneity of the cases with regard to their different causally relevant conditions. The most important advantage of deploying QCA is that it allows examining INUS conditions - causal conditions that are insufficient by themselves but necessary components of causal combinations that are unnecessary (because of multiple paths) but sufficient for the
outcome (Mackie, 1980). In other words, as Ragin (2013) explains, solutions may be both conjunctural (i.e. grouping factors into combinations that are jointly sufficient for the outcome) and equifinal (i.e. reachable through multiple possible combinations). Thus, QCA allows causal patterns that are complex and involve different combinations of causal conditions capable of generating the outcome of interest. The emphasis on complex causality contrasts with the “net effects” approach that dominates conventional quantitative social science. QCA has a second significant advantage, in that it requires explicit counterfactual analysis that is grounded in empirical and theoretical reasoning, while conventional comparative analysis usually fails to explicitly consider counterfactuals, often to the effect of reaching oversimplified solutions.

QCA is grounded in the analysis of set relations, rather than correlations. The focus of the analysis is to identify approximate necessity and sufficiency conditions, given across-case patterns. Necessity is identified when the outcome is a subset of the causal condition; while sufficiency is identified when the causal condition is a subset of the outcome. With INUS conditions, cases with a specific combination of causal conditions form a subset of the cases with the outcome.

QCA does not seek to infer population properties from a sample, nor does it seek to make causal inferences based on a test of a causal model. It does not assess the separate impact of competing independent variables, nor interaction effects. Instead, the goal is to aid causal interpretation, supporting the scholar’s knowledge of cases, in order to identify combinations of conditions linked to the outcome of interest. Results depend on the researcher’s specification of causally relevant conditions (e.g. thresholds and the treatment of counterfactuals). The outcome depends therefore on the researcher’s theoretical and empirical assessment of the cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). The variable-oriented approach focuses on average effects, where underlying relationships are revealed by purging the cases of their specificity, and cases taken individually are considered deceptive. Case-oriented approaches like QCA instead emphasize the close examination of each case, and embrace case heterogeneity as highly relevant to explanation. Cress and Snow (1996) and McAdam and Boudet (2012) provide highly relevant applications of this method to the study of local protest and mobilization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-Site-Group</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Experiential</th>
<th>Networks</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>HighIncome</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>CouncilAllY</th>
<th>PartisanHarb Impact</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>23,606</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota-Antioquia-Teusaquillo Public</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>23,606</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires-San Telmo-MOI</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>23,606</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago-Colina-Vicinos</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23,929</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago-Yungay-Vicinos</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,929</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul-Fener&amp;Balat-Residents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,667</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>24,667</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul-Durban Restaurant-Owners</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>34,355</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>34,355</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<td>34,355</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul-Yongsan-commercial tenants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,355</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid-Lavapies-Asamblea/PAH Centro</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39,288</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne-Urban &amp; Richmond-H.O.M.E.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>40,244</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne-Prahan-H.O.M.E.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>40,244</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv-1/2 Residents</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>42,614</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv-Rothchild This-is-a-house</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42,614</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto-Lawrence Heights-Residents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>45,771</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto-Mimico-MHA &amp; MLN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45,771</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto-QueenStreetWest-Active 18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45,771</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto-Parkdale-Pope Squat</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>45,771</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto-Regent Park-Residents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>45,771</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg-Gemarkung-Köln in die Gänge</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>49,757</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg-St.Paul-Dancing-Towers-Skam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49,757</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg-St.Paul-Park Fiction Es Regent Kevlar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49,757</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Royal Heights/Art Galleries-UnionDeVecinos</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>65,082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-ROH campaign-SI CAN</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>65,082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Rolland Curtis-Trust South LA</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65,082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explaining Mobilization

QCA seeks to identify sets of cases that share an outcome and uses controlled case comparisons to eliminate causal conditions in an incremental, context-bound manner. The logical combinations of causal conditions – based on the cases at hand - are presented in truth tables, which therefore are used to express the links between conditions and outcomes. If cases with a given configuration of causally relevant conditions share an outcome, they constitute a subset of the cases with the outcome.

To aid the analysis the researcher usually assigns rules to examine counterfactuals. The rules are derived from theoretical and substantive knowledge, which allows defining “easy” counterfactuals, i.e. hypothetical cases that resemble empirical cases (actually present in the dataset) in all respects except one, with the one difference making the outcome more likely in the hypothetical case than in the empirical case. This strategy renders explicit the analysis of counterfactuals, thus improving on most small-N comparative research.

Once QCA lists the possible paths to the outcome, the researcher sets the consistency threshold for considering a path as associated with a positive outcome. The threshold depends on a variety of factors, and is recommended above 0.85. In this case it is set at or above 0.9, but the results are the same with the threshold as low as 0.75 because the consistency gap in the truth table falls from 0.94 directly to 0.72.

Table 3: Truth table for Mobilization
The next step is the analysis of the truth table for mobilization, which displays all possible logical combinations given the available factors (see Table 3, where the column titled “number” provides the number of actually available cases for each logical combination of factors). In order to pursue the analysis, the software package fsQCA provides three solutions types: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate. A complex solution reflects only the rows for which cases are available, i.e. remainders (rows for which cases are not available) are all set to false and there is no use of counterfactuals. Because social science datasets are typically marred by lack of diversity, the available rows do not fully reflect the underlying population. Consequently, in complex solutions, results usually comprise convoluted paths because they reflect the high degree of specificity of the cases actually available in the dataset. They also often include spurious factors, called nuisance conditions, which do not make theoretical sense, but are instead the result of limited variation.

Parsimonious solutions suffer from the opposite problem: they are compiled by setting in the truth table all remainder rows (combinations lacking cases in the dataset) to “don’t care”, regardless of whether they constitute “easy” or “difficult” counterfactuals. The effect is that any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler solution is used. (Note that correlational solutions are closest to parsimonious solutions in that they do not explicitly consider counterfactuals that could undermine the outcome.)

Usually the scholar has enough knowledge of the issue to know that some simplifying assumptions incorporated to arrive at a parsimonious solution are in fact empirically or theoretically untenable. That is why the recommended protocol is to select intermediate solutions. In this case, the program considers all the cases plus the remainders rows for which the scholar has reasonably accepted hypotheses. Only remainders that are “easy” counterfactual cases (in the sense that they conform to empirical and theoretical expectations) are allowed to be incorporated into the solution. The designation of “easy” versus “difficult” is based on user-supplied information regarding the connection between each causal condition and the outcome (Ragin, 2013). In intermediate solutions, the inclusion of easy counterfactuals allows the algebraic elimination (through Boolean simplification) of nuisance conditions. Intermediate solutions offer two additional important advantages: they allow scholars to deploy the theoretical knowledge that is accumulated in a given field by providing expected associations; and – contrary to common practice – they actually require the scholar to make explicit the theoretical assumptions about logical combinations that are not available in the dataset.

The social movement literature supports the hypotheses that higher mobilization is likely to be positively associated with higher union support, higher network engagement, and higher legacy...
I therefore imposed the assumption that union support, network activation, and legacy are present whenever mobilization is present. As captured in Figure 1, the intermediate solution then indicates that three paths explain cases with high mobilization:

1) The combination of union support and activated networks (25 percent of mobilization cases are explained by this combination, and 11 percent are explained only by this combination);

2) The combination of experiential tools and activated networks (81 percent of mobilization cases are explained by this combination, and 23 percent are explained only by this combination);

3) The combination of experiential tools and legacy (59 percent of mobilization cases are explained by this combination, and 5 percent are explained only by this combination).

In set theoretic terms, the outcome is explained by the intersection of union support and activated networks, or the intersection of experiential tools and activated networks, or the intersection of experiential tools and legacy.

Figure 1: Truth table analysis for Mobilization

The truth table analysis output includes measures of coverage and consistency for each solution term and for the solution as a whole. Consistency measures the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome (and thereby it is a measure of sufficiency). Coverage measures how much of the outcome is covered (or explained) by each solution term and by the solution as a whole (and thereby it is a measure of necessity). These
measures are computed by examining the original fuzzy dataset in light of the solution (composed of one or more solution terms). The degree to which cases in the dataset have membership in each solution term and in the outcome form the basis of consistency and coverage measures. The solution coverage value indicates that taken together, the three paths explain 98 percent of the cases of mobilization. It should be noted that network activation is a widely shared antecedent, which approximates a necessary condition. The solution consistency is at least 98 percent for each solution term and for the solution as a whole, indicating that each is a nearly full subset of the outcome (in other words, nearly all cases fully conform to the recipe).

In sum, three paths lead to mobilization, the first outcome of interest. First, successful protest groups are more likely to seek collaboration of labor unions in cities where the latter are strong. However, in the majority of aspiring global cities, unions are relatively weak, and often espouse pro-growth agendas – thus, while they might support affordable housing construction, they are typically unsupportive of housing preservation campaigns.\(^5\) In these settings, protest groups mobilize by deploying experiential tools. Building on this observation, cultural producers tend to be less involved in protests when the latter are supported by unions (as in Melbourne and most cases in Buenos Aires) or when they rely on judicial strategies and bureaucratic engagement (such as TRUST South LA and Lawrence Heights in Toronto). Instead, they play an influential role in protests that rely on gaining public opinion clout and therefore need to create a buzz (cases in Seoul, Tel Aviv, and Hamburg illustrate this point with special efficacy). Some of the most effective campaigns engage in both judicial and public opinion tactics, and in those cases artists do not lead, but still contribute substantially in mobilizing participation and the consequent political clout (as in Santiago and Madrid).

Second, my findings confirm the role of networks indicated by the literature. In successful cases, resistance groups are supported by multiple cross-sectorial groups or organizations within the neighborhood and/or sectorial groups or organizations across the city. Support of a wide local network lends legitimacy and signals the committed political clout behind protestors; in contrast, international networks – even at the highest level – do not seem to offer significant political clout. Groups often seek the endorsement of officials and organizations close to the institutions of government. The explicit support of other groups with a history of successful struggles is also pursued because it signals to authorities the determination and capacity to sustain protest.

\(^5\) Union density data for the regions and period under examination range from 40 percent for Buenos Aires to 6 percent in Istanbul. In liberal market economies density ranges between 25 and 14 percent; yet though influential, unions tend to have pro-growth agenda with the important, enduring, and well-document exception of Melbourne (Burgmann & Burgmann, 1998; Haskell, 1977; Iveson, 2014).
The third path to mobilization requires a strong legacy in organizing and experiential tools. The role of legacy is widely recognized in the social movement literature and what is interesting in the present analysis is that – while the presence of networks is nearly ubiquitous across successful cases - there are paths to mobilization that do not require legacy; in order words, in the current fluid political landscape there is significant space for newcomers to protest. Finally, the impact of city income per capita, added as an underlying factor, was not consistent enough to become a component of a specific path to mobilization.6

Beyond the core interest in mobilization, an earlier section proposed deploying the insights from the literatures on varieties of capitalism and legal system origin to address additional questions that emerge from the analysis. The empirical data suggests some trends, depending on whether the city was set in a coordinated market economy (which includes the European cases, and by extension Israel (Knell & Srholec, 2007) and South Korea (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Schneider, 2013)), a liberal market economy (which includes the Anglo-Saxon cases), or a hierarchical market economy (which according to Schneider (2013) includes the South American cases, although Argentina is somewhat of an outlier, and Turkey).7

As hypothesized in an earlier section, coordinated and hierarchical market economies displayed more tolerance towards squatters - a reflection of the weaker reliance and enforcement of contract law, especially as pertains evictions (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). Long-term squats were tolerated and even regularized in Hamburg, Buenos Aires, and Madrid – but not in Toronto, Los Angeles, or Melbourne (the latter two cities, cases are separate but related to the ones covered). At least as pertains to cases in this book, the outcome results in a rich tradition of self-managed occupation in most coordinated and hierarchical market economies,

6 I ran the analysis with city GDP/capita coded as indicated in Table 1, where the values are assigned intervals values of zero for incomes up to 30,000 USD, 0.25 for incomes up to 38,000 USD, 0.75 for incomes to 43,000, and 1 for incomes above 43,000 USD. In the fuzzy set analysis that follows, I created an additional variable by calibrating city GDP/capita per capita values in order to identify membership in a high-income city. (The calibration is set with full membership in the set of high-income cities set at 45,000 USD, the crossover point set at 39,000 USD and the full nonmembership from the set of high-income cities at 25,000 USD.) The two approaches - with four interval sets and the calibration for high-income city group - produce the same result in fsQCA. Calibration is recommended for fsQCA, and therefore below I present results based on the calibrated version of city GDP/capita.

7 Knell and Srholec do not consider the possibility of hierarchical market coordination and identify Turkey as a mildly coordinated market economy, with values close to Israel (Knell & Srholec, 2007, Table 2.4, p. 60-61).
against a more intolerant stance in liberal market economies. As the cases attest, the different stance undermines the ability of protestors to utilize a tool that is of practical use against displacement, but also critical to raising consciousness and support for alternative social and political worldviews among mainstream voters.

The distinction between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies also illuminates the question of where developers are more likely to offer incentives to coopt artists. Cooptation is most clearly displayed in Toronto and Los Angeles, where the cases covered pertain to private market rather than public housing conflicts. In contrast, in at least three out of four coordinated market economy cases, as well as the hierarchical market economy setting of Buenos Aires, the government (rather than private developers) is the central node in the relationship between redevelopment and cultural producers, because as part of culture-led growth policies, it offers them spaces to live and/or work (however divisive and contested these deals are for the artist community and other residents). Thus, as expected, in coordinated market economies the government exhibits programmatic functions that depart from short-term rent-maximization. We could expect more widespread efforts by developers at coopting cultural producers with the offer of space, especially where creative presence fits with their neighborhood branding. However, these arrangements might also be more common in liberal market economies because participants there are more primed to market-based solutions. Norms and expectations surrounding conflict negotiation and resolution and the expected role of government might thus affect the use of space and hence redevelopment.

The degree to which protestors rely on judiciary tools is especially complex and will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. Briefly, as can be expected, in liberal market economies protestors rely extensively on judicial avenues and on enduring collaboration with legal aid organizations to provide the expertise needed to navigate the complexities of this strategy. Cases in Istanbul (hierarchical market economy) and Seoul (coordinated market economy) display some attempts at judicial initiatives, although to little avail – and, rather than their perceived efficacy, the presence of these attempts can be perhaps be better explained by the perceived lack of both alternatives and political support for regulatory solutions in those more authoritarian and developer-friendly contexts. The interesting twist in trying to explain the degree of use of legal strategies is that Buenos Aires stands out as a place where resistance often and successfully builds on legal battles. This seems in contradiction with theoretical expectations, given that Buenos Aires is a hierarchical market economy and in the French legal tradition, both factors more associated with negotiation and regulation rather than judicial strategies in the solution of disputes. The explanation is that in Buenos Aires protestors rely on the recurso de amparo, a very
active and influential citizen ombudsman statute of North American inspiration (Lazzarini, 2000). While amparo exists also in Madrid and Santiago, special provisions render it far more helpful to protestors. Specifically, in Buenos Aires (but not elsewhere), the statute covers constitutional rights, but also rights deriving from international treaties, national law, and the city’s progressive 1994 constitution. Protection in Buenos Aires can thus be initiated by any inhabitant and legal person defending against any form of discrimination or in cases where collective rights or interests are affected, such as the protection of the environment, of work and social security, of the cultural and historical heritage of the city, as well as of users or consumers (Maraniello, 2011).

The impact of liberal, coordinated and hierarchical economies will be further explored in the following chapters, yet this summary has illustrated the multiple ways in which political institutions influence protest strategies. The chapter concludes with an overview of results for the second outcome of interest, group impact in a given campaign, where institutions and political structures play an even more influential role.

**Explaining Impact**

The second outcome of interest is impact. The threshold for mobilization was set for raw consistency at or above 0.9. The truth table displaying the logical possibilities with available cases is presented in Table 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>Councillor</th>
<th>Partisan Harmony</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>raw cons.</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Y</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>0.782509</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.227272</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Truth table for Impact*

In this case, the only assumption entered to guide the intermediate solution is that mobilization and impact are likely to be co-present. The truth table analysis is presented in Figure 2, which shows that only one path leads to impact: the combination:

---

8 Cases in Hamburg were dropped from the analysis of policy impact because they miss the value for partisan harmony. Because of its tradition as a city-state and the high degree of autonomy, and because it is not a federal capital, urban redevelopment projects in Hamburg are largely unaffected by actors at the federal level. Archival and literature reviews, as well as interviews, supported this coding decision. The impact of resistance in the Hamburg cases is discussed in Chapter 5.
Mobilization*CouncilAlly*~PartisanHarmony.\textsuperscript{9} Consistency is 95 percent, and coverage is 64 percent, indicating that some cases displayed some success in impact outside of this path.

\begin{verbatim}
***************
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
***************
File: /Users/panott/Dropbox/QCA/PhD/Dataset 11.csv
Model: Impact = f(Mobilization, CouncilAlly, PartisanHarmony)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.945946
Assumptions:
Mobilization (present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization<em>CouncilAlly</em>~PartisanHarmony</th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.636364</td>
<td>0.636364</td>
<td>0.945946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solution coverage: 0.636364</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solution consistency: 0.945946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\end{verbatim}

Figure 2: Truth table analysis for Impact

In sum, for protest to impact policy, mobilization is necessary, but the outcome ultimately depends on the political context. Two variables capture the context’s favorability to protest: first, the group’s ability to gain institutional support within city council. In councils elected through single member districts, the support (or lack thereof) of the relevant councilor or councilors is critical to the group’s success. When councilors are elected at large, usually, council support materializes when far left parties (left-socialist or communist) have a significant presence in councils.

The second variable refers to the degree of mutual support or competition between the municipal executive and the relevant higher-level executive. When the local government enjoys the backing of the relevant higher-level executive over redevelopment projects, it is unlikely that local resistance will have any impact on policy outcome. If the higher-level and municipal executives are political rivals, however, protestors can find a natural ally in higher-level institutions. Usually, these alliances follow party lines. The finding applies to the relation between municipal and national executives in unitary states, especially those with a high degree of centralization (such as Israel, Korea, Turkey, and Chile). However, the finding also applies to federal states; specifically, where the city in question is the country’s capital, the relevant higher political level is usually the national (rather than regional) level – this is due to the special visibility and sometimes legislative status of the capital city (a good example is Buenos Aires). In federal systems where the city under observation is not the capital of the country, the property applies to the relation between municipality and state or provincial authorities (among the several

\textsuperscript{9} ~ is read as “absence of”; * is read as “and”.

36
cases, Australia stands out as a system in which state governments are especially influential relative to municipalities).

The analysis thus presented offers a summary of the argument developed in this book. A more nuanced explanation will be developed in the remaining chapters through a thematic narrative of the case studies, presented as explained in the next section.

**Plan of the Book**

This chapter introduced the project, and discussed scope, selection, and method. It then presented an overview of both argument and findings. Chapter 2 continues to set the comparison by providing background on the ten aspiring global cities and the features that render them theoretically and empirically comparable.

Part II examines the three paths to mobilization identified above. Chapter 3 analyzes the component Experiential Tools*Networks. The chapter examines the critical cases in Santiago, and follows with the negative case in Istanbul (which lacks both experiential tools and network activation). It then hones in on cases in which Experiential Tools*Networks led to mass mobilizations (namely, Gezi Park in Istanbul and the July 2011 protest in Tel Aviv).

In Chapter 4, the analysis of paths to mobilization moves to the second component, Experiential*Legacy – it therefore focuses on the varied role played by legacy in mobilization. Despite the path, in some cases, legacy is present, yet not influential or even counterproductive (as illustrated in Seoul’s Yongsan and Hamburg’s Park Fiction cases). The analysis continues with a comparison of three squats (Hamburg’s Gängeviertel, Toronto’s Pope Squat, and Madrid’s Tabacalera), which relied on an important anarchist tradition. The last section in this chapter focuses on cases in which legacy was critical because protest relied heavily on judicial tools; and this approach entailed a level of institutional complexity that required longstanding expertise (the cases examined are Madrid’s PAH, as well as Los Angeles’ LA CAN and Trust South LA).

Chapter 5 examines the last term in the recipe for mobilization: Union*Networks. The analysis focuses on three cases in Buenos Aires, putting in relief when and where unions played a critical role, and showing that when unions failed to support a neighborhood organization, the strategy moved to experiential tools instead.

Part III focuses on the path to impact. Chapter 6 opens with the discussion of Buenos Aires and Santiago, which offered different paths to mobilization (Buenos Aires cases mostly through union support, while Santiago cases through experiential tools). Yet, cases in both cities displayed high impact. The analysis focuses on the key role played by partisan disharmony in both settings. The following section examines Seoul – a city that is interesting because it displays significant
variation in impact in a context of partisan harmony. The contrast between Duriban and Myeong-dong shows that a local political ally is vital under the adverse condition of partisan harmony, because the very same set of protest strategies led to a moderate yet unexpected success in a leftist district, yet they failed in a conservative ward. The following section continues in Seoul, showing that in such an adverse landscape, an alternative strategy is to infiltrate institutions and obtain support through insider lobbying; cooptation here masks a shrewd appropriation by at-risk residents of state discourse around culture-led growth.

The remainder of Chapter 6 focuses on the role of council support in two distinct settings of resistance against redevelopment: mixed income neighborhoods and public housing estates. Mixed income neighborhoods, and middle class resistance in particular, are not the main focus of the book because in these instances redevelopment is less likely to imply displacement. However, the two divergent Toronto cases help unpack the impact of the city councilor on resistance efforts by residents. They also offer a clear window on the dynamics of cooptation of the creative class by real estate developers; an important lesson because signs indicate that cooptation will become more common. Resistance in public housing estates is examined with two pairs of cases, one pair in Toronto and one in Melbourne, each city displaying a success and a failure in both mobilization and impact. The cities make an excellent pairing because, in both, public housing residents were characterized by a high degree of ethnic and racial diversity, which undermined the ability of residents to coordinate in protest. Toronto shows a case in which residents failed to organize, and the role that the cooptation of cultural producers had in distracting media and public opinion from dynamics of displacement and residential segregation; yet in another case, a serendipitous investment in social heritage and pre-existing organizations combined to foster a strong resident voice in revitalization plans, and prevent displacement. The analysis from Melbourne’s estates illustrates, perhaps more than any other case in the book, the specific impact of a committed socialist councilor in organizing a vulnerable set of residents.

The empirical analysis concludes with Chapter 7, examining a group in Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights that deployed a radical and novel approach to fighting displacement: it directed its militant protest directly at art galleries, identified as the key culprits of gentrification. While the group met some success, forcing one gallery’s closure with its confrontational tactics, it is too early to assess the overall impact of the strategy. Yet, the approach calls for examination because it stands as an innovative, ambitious, and analytically coherent response to the threat of displacement.
References


