Chapter 1
Bringing Bureaucrats Back In

1 Introduction

Esther Kipsang was a new recruit in Kenya’s administrative and security bureaucracy, the Provincial Administration, in 1995. Her first posting was to Busia, a town 450 kilometers by road from Nairobi, near Kenya’s border with Uganda.\(^1\) Kipsang’s formal job was to govern the area, both maintaining order through the local administration of national-level police, and improving local development outcomes through the coordinated provision of local public goods, such as boreholes and health clinics. The country’s president at the time, Daniel arap Moi, relied heavily on PA officers for an additional purpose, however: to help him stay in office.

It is therefore unsurprising that residents of Busia complained about their local Provincial Administration officer, who allegedly spent more time beating suspected dissidents than working to improve the area’s development.\(^2\) Kipsang effectively corroborated the allegations: “I was deployed with a mission to supervise opposition activity.”\(^3\) So did ruling elites, one of whom claimed that Moi’s co-ethnic Kalenjin officers – including Kipsang – could be “trusted” to do their job: separately from their formal duties, informally, officers were expected to prevent mobilization of local residents by the regime’s opponents. Kipsang was coercing residents on Moi’s behalf, not just promoting local development.

But Kipsang’s behavior changed markedly in her next deployment. After less than 12 months in Busia, Kipsang was rotated, or shuffled, to a town outside Tinderet and its tea estates, about 100 kilometers from her previous post. During her four years there, Kipsang constantly met with local community leaders about the area’s concerns and residents’ demands from the state. Equipped with this information, Kipsang was able to complete many development projects in the area. She repaired the community’s broken irrigation system – a task that she completed after contributing to the project from her own salary – and she secured additional financing from Nairobi for two additional community health workers.\(^4\)

---

\(^1\)I have changed the names of the officers and precise postings in this chapter to preserve anonymity. However their surnames are indicative of their ethnic identity, and the postings listed have a similar ethnic make-up as their true postings. Though the vast majority of Provincial Administration officers are men, I have changed their genders to female to simplify pronoun usage between officers and the autocrat, which I refer to as he.

\(^2\)Archive Folio DB/1/38, Kenya Provincial Archives, Kakamega, Kenya.

\(^3\)Interview with former DO, Nairobi, Kenya, November 23, 2011.

\(^4\)Ibid.
While Kipsang was stationed in Busia, her colleague, Josephine Maina, was working in a small town just outside Mwingi. Though the regime asked her to coerce local dissidents, Maina was unwilling to comply. Instead, Maina used her short time in this post to subtly implement her own agenda, which undermined the regime locally; granting regime dissidents permits to hold public rallies, dragging her feet on approving permits for the ruling party’s local representative, and (justly) jailing fervent regime-supporting “youths” who beat local residents that spoke out against Moi. Maina’s behavior served to augment the local support of Moi’s political opponent, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu and Maina’s coethnic. Maina, however, was not long for Mwingi. She was rotated to a new station soon afterwards.

Another Kikuyu named Harriet Gitonga was in charge of governing the entirety of Nyanza Province, an area roughly the size of Connecticut or half the size of Lebanon, at about that same time. Gitonga was a senior officer in the Provincial Administration, having worked in the state for decades. Gitonga was also expected to coerce residents. But unlike her co-ethnic Maina, Gitonga complied. One national periodical described how Gitonga shut down opposition meetings and refused to investigate the deaths of area residents who died at the state’s hands. In other cases, she refused to allow opposition parties to campaign, or even organize. While Gitonga herself explained that her ethnic group “was very heavy in the opposition” she was considered among the most loyal officers in the entire Provincial Administration. Nonetheless, just as Gitonga was becoming familiar with local dynamics in Nyanza, she was shuffled away to a new post.

The contrasting behavior and posting patterns of Esther Kipsang, Josephine Maina, and Harriet Gitonga bring to the forefront several questions about President Moi’s reliance on the state to temper popular challenges to his rule. Why did Moi’s government demand that officials coerce residents in Busia, Mwingi, and Nyanza, but co-opt residents of Tinderet? What explains why Kipsang and Gitonga complied, but Maina shirked? Indeed, Gitonga’s zealous compliance indicates that officer loyalty to Moi crossed ethnic lines. What explains how these officers were posted and shuffled across the country? And fundamentally, how do leaders use the state to guard against threats to their rule?

The answers to these questions are important. Much existing research has examined how leaders can use the state to stay in power by focusing on the formal institutional design of the state. The way in which a state is organized is thought to affect the livelihoods of everyday citizens through outcomes as varied as economic development (Oates 1972, Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2003) to the level of coercion that citizens can expect (Greitens 2016).

As the opening paragraphs suggest, however, neither a state nor its formal institutions act. Instead, bureaucrats work through the state to carry out the leader’s demands. Examining the role bureaucrats play, therefore, is crucial: bureaucrats are the link between citizens in the periphery and the government in the center, and thereby “deliver [the] benefits and sanctions [that] structure and delimit people’s lives and opportunities ” (Lipsky 1980, 2). Understanding a leader’s management of the state – how bureaucrats are

---

5Interview with former DO, Nairobi, Kenya, 08 January 2012.
7For instance, see Archive Folio HT/23/151, Kenya Provincial Archives, Kisumu, Kenya.
8Interview with former PC, 3 July 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.
recruited, posted, shuffled, and promoted – prompts us to consider the strategic decisions that leaders must make to achieve bureaucratic compliance towards their policy and political goals. Bringing bureaucrats back into the discussion about how states govern therefore promises to provide us with new insights on the state, the principal-agent problem, and regime durability.

This book begins from the premise that core tasks of governing performed by the state – the distribution of local public goods, administration of the population, and most importantly, maintenance of law and order – can be re-purposed to limit popular challenges against the leader. This re-purposing can hold true for the entire spectrum of regime types, from autocratic regimes – such as Kenya from independence until 1992 – in which the largest popular challenges to the leader are widespread protests or strikes to electoral regimes – such as Kenya since 1992 – where the leader is chosen through multi-party elections and his greatest challenge is through the ballot box. Either way, the state’s ability to govern translates into a leader’s ability to both co-opt societal groups that he needs to support him and coerce other groups most likely to challenge his rule.

A leader cannot carry out his own dirty work but must rely on bureaucrats to carry out the co-optation and coercion he needs. This reliance creates a fundamental principal-agent problem – after the leader (the principal) empowers a bureaucrat (agent) to act on his behalf, the bureaucrat might shirk from the leader’s demands if her incentives differ from the leader’s. This problem grows among street-level bureaucrats who are stationed far from the center and have high discretion over the implementation of central mandates.

Conventional wisdom holds that a leader can best ensure the necessary co-optation and coercion from state officials – and thereby prevent popular threats – when he hires “good types.” In countries with salient identity cleavages such as Kenya, this means packing the state with in-group members. These bureaucrats benefit from the leader staying in power and are thus expected to comply with the leader’s orders even when their behavior is not monitored.10

But empirically, and despite a widespread assumption that packing is the ubiquitous solution to leaders’ compliance problems, most states are not actually packed. Elite-led threats have historically been the most dangerous to leaders across both autocratic and electoral regimes precisely because of the resources and clout that elites hold. As such, the severity of elite-led challenges has pushed leaders to use the state to first and foremost stymie elite threats. Leaders use the state to first solve pressing elite-led threats by incorporating some rival elites into the government. This incorporation effectively allows a leader to distribute state

9“Leader” is thus a catch-all term for the country’s executive. Depending on the case, leader may refer to a president, prime minister, king, military junta, or party chairman. I speak of management as carried out by the leader as shorthand for the leader’s top advisors.

10There is a large literature on why in-group state officials are thought to be the most loyal which I discuss more in-depth in the next chapter. While most of this literature has been developed for the coercive apparatus within autocracies, as opposed to bureaucracies across regime types more generally, the logic still applies. See Enloe (1973), Jackson & Rosberg (1982), Horowitz (1985), Brown (1994), Quinlivan (1999), Slater (2003), McLauchlin (2010), Sassoon (2011), Decalo (2012), Nepstad (2013).

11With regards to autocratic regimes, Svolik (2012) finds that more than 60% of autocrats from 1945 - 2008 fell from power because of an elite-led coup. With regards to electoral regimes, a leader or his party is more likely to lose re-election power when the opposition is led by elites who are well-financed and coordinated. For evidence of this in sub-Saharan Africa see Arriola (2012) and Riedl (2014).
spoils to these rivals in an attempt to neutralize the threat that they pose. Importantly, leaders allow elites’ supporters into state positions – i.e., bad types – in the process of incorporating those elites. Incorporation and coalition-building is expected in electoral regimes as leaders try to build a minimum-winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Posner 2005) but surprisingly, it is ubiquitous within autocratic regimes too. In fact, nearly 80% of autocrats from 1945 - 2005 worldwide (Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009) and 90% from 1960 - 2010 in sub-Saharan Africa (Roessler 2017) incorporated out-group elites into their governments.\footnote{Also see Rothchild & Foley (1988).} In Kenya, the country’s presidents incorporate rival elites through the cabinet. My data documents that each president’s co-ethnic bureaucrats never comprised a majority in the country’s largest administrative and security agency. Instead, the ethnic make-up of the bureaucratic corps largely reflects the ethnic breakdown of each president’s cabinet.

At first blush, then, the use of the state to stave off elite and popular challenges are fundamentally at odds with each other. Reliance on the state to put down popular challenges seems to require a packed state to ensure compliance, especially among street-level bureaucrats. But leaders are reticent to pack the state because doing so would preclude the leader’s ability to incorporate rival elites and stave off elite challenges.

I argue that leaders can jointly use the state to prevent both elite and popular threats through a strategic management of state officers. First, and since elite threats are the most pressing, the leader decides the make-up of the bureaucratic corps in an attempt to appease rival elites. The leader willingly reserves spots in the state for bureaucrats who are likely to have loyalties to elites other than the leader himself. How a leader manages bureaucrats to ensure compliance, therefore, must take into account variation in officer type: not all officers can be expected to comply, or to comply across all stations. Second, the leader uses the state officials that have been hired to forestall popular threats through deliberate choices on their posting and shuffling patterns. Crucially, threats from the population are not equally distributed across all state posts and sub-national jurisdictions. The leader strategically posts and shuffles bureaucrats so that they will carry out the orders that prevent the most pressing popular challenges. The areas of the country where compliance is most necessary are governed by officials who are willing, and if possible, best able, to comply with the orders that keep the leader in office. In this way, a leader can afford to both recruit potentially disloyal bureaucrats, thereby tempering elite threats, and still rely on bureaucrats to prevent popular threats in the areas that they are likely to emerge.

This book lays out a theory of the patterns of sub-national management of bureaucrats we should expect. I argue that a leader posts and shuffles officers by evaluating the interacting incentives of three key actors who decide, execute, or are affected by the resulting governance decisions; 1) his own (the leader’s), 2) individual local state officials, and 3) residents of the jurisdiction to which a local state official is posted. These relationships are visualized in Figure 1 and discussed at length in Chapter 2.

The alignment between the leader and the local area affects the leader’s perceived level of popular threat and subsequently, how he intends to have state officials govern residents; the bureaucrat’s loyalty to the leader affects the bureaucrat’s expected benefits from the leader staying in office and, therefore, her
willingness to comply with the leader’s orders; the embeddedness of the bureaucrat among area residents affects the official’s ability to carry out the leader’s orders in her posted jurisdiction.

The logic of the strategic management of bureaucrats is borne out in this chapter’s opening examples. Beginning with the alignment between the leader and an area, Moi felt secure in Tinderet where the vast majority of residents were Moi’s co-ethnic Kalenjin. However, popular threats had a strong potential of arising in Busia town and Nyanza Province. Moi needed co-optation in places like Tinderet and saved the harshest levels of coercion for places like Busia and Nyanza.

Turning to the loyalty of an individual officer to the leader, Kipsang, as a co-ethnic of President Moi, could expect to benefit from Moi staying in power and was therefore considered likely to comply with orders. There was little expectation among Moi, however, that Maina would comply with orders as she was a co-ethnic of Moi’s most powerful elite rival. Maina had been appointed as a favor to one of these rivals,
and therefore owed much of her loyalty to an elite patron different from the president. Maina’s fortunes were therefore less tied to Moi’s and, in fact, she had reasonable expectations of benefiting if her patron or another co-ethnic took office as president, dethroning Moi.

Though Gitonga was not a co-ethnic of Moi’s, but instead a co-ethnic of the main opposition candidate like Maina, she was loyal to Moi through patronage. Gitonga was one of the best paid and most revered civil servants in the entire country, having been personally selected to serve at the highest possible rank within the Provincial Administration by Moi himself. Perhaps more importantly, her position allowed her ample opportunity to predate, or as it is known in Kenya, to “eat” (e.g., Wrong 2010). There were even reports of Gitonga “grabbing,” or signing over the title deed for, the valuable state land where her office was located. Moi’s elite rivals were sure to fill Gitonga’s coveted spot with their own personal picks if they came into office, and perhaps even investigate Gitonga for graft or the misuse of power. Gitonga’s continued career in the state and her personal livelihood were closely tied to the fate of Moi, despite her own ethnicity.

Regarding the embeddedness of a bureaucrat and her jurisdiction, Moi hoped to co-opt residents around Tinderet by posting a co-ethnic bureaucrat and lengthening that bureaucrat’s tenure there – increasing Kipsang’s local embeddedness made her better able and personally willing to co-opt residents by deliver on the area’s development needs. On the other hand, Moi sought to prevent this local embeddedness elsewhere. Though locally embedded officers know an area best and can theoretically better repress it, they are often unwilling to carry out coercive orders because of their strong social bonds with area residents. Kipsang’s local embeddedness was beneficial to Moi in Tinderet but the regime purposefully managed officers in jurisdictions it wanted coerced – Kipsang in Busia, Gitonga in Nyanza – by only posting non-co-ethnic bureaucrats and permitting them short tenures.

Taken together, these relationships between Moi, each bureaucrat, and the jurisdiction in which they served explain the posting patterns of Kipsang, Maina, and Gitonga, and ultimately how sub-national areas are governed. The regime sent Kipsang to Busia and Tinderet, and Gitonga to Nyanza because these bureaucrats could be trusted to comply where it mattered most. Kipsang’s local embeddedness in Tinderet helped ensure the co-optation of locals, thereby increasing Moi’s support in the area. But her lack of embeddedness in Busia, and Gitonga’s lack of embeddedness in Nyanza – due to their non-co-ethnicity and short tenures – precluded them from having or gradually developing an attachment to the area’s residents that might weaken their resolve to coerce residents who opposed Moi. Meanwhile, Moi sent Maina to Mwingi because her presumed unwillingness to coerce on his behalf would have less of an impact in a strategically non-valuable area where popular challenges were less likely.

This book expands on the posting and shuffling patterns of Kipsang, Maina, and Gitonga to explore ideas about social control through bureaucratic management. Chapter 2 presents a theory of bureaucratic management that is tested in later chapters. The empirical chapters of the book give an in-depth account of

13 I chose the pseudonym Gitonga purposefully. It means “wealthy one” in the Kikuyu language.
14 Rival elites have difficulty buying the loyalty of high-ranking officers because the leader buys high-ranking officers less through money and more so through the permission to predate. It was assumed that Gitonga would use her authority to predate and that Moi would shield Gitonga from sanction.
the politicized management of the Kenyan state for the five decades after independence in 1963 by tracing how each of Kenya’s first three presidents – spanning both autocratic and electoral regimes, sometimes even within a single presidency – governed different sub-national jurisdictions depending on the perceived challenges to their rule. Moreover, by examining how Kenya has been governed before and after its formal democratic opening in 1992, I show how vestiges of Kenya’s authoritarian era linger within state institutions and have affected the trajectory of the country’s democratization. I use micro-level quantitative bureaucratic data on the staffing of the country’s primary security and administrative apparatus that cover the careers of some 2,000 bureaucrats and more than 15,000 individual bureaucratic postings.\[16\] I flesh out the quantitative data by relying on archival material from all of Kenya’s major archives and dozens of interviews with bureaucrats and regime elites.

The evidence provides strong and consistent support for the strategic management of bureaucrats. The first part of the book’s empirics cover the country’s first 30 years, under a one-party regime. Though many look to this period for evidence of the capacity of the ruling party to sustain authoritarianism (e.g., Widner 1992),\[17\] I find that the durability of Kenya’s autocratic regime was actually rooted in the state. Indeed, to the extent that Kenya had a party-state, it was due to the state bolstering what was in reality a weak ruling party. The empirics follow high-ranking officers like Gitonga who were all loyal to their respective president through patronage. The country’s first autocrat, Jomo Kenyatta, sought to forestall popular challenges to his rule by consolidating the support of his co-ethnic Kikuyu base and coercing other parts of the country, especially among areas inhabited by the Luo ethnic group among whom popular challenges had arisen early in his presidency. In response, I find that Kenyatta managed bureaucrats so that Kikuyu areas saw more locally embedded officers – Kikuyu officers, and officers who had long tenures in their stations – in an attempt to co-opt his base. Elsewhere, and especially among the Luo, the local embeddedness of officers was purposefully reduced.

The one-party reign of Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi (1978 - 1992), saw similar posting and shuffling patterns among bureaucrats when we consider the alignments of ethnic groups to Moi. Moi increased embeddedness to co-opt his co-ethnic base and lowered it elsewhere, especially in areas inhabited by the ethnic groups most likely to directly launch a popular challenge against him. In other words, when ethnic coalitions switched, so did the management of bureaucrats in response.

Evidence from the country’s next 20 years, after the introduction of multi-party elections, is in-line with the theory as well. As in the first part of the book, I follow high-ranking officers like Gitonga. I also look at entry-level officers like Kipsang and Maina. These bureaucrats earned, and ate, much less than their senior colleagues. Their loyalty towards their respective president was based on their (non) co-ethnicity with him. As this chapter’s opening suggest, Moi continued to increase the local embeddedness of officers in his co-ethnic areas while lowering local embeddedness elsewhere. Moreover, Moi sent loyal officers such

\[16\]This micro-level data spans both Kenya’s authoritarian and electoral regimes. I am aware of only a handful of other studies that rely on micro-level bureaucracy data within autocracies (e.g., Sassoon (2011) for Iraq, Carter (N.d.) for Republic of Congo, Wilkinson (2015) for India, Woldense (2016) for Ethiopia).

\[17\]Opalo (2018) looks at the role of the legislature.
as Kipsang and Gitonga to valuable unaligned, or swing, areas, while keeping disloyal officers like Maina away from these strategically valuable places. Moi’s successor, the Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki, continued many of the same management practices. Kibaki increased the local embeddedness of officers in Kikuyu areas and lowered it elsewhere. And in patterns that mirror Moi’s, he kept disloyal officers away from strategically valuable areas in the run-up to his 2007 re-election campaign.

In the rest of this introduction chapter I discuss the broader implications of the book project, motivate the Kenyan case, and provide an outline for subsequent chapters.

2 Implications of the Argument

This book contributes to on-going debates on state capacity, the principal-agent problem, and authoritarian regimes and democratization.

2.1 State Capacity

This book, above all else, contributes to literature on the state and helps us reconceptualize state capacity. State capacity, or a state’s “infrastructural power” (Mann 1984), is the state’s ability to efficiently redirect resources to achieve its goals (Skocpol 1985). Though clearly important, this definition has proven difficult to operationalize in practice. Many scholars treat state capacity as a fixed (or at least slow-moving), uniform characteristic of a state, as in work that measures capacity using national-level GDP (e.g., Fearon & Laitin 2003). Many scholars have moved beyond this simplification and recognize that the capacity of a state to carry out its functions is dependent on the capabilities, resources, and training of its bureaucrats (e.g., Evans & Rauch 1999, Rauch & Evans 2000). And many databases incorporate measures of bureaucratic capacity. Yet this work still considers bureaucratic capacity as fixed across bureaucrats and across the country. As Martin Williams (N.d.) warns, such measures of capacity may be a convenient shorthand for the complex array of factors that determines whether and how a particular policy is likely to be implemented in a specific case, but it achieves this convenience by abstracting away from the mechanisms that are critical for understanding and improving bureaucratic performance and policy implementation.

This book shows that state capacity is not uniform across the country, nor is it fixed even in the short-run. The capacity of the state to carry out the executive’s demands are highly context specific. The ability of a bureaucrat to carry out activities varies depending on the nature of the task and her local embeddedness in a post. And since the executive strategically manages the bureaucracy, we should expect purposeful, sub-national and over-time variation in capacity across the same state.

18 For instance, Political Risk Services includes a measure of bureaucracy quality. The Business Environmental Risk Intelligence has a measure for bureaucratic delays. The Global Competitiveness Report includes a measure of civil service independence. Looking at coercive institutions in particular, the National Material Capabilities dataset by the Correlates of War Project considers military personnel and expenditure.
This critique of state capacity helps broaden existing work on its origins. Many scholars look to long-run factors to explain capacity, such as geography (Diamond 1998, Herbst 2000) or conflict (Tilly 1985, Besley & Persson 2009, Slater 2010). Others look to medium-run political factors such as party competition (Grzymała-Busse 2007). These factors are important to determine the level of effectiveness that a state can theoretically achieve. But a more complete understanding of why some states are actually more effective than others, why some bureaucracies within a state are more capable than others, and why some bureaucrats perform better at some activities over others, requires that we examine the formal and informal management practices of how the state is run.

A more complete understanding of what state capacity is promises to contribute to work that uses state capacity as an independent variable. Much work has looked at the causal effect of state capacity on important outcomes, such as regime durability (Levitsky & Way 2010, Slater 2010, Albertus & Menaldo 2012), civil war outcomes (Sobek 2010), and, more generally, the center’s ability to penetrate society and engage in social control (Migdal 1988). This research is largely carried out at the nation-state level, with higher capacity seen as more useful for a leader. If we recognize the variability of capacity over space, across agencies, and within bureaucracies, however, we can develop theories about where a leader develops and deploys capacity sub-nationally. This logic helps us reconcile the fact that many states categorized as “weak” — such as Kenya’s — have proven very capable of helping their leaders meet critical policy and political goals. Though the Kenyan state as a whole is inefficient in carrying out its functions, leaders have consistently deployed the capacity of the state selectively to the problems and places that are most important for their survival.

2.2 Principal-Agent Problem

The theory and empirics I present also contribute to our understanding of the principal-agent problem within bureaucracies and organizations more broadly. Further, I show how the presence of a salient identity cleavage, such as ethnicity, complicates the principal’s management strategies.

I show that there are conditions under which a principal does not always hire “good types.” Standard literature on organizations has long assumed that principals try to avert the adverse selection problem if they can easily identify agent type. Put simply, we should only see bad types hired into the organization because the principal finds it too costly to screen during the hiring process. But I theorize conditions under which a principal can benefit from doing the opposite — deliberately hiring bad types who are likely to shirk. This behavior is rational once we recognize that a principal faces different types of threats at the same time. Preempting each type of threat suggests a different management strategy for his organization, and he cannot put into place different management strategies simultaneously.

The theory and empirics also contribute to literature on the principal-agent problem in ethnicized countries. In these cases, ethnicity (or any other salient identity cleavage) adds a wrinkle to the leader’s decision

\[19\] This argument is predicated on the assumption that agents have an incentive to claim that they are a good type, even when they are a bad type, during the hiring process. This leads to a pooling equilibrium.
about how to manage bureaucrats since agents are not blank slates who operate on command, but instead weigh the social bonds they have with those over whom they govern (Grossman 1996). The emotional toll that violence takes on bureaucrats is thus especially strong when they are expected to coerce their in-group members (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Principals, therefore, find it more difficult to ensure compliance with orders to coerce than orders to co-opt.20 At the same time, the embeddedness that makes shirking with orders to coerce more likely is sometimes purposefully developed. The leader is willing to post a bureaucrat to the bureaucrat’s in-group area when the leader wants the area to be co-opted; the bureaucrat becomes a principal to the local area, but in doing so, her attention to the area’s needs meets the leader’s goals of co-opting the area.

In this way, the book makes theories about embeddedness and discretion more nuanced. The literature on bureaucracies has debated whether bureaucratic drift – where bureaucrats create or implement policy that differs from the principal’s mandate – or when bureaucrats “go native” – weighing constituent needs more heavily than their principal’s demands – are beneficial for the principal and the organization in the long run. Some scholars find these characteristics to be detrimental, because they create centrifugal forces whereby agents unevenly apply their mandate (Epstein & O’Halloran 1994). But allowing a bureaucrat to shape policy responses based on area need tends to result in better governance and higher levels of citizen satisfaction with the state (e.g., Honig 2018, Rasul & Rogger 2018). I show that rather than being uniformly good or bad, leaders allow embeddedness in places where they benefit from its positive externalities and prevent embeddedness in places where they fear the negative consequences.

One implication of the deliberate discretion is to provide a mechanism behind leaders’ in-group favoritism. Much work has empirically established that leaders target valuable state resources – education, healthcare, roads, foreign development aid, electricity – to their in-group areas, and more broadly, groups whose support they need to maintain.21 These outcomes, the literature argues, are simply the result of a leader’s decision about where to channel the state’s resources. However the results of this book indicate that we see ethnic favoritism because the leader decides to manage the areas in which these groups inhabit differently. In this way, I join recent work on bureaucratic politics that recognizes the importance of informal management techniques to affect state provision.22

2.3 Regimes and Regime Change

Finally, the book speaks to the intertwined literatures on authoritarian regimes, regime change, and democratization.

This book seeks to update the literature on authoritarian regimes from an elite-centric view to a more comprehensive one. Elite threats have empirically proved the most dangerous to autocrats (Svolik 2012). As such, much recent work on autocracy has examined why some autocrats create ruling parties, why others

20 For a practical discussion of this point, see the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
22 For instance, see Brierley (N.d.), Raffler (2016), and Gulzar & Pasquale (2017).
allow meaningful debate in legislatures, and why still others hold elections, largely concluding that these nominally democratic institutions are useful because they co-opt elites and stave off elite threats.23 This book follows in this tradition, examining how autocrats rely on the state – an entity present in all autocracies – to incorporate rival elites and employ the in-group members they represent.

Unlike most existing work on autocracy, however, I consider the downstream effects of incorporation on popular threats. The literature has paid less attention to the potential for popular threats to unseat the autocrat or how elite and popular threats interact because popular challenges are assumed to be less threatening.24 Instead, I join recent work that recognizes that leaders face multiple threats simultaneously and sequence their strategies based on the perception of which threat is most dangerous (Wilson 2015, Greitens 2016).

In addition, this book contributes to debates on regime change. After the end of the Cold War, autocratic leaders across the developing world were forced to introduce multi-party elections. I find that these formal changes have had real consequences for the targeting of state coercion that citizens receive. Under autocracy, the country’s most misaligned areas and civilians are targeted with state coercion. This is to stop popular threats from spreading. But I find that, to the extent that coercion is used, leaders of electoral regimes reserve the harshest level of coercion for unaligned, or swing, groups. In electoral regimes, misaligned areas are already lost and only costly coercion could “win” their votes. Since the leader only needs to create a minimum-winning coalition, he finds it cheaper to target unaligned groups (Robinson & Torvik 2009). The mere presence of elections, therefore, changes how leaders react to popular threats and the parts of the country viewed as most necessary for maintaining control (Magaloni 2006).

Moreover, the type of coercion we see in electoral regimes today is different than what is common under autocratic regimes. Much scholarship has documented lower levels of coercion in electoral regimes than autocratic ones (Davenport 2007, Carey 2010). While this is arguably empirically true, leaders of electoral regimes are punished on the international arena for relying on large-scale, visible acts of violence against their citizens. Leaders of electoral regimes are liable to turn to coercion that is instead more difficult to systematically observe: instead of jailing known opposition figures, the state opts to deny opposition figures permits to hold rallies, instead of outlawing opposition parties, the state creates arbitrary criteria for registration that the opposition fails to meet, instead of jailing opposition supporters the state harasses them. These acts of “low-intensity coercion” (Levitsky & Way 2010), “institutional repression” (Koopmans 1997), “covert repression” (Davenport 2005), “systematic procedural violations” (Ziblatt 2009), or “smart authoritarianism” (Frantz & Morgenbesser 2016) are much less visible to citizens and the international community


24 Some notable, recent exceptions are Slater (2010), King, Pan & Roberts (2013), and Wallace (2014).
than outright violence. But they allow the leader to procedurally nip budding popular threats before they blossom into large challenges that require swift, decisive, and effective action. In this way, the low-intensity coercion more commonly found among unconsolidated electoral regimes may seem less perilous than acts of highly visible coercion, but it is in fact more necessary for preventing political liberalization precisely because of its lower visibility and ability to prevent challenges from emerging in the first place.\textsuperscript{25}

In addition, and through an empirical focus on Kenya’s largest security apparatus, this book suggests that full democratization cannot occur without changes to organs of domestic security (Weitzer 1990). Security organs maintain significant clout during authoritarian periods in large part because of their symbiotic relationship with the autocrat: they are the main executers of the coercion that keeps the autocrat in office and, in return, are given a central place within the regime. Executive control over the state’s coercive apparatus under authoritarianism can therefore lead to the entrenchment of informal norms about how coercive officers are expected to use their authority and how they are compensated. The transition to multi-party elections disrupts this equilibrium. More distributive state bureaucracies – e.g., education or health ministries – are managed in a way to sustain neopatrimonial relationships and comply with the autocrat’s demands under authoritarian eras, but they nonetheless can envision a future under democracy without challenges to their core institutional mission or culture. But the identity and fate of security organs are more wedded to that of the regime (Bellin 2004, Cook 2007, Bellin 2012). Challenges to authoritarianism rock the foundation of the coercive apparatus as much as they do the autocrat. Transitions to democracy risk a decrease in status, budgets, and personnel of the security apparatus that elites in the organization are often unwilling to take. Instead, many within the security apparatus see the benefit of continuing their neopatrimonial relationship with president after the formal introduction of multi-party elections. By perpetuating many of the practices that occurred before the transition, the coercive apparatus maintains its importance. This in turn, can allow authoritarian legacy institutions to not only continue, but to wield their coercive capacity in a manner to prevent full democratic consolidation long after the formal introduction of multi-party elections.

3 The Case and Empirical Strategy

I explore the argument through an in-depth examination of the Kenyan state for the first five decades after independence in 1963.\textsuperscript{26}

Kenya is an ideal setting for this book because of the variation in regime type and ethnic coalitions. President Jomo Kenyatta started his reign under an electoral regime before he consolidated power under a one-party authoritarian regime. The one-party regime continued after Kenyatta’s peaceful death in 1978 under President Daniel arap Moi, until Moi was forced to hold multi-party elections in 1992. Kenya has remained an electoral regime since, including a decade each under Presidents Moi (1992 - 2002) and Mwai

\textsuperscript{25}For examples on the importance of low-intensity coercion, see Stockmann & Gallagher (2011), Sullivan (2016), and Hassan (2017).

\textsuperscript{26}Kenya was a centralized, unitary state for the majority of the study period. Kenya gained independence with a devolved, federal state structure but the country’s first president quickly dismantled that state structure in favor of a centralized, unitary state. The country’s new constitution, only fully adopted in 2013, devolves significant authority to sub-national counties.
Kibaki (2002 - 2013). Ethnicity was and remains a salient political cleavage in Kenya (Elischer 2013, Horowitz 2016). Further, there is variation in the ethnic identity, and thus the alignment of different ethnic groups towards each president, across regime type. Presidents Kenyatta and Kibaki hail from the Kikuyu, the country’s plurality ethnic group. President Moi is a Kalenjin.

Empirically, I focus on Kenya’s largest administrative and security apparatus, the Provincial Administration. The Provincial Administration is unequivocally the most important bureaucracy within the Kenyan state. The duties of these state officials range from overseeing the maintenance of law and order, to the administration of land in this agrarian nation, to the distribution of centralized resources. The centrality of the Provincial Administration in Kenya’s political development is in part demonstrated by the sheer volume of work on this bureaucracy from colonialism until today. Daniel Branch, a leading historian of Kenya, writes, “few scholars of the [Kenyan] post-colonial nation-state, however, would need convincing of the importance of the Provincial Administration [in] the governance of Kenya throughout the past century” (Branch 2009, 164).

An in-depth exploration of Kenya’s largest and most important bureaucracy allows for a rigorous examination of the theory while still maintaining broad applicability. By examining presidential management of the Provincial Administration since independence, I am able to leverage multiple regime types with different ethnic coalitions, as well as variation in where each leader’s threats emerged.

The Kenyan state is also similar to others across the world, and the Provincial Administration is nearly a clone to other prefectural administrations and executive bureaucracies. Kenya was a unitary state for much of the study period, where the executive had strong executive power over all state bureaucracies. This set up is similar to the majority of countries across the world. Moreover, even executives of federal countries maintain control over centralized bureaucracies. And to the extent that bureaucracies are run by governors of federal units, the theory can be adapted to consider the governor’s elite threats (in this case, either within his unit or from the national government), the governor’s relationship with bureaucrats under his control, and his alignment with different sub-unit areas.

Many countries have (or had) an executive bureaucracy that mirrors Kenya’s Provincial Administration. An executive bureaucracy tends to be in charge of administrative and security functions across the country. Their duties range from tax collection, to the protection of property, to overseeing local development to maintaining law and order, by force if necessary. They have a direct line of command that reaches the leader and is accountable directly to him (or the Interior Ministry). For these reasons, state officials across executive bureaucracies serve as the state’s “hands on the ground” within their jurisdiction. Bureaucrats in these organs have various names, such as regional executives, local prefects, (appointed) governors, or county commissioners.

27 The Provincial Administration has since been renamed the National Administration, but I refer to it as the Provincial Administration throughout.
29 Moreover, the executive bureaucracy oversees the functions of other (service) bureaucracies in the field.
Executive bureaucracies are (and were) common for two reasons. First, they were initially adapted in Europe during the 1800s or earlier, including among sub-Saharan Africa’s largest colonizers, who later replicated this structure in their colonies (Fesler 1965, Berman 1992). Second, this type of bureaucracy allows for the governing of a jurisdiction on the cheap. Instead of investing significant money and training into multiple bureaucracies, the center only needs to pour resources into one bureaucracy. This concentration of authority, with little means of horizontal accountability, is the main drawback of an executive bureaucracy. However this drawback was of less of a concern for imperial colonial powers. Kenya’s colonial Provincial Administration — of which the post-independence Provincial Administration is an almost identical replica — was remarkably similar to those used in other British colonies. In fact, British colonial officers were sometimes rotated between colonies, not only between posts within a colony.  

Parallel institutions can be found in other colonies and countries. Consider the legal-administrative kadi officers in the Ottoman Empire who,

administered criminal law as it emanated from the sultan. The kadis also received and entered in their local court registers all imperial fermans and administrative rules and regulations. The execution of at least a portion of such orders was left in their hands. They were also charged with ensuring that correct procedures were followed by other officers .... [they] were asked to facilitate the performance of their various tasks, from tax collection to special investigations (Kunt 1968, 12)

With this sweeping authority, kadis were expected to suppress popular revolts in the countryside. The functions of the Landespolizei of colonial Namibia were similar to the Provincial Administration:

members of the Landespolizei had to assume duties, which had little or nothing to do with police work in a narrow sense. [They] handled anything from health and veterinary inspections, the enforcement of mining and labor legislation, to post and customs duties. One leading former officer took pride in the fact that police had acted as “girl Fridays” of the colony (Juan, Krautwald & Pierskalla 2017).

The Landespolizei seemed to have been modeled off of Prussian landrats who were considered “the linchpin” of the Prussian state. According to Daniel Ziblatt (2009), landrats served as the “central government’s bureaucratic ‘field officer’ on the ground, overseeing tax assessment, schools, the military draft, police, and the management of elections.”

Many executive bureaucracies in former colonies have persisted to the present day, as indicated by the academic work that cites their importance in Egypt (Blaydes 2011), Ghana (Brierley 2016), India (Bhavnani & Lee 2018), Iraq (Sassoon 2011, Blaydes 2018), Republic of Congo (Carter N.d.), Sudan (El-Bathtahani & Gadkarim 2017), and Zaire (Young & Turner 1985, Schatzberg 1988) among others. Further, executive bureaucracies are exceedingly common in large, populous and diverse federation including China (Landry

30Interview with colonial DO, 13 July 2017, Nairobi, Kenya.
31Jacob (1963) as seen in Ziblatt (2009).
2008), Ethiopia (Woldense 2016), and Russia (Reuter & Robertson 2012, Reuter 2017) precisely because of this organ’s ability to help the center control the population.

As a result, while I look at one case, management of similar state institutions is a constant confer of leaders around the world.

3.1 Organization of the Book

This book builds a theory of how leaders manage the state to prevent elite and popular threats to their rule, and then empirically evaluating it in Kenya. Chapter 2 lays out the theory. I examine the range of threats that leaders face and why the state is a powerful tool to preempt popular threats. This discussion motivates the necessity of understanding the actions of the bureaucrats who actually carry out the orders that temper popular threats.

This chapter then pivots to exploring the leader’s principal-agent problem that emerges from relying on bureaucrats. I outline existing theories that can prevent shirking, but argue that each theory has negative externalities that inhibit a leader’s stability in a manner separate from ensuring compliance. I then proceed to lay out the book’s theory of the management of state officials. I argue that the hiring of bureaucrats is done with an eye towards tempering elite threats. Though this initially aggravates the leader’s principal-agent problem and increases the risk of shirking, the leader strategically posts and shuffles bureaucrats such that areas of the country where a popular threat is most likely to arise is overseen by bureaucrats that are most willing, and if possible best able, to comply. The promotion of bureaucrats is sanctioned in part through an attempt to temper elite threats, but promotion also serves as a mechanism to reward bureaucratic compliance.

Chapter 3 introduces the Kenyan case and the Provincial Administration. I discuss the origins of the Provincial Administration under colonialism and how anti-colonial conflict led to an increase in the size and scope of this bureaucracy on the eve of independence. I next lay out Kenya’s post-independence administrative and political landscape. I then examine the de jure management of the Provincial Administration. Chapter 3 also introduces the data that is at the core of the empirical chapters. The quantitative data analyzed in this book is, to my knowledge, the first micro-level dataset of security officers within an authoritarian regime. Though studying governance under autocracy requires micro-level data about how local-level bureaucrats are managed, it is hard to obtain systematic data on the inner workings of an authoritarian state. Our lack of data has led to theories about autocratic states that are empirically unvalidated at best, and inaccurate and misleading – such as an unwavering belief that all autocrats pack their states – for theory building at worst.

Chapter 4 chronicles the elite and popular threats that Kenya’s first three presidents faced. I show how elite incorporation into the state was useful in pre-empting some elite threats. I next lay out the downstream consequences of (partial) elite incorporation in two ways. First, I lay out the popular threats that elite incorporation could not temper and for which each president would come to rely on the Provincial Administration to put down. Second, I quantitatively evaluate the make-up of the Provincial Administration in light of elite incorporation. I find that the Provincial Administration was never packed with the president’s co-ethnics.
Instead, its ethnic make-up reflected patterns of elite incorporation in the cabinet alongside the country’s
general ethnic heterogeneity.

Chapter 5 examines Kenya’s one-party era under President Kenyatta (1963 - 1978) and under President
Moi (1978 - 1991). I examine management of the senior ranks of the Provincial Administration. These
officers were like Gitonga in that they all had a neopatrimonial relationship with their respective president
through patronage. I find that these officers were managed to increase local embeddedness in each presi-
dent’s co-ethnic areas and decrease it elsewhere. I also find evidence that local embeddedness was especially
low in misaligned areas so as to increase the willingness of officers posted there to coerce.

Chapters 6 and 7 look at how Presidents Moi (1992 - 2002) and Kibaki (2002 - 2013) managed the
Provincial Administration after the re-introduction of multi-party elections. In Chapter 6, I examine the
management of the senior ranks of the Provincial Administration. These officers were managed in much
the same way under multi-party elections as they were under autocracy. This is despite the fact that the
form that popular threats took differed between these periods. The local embeddedness of officers was in-
creased in each president's co-ethnic areas and decreased elsewhere. Chapter 7 studies the lower ranks of
the Provincial Administration, officers such as Kipsang and Maina. Presidents could not rely on money to
create a neopatrimonial bond with these officers. I find that co-ethnics of the president were sent to elec-
utorally valuable areas. Co-ethnics of viable opposition candidates were sent to places where their shirking
behavior would least affect the outcome. Chapter 7 also leverages Kenya’s waves of incumbent-instigated
election violence to examine the promotion of lower-level officers. Though the center cannot monitor the
behavior of officers in the execution of routine and everyday bureaucratic tasks, it can observe how officers
acted in the wake of large-scale violence (Policzer 2009, Hassan & O’Mealia 2018).

Chapter 8 concludes by discussing the implications of the argument for the state’s role in democratic
consolidation.
References


Jacob, Herbert. 1963. German Administration since Bismarck: Central Authority versus Local Autonomy. Yale University Press.


Skocpol, Theda. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. chapter Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research.


Williams, Martin J. N.d. “States Don't Have ‘Capacity’.” Oxford University.


